

The implications of the Russian invasion of Ukraine for African economies: A CGE analysis for Ethiopia

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Abstract

The Russian invasion of Ukraine contributed to soaring world market prices of many commodities with severe repercussions for many African countries. This study examines the implications of the 2022 world market price increases for wheat, fuels, and fertilizers for Ethiopia. Using a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model, the study shows negative impacts on GDP, wage rates, and households' consumption in the country. The effects of fertilizer and petroleum price changes are notable and unequal across production sectors. With increasing import prices of inorganic fertilizers, crop growing activities substitute inorganic fertilizers with animal manure reducing the use of manure as cooking fuel. The effects on urban households are more severe than the effects on rural households. Policies supporting biofuels and biogas digesters may dampen the adverse effects stemming from petroleum price surges.

1. INTRODUCTION

The Russian invasion of Ukraine and the subsequent war have caused a wide-range of crises with short- and long-term implications to the global economy. The repercussions of the war range from disruption of global commodity markets to long-term effects on the prospects of globalization and geopolitical order (Garicano et al., 2022; Ruta, 2022). The disruptions in the global supply chains increased the synchronization of grain, energy, and fertilizer prices at the global level (Ihle et al., 2022). This resulted in contagion across food and non-food markets which would restrict the ability of consumers to mitigate the adverse effects of food and energy price spikes by resorting to inexpensive alternatives (Ihle et al., 2022). The disruptions in global food, fertilizer and energy markets threaten to further increase the number of poor and malnourished people, especially in developing countries (Guan et al., 2023; Osendarp et al., 2022).

The type and size of the effects will differ across countries as these are determined by the trade, production and consumption structures, and government responses in different countries (Garicano et al., 2022). It is therefore necessary to understand how the war in Ukraine affects individual economies (Ruta, 2022) to underpin country-specific policy measures increasing the resilience of each economy.

The short- and long- term implications of the war in Ukraine for African countries are worrisome (Badiane et al., 2022; UNCTAD, 2022). From the 107 economies highly exposed to the shocks due the war in Ukraine, 41 are in Africa (UN, 2022a). Since many African countries are net importers of cereals, vegetable oils and fertilizers, the implications of the war to food security are substantial (Badiane et al., 2022). Higher import prices represent negative terms-of-trade for African economies in which poor households face the hardest hit (Arndt et al., 2008). Besides, many African countries have limited fiscal and borrowing capacities to respond to global energy and food market crises,

1 particularly after various spending measures and tightening of monetary policies to cope with and
2 recover from the COVID-19 pandemic crisis.

3 The effects on Ethiopia are of particular interest (Diao et al., 2022) as it depends almost entirely on
4 imported petroleum and inorganic fertilizers (Mengistu et al., 2019); the two commodities that felt
5 the highest and immediate effects of the war on Ukraine in 2022 (Ruta, 2022; World Bank, 2023).
6 Ethiopia has also been subject to multiple shocks in recent years (e.g., COVID-19 pandemic,
7 droughts, and armed conflicts) leaving the country with little fiscal space to cushion the adverse
8 spillover effects from the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

9 This study examines the economy-wide implications of changes in world prices for three
10 commodities– wheat, fertilizers, and petroleum oil– highly significant for the Ethiopian food and
11 energy systems. It applies a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model, which tracks the direct
12 and induced economy-wide effects of the changes in world prices for the three major Ethiopian
13 imports. Quantifying such effects and understanding their transmission mechanisms would provide
14 lessons for possible policy responses in the advent of similar incidents with implications for global
15 markets in the future.

16 The study explicitly represents the sectors and commodities linked to agrifood and energy systems
17 and applied case-specific nesting of production and consumption functions to investigate the
18 implications of world market prices changes to the food-energy nexus in Ethiopia and other low-
19 income countries. The model combined production nesting features which are common in equilibrium
20 model applications with detailed representation for energy (e.g., Feng & Zhang, 2018; Hutagalung et
21 al., 2019) and agriculture (e.g., Hertel et al., 1996; Brunelle et al., 2015) sectors. The production nests
22 allow for the imperfect substitution between different fuels (petroleum fuels, electricity, and biomass
23 fuels) and, for growing crops, limited substitution between organic (animal manure) and inorganic
24 (chemical) fertilizers, and then between composite fertilizer and land.

1 The study contributes to the literature on the transmission of shocks from global-to-domestic markets
2 and their economy-wide impacts (e.g., Arndt et al., 2008; Dillon & Barrett, 2016; von Arnim et al.,
3 2018), and the food-energy nexus (e.g., Mekonnen et al., 2017) in African countries.

4 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the materials and methods of
5 the study. Section 3 presents the results followed by Section 4 for the discussions. Section 5 concludes
6 the paper.

7

8 **2. MATERIALS AND METHODS**

9 Given their detailed coverage of commodity and factor markets, and that of the circular flow of
10 income, CGE models are widely applied for many trade, development, and fiscal policy issues of
11 developing countries (Devarajan & Robinson, 2013). Single-country CGE modelling approach
12 particularly helps to assess the direct and indirect effects of exogenous changes on different parts of
13 the economy by comprehensively accounting for the country-specific interlinkages between
14 production and consumption, and agrifood and energy sectors.

15

16

17 ***2.1. Model description***

18 The Dynamic Equilibrium Model for Economic Development, Resources and Agriculture
19 (DEMETRA) model is an extension of the STAGE_DEV model (McDonald et al., 2016).

20 DEMETRA is a single-country recursive-dynamic small open-economy CGE model. The model
21 allows for an advanced characterization of impacts of shocks at different levels: sectoral (output and
22 production costs), household (income and consumption demand), factors (demand and income), and
23 national (GDP, employment, and trade). DEMETRA incorporates behavioral equations that represent

1 the economic relationships in developing countries: nested production and consumption functions
2 and factor market segmentations (JRC, 2021; McDonald et al., 2016). The model and the underlying
3 database have been applied in studies focusing on food security and agricultural policies in
4 developing countries (Nechifor et al., 2021; Boulanger et al., 2022; Ntah et al., 2024). Further
5 information and documentation about the model are available in JRC (2021).

6

7 **2.2. Model calibration**

8 The model assumes perfect competition in factor and commodity markets. Therefore, both the sellers
9 and buyers in the factor and commodity markets take the prices determined by market supply and
10 demand forces as given. Ethiopia is a small open-economy and thus its domestic price changes do not
11 affect world market prices whereas world market price changes (of the country's exports and imports)
12 are exogenous. In line with the Armington assumption (Armington, 1969), the imported and
13 domestically produced varieties of commodities are imperfect substitutes. The elasticities used in
14 production, commodity, and households' consumption nests are *ad hoc* values (summarized in **Table**
15 **A2** in the appendix) within the range found in the existing literature relevant for low-income countries
16 and increase from agriculture to service sectors (e.g., Lofgren, 1994; Diao et al., 2012; Hertel & van
17 der Mensbrugge, 2019).

18 The production activities are disaggregated into sub processes captured by nested constant elasticity
19 of substitution (CES) and Leontief production functions, which combine primary factors and
20 intermediate inputs at different stages. The substitutions are driven by relative price changes. The
21 decisions of production activities at different stages are driven by cost minimization goals constrained
22 by market prices (of inputs and outputs) and production technology. The production technology nest
23 of activities (**Figure A1**) is flexible and allows substitution possibilities among different factors and
24 intermediate inputs at different levels. The top level is specified as Leontief aggregation of a

1 composite intermediate input, and a composite valued-added-energy input, assuming a perfect
2 complementarity between the two aggregates. The composite (aggregate) intermediate input is a
3 Leontief aggregation of non-energy and non-fertilizer intermediate inputs. The composite value-
4 added is a CES aggregation of a composite labor (of unskilled, semi-skilled, and skilled), a composite
5 capital (of livestock, agricultural capital, non-agricultural capital), and a composite land (of irrigated
6 or non-irrigated, and composite fertilizer) inputs. The composite energy input is a CES aggregate of
7 energy commodities (electricity, fossil fuels, and bioenergy – fuelwood in hotels or biofuels in
8 transport). Such nesting between energy and factor inputs resembles recent CGE applications (e.g.,
9 Feng & Zhang, 2018; Hutagalung et al., 2019). The value-added nest for crop-growing activities
10 comprises a fertilizer nest which is a CES aggregation of animal manure (domestic) and inorganic
11 (imported) fertilizers. This nest better represents the contexts in the country (Metaferia et al., 2011;
12 AgSS, 2020) and allows for substitutability between them due to relative price changes which would
13 not be allowed within the Leontief structure. In the recent five harvest seasons, about 45-50% and
14 11-13% of crop area cultivated by smallholder farmers in Ethiopia applies synthetic (inorganic) and
15 natural (organic) fertilizers (AgSS, 2020). The composite fertilizer (of organic and inorganic types)
16 is then treated as an imperfect substitute for cropland. The nesting structure for crop activities is also
17 related to previous research on factor substitution in agriculture (e.g., Binswanger, 1974; Hertel,
18 1989; Ali & Parikh, 1992; Hertel et al., 1996; Dalton et al., 1997), and in agricultural land-use (e.g.,
19 Brunelle et al., 2015; Lungarska et al., 2023).

20 Households maximize their consumption utility subject to a nested Stone-Geary (or Linear
21 Expenditure System – LES – demand) and CES functions (**Figure A2**), and to income constraints. In
22 the Stone-Geary/LES utility function, at the top of the utility nest, household consumption demand
23 consists of ‘subsistence’ demand and ‘discretionary’ demand. The commodities in the LES demand
24 function are defined as ‘broad’ commodity groups, which are either aggregates of ‘natural’
25 commodities or individual ‘natural’ commodities that are deemed sufficiently distinctive as to justify

1 the assumption that they are characterized by having a distinct level of ‘subsistence’ demand (JRC,
2 2021). The second level of the utility functions nest is defined with CES preferences. It consists of
3 six commodity categories representing cereals (6 commodities), livestock (7 commodities including
4 fish), energy (8 commodities in which the 2 are electricity from off-grid and grid sources), processed
5 food and beverages (4 commodities), sweets (sugar and honey), and transport services (equines and
6 modern transport services). Two of the energy commodities (crop residues and biogas), and one of
7 the transport services (from equines) are consumed only by rural households. Additionally, animal
8 manure, crop residues, and biofuel are by-products from livestock, crops, and sugar manufacturing.
9 Households’ consumption expenditure is a residual of household income after deducting direct
10 (income) taxes, savings, and their net transfers to other institutions (i.e., to the other household group,
11 to enterprises, to the government, and to the rest of the world). Households’ income sources include
12 factors of production they own and supply, and net transfers from the rest of institutions. Households’
13 consumption demand is therefore expected to be affected by changes in both households’ income and
14 commodity prices.

15 Factors can be mobile across activities (labor and land factors¹) or activity-specific (capital and
16 livestock factors). For the mobile factors, flexible average economy-wide wage rates equate their
17 demand and supplies whereas flexible activity-specific wage distortion factors (proportions)
18 equilibrate the markets for activity-specific factors. The supplies of primary factors of production are
19 fixed at their initial levels. Government and foreign savings are fixed at their initial levels. The
20 external (foreign sector) balance is maintained by a flexible exchange rate. All tax rates are fixed at
21 the benchmark level.

22

23

¹ Sensitivity analysis was performed with partially and entirely activity-specific croplands.

1 **2.3. Model database**

2 The CGE model is calibrated to a modified version of the 2015/2016 social accounting matrix (SAM)
 3 for Ethiopia (Mengistu et al., 2019).² The adjusted SAM consists of 71 production activities (**Table**
 4 **A1**). The agriculture activities comprise 30 crop-growing activities, 7 livestock raising activities, and
 5 4 other allied activities to agriculture. There are 8 industrial and 6 service activities. The remaining
 6 16 activities are related to energy sectors.

7 The modified SAM comprises 51 commodities of which 28 are exportable. Synthetic (inorganic)
 8 fertilizers and petroleum oils are virtually all imported. There are 17 primary factor accounts
 9 representing different labor (3 by level of skill), land (rainfed and irrigated), capital (5 by primary use
 10 of the capital), and livestock (7 by species). There are four tax accounts representing domestic sales
 11 taxes, import tariffs and duties, direct (income) taxes, and subsidies to selected electricity producing
 12 activities (recorded in the SAM as negative taxes in **Table 1**). The SAM comprises five accounts
 13 representing two households (rural and urban), enterprises, government, and the rest of the world.
 14 The remainder of the SAM accounts represent trade and transport margin (or transaction costs), and
 15 disaggregated investment accounts.

16 **Table 1.** Macro SAM of Ethiopia (2015/2016, billion birr)

	Activities	Commodities	Factors	Households	Enterprises	Government	Taxes	Investment	RestOfWorld	Total
Activities		2159.70								2159.70
Commodities	742.26	456.68		1096.46		148.84		591.58	123.21	3159.04
Factors	1425.11								7.83	1432.93
Households			1268.15		11.15	11.32			126.23	1416.84
Enterprises			158.60			5.52			0.28	164.40
Government				8.19	26.72		181.22		28.35	244.49
Taxes	-7.67	118.59		29.21	41.09					181.22
Investment				280.33	84.83	73.06			153.36	591.58
RestOfWorld		424.07	6.19	2.64	0.61	5.75				439.26
Total	2159.70	3159.04	1432.93	1416.84	164.40	244.49	181.22	591.58	439.26	

18 Source: Authors' elaboration.

² Additional notes regarding adjustment of the SAM are given in the Appendix.

1 Primary factors account for 66% of the production costs. Approximately 90% of the factor incomes
2 goes to households. Imports account for about 14% of the supply of commodities. Consumption
3 (77%) and savings (20%) are the main households' expenditure items whereas public services (61%)
4 and savings (30%) are the main government expenditures. The inflows from the rest of the world
5 include foreign saving (which is current account deficit for Ethiopia) (35%), remittances (29%) and
6 export earnings (28%). Households' consumption (35%), intermediate inputs (23.5%), and
7 investment demand (18.7%) are the main sources of demand for domestically supplied goods and
8 services while export demand accounts for approximately 4%. Factor incomes (88.5%) followed by
9 remittances (8.9%) are the main sources of households' income. Taxes are the main source of
10 government revenue as they account for 74% of the total government income. About 65% of tax
11 revenues are collected from commodities (on imports and on domestic sales) followed by income
12 taxes from households and enterprises (30%). Production subsidies (applicable only to the power
13 sector) account for - 4% of the total tax revenue. Ethiopian households and foreign sources contribute
14 to 47% and 26% of the total national saving, with the remaining saving coming from enterprises and
15 the government. Imports constitute about 97% of the total outflows from Ethiopia to the rest of the
16 world.

17 The 2015/2016 SAM was updated using the recursive features of DEMETRA to the year 2022 using
18 actual and forecasted growth rates of GDP (IMF, 2022) and population (UN, 2022b). The real GDP
19 growth rate for 2022 was 3.8% (IMF, 2022). We assume this GDP growth rate, which is lower than
20 the country's five-year average of 8% growth rate (IMF, 2022; NBE, 2023), accounted mainly for the
21 impacts of recent crises on Ethiopia but little for anticipated cascading effects from the Russia's
22 invasion of Ukraine war impacts on world markets.

23 The calibration process and the adjusted SAM represent the contexts of the country and make the
24 model suitable to address the study's research question. The production nest for crops along with the

1 households' utility nest for energy commodities allow capturing the competition between agriculture
2 and energy for animal manure (Mekonnen et al., 2017). The possibility of substitution between
3 different fuel types (agricultural residues, fuelwood, petroleum products and electricity services)
4 captures the "fuel stacking" behavior of Ethiopian households (Yalew, 2022).

5

6 *2.4. World price change impact scenarios*

7 The effects of global commodity supply, transport and logistics disruptions, the sanctions against
8 Russia, the export bans adopted by some countries, and speculative market behaviors that ensued
9 Russia's invasion of Ukraine have tremendously affected the prices for different world commodities
10 in 2022 (World Bank, 2022). Although prices for some commodities showed a downward trend by
11 the end of 2022 their level remained higher than in 2021 (World Bank, 2023).

12 Prices of many agrifood and energy commodities in Ethiopia increased in the past decade (ESS,
13 2023). Yet, the impacts of the recent domestic crises (e.g., armed conflicts, droughts) and international
14 crises (e.g., COVID-19 pandemic and Russia's invasion of Ukraine) are conspicuous (NBE, 2023;
15 EGTE, 2023). The annual average price indices for petroleum oil and wheat in the global and
16 Ethiopian markets exhibit similar trends (**Figure 1**) substantiating the high inflation trends in Ethiopia
17 in the past decade (ESS, 2023) as the local price changes grew faster compared to the world market
18 prices. Likewise, domestic fertilizer prices increase might be larger than increases in world market
19 fertilizer prices (Abay et al., 2024).


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23

1 **Figure 1.** Comparison of local and world price indices for wheat and petroleum oil



2 Source: Authors' illustration based on data compiled from various reports by the National Bank of Ethiopia (retail gasoline price in
3 Addis Ababa, Ethiopia), the Ethiopian Grain Trade Enterprise (wholesale wheat price in Ethiopia), and World Bank (2023) (crude oil
4 and wheat prices in world markets). Trends for fertilizer prices were not presented here due to lack of publicly available trend data.
5
6

7 Global price changes would contribute to (or exacerbate) the domestic price changes which is why it
8 is imperative to examine the implications of global commodity market shocks, such as those followed
9 the war on Ukraine, for Ethiopia.

10 This study considers the impacts of world import price changes for three commodities (wheat,
11 fertilizer, and petroleum products) which play substantial roles in the food and energy markets in
12 Ethiopia and experienced more than 30% annual average real price changes in 2022 compared to
13 2021 (

14 **Table 2).** The simulation scenarios are designed in a way to: (i) assess the potential losers from each
15 commodity price change, (ii) identify the dominant impact channel, and (iii) assess the combined
16 effects of the increase in the import prices of the three commodities.
17

18 **Table 2.** Summary of the simulation scenarios

Scenario	Description	Import price shocks
<i>Wheat</i>	<i>World wheat import price changes</i>	+ 34%
<i>Fertilizer</i>	<i>World fertilizer import price changes</i>	+ 54%
<i>Petroleum</i>	<i>World petroleum oils import price changes</i>	+ 50%
<i>Combined</i>	<i>Combination of the above impact scenarios</i>	

19 Source: Authors' calculations from World Bank (2023).

1 Note: The annual average real price changes, between 2022 and 2021, were calculated as of February 2023.
 2 Equations 1 to 4 capture the mechanisms to transmit the impacts of world import price changes to the
 3 Ethiopia's economy in DEMETRA:

$$4 \quad PM_c = [P\overline{WM}_c * (1 + TM_c)] * ER \quad (1)$$

$$6 \quad QQ_c = \alpha_c * [\delta_c \cdot QM_c^{-\rho_c} + (1 - \delta_c) \cdot QD_c^{-\rho_c}]^{-\frac{1}{\rho_c}}, \forall c \in (cm \neq 0 \cap cd \neq 0) \quad (2a)$$

$$7 \quad QQ_c = QM_c, \forall c \in cd = 0 \quad (2b)$$

$$8 \quad \frac{QM_c}{QD_c} = \left[\frac{PD_c}{PM_c} * \frac{\delta_c}{(1 - \delta_c)} \right]^{\frac{1}{(1 + \rho_c)}}, \forall c \in (cm \neq 0 \cap cd \neq 0) \quad (3)$$

9
 10 The domestic price of competitive imports for commodity c (PM_c) is a product of the world price of
 11 imports ($P\overline{WM}_c$, denominated in foreign currency, assumed to be exogenously determined and fixed
 12 by the world markets), the exchange rate (ER , domestic per foreign currency), and the import tariff
 13 rate (TM_c) (**Equation 1**). The equation applies for wheat, fertilizer, and petroleum fuels. Imported
 14 (QM_c) and domestic (QD_c) varieties are imperfect substitutes whose CES (or Armington) aggregation
 15 (QQ_c , the aggregate domestic supply of commodity c) is influenced by the share (δ), the elasticity of
 16 substitution (ρ), and the shift (α) parameters, for all commodities, such as wheat, which have both
 17 domestically produced (cd) and import (cm) varieties (**Equation 2a**). However, for some
 18 commodities such as fertilizers and petroleum oil their domestic supplies supply is composed of
 19 imports only (**Equation 2b**). The cost minimization behavior of domestic agents (i.e., deriving the
 20 first order conditions of **Equation 2a**), determines the optimal mix of supplies from domestic and
 21 foreign (import) producers depending on the relative price of domestic (PD_c) and import (PM_c)
 22 varieties of the same commodity (**Equation 3**).

23 For each cropping activity a , we endogenize land productivity to consider the yield improving role
 24 of chemical fertilizer application. Crop yields ($Y_{l,a}$) endogenously respond to the relative changes to
 25 the chemical fertilizer application, i.e., the application in the new scenario ($D_{f,a}^N$) relative to the

1 application in the base scenario ($D_{f,a}^B$). The response factor (μ_f) consider the crop phenological
2 responses to chemical fertilizer application, and thus translating into a change in crop yield per unit
3 of cultivated land (**Equation 4**).

$$Y_{l,a}^N = Y_{l,a}^B * \left[\frac{D_{f,a}^N}{D_{f,a}^B} \right]^{\mu_f} \quad (4)$$

4 The value of response factors ($\mu_f = 0.21$) was obtained from a relevant study (Sheahan et al., 2016)
5 and can be interpreted as a 1% increase (decrease) in fertilizer application leads to a 0.21% increase
6 (decrease) in crop yield. Although the yield responses to fertilizer use could vary by crop type (Hertel
7 et al., 1996; Rashid et al., 2013), due to lack of information, we applied a uniform response rate for
8 all crops, which we acknowledge as a limitation.

9 The three commodities considered are essential items in both production and final consumption
10 sectors. They account for one-fifth of the total spending for merchandise imports in Ethiopia (NBE,
11 2023). Ethiopia is a net importer of wheat with imports accounting for a quarter of the wheat supply.
12 According to the SAM, wheat accounts for 3.3% of total imports of goods and services and it is
13 consumed as an intermediate input (26%) and as food by households (74%). The LES-CES utility
14 functions nest employed in the model allows the possibility that households substitute wheat by other
15 cereals such as teff, barley, maize, and sorghum depending on their relative price changes.

16 Ethiopia depends on imported chemical fertilizers and petroleum products. Fertilizer imports
17 comprise approximately 2% of the total good and services imports in the SAM. Fertilizers are used
18 as inputs in crop-growing activities and more than 50% of the supply is used in growing major cereal
19 crops e.g. wheat, maize, teff, barley, and sorghum. In wheat and maize, chemical fertilizers account
20 for up to 6.5% of the total production costs. Increasing chemical fertilizer prices are expected to
21 reduce the use of chemical fertilizers by crop growing activities, and partly cropland productivity
22 (**Equation 4**).

1 Petroleum fuels account for about 10% of imports of goods and services in the SAM. They are
2 consumed as inputs in agriculture (0.4%), industry (28.1%), electricity (2.7%), transport (51.3%), and
3 the rest of services (10.7%). Households' demand represents 6.8% of the demand for petroleum fuels
4 while petroleum fuels account for only 0.4% and 0.5% of rural and urban households' consumption
5 expenditure. The bigger proportion of petroleum fuel price change impact on households' welfare is
6 expected through indirect effects (i.e., higher commodity prices due to increased production costs in
7 most of the sectors as consequence of higher petroleum prices).

9 3. RESULTS

10 The subsections below present the impacts of world commodity price increases on different
11 components of Ethiopian economy. All results are presented as percentage changes relative to the
12 base scenario, which represents the counterfactual Ethiopian economy in 2022 without economic
13 repercussions from Russia's invasion of Ukraine. One could consider the impact scenarios as "what
14 if" scenarios in which the information on world import price changes (

15 **Table 2**) were projected and communicated in advance as soon as the war on Ukraine began (say as
16 early warnings). This would have helped Ethiopian producers and consumers plan and undertake
17 anticipatory measures (e.g., factor allocations and adjustments in consumption demand) in response
18 to the anticipated repercussions from the global market shocks but no significant investment and
19 policy changes.

21 *3.1. Impacts on the macroeconomy*

22 The combined world price changes could reduce Ethiopia's real GDP (by 0.65%), imports (by 5.5%),
23 private consumption (by 2.7%), and investment demand (by 1.3%) (**Table 3**). Likewise, the
24 absorption, which measures the domestic expenditure on goods and services, falls by 2%. The effects

1 are driven by the fertilizer and fuel price changes although wheat prices have a marked impact on the
 2 trade balance. Increasing wheat import price decreases wheat imports (and hence total imports) but
 3 increases domestic wheat production as well as its substitute cereals (to meet the supply gap) which
 4 would pull factors from other sectors including those contributing to exports such as coffee, oilseeds,
 5 and manufactured foods and beverages.

6

7 **Table 3.** The impacts on the macroeconomy (% changes)

Variable	Import price change scenarios			
	Wheat	Fertilizer	Petroleum	Combined
GDP	-0.04	-0.32	-0.27	-0.65
Private consumption	-0.32	-0.74	-1.64	-2.70
Investment demand	0.13	-0.10	-1.34	-1.34
Absorption	-0.16	-0.46	-1.39	-2.01
Government consumption	-0.12	0.22	0.25	0.39
Imports	-0.87	-0.83	-3.81	-5.53
Exports	-1.21	-0.25	2.12	0.55

8 Source: DEMETRA simulations.

9

10 As production in some activities contract (and hence factor employment and income) direct tax and
 11 total government revenue decline by 4.1% and 0.54% in the combined impacts scenario.

12

13 **3.2. Impacts on production activities**

14 The domestic production in different sectors respond differently to the aggregate and individual
 15 commodity price changes (

16 **Table 4).** The sectors with the highest contraction of output in the combined impacts scenario are
 17 services, construction and utilities largely driven by the fuel price changes. Production in the rest of
 18 manufacturing, natural resources-based primary sectors, and public services slightly expand (under

1 fertilizer price changes) and in crops and food and beverages (under fuel price changes). Petroleum
 2 price change results in a wider range of output impacts (**Figure 2**).

3

4 **Table 4.** The impacts on domestic production by activity groups (% changes)

Activities	Import price change scenarios			
	Wheat	Fertilizer	Petroleum	Combined
Crops	0.35	-1.48	1.7	0.52
Livestock	-0.17	-0.07	-0.14	-0.35
Primary sectors – grazing, fishing, forestry, mining	-0.19	0.27	-0.41	-0.35
Food and Beverages	-0.87	-0.13	0.42	-0.57
Textiles, clothes, leather, and wood processing	-0.07	0.31	-0.32	-0.04
Rest of manufacturing	-0.08	0.59	0.09	0.68
Utilities - electricity and water	-0.08	-0.06	-2.72	-2.87
Construction	0.08	-0.04	-1.06	-1.03
Services - Private	-0.15	0.08	-2.59	-2.69
Services - Public	-0.11	0.16	0.07	0.14


5 Source: DEMETRA simulations.

6

7 Disaggregated results show that the impacts are highly scattered across sectors (**Figure 2**). Rising
 8 wheat prices expand domestic wheat production by 2.5%. Under petroleum price changes, domestic
 9 production expands in activities with substantial contribution to exports (oilseeds, coffee, vegetables,
 10 cotton, and tea) and electricity-powered transport services. The expansion of production in export-
 11 oriented agricultural activities derived from the depreciating exchange rates (due to higher import
 12 bills) making Ethiopian exports cheaper in the world markets and thus to balancing the increasing
 13 import costs. In contrast, rising fuel prices reduce the outputs from fuel-powered transport services,
 14 diesel-powered electricity (from grid and off-grid systems), and other private (commercial) services
 15 which includes hotels, financial intermediaries, and other business services. Consequently, exports
 16 from fuel-powered transport services and, slightly, electricity utilities decline.

17

1 **Figure 2.** The impacts on domestic production activities (% changes)



2

3 Source: DEMETRA simulations.

4

5

6 Production in most cropping activities contracts following the rise in world chemical fertilizer prices

7 (

8 **Table 4)** with negligible size except for oilseeds, wheat, and maize which declined by 5.4%, 3.8%,

9 and 3.2%. The marginal effects on the other crop growing activities are explained by the small shares


10 of inorganic fertilizer inputs in the base scenario and from the substitution by manure (organic) for

11 inorganic fertilizers (**Figure 3**). This, however, reduces manure available for household energy

12 (**Table 6**).

13

14 **Figure 3.** Fertilizer demand under inorganic fertilizer price increase scenario (% changes)



15

16 Source: DEMETRA simulations.

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
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3.3. Impacts on households' consumption

4 Rising import prices affect households' consumption demand directly (due to increased prices) and
5 indirectly (declining household incomes as factor incomes fall due to contraction of production). In
6 the combined impacts scenario, factor income decreases in thirteen of the seventeen factors. For
7 instance, labor factor incomes decline by approximately 2% for unskilled to approximately 4% for
8 semi-skilled and skilled labor categories whereas households' income from enterprises decline by
9 about 10% (of which 7% is due to the petroleum price increases).

10

11 **Figure 4.** The impacts on households' consumption expenditure (% changes)



12

13 Source: DEMETRA simulations.

14
15

16 The decline in households' income and the resulting decrease in demands for commodities (due to
17 higher prices) result in declining households' consumption by 2% for rural and 3.5% for urban
18 households (**Figure 4**). The effects on the household groups vary across import price change
19 scenarios. Urban households are worse off when it comes to wheat and fuel price changes whereas
20 rural households are worse off under fertilizer price changes. The adverse effects on both household
21 groups are mostly driven by petroleum price increases because petroleum products are inputs in

1 almost all activities (and thus the rise in fuel prices increases in the costs of production and reduces
 2 factor demands and incomes) and as final demand product by households (and thus increasing price
 3 reduces quantity demanded).

4

5 **3.4. Implications for food security**

6 Of the four dimensions of food security, i.e., availability, accessibility, utilization, and stability (Peng
 7 and Berry, 2019); the world import prices are expected to directly affect food *availability* (i.e.,
 8 reduced wheat imports and reduced agricultural output due to expensive fertilizers and to some extent
 9 fuel prices), *accessibility* (i.e., increased transport costs and/or reduced transport services), and
 10 *stability* (i.e., the ability of the country’s food system to withstand other natural and man-made shocks
 11 in the future due to reduced economic growth and government revenue).

12

13 Except for rural households under the wheat price change scenario, rural and urban households’ food
 14 consumption decline (**Table 5**). Mirroring the impacts on crop production (
 15 **Table 4**), the index of food production, which includes crops, sugar, processed foods, and fish,
 16 declines (by 1.2%) only under the fertilizer price scenario (**Table 5**). The increase in food production
 17 index under petroleum price change is explained by increased agricultural exports, as discussed
 18 earlier.

19

20 **Table 5.** Implications for food security (% changes)

Scenario	Food Production Index	Food Price Index		Food Consumption	
		Rural	Urban	Rural	Urban
Wheat	0.10	0.80	0.34	0.14	-0.19
Fertilizer	-1.19	0.80	0.41	-0.41	-0.21
Petroleum	1.49	0.00	-0.08	-1.17	-2.39
Combined	0.35	1.48	0.60	-1.53	-2.84

21 Source: DEMETRA simulations.

1
2
3 The impacts on food production (**Table 5**) are negligible in most cases except under higher world
4 prices for inorganic fertilizers due to Ethiopia's low dependence on food imports while many food
5 staples (including teff and sorghum) are not traded internationally in large volumes (Diao et al., 2022).
6 Yet, the index of food production increase includes overall crop production, most of which go to
7 exports rather than to households in this scenario. That is why, food consumption in both rural and
8 urban households decreased despite the increased food production index (**Table 5**). The possibility
9 of substitutions (e.g., wheat by other cereals, inorganic fertilizer by animal manure) allowed by the
10 model contributed to relieve some of the price increase burdens on households' consumption.

11 **3.5. Implications for household energy**

12 The repercussions on households' energy consumption have implications for the food-energy nexus
13 in Ethiopia (Mekonnen et al., 2017; Yalew, 2022). Agricultural wastes (e.g., crop residues, and animal
14 dung) and products (e.g., biogas, ethanol) are important sources of household energy but using
15 agricultural waste as fuel reduces organic fertilizer available for cropping activities.

16
17 **Table 6.** Impacts on household energy demand (% changes)

Fuels	Fertilizer		Petroleum	
	Rural	Urban	Rural	Urban
Residues	-1.39		0.65	
Wood	-0.12	0.02	-0.03	-0.76
Manure	-5.42	-3.20	-0.98	-1.33
Petroleum	-1.78	-0.98	-45.95	-31.38
Biogas	-0.81		0.16	
Ethanol	-1.26	-0.67	13.55	7.12
Electricity, off-grid	-0.41	-0.16	-9.06	-6.24
Electricity, grid	-0.66	-0.31	-5.16	-3.84

18 Source: DEMETRA simulations
19

20
21 The changes in demand for energy fuels are higher in rural households (**Table 6**) because they have
22 a wider option of fuels, and hence their demand for a specific fuel is set to be relatively elastic

1 compared to that in urban households. Petroleum prices affect households' energy prices directly
2 (e.g., gas and kerosene) and indirectly (e.g., electricity from diesel generators). Indeed, as discussed
3 in Section 2, the demand for petroleum in production activities is also significant. The decrease in
4 petroleum fuel demand entails an increase in ethanol consumption in both household groups. Since
5 ethanol is mostly produced from sugar molasses, in the long-term, this is an additional motive to
6 expand sugar manufacturing capacities in the country. The combination of these mechanisms results
7 in a differentiated price increase of the aggregate energy for households (by 1.5% for rural and by
8 3.5% for urban households). The combined share of electricity and ethanol in the total households'
9 energy consumption is 5% while grid electricity accounts for about 18% of the urban households'
10 energy consumption expenditure. As such, part of the decline in electricity demand is also associated
11 with decreasing households' income in addition to its price change relative to other fuels. Rising
12 inorganic fertilizer price increases the demand for animal manure as organic fertilizer (**Figure 3**) and
13 hence reduces the amount of manure consumed as fuel by households. Demand for animal manure
14 used as household energy declines by 5.4% and 3.2% in rural and urban households (**Table 6**).
15 Increasing petroleum prices induces a slight increase in the use of biogas by rural households. This
16 has positive implication for the domestic (household) biogas sector which converts cattle dug to fuel
17 (biogas) and fertilizer (bio-slurry). As such, although the biogas sector in Ethiopia is yet at its niche
18 phase (Kamp & Forn, 2016; Yalew, 2021), support for the biogas sector has the potential to help
19 agrifood and energy sectors in the face of petroleum price crises.

20

21 ***3.6.Sensitivity analysis***

22 Finally, we performed sensitivity analyses for the Armington (import) substitution elasticities (as the
23 exogenous shocks analysed are related to import price changes) and two main assumptions pertaining
24 to the crop sector (as the sector is important source of domestic food supply and exports). First, the

1 overall results and conclusions remain less sensitive to increasing or decreasing the Armington import
2 substitution elasticities by 30% (**Table A3**). An exception is that with higher elasticity of import
3 substitutions, as import prices increase, the demand for imported goods become relatively elastic and
4 decline further with which the aggregate exports decrease as exchange rates depreciates lesser
5 compared to the case with low import elasticities. Second, the severity of the impacts partly depends
6 on the crop phenological response factor to inorganic fertilizer use. For instance, if crop yields would
7 be less sensitive to the amount of inorganic fertilizer applied, the combined impact on the real GDP
8 drops to -0.39% (**Table A4**). Third, we deviated from our initial assumption regarding the flexibility
9 of cropland allocations. We assumed cropland is partially mobile by fixing the land for 14 perennial
10 crops (of the total 32 land-based activities). We then assumed all land is crop-specific (fixed to all
11 activities), i.e., land cannot be reallocated in responses to shocks compared to the initial assumption
12 such that framers would easily and quickly switch between the crops they want to cultivate in response
13 of actual and anticipated shocks. The sensitivity results (**Table A4**) show that adverse effects worsen
14 when cropland is assumed to be immobile across activities. The impacts are notable on the export
15 sector which decline by 0.91% compared to an increase by 0.55% when cropland is assumed to be
16 freely allocable (or mobile) to growing different crops. The contraction of exports implies that there
17 will be lesser resources to finance imports and thus total imports decline by 6.2% compared to by
18 5.5% under the assumption of fully mobile cropland.

4. DISCUSSIONS

21 The Russian invasion of Ukraine, since February 2022, had profound implications for the global and
22 African economies. The war caused massive supply chain disruptions and mounting trade costs
23 globally (UNCTAD, 2022) producing price spikes for many globally traded commodities (World
24 Bank, 2022). In Ethiopia, information from the past decade shows that local price changes for

1 domestic commodities with competitive imports exhibit similar trends to that of world price changes.
2 This implies that global price changes would contribute or exacerbate the price changes due to
3 domestic market conditions. This necessitates to evaluate the implications of global commodity
4 market shocks for Ethiopia.

5 This study showed that the global market repercussions due to the war on Ukraine are likely to have
6 negatively affected the aggregate imports, households' consumption, and labor wage rates in
7 Ethiopia. The effect on the real GDP is approximately -0.65% and is comparable to Diao et al. (2022).
8 Nevertheless, the impacts are unevenly distributed among different sectors and households. Crop
9 growing activities substitute animal manure (domestic) for inorganic (imported) fertilizers that
10 eventually could dampen the adverse effects on crop production. This, however, would reduce
11 manure available as cooking fuel which substantiates the relevance of the food-energy nexus in the
12 country (Mekonnen et al., 2017; Yalew, 2022). The impacts on consumption are worse for urban
13 households compared to rural ones except under fertilizer import price changes. The results of this
14 study are comparable to previous studies showing the detrimental effects of world commodity market
15 impacts on African economies (Arndt et al., 2008; Dillon & Barrett, 2016; von Arnim et al., 2018).

16 Three caveats apply to this analysis. First, the behavioral and crop phenology parameters used in the
17 model (i.e. model elasticities) influence the simulation results. Despite the model and the adjusted
18 SAM employed allow capturing several contexts of the Ethiopian economy, as in most CGE models,
19 the results are still influenced by the neoclassical assumptions of perfect competition in the CGE
20 model. Likewise, in line with the tradition in CGE model calibrations (Lofgren, 1994; Devarajan &
21 Robinson, 2013), most of the production, international trade, and consumption are *ad hoc* values in
22 the range of previous literature and economic theory. We therefore performed several sensitivity
23 analyses for a selected set of parameters and assumption affecting import substitutions (**Table A3**)
24 and crop activities (**Table A4**). The results from the sensitivity analysis regarding cropland mobility
25 across activities are in accordance with the findings of previous research (e.g., Salazar-Espinoza et

1 al., 2015; Martey et al., 2022) which showed farmers shift land use away from cash and permanent
2 crops (and thus Ethiopian exports fall) and devote more to growing staple crops in response to adverse
3 natural and man-made shocks. The sensitivity analysis also substantiates the important role of
4 inorganic fertilizers to enhance cropland productivity (Rashid et al., 2013; Sheahan et al., 2016) and
5 of crop agriculture in Ethiopia (Mengistu et al., 2019; NBE, 2023). Our findings that farmers
6 substitute animal manure for inorganic fertilizers are similar to Abay et al. (2024). The study, citing
7 survey data, indicated that the surge in inorganic fertilizer price in recent years might have encouraged
8 Ethiopian farmers to shift to organic fertilizers. However, more research on the empirical estimates
9 for the elasticities of substitution between organic and inorganic fertilizers, and between land and
10 fertilizer for Ethiopia and other agrarian countries is highly needed.

11 Second, the study does not explicitly incorporate the impacts from interactions with domestic crises
12 (e.g., armed conflicts, droughts) that have severely impacted Ethiopia in 2022. The armed conflicts
13 in northern Ethiopia, between 2020-2022, might have pushed additional 3 million peoples deeper into
14 poverty (Endale, 2023) while the droughts in the southern and southeastern parts of the country had
15 affected an estimated population of 24 million in 2022 (ACAPS, 2023). We assumed that the impacts
16 due to the domestic crises are accounted in the projected GDP growth rate (IMF, 2022) which is used
17 to calibrate the baseline scenario. This could be a limitation as such compounding factors could
18 influence the magnitude of the impacts from world market shocks (Headey & Fan, 2008; Abbott &
19 Borot de Battisti, 2011; Meyimdjui & Combes, 2021). Thirdly, we assumed the Government of
20 Ethiopia will not consider the possibility of adopting policy responses counteracting these global
21 shocks. Government responses to global commodity market shocks such as social protection
22 programs, export restrictions, price caps, subsidies, and tax reliefs (Abay et al., 2023) could have
23 dampened the adverse impacts on production and consumption but mostly by transferring the burden
24 to fiscal deficits (Headey & Fan, 2008; Ntah et al., 2024). Future research examining the interactions
25 and the combined effects of domestic and international market disruptions will be helpful.

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5. CONCLUSIONS

This study assessed the consequences of the global commodity price changes in 2022, which followed from Russia's invasion of Ukraine, on Ethiopia. The results show that repercussions from global commodity market price increases adversely affect imports and households' consumption in Ethiopia. Rising petroleum prices increase households' demand for ethanol and biogas that can be considered as co-benefits to expanding sugar manufacturing and household biogas digesters. Rising fertilizer prices tighten the competition for the use of animal manure between cropping activities (as fertilizer) and households (as fuel). Policy measures to support the expansion of household (domestic) biogas digesters producing biogas (fuel) and bio-slurry (fertilizer) could be one mechanism to promote an optimal use of animal manure at the time of contemporaneous shocks to fertilizer and petroleum oil prices.

The study gleaned insights on how the different parts of the Ethiopian economy would respond to the world global commodity market shocks without explicitly incorporating other important internal natural and man-made crises that have battered the country in and around 2022. Further research on how these multiple impacts have interacted is highly needed to identify policy measures to build an economy resilient to simultaneous domestic and global market crises. The nature and size of these additional adverse conditions may become clearer in the medium-term.

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APPENDIX

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2 *1. Notes on SAM adjustment*

3 This study used a modified version of the 2015/2016 SAM for Ethiopia (Mengistu et al., 2019).
4 Important adjustments were made particularly pertaining to the agriculture, forestry, electricity, and
5 transport sectors. For 14 crop growing activities, irrigated farming was separated from rainfed
6 farming using information from agricultural surveys (AgSS, 2016) and other research reports (NCDS,
7 2017; Tilahun et al., 2011; Hagos et al., 2009). The livestock sector was further disaggregated to
8 explicitly account for 7 types of activities (cattle, sheep, goats, camels, equines, poultry, and
9 beekeeping) using information from agricultural survey (AgSS, 2016) and national income accounts
10 (MoFED, 2012). Animal feed sources include grass fodder, crop residues, animal forages, and
11 proceed animal feed (AgSS, 2016). Forest products were disaggregated into three distinct products –
12 wood fuel, industrial wood, and non-timber forest products (NTFPs) using product shares from the
13 national income (MoFED, 2012) and forest sector accounts (MoFECC, 2017). Electricity production
14 is disaggregated into off-grid and grid connections (MoWIE, 2013), and then by technology using
15 information on installed capacities information (LMSIS, 2017; NBE, 2020; Pappis et al., 2021; GSE
16 & JICA, 2015; EAPP, 2014) in line with the recent discussion regarding the power sector in CGE
17 models (e.g., Chepeliev, 2020; Peters et al., 2016; Cai & Arora, 2015; Sue Wing, 2008). Electricity
18 output also accounts for electricity from bagasse as byproduct from sugar manufacturing (ESC, 2019;
19 Kruger et al., 2019). Further adjustment was made to account for the implicit subsidies to the state-
20 owned electricity utility enterprise (Trimble et al., 2016) and export to neighboring countries (NBE,
21 2020). Electricity-based transport services (of Ethio-Djibouti Railway and Addis Ababa Urban Light
22 Rail services) are distinguished from fuel-based (road and air transport) services. To better account
23 for the interlinkages between agriculture and energy sectors, the adjusted SAM also contains biogas
24 (activity and commodity) (Yalew, 2021) and biofuel (mainly as a byproduct from sugar molasses in
25 sugar manufacturing (ESC, 2019; Tesfaye, 2020)). Finally, compared to the initial SAM (Mengistu et

1 al., 2019), the adjusted SAM contains highly aggregated manufacturing (as rest of manufacturing)
 2 and private services (as rest of commercial services). For some of the adjustments, when
 3 correspondence allows, cross-checks were made with the supply and use tables of the 2005/2006
 4 SAM for Ethiopia (IFPRI, 2014).

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
6 **Table A1.** List of activities in the SAM and their group for reporting results

Group	Activity	Group	Activity
<i>Crops</i>	Growing <i>rainfed</i> teff	<i>Primary sectors</i>	Managed natural grass fodder
<i>Crops</i>	Growing <i>irrigated</i> teff	<i>Primary sectors</i>	Fish
<i>Crops</i>	Growing <i>rainfed</i> barley	<i>Primary sectors</i>	Forestry
<i>Crops</i>	Growing <i>irrigated</i> barley	<i>Primary sectors</i>	Mining and quarrying
<i>Crops</i>	Growing <i>rainfed</i> wheat	<i>Food & Beverages</i>	Processed and manufactured foods
<i>Crops</i>	Growing <i>irrigated</i> wheat	<i>Food & Beverages</i>	Sugar
<i>Crops</i>	Growing <i>rainfed</i> maize	<i>Food & Beverages</i>	Beverages and tobacco
<i>Crops</i>	Growing <i>irrigated</i> maize	<i>Textiles, clothes...</i>	Textile, leather, clothes, and wood processing
<i>Crops</i>	Growing <i>rainfed</i> sorghum	<i>Rest of manufacturing</i>	Rest of manufacturing
<i>Crops</i>	Growing <i>irrigated</i> sorghum	<i>Construction</i>	Construction
<i>Crops</i>	Growing <i>rainfed</i> pulses	<i>Utilities</i>	Water supply
<i>Crops</i>	Growing <i>irrigated</i> pulses	<i>Utilities</i>	Off-grid electricity, diesel
<i>Crops</i>	Growing <i>rainfed</i> oilseeds	<i>Utilities</i>	Off-grid electricity, solar
<i>Crops</i>	Growing <i>irrigated</i> oilseeds	<i>Utilities</i>	Grid electricity, hydro, Abbay basin
<i>Crops</i>	Growing <i>rainfed</i> vegetables	<i>Utilities</i>	Grid electricity, hydro, Omo basin
<i>Crops</i>	Growing <i>irrigated</i> vegetables	<i>Utilities</i>	Grid electricity, hydro, Awash basin
<i>Crops</i>	Growing <i>rainfed</i> fruits	<i>Utilities</i>	Grid electricity, hydro, Tekeze basin
<i>Crops</i>	Growing <i>irrigated</i> fruits	<i>Utilities</i>	Grid electricity, hydro, Wabi-Shebele basin
<i>Crops</i>	Growing coffee	<i>Utilities</i>	Grid electricity, hydro, Rest of basins
<i>Crops</i>	Growing enset	<i>Utilities</i>	Grid electricity, wind
<i>Crops</i>	Growing <i>rainfed</i> sugarcane	<i>Utilities</i>	Grid electricity, geothermal
<i>Crops</i>	Growing <i>irrigated</i> sugarcane	<i>Utilities</i>	Grid electricity, solar
<i>Crops</i>	Growing <i>rainfed</i> chat	<i>Utilities</i>	Grid electricity, municipal waste
<i>Crops</i>	Growing <i>irrigated</i> chat	<i>Utilities</i>	Grid electricity, diesel
<i>Crops</i>	Growing tea	<i>Utilities</i>	Grid electricity, transmission & distribution
<i>Crops</i>	Growing <i>rainfed</i> cotton	<i>Private Services</i>	Transport services, electricity-based
<i>Crops</i>	Growing <i>irrigated</i> cotton	<i>Private Services</i>	Transport services, fuel-based
<i>Crops</i>	Growing <i>rainfed</i> crops nec	<i>Private Services</i>	Rest of private commercial services
<i>Crops</i>	Growing <i>irrigated</i> crops nec.	<i>Public Services</i>	Public administration
<i>Crops</i>	Forage & bioenergy crops	<i>Public Services</i>	Education services
<i>Crops</i>	Cut flower	<i>Public Services</i>	Health services
<i>Livestock</i>	Cattle	<i>Public Services</i>	Health services
<i>Livestock</i>	Sheep		
<i>Livestock</i>	Goats		
<i>Livestock</i>	Camel		
<i>Livestock</i>	Poultry		
<i>Livestock</i>	Beekkeeping		
<i>Livestock</i>	Equines		
<i>Livestock</i>	Domestic biogas		

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
1 **2. Model calibration**

2 **Figure A1.** Production technology nest structure (author's elaboration).



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6 **Figure A2.** Households' utility nest (authors' elaboration).



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1 **Table A2.** Range of production, trade, and consumption elasticities

Type	Nest	Description	Range
Production	L	Elasticities of substitutions among different labor categories (e.g., skilled, semi-skilled, unskilled workers).	0.30–1.50
	K	Elasticities of substitutions among different capital categories (e.g., animal draught power, agricultural machinery, and non-agricultural capital).	0.20–1.50
	FERT	Elasticities of substitutions between organic and inorganic fertilizers.	0.70
	LAND-FERT	Elasticities of substitution between composite fertilizer and land factor.	0.30
	ENG	Elasticities of substitution between energy commodities for intermediate consumption (e.g., wood fuel, biofuel, petroleum oil, electricity).	0.30
	VA	Elasticities of substitutions among composite primary factors (e.g., labor, land, capital)	0.30–1.50
	VA-ENG	Elasticities of substitutions between composite energy and value-added.	0.30
	Intermediate	Elasticities of substitution among different intermediate inputs other than fertilizers and petroleum fuels.	0.00
	Top level	Elasticities of substitution between composite VA-ENG and intermediate inputs at the top of the nest.	0.00
Trade	Imports	Elasticities of substitution between import and domestic varieties of a commodity	0.80–3.00
	Exports	Elasticities of transformation between exports and domestic varieties of a commodity	0.80–3.00
Consumption	Households	Elasticity of substitution among consumption goods (only for those under CES nests)	0.75–2.50
	Households	Income elasticity of consumption demand	0.50–1.20
	Households	Frisch parameter	-1.50

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1 **3. Sensitivity analysis**

2 **Table A3.** Sensitivity of simulation results to Armington (import) substitution elasticities

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Level	Variable	Armington elasticities [Table A2-30%]				Armington elasticities [Table A2]				Armington elasticities [Table A2 +30%]			
		WHT	FRT	PTR	CMB	WHT	FRT	PTR	CMB	WHT	FRT	PTR	CMB
Macroeconomic Indicators	GDP	-0.04	-0.33	-0.28	-0.66	-0.04	-0.32	-0.27	-0.65	-0.05	-0.32	-0.27	-0.65
	Private consumption	-0.33	-0.74	-1.63	-2.69	-0.32	-0.74	-1.64	-2.70	-0.31	-0.74	-1.65	-2.70
	Investment demand	0.07	-0.13	-1.36	-1.44	0.13	-0.10	-1.34	-1.34	0.18	-0.09	-1.33	-1.26
	Absorption	-0.18	-0.46	-1.39	-2.03	-0.16	-0.46	-1.39	-2.01	-0.14	-0.46	-1.40	-2.00
	Government consumption	-0.06	0.27	0.31	0.56	-0.12	0.22	0.25	0.39	-0.16	0.18	0.21	0.26
	Imports	-0.82	-0.81	-3.61	-5.24	-0.87	-0.83	-3.81	-5.53	-0.90	-0.85	-3.98	-5.76
	Exports	-0.77	-0.19	2.56	1.49	-1.21	-0.25	2.12	0.55	-1.55	-0.29	1.73	-0.23
Activity Outputs	Crops	0.25	-1.45	1.67	0.45	0.35	-1.48	1.70	0.52	0.43	-1.51	1.73	0.59
	Livestock	-0.15	-0.06	-0.17	-0.36	-0.17	-0.07	-0.14	-0.35	-0.18	-0.07	-0.12	-0.34
	Primary sectors – grazing, fishing, forestry, mining	-0.14	0.27	-0.46	-0.35	-0.19	0.27	-0.41	-0.35	-0.23	0.27	-0.37	-0.34
	Food and Beverages	-0.80	-0.16	0.24	-0.74	-0.87	-0.13	0.42	-0.57	-0.93	-0.12	0.58	-0.43
	Textiles, clothes, leather, and wood processing	-0.02	0.25	-0.61	-0.36	-0.07	0.31	-0.32	-0.04	-0.12	0.34	-0.09	0.18
	Rest of manufacturing	-0.01	0.52	-0.22	0.35	-0.08	0.59	0.09	0.68	-0.15	0.62	0.32	0.88
	Utilities - electricity and water	-0.06	-0.07	-2.72	-2.87	-0.08	-0.06	-2.72	-2.87	-0.09	-0.05	-2.73	-2.88
	Construction	0.04	-0.07	-1.14	-1.18	0.08	-0.04	-1.06	-1.03	0.11	-0.01	-0.99	-0.91
	Services - Private	-0.11	0.05	-2.46	-2.57	-0.15	0.08	-2.59	-2.69	-0.18	0.10	-2.71	-2.82
	Services - Public	-0.06	0.20	0.11	0.28	-0.11	0.16	0.07	0.14	-0.14	0.13	0.03	0.04
Consumption	Rural	-0.01	-0.59	-1.25	-1.93	-0.01	-0.62	-1.29	-2.00	0.00	-0.64	-1.31	-2.04
	Urban	-0.26	-0.38	-2.70	-3.39	-0.35	-0.41	-2.72	-3.52	-0.42	-0.42	-2.74	-3.62

4 Source: DEMETRA simulations.

5 Notes: WHT – Wheat, FRT – Fertilizer, PTR – Petroleum, and CMB – Combined price scenarios.

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Table A4. Sensitivity of simulation results to assumptions affecting crop activities

Level	Variable	<i>Crop phenology is less sensitive to the level of chemical fertilizer</i>				<i>Land partially mobile across activities</i>				<i>Land immobile across activities</i>			
		WHT	FRT	PTR	CMB	WHT	FRT	PTR	CMB	WHT	FRT	PTR	CMB
Macroeconomic Indicators	GDP	-0.05	-0.05	-0.28	-0.39	-0.04	-0.32	-0.29	-0.67	-0.04	-0.32	-0.33	-0.71
	Private consumption	-0.33	-0.33	-1.64	-2.28	-0.32	-0.75	-1.64	-2.70	-0.31	-0.75	-1.67	-2.72
	Investment demand	0.15	-0.12	-1.43	-1.41	0.14	-0.09	-1.44	-1.42	0.18	-0.07	-1.67	-1.58
	Absorption	-0.16	-0.23	-1.41	-1.79	-0.15	-0.46	-1.42	-2.03	-0.14	-0.46	-1.48	-2.08
	Government consumption	-0.13	0.10	0.36	0.34	-0.12	0.20	0.34	0.46	-0.17	0.18	0.67	0.70
	Imports	-0.83	-0.53	-4.06	-5.38	-0.83	-0.82	-4.06	-5.72	-0.68	-0.74	-4.77	-6.15
	Exports	-1.10	0.56	1.54	1.03	-1.10	-0.20	1.54	0.14	-0.74	0.03	-0.18	-0.91
Activity Outputs	Crops	0.35	-0.41	1.61	1.54	0.33	-1.40	1.55	0.44	0.40	-1.36	1.19	0.19
	Livestock	-0.19	0.01	-0.04	-0.22	-0.12	-0.26	0.21	-0.15	-0.12	-0.25	0.34	-0.03
	Primary sectors – grazing, fishing, forestry, mining	-0.19	0.13	-0.41	-0.46	-0.12	0.14	-0.38	-0.37	-0.14	0.12	-0.31	-0.33
	Food and Beverages	-0.88	-0.08	0.48	-0.48	-0.87	-0.13	0.46	-0.53	-0.92	-0.07	0.61	-0.36
	Textiles, clothes, leather, and wood processing	-0.08	0.13	-0.19	-0.14	-0.07	0.29	-0.22	0.03	-0.13	0.26	0.16	0.31
	Rest of manufacturing	-0.11	0.26	0.29	0.47	-0.10	0.57	0.26	0.82	-0.20	0.52	0.89	1.27
	Utilities - electricity and water	-0.08	-0.05	-2.72	-2.86	-0.07	-0.06	-2.74	-2.88	-0.09	-0.06	-2.72	-2.88
	Construction	0.09	-0.08	-1.11	-1.10	0.09	-0.03	-1.12	-1.08	0.11	-0.02	-1.24	-1.18
	Services - Private	-0.16	0.02	-2.56	-2.71	-0.15	0.07	-2.59	-2.69	-0.19	0.05	-2.46	-2.61
	Services - Public	-0.12	0.07	0.15	0.11	-0.11	0.14	0.14	0.20	-0.15	0.12	0.41	0.40
Consumption	Rural	0.01	-0.28	-1.44	-1.75	0.02	-0.64	-1.41	-2.12	0.09	-0.60	-1.93	-2.48
	Urban	-0.36	-0.08	-2.74	-3.19	-0.34	-0.44	-2.72	-3.53	-0.34	-0.42	-2.79	-3.57

4 Source: DEMETRA simulations.

5 Notes: WHT – Wheat, FRT – Fertilizer, PTR – Petroleum, and CMB – Combined price scenarios. Under ‘land partially mobile’ sensitivity test, cropland for selected crops (i.e.,
6 fruits, coffee, tea, sugarcane, enset, chat, cotton, forage and bioenergy crops, grass fodder, and cut flower) was assumed to be activity-specific and hence cannot be reallocated in
7 response to the anticipated impacts.

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