



The semantics of the Italian adverb *magari*: a threshold-based approach to its polysemy¹

Nicola D'Antuono

Università degli Studi di Bologna
(nicola.dantuono@studio.unibo.it)

Citation: N. D'Antuono (2020)
The semantics of the Italian adverb magari: a threshold-based approach to its polysem. *Qulso* 6: pp. 67-95. doi: <http://dx.doi.org/10.13128/QULSO-2421-7220-9694>

Copyright: © 2020 N. D'Antuono. This is an open access, peer-reviewed article published by Firenze University Press (<https://oajournals.fupress.net/index.php/bsfm-qulso>) and distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.

Data Availability Statement: All relevant data are within the paper and its Supporting Information files.

Competing Interests: The Author(s) declare(s) no conflict of interest.

Abstract:

The aim of this paper is to demonstrate that the several uses of the Italian adverbial *magari* (the optative, short answer, hypothetical, concessive and imperative uses) can be led back to one basic core meaning. This core meaning is taken to account for all the uses of the item without reference to a grammaticalization process, but only through syntactic and pragmatic operations such as ellipsis, scope variability and pragmatic interpretation on the part of the hearer. *Magari* first appears in Italian optative constructions, which are characterised by the presence of a scalar reading along an epistemic dimension. The expansion of the uses of *magari* is explained in terms of its additive properties (i.e. need for other propositions to be true within the Common Ground) plus a requirement that the propositional content be higher than a contextually given threshold along an epistemic scale.

Keywords: *adverbs, discourse particles, implicatures, scalarity, semantic-pragmatic interface*

1. Adverbs and particles: a unified view

The introductory paragraph will concern the framework of this paper. In particular, the classes which will be dealt with are described and the relation between them is understood to be a dynamic one, which is dominated by an analysis that considers polysemy², rather than grammaticalization or lexical proliferation, to be the origin of the diverse contexts and interpretations in which an item is found.

¹ I thank two anonymous reviewers for their insightful observations on a previous version of this paper, which have helped clarify some points and enrich some of the perspectives exposed here. I also thank Giuliano Bocci for the discussions and for the advice he has given me at an early stage of the development of this paper. Needless to say, I am responsible for any remaining shortcomings and errors.

² As an anonymous reviewer correctly points out, the term is here intended as syntactic polysemy. In fact, throughout the paper it will be assumed that the lexical semantics of the adverb do not vary according to the context, and that pragmatic and syntactic factors are responsible for the different interpretations of the item.

1.1 A working definition of discourse particles: their key features and functions

The sheer bulk of research on Discourse Particles (DParts) (Manzini 2015; Cardinaletti 2015 for Italian), Discourse Markers (Fraser) and the research on German Modal Particles (MPs, Abrahams 1991; Coniglio 2008 and Coniglio and Zegrean 2010 for Italian; Gast 2008, to mention a few) makes it even hard to pinpoint their exact nature, since the characterisation of the class varies among researchers, often considerably. Consequently, and since a taxonomy of DParts is not the aim of this paper, a strict distinction will not be attempted. Rather, the main features of DParts with respect to other particles will be examined, in order to make it possible to individuate their uses and functions.

In general, these particles can be safely opposed to grammatical particles. The latter are invariable elements, like the ones mentioned above, but serve a grammatical function: the particle *to* in the verb *to eat* is one such element, since it marks infinitive mood. On the other hand, the particles under exam serve no grammatical purpose, rather they are associated with discourse management, modality and pragmatic purposes.³ For example, DMs are defined by Fraser (1991: 7) as “lexical expressions, syntactically independent of the basic sentence structure, which have a general core meaning signalling the relationship of the current utterance to the prior discourse”.

- (1) John was very rude yesterday, so I decided never to talk to him again.

In (1) the function of *so* is that of marking the relation between the first and the second part of utterance. Removing it does not alter the truth conditions of the proposition, nor does it render the sentence ungrammatical. Its purpose is that of organising the flow of discourse and of managing it, in order to make it clear to the hearer in which way the two parts of the utterance are related. In Fraser's terms, *so* is an inferential marker, showing what follows it to be a consequence of what precedes it.

MPs have in common with DMs the lack of truth-conditional import, plus a strong bond with illocutionary and pragmatic properties. As their name suggests, these particles are used to express modality, thus manifesting the speaker's intentions and attitudes with respect to the current discourse and situation. They are usually associated with German:

- (2) a. Kannst du *denn* singen?
Can.2SG you PRT sing
'Can you sing?'
- b. Peter ist *ja* klug
Peter is PRT clever
'Peter is clever, as you know.'
- c. Ruf *bloß* die Polizei!
Call PRT the police
'Call the police' ('You may call the police', 'Call the police if you please')

MPs are also sensitive to clause-typing. *Denn*, “which usually expresses the speaker's concern” (Coniglio 2008: 11, fn. 29), as to the subject of (or answer to) the question is only found in interrogative sentences. *Ja* is only positive and points to a shared knowledge of the content of the utterance both on the part of the speaker and hearer ('as we know', 'as is known'). *Bloß*

³ For the difference between grammatical and discourse particle, see also Roussou (2015).

is characterised as a mitigating particle (Abtonugspartikel), which is used to attenuate the illocutionary effect of the imperative.

These particles have been studied by Coniglio and Zegrean (2010), in particular with regard to the split between their illocutionary effect and clause-type restrictions. The authors set out a theory in which Rizzi's (1997) complex CP is enriched by splitting the Force projection in CT (clause type) and ILL (Illocutionary Force). That is because a sentence could be interrogative with regard to CT, but directive as to ILL (as in the case of *Could you open the window?*). The authors notice that "these particles do not modify the type, but rather the illocutionary force of the clause" (Coniglio and Zegrean 2010: 12), although they display a strong sensitivity to CT. *Bloß* in (2c) acts on ILL, but its absence would not make (2c) any less imperative.

MPs are traditionally considered to be a German class. That is because the main syntactic feature of MPs is that of occurring in the space called *Mittelfeld*, or Middle Field, roughly situated between the inflected verb in T° and the vP. Despite this relatively low position, they behave at LF as if they were in the left periphery (where modality is generally expressed), scoping over the whole sentence and not only over the constituents that follow them.

Coniglio (2008) and Coniglio and Zegrean (2010) argue that MPs are not exclusive to German, and that elements such as *pure*, *mai*, *mica* are in no way different than German MPs: they express modality (i.e. the speaker's attitude), occur in a syntactic position roughly corresponding to the German *Mittelfeld*, and scope out of it, over the whole sentence and over the illocutionary/clause-typing node.

- (3) a. Chiama *pure* la polizia!
Call PRT the police
- b. Cosa significheranno *mai* quelle parole?
What will.mean PRT those words
'What will those words mean?'
- c. Non è *mica* vero!
NEG is PRT true
'Nay, it is not true!'

1.2 From adverb to DPart: is grammaticalization a necessary step?

It is clear from the examples above that elements which serve as DParts, DMs or MPs also have different functions: *so* is used in a variety of cases (as in *my trip was not so nice as it was tiring*, *the show was so funny we laughed our heads off*, etc.) *mai* is an Italian NPI adverb meaning 'ever' and *pure* means 'also'. Adv elements are more on the lexical than functional side, whereas particles, while having a meaning of sorts, are characterised as functional. The perspective of an analysis in terms of grammaticalization is tempting, but it is not to be embraced too enthusiastically. What is meant by this term is the process whereby a lexical element becomes functional. It begins to serve a grammatical purpose, rather than conveying a lexical meaning. In the process, the element usually undergoes some phonetic reduction and semantic bleaching. If one takes the examples in (3a-b) it becomes clear that no phonetic reduction has taken place. As to semantic bleaching, this means that a lexical feature of the item is lost in favour of a new *grammatical* function. The problem is, it is unclear which grammatical function would be acquired in the first place. Seeing the shift from adverb to DPart as a case of grammaticalization clearly misses the point: if these particles are different than grammatical particles, as mentioned, then becoming a DPart cannot be a matter of grammaticalization, since it is not

clear what grammatical function would be acquired by an element which is not related to the grammatical system and non-truth-conditional by definition (therefore not computed by the semantic component).

1.2.1 Manzini's (2015) analysis of Discourse Particles

Another view which will be adopted in this work is found in Manzini's (2015) study of Italian DParts, in particular *poi*, *mai* and *pure*. Only *mai* and *pure* will be examined here. *Pure* is especially relevant for the present work. According to Manzini, DPart is not the name of a lexical class, rather it is a special interpretation of adverbs. In fact, one point which Manzini has in common with the mentioned literature on particles is that "discourse particles take the entire assertion (or command, or question) as their argument, relating it to the store of propositional contents shared by the speaker and hearer" (Manzini 2015: 93). This weakens the hypothesis that DParts would be located in specific functional heads, since their behaviour as particles derives from scope phenomena and from the nature of what they take as argument. This view avoids the characterisation of DParts as a class which is distinct from adverbs, while explaining their behaviour within the common syntax synchronically and without need to take grammaticalization into account. Two examples will be briefly discussed in order to show the effectiveness of a view which explains DParts in terms of their syntactic and semantic features, rather than in terms of categorisation.

Mai is a temporal adverb, an NPI meaning 'ever'. It is licensed in the scope of negation (in which case it means 'never') and, in PI guise, in the scope of the interrogative operator. Its DPart use is displayed in (4c).

- (4)
- a. Gianni non ha (mai) mangiato (mai) niente
Gianni not has never eaten never nothing
'Gianni has never eaten anything.'
 - b. Se (mai) venisse (mai) davvero, mi farebbe un piacere
if ever he.came ever truly me he.would.do a favour
'If he ever really came, he would do me a favour.'
 - c. Cosa avrà (mai) voluto (mai) dire?
what have.FUT ever wanted ever say
'What did he mean, I wonder?'

According to Coniglio (2008: 108), *mai* in (4b) has the function of "signalling the rhetoricity of a question or the total incapacity on the speaker's side to give an answer to it". But *mai* is a temporal adverb, so the question arises as to the way this modal meaning comes about. Manzini's suggestion is that *mai* means 'at any time t '. This means that *mai* introduces a temporal variable which is interpreted by the negative marker in negative sentences (so that it ends up meaning 'at no time t ', i.e. 'never'). On the other hand, in the scope of questions and hypotheticals, this temporal variable remains open: "existential closure has no value beyond that already provided by the T category; in other words, the only informative value of *mai* in questions or hypotheticals consists in its pragmatic contribution" (Manzini 2015: 114). Manzini also suggests that the reading of the adverbial is always temporal and that, in this case, scope is not even involved: quite simply, the temporal variable remains open because nothing interprets it.

The second case examined by Manzini is *pure*. As usual, this DPart is originally an adverb, whose meaning is 'also'. Once again, its use as a particle should derive from the application of its core semantics to the entire assertion.

- (5) a. Gli dà pure dei soldi
to.him he.gives also of money
'He also gives him money.'
- b. Ha pur(e) confessato la sua colpa
he.has yet confessed his fault
'He yet confessed his fault.'
- c. Dagli pure dei soldi
give-him yet of money
'Do (yet) give him money!'

(5a) shows the adverbial use of *pure*, meaning 'also'. In declarative clauses, such as (5b), "*pur(e)* signals that the speaker has no evidence to prove that his assertion is true, but he still thinks it logical to suppose that it must be true", while in imperative sentences like (5c) it apparently "weakens the strength of an order" (Coniglio 2008: 115). First of all, the core semantics of *pure* must be defined. "In its ordinary adverbial meaning *pure* is [...] a focuser taking in its scope arguments or events". This focuser can either take a DP or the whole event as argument. This means that, in (5a), "there is at least one $y, y \neq x$, such that he gives him y ' besides ' $x = \text{money}$ ' [i.e.] there is at least one additional element satisfying [the Focus presupposition], to be gleaned from the Common Ground" (Manzini 2015: 115).

When *pure* is applied to the entire sentence, scoping over illocutionary force, the speaker means that "the assertion of the propositional content S [...] has alternatives within the Common Ground [...] though the speaker holds the proposition that is asserted as true, he signals the lack of a secure standing for it by pointing the hearer to a set of alternatives" (Manzini 2015: 116), which the author represents as follows:

- (6) 'also' ([ASSERT/ALLOW S '], [ASSERT/ALLOW S])

Imperatives express either command or permission. Thus, including *pure* in an imperative excludes the necessity reading by presenting the utterance as an alternative (hence, permission to do S among the set of possible S 's). *Pure* does not attenuate the command, rather it rules out the deontic reading of the imperative, leaving only the bouletic one (that is, permission). This analysis has the double advantage of explaining the contribution of the particle in a principled way (pointing to its relation with the possible interpretations of the imperative) and of accounting for its particle use relying only on its semantics as an adverb.

1.3 *The present view*

In this paper, uses such as those described above (DPart, MP, DM) will be treated as interpretations of the corresponding adverbial item, not as the result of grammaticalization. Whenever MP, DPart or such terminology will be used it shall thus refer to the interpretation of adverbial elements. Additionally, I endorse the general assumption of German linguists, suggested for Italian by Coniglio (2008) and Coniglio and Zegrean (2010) that elements used as MPs have a fixed, middle syntactic position (without further assumptions as to which position this is) and I take this fixation to be a case of what Larrivé and Poletto (2018) consider as syntacticisation (though not complete), meaning by that a strict association between a certain interpretation of

an item and the syntactic position in which such interpretation arises. I consider MPs as being incapable of overt movement as a working hypothesis.⁴

2. *Magari*

The adverb *magari* is used in Italian with a variety of interpretations. Before going on to produce some examples, looking at its etymology is useful. Its origin is the Byzantine Greek word *makari*, meaning 'happy', 'blessed', as specified in Ottorino Pianigiani's *Vocabolario Etimologico della Lingua Italiana*. According to him, it bears an optative meaning, which is common in colloquial Italian:⁵

- (7) Magari potessi venire!
 magari I.could come
 'If only/I wish I could come!'

Another usage of this word, meaning 'maybe', is as a hypothetical or conditional element and it has several possible positions in the sentence, which correspond to those of the adverb *forse* ('maybe'):

- (8) a. (Magari) ha (magari) perso il treno (magari)
 b. (Forse) ha (forse) perso il treno (forse)
 'Maybe he missed the train.'

It can also be used as a positive answer, especially to an offer.

- (9) A: Vuoi che apra la finestra?
 Want.you that I.open.SUBJ the window
 'Do you want me to open the window?'
 B: Magari!
 'I wish you would (i.e. yes).'

In the case of answers to yes-no questions, it is somewhat regretful and points to the unachievability (or falsehood) of the content of the previous utterance.

⁴ An anonymous review asks why MPs are incapable of overt movement. While this matter is controversial, Bayer and Obenauer's (2011) theory may be cited as an example of an alternative view to that of Coniglio (2008), which involves covert movement of the particle above ForceP. The authors assume that MPs are interpreted through a feature checking operation taking place in accordance with Pesetsky and Torrego's (2007) version of checking theory, which involves both valuation and interpretation of features. The process would then take place between the Force head, which bears an *i*Q, QForce feature, and the particle, endowed with a *u*QForce[] feature, which gets valued, while the *u*Q feature of the particle gets cancelled by the *i*Q on the Force head. Under this view, MPs do not move because movement would be unnecessary (since interpretation and valuation happen *in situ*) and thus, according to minimalist theory, forbidden.

⁵ Actually, this interpretation is desiderative rather than optative. Nevertheless, the construction is usually called optative even in scientific literature, therefore it will be thus called for the rest of this work.

- (10) A: Hai finito di lavorare per oggi?
 have.you finished C to.work for today
 'Are you done working for today?'
 B: Magari!
 'I wish it were so! (i.e. no)'

It is also to be noted that colloquial Italian (though not in the variety spoken by the author of this article) presents a concessive *magari* used in a specific construction:

- (11) Supererò l'esame, magari dovessi studiare di notte
 I.will.pass the.exam even.if I.had to.study of night
 'I will pass the exam, even if I had to study by night'

2.1 Optative magari

The OVI corpus, a corpus of Old Italian texts, gives no result for the keyword *magari*. Nonetheless, the old *macari* and *macara* (closer to the Greek form above) are attested. Here are some interesting examples (all of the examples which were found in the corpus) which come from Sicilian sources ranging from the 1230s to 1373:

- (12) Macara se doles[s]eti che cadesse angosciato
 magari RFLX it.ached.SUBJ.you.DAT that you.fell.SUBJ in a swoon
 'If only you would feel so bad as to faint!/May you feel so bad as to faint!'
 (1231/1250, *Rosa fresca aulentissima*, Cielo d'Alcamo, ln. 97)
- (13) a. Macari putissi essiri morta per ti!
 magari I.could be dead for you
 'If only I could be dead for you (i.e. in your stead)!'
 (1373, *Sposizione del Vangelo della Passione secondo Matteo*, anonymous, ch. 18, par. 3)
- b. Macari mi dugni Deu gracia, ki eu possa meditari
 magari to.me give.SUBJ God grace that I may meditate
 'I wish God would grant me grace, that I may meditate /
 May God grant me grace, etc.'
 (*Ibidem*, ch. 27, par. 1)
- (14) a. Cussì no ndi purtau macari nulla terra di li citadini di Ruma
 So NEG from.it brought magari no land of the citizens of Rome
 'Moreover, he obtained no land from the citizens of Rome'
 (1321/1337, *Libru di Valeriu Maximu translatau in vulgar messinisi*, Accurso of Cremona, bk. 2, ch. 3)
- b. Intra tuctu quistu, macari issu non lu nominau a lu testamentu
 among all this magari he NEG him nominated to the will
 'Apart from all this, moreover he would not mention him in his will'
 (*Ibidem*, bk. 7, ch. 9)

What is interesting in these examples is that the optative meaning in (12) appears much earlier than the hypothetical or conditional meaning. For all that we can obtain from the OVI

corpus, we may assume that *magari* starts out with an optative meaning and that its other meanings are later developments.

The examples in (13-14) clearly show that its leftmost position, a key feature of present-day optative *magari*, is already to be found. The subjunctive mood is present as well. (14) shows already by the first half of the 14th century a reading which does not correspond to optative *magari* anymore.⁶

The leftmost position of *magari* is likely related to focus. *Magari* always bears a focus accent and seems *prima facie* incompatible with the presence of another focused item (see Rizzi 1997):

- (15) *Magari GIANNI fosse venuto!⁷
 'If only GIANNI had come!'

(13b) shows that *macari* caused verb-subject inversion as a consequence of V2 and is compatible with a focus analysis (what else could cause inversion in that context apart from *macari*?).

Magari is briefly addressed by Grosz (2012), who rightly considers it as directly derived from the analogous Greek construction:

- (16) Makari o John na akusi tin Mary!
 makari the Janis subj listened the Mary.acc
 'If only Janis listened to Mary!'

Other languages, like Romanian (*măcar*) and Serbian (*makar*) have taken this particle from Greek, with similar optative use. Therefore, there is no reason to believe that *magari* ever meant 'happy' in Italian or Sicilian.

What is interesting about these data is that *magari* is not necessary to make a sentence optative.

- (17) a. Magari fossi arrivato prima!
 if.only I.were arrived before
 'If only I had arrived earlier!'
 b. Fossi arrivato prima!
 c. Che tu possa vincere!
 C you may win
 'May you win!'
 d. 'If #(only) I had arrived earlier!'

⁶ As will be clear from 2.4, Sicilian *macari* has a different history than the Italian counterpart and it means 'also' or 'moreover'. This will be dealt with in depth in the next pages.

⁷ Giuliano Bocci (private conversation) suggests that the true reason why (15) is ungrammatical (or sounds bad, by all accounts) is that focus fronting is possible in Italian only when it has a mirative or corrective value. When *Gianni* is lower and its focus is informative, as in *Magari avessero invitato GIANNI alla festa* ('If only they had invited GIANNI to the party') the sentence is indeed acceptable and the compresence of *magari* and focus does not cause ungrammaticality. For this reason, it is better not to exaggerate the connection between focus and *magari*. Anyway, in the light of the following comparative analysis with *if only*, and considering that *only* is a focus-sensitive element, and especially given the contribution of Biezma (2011), the link with focus and in particular with the creation of alternatives cannot be overlooked. Moreover, the fact that *magari* occupies a focus position, at least in some cases, is independently argued for in 2.2.

Magari can be missing with the utterance maintaining its desiderative import. This means that, albeit used in connection with optative or desiderative interpretation, *magari* is not a realisation of these moods.⁸ We can employ Grosz' (2012) between a prototypical optative marker (*magari*) and an obligatory optative licenser (like *only* in English *if only* clauses). This point is very important, since it emancipates *magari* from a too strict connection with optative or desiderative semantics.

Nevertheless, what remains to be explained is the way in which desirability comes about. To this purpose, the results obtained by Biezma (2011), who studied optative constructions with *if only*, will be compared to those of Grosz (2012), whose chief interest lies in optative constructions, in order to understand which view fits our case best.

2.1.1 Biezma (2011) and Grosz (2012): deriving desirability in optatives

Biezma (2011) offers a view of optativity in which desirability originates from a combination of a focus adverb, which causes a scalar reading to arise, and informativeness, which forces the speaker to provide the most informative statement. Thus, optativity arises from an interplay of pragmatic and semantic factors. The author couches her research in the theory of Roberts (1996) and the concept of immediate question under discussion (IQuD).

The main goal of a discourse then is to narrow down the context set to finally obtain a singleton, namely, the set containing only the actual world [...] speaker's intentions are tracked by assuming that every utterance is an answer to an (implicit) question that the speaker agrees to address (pay-off moves), i.e. the immediate question under discussion (IQuD) (Biezma 2011: 113).

In Biezma's opinion, optatives are indeed conditionals, which chimes in with our own intuitions concerning *magari*. Nevertheless, they differ from conditionals in relevant ways. First of all, conditionals do not encode desirability. Secondly, optatives are characterised by the presence of a focus adverb, like *only* (see (19b) above).

Thirdly, the presence of a focus-sensitive operator like *only* in optative clauses means that the usual topic-focus relation of conditionals is reversed: in regular conditionals, the antecedent is the (aboutness) topic and the consequent is the focus. But due to the presence of *only*, the element corresponding to the antecedent in optatives is now the focus: the information structure is thus reversed. Crucially, the consequent is not spelled out, which would not be possible if it were the focus. Biezma considers this to be a case of topic-drop (though not in the generally intended meaning). On the other hand, for an optative to be uttered lawfully the consequent must be recoverable, which means that the consequent is presupposed.

Desirability is a key feature of optatives. Biezma tries to lead this feature back to the most evident difference between optatives and conditionals: the presence of the focus adverb *only*. The IQuD of conditionals, given that their form is *if α , β* , is *What does α bring about?* or *What would α have brought about?* which means that in the most similar worlds to w in which α is true, β is true. But given the reversal in information structure, the (presupposed) topic of conditionals is now β and the question is rather *How can β be brought about?* The question no longer concerns the consequences of α , but the conditions that cause β to happen. This means that the question is about the best way to make the propositional content of the antecedent

⁸ A quick online search confirmed this insight: both *Enciclopedia Treccani* and the *Sabatini Coletti* dictionary list utterances like *Fossi Einstein!*, 'if only I were Einstein!' as optative/desiderative without *magari*.

true, not an exhaustive list of ways it can be true. It corresponds to a mention-some question, asking for the best way of making things happen.⁹

That is where the scalar import of *only* becomes crucial. According to the literature (Beaver and Clark 2008), the meaning of exclusives (like *only*) is threefold: it has the discourse function of weakening expectations (if only John came to the party, then there was an expectation that others would come, the set over which *only* quantifies), it bears the presupposition that the strongest true alternatives in IQuD are at least as strong as the prejacent (no one else is less expected than John to come), while its descriptive content, what the sentence with *only* ends up meaning, is that the strongest true alternatives in the IQuD are at most as strong as the prejacent (the effect of the utterance is that no one is more expected than John to come). Since we are talking about conditionals and optatives, the scale involved here cannot be one of truth, but it will be one of likelihood. Speakers choose the strongest (in this scale, the most likely) alternative that brings about the consequent.

Desirability arises from this scale of likelihood when it is paired with informativeness, in the Gricean spirit. In accordance with conversational maxims, the speaker is expected

to make the strongest claim he can. Hence, if there are two possible alternatives that can bring about the desired consequent (p and p' , with $p \subseteq p'$) and if optatives without consequents (*if only* α) are conditionals, we expect speakers to utter the optative spelling out the weaker alternative. The prediction is that if only p' will be preferred over if only p (Biezma 2011: 102).

If I am late at an appointment and regret that I have not taken a cab (any cab), it makes no sense to say *If only I had taken a red cab!*, since red cabs are not *per se* more likely to get me there than cabs of any other colour. Then, *If only I had taken a cab!* will be preferred on the basis of its informativeness.

Anyway, in several languages, including Spanish, one finds optatives which do not have an *only*, *at least* or *but* component providing the scale, for example in HPCs ('haber' plus participle clauses) in Spanish:

- (18) A: No llegué a tiempo
 NEG I.arrived at time
 'I didn't arrive on time.'
 B: Haber salido antes
 have.INF gone.out before
 'If only you had left earlier.'

For these cases, Biezma claims that a covert *only* is present to provide the scale which causes desirability to arise. This operator is only there in order to provide the scale of likelihood.

Grosz (2012) challenges this view, considering it too centred on English and wondering why it is necessary to provide a differential analysis for cases with or without *only* (or similar elements) in different languages. He suggests that optatives can be derived by the presence of an *EX* (exclamative and expressive) operator and that the conspiracy of pragmatic and semantic factors is not at play, but optative can be derived from the semantics of the covert operator,

⁹ If I ask *Who came to the party?* what I want is a list of people, but if I ask *How do I get to the station*, then I am asking for the best way of getting there, not for a list of possibilities. Roughly, that is the difference between a mention-all and a mention-some question.

plus the contribution of mood and the disambiguating effect of optative markers, which clarify the optative import of the clause without bringing it about themselves. “Optative utterances are a variant of exclamative utterances, the meaning of which is due to a null operator *EX*. *EX* selects a contextually salient scale and conveys that the modified proposition exceeds a salient threshold on that scale [...] In optatives, the relevant scale reflects the speaker’s preferences”. *EX* has the following semantics (Grosz 2012: 91, (138)):

(19) *Lexical entry for EX*

For any scale S and proposition p , interpreted in relation to a context c and assignment function g ,

an utterance $EX(S)(p)$ is felicitous iff $\forall q[\text{THRESHOLD}(c) >_s q \rightarrow p >_s q]$

‘*EX* expresses an emotion that captures the fact that p is higher on a (speaker-related) scale S than all contextually relevant alternatives q below a contextual threshold’.

where $\text{THRESHOLD}(c)$ is a function from a context into a set of worlds / a proposition that counts as high with respect to a relevant scale S .

That of exceeding a threshold is way more attractive for this analysis than the simple intuition that optatives refer to an endpoint or that they create a scale. In fact, the other uses of *magari* are easier to explain as an expansion of a previously given context than as an extreme reading which is not always found. The concept of threshold is thus more useful than that of extreme degree.

What is most interesting, the scale is contextually given: the fact that a sentence is optative does not have to do with a specific optative component. In this, Grosz’ analysis is after all close to that of Biezma: what distinguishes, say, an optative from a polar exclamative is the fact that in the former the scale is defined in terms of preference, in the latter in terms of belief.

What is most interesting of Grosz analysis is the role of elements such as *only* or *at least*, which Biezma considered crucial for the optative meaning to arise. Grosz treats them as discourse particles, which is why his analysis is taken to be more consistent with ours. *Only* does not have the purpose of creating a scale of likelihood (since *EX* is enough for it to come about). Rather, its purpose is that of disambiguating the exact meaning of the utterance:

I argue that particles in optatives are truth-conditionally vacuous elements that act as pure presupposition triggers, modulating the expressive meaning that is conveyed by means of *EX* [...] Each particle maps a proposition to itself, provided that the particle’s non-truth-conditional contribution is licensed in the utterance context. I conjecture that this is a hallmark of the meaning of discourse particles. (Grosz 2012: 263)

The reason why *only*, *at least*, *but* in English, *nur* and *wenigstens* in German, *solo* in Italian are used in optatives is to imply that the speaker’s wish is not too much to ask for. *Se solo fossi ricco*, ‘If only I were rich’, means that being rich would be a sufficient condition for the speaker’s preference to be satisfied. *Solo* means that it takes little effort to overcome the threshold that conveys a high preference with respect to the contextually lower alternatives in the scale of preference. This analysis is extremely similar to Manzini’s view on DParts. These particles do

not convey optative meaning: they modulate it, contributing pragmatic and presuppositional meaning to the utterance without altering its truth conditions.

2.1.2 *The contribution of optative magari*

Grosz does take *magari* under consideration, along with what he considers to be cases of *Adv-Optatives*. In his opinion, these are optatives that do not involve an *EX* operator. The presence of a dedicated and optional optative adverb serves to characterise the propositional content as the speaker's wish, without a scale being involved. These elements would not be optative operators; rather, they would be comparable to English *hopefully*.

Spanish *ojalá*, which is not dealt with by Biezma in her chapter on optatives, but is considered by Grosz, would be one such particle. This element has an extreme-degree quality to it, in that it derives from Arabic *law šā'a l-lāh*, 'if (only) God wanted'. As noted by Kehayov (2009), reference to heaven, hell and supernatural elements in general is often exploited by languages as a way of conveying extreme-degree readings, since at that point the utterance concerns states of things which could not be normally achieved in w. What better way of reaching highest desirability than hoping one's wish to be God's will?

- (20) a. Ojalá (que) me dejaras en paz!
if.only C me you.left in peace
'If only you would let me be!'
- b. Ojalá (que) me dejes en paz!
hopefully C me you.let.SUBJ in peace
'Hopefully you will let me be!'
- c. ¿Qué dice Juan que ojalá hubieras comprado?
what says Juan that OJALA you.had bought
'What does Juan say that he wishes you had bought?'

The syntax of (20) is also interesting. For one thing, it proves that *ojalá* is in the left periphery above the complementizer *que*. The complementizer is optionally present below the optative element, which is also a remnant of the original biclausal construction. Grosz considers members of the *magari* family to be part of this category as well, because they are embeddable (as in (20c), which means that they are not expressive, so they lack an *EX* operator) and because they are not (necessarily) exclamative. He also lists *magari* as a candidate for being one of these optative adverbs. We disagree with this view. For one thing, Grosz himself notes that native speakers consistently refuse the embeddability of *magari* optatives:

- (21) *Gianni dice che magari fosse ricco.
Gianni says that magari he.were rich
'Gianni says that he wishes he were rich.'

Given that non-embeddability is a crucial test for determining whether an element is such an optative adverbial, this is enough to rule out *magari*: it is best to consider an *EX* operator to be present in Italian optatives with *magari*. Moreover, clauses with *magari* are always exclamative and always refer to the speaker's wish (*ojalá* may well refer the wish to the matrix subject, as above). Most importantly, Grosz does not consider the wide variety of meanings *magari* has in Italian, which makes it doubtful that restricting the characterisation of *magari* as optative adverb

is satisfactory. For these reasons, it is best to consider *magari* as having a definite contribution to optatives, deriving from the application of its semantics to the whole utterance.

As a first step, consider one of the most commonly used forms of optative and desiderative sentences: curses and wishes. These are rapidly dealt with by Grosz (2012: 261). He concludes, rightly in our opinion, that *magari* is not what he calls an optative licenser, because Italian optatives do not need its presence. He also cites wishes in Italian, noting that they are particle-less, but does not go on to test them for the presence of *magari*. If *magari* is just an optional general-purpose optative marker, we would expect to find it in any type of optative construction (like *ojalá*, which can be found in wishes and in optatives with the present subjunctive as in the examples above). The examples below show that this is not the case:

- (22) a. (*Magari) ti venisse/venga un accidente!
 magari to.you would.come a disgrace
 ‘Woe betide you! (lit. If only evil befell you!)’
 b. (*Magari) (che) Dio ti benedica!
 magari C God you.ACC bless.SUBJ
 ‘God bless you!’

Why do wishes not allow for *magari*? Which element is missing in comparison with other optatives, which bars *magari* in these cases? The first thing to be noted is that the utterance in (22) can use both present and past subjunctive. (22a) rather corresponds to English *May evil befall you*, which is not an *if only* optative. The fact is, these optatives do not express preference *in bringing about a desired and presupposed consequent*. In *if only* optatives the desired state of things is presupposed, but in this case it is expressed in the optative itself. The speaker expresses the wish itself, not a preferred condition that brings it about. This can be seen as presupposition failure: *magari* needs a presupposed state of things, which is desired, and it needs a scale of preference defined along an ordered set of propositions that make it happen. When no such presupposition is present, *magari* is not acceptable.

Magari has been recognised as accessory in determining optative mood. This is probably the reason behind the expansion of its uses: had it been a non-obligatory optative marker, as Grosz has it, we would have to allow for a number of changes and shifts in its semantics to expand its uses. Instead, considering its contribution to be independent of optative meaning gives an opportunity to maintain our hypothesis that *magari* could be the same element in all cases. The next paragraphs will be devoted to understanding what the exact semantics of *magari* are, developing the suggestions derived from the optative case.

2.2 *Magari* as a short answer


Before going on to examine the shift from optatives to hypotheticals, it is fitting to examine the use of *magari* in isolation, since this can be derived from the optative semantics. As mentioned, *magari* can be either a positive or a negative answer, and is thus very similar to holophrastic answer particles. Merchant’s (2004) theory of responsive ellipsis assumes that short answers are produced by PF-deletion after evacuation of relevant material (the answer proper) via focus extraction. Since focus is a means of highlighting the only member of a set of alternatives that makes a proposition true, this makes much sense. In this view, the Ellipsis Condition (EC) requires that all the material that is silenced by ellipsis be old. The semantic condition on ellipsis is e-givenness: “roughly, an expression E is e-given iff there is an antecedent

A which entails E and which is entailed by E” (Merchant 2004: 672), which means that there must be mutual entailment between the semantic content of the antecedent expression and that of the elided one, a condition also known as ‘no new lexeme requirement’. Additionally, ellipsis has a syntactic condition: what is elided is the complement of F° , which means that anything that is found in the fragment must be situated to the left of the elided site, i.e. at least in F° or SpecFocP. Evacuation of the fragment to SpecFocP has not only the purpose of highlighting the answer through the salient position to which it is moved, but also of exploiting the purpose of Focus, described by Krifka (2007: 6) as a device which “indicates the presence of alternatives that are relevant for the interpretation of linguistic expressions”. The function of Focus is showing which element is the only one that makes the proposition true, which in the case of questions is the answer. (9) and (10) can be represented like this (square brackets indicate the ellipsis site):

- (23) A: Vuoi che apra la finestra?
 B: Magari [apriSSI la finestra]!
 if.only you.would.open the window
 ‘If only you would open the window!’
 The speaker wishes that $p = 1$ in $w \rightarrow$ yes
- (24) A: Hai finito di lavorare per oggi?
 B: Magari [avessi finito di lavorare]!
 if.only I.had.finished to work.INF
 ‘If only I had finished working!’
 The speaker would like $p = 1$, i.e. $p = 0$ in $w \rightarrow$ no

Taking short-answer *magari* to be the result of ellipsis dispenses one from assuming that *magari* means ‘yes’ in the case of offers and ‘no’ in the case of yes-no questions (YNQs). This use of *magari* can be analysed as an elided optative sentence based on the content of the offer/question. In the case of an offer, the speaker’s wish that the propositional meaning of the previous interrogative be true is pragmatically interpreted as a positive answer. The questioner’s reasoning goes along these lines: ‘I offered the hearer to bring about p and she manifests the wish that p be true: this amounts to a positive answer’. In the case of YNQs, the reasoning is similar. A question is a demand for a truth value for p . Instead of giving it, the interlocutor, again, expresses the wish that p be true. This means that p is not true in w (otherwise, why wish it?), hence the negative meaning of *magari*. In both cases, the meaning of the short answer is pragmatically derived from the context, via an implicature.

This is also strong evidence that optative *magari* is in a focus position, at the very least in the case of short answers. In Merchant’s terms, responsive ellipsis is ellipsis of the complement of F° . Taking the material following *magari* as its complement nicely accounts for all these facts, as can be seen in this tree for (23) (the complement of F° has been indicated generally as FinP):



Thus, although it is hard to generalise the position of optative *magari* to that of focus (see fn. 3), there is some evidence that *magari* can indeed occupy SpecFocP, and that it does so in fragment answers.

2.3 Hypothetical *magari*, additivity and scalarity

Optative and Desiderative are subcategories of Irrealis Mood, which means that optative clauses already have an Irrealis quality to them, as was mentioned in the previous section: what is wished or hoped is either untrue or uncertain.

The difference between Conditional and Potential reading is that, in the case of Conditional, *p* is not true in the actual world, while in the case of Potential, it is not certain whether *p* is true in the actual world or not, but it is not ruled out either. This difference is not a feature of *magari*, at least not *per se*; after all, even optative *magari* has been known to display either the wish that something *were* true, or that it *be* true. This is clear if one takes the English sentence *If only John were alive!* In a world in which John is dead, the optative has the Conditional reading (John is dead in the actual world). Anyway, the sentence is also acceptable in the case in which the speaker does not know whether John is dead or alive and simply wishes that the proposition *John is alive* be true. The same point is made by Biezma (2011: 77): “counterfactuality is not essential for optatives [...]. Rather, what is essential is the speaker’s ignorance regarding the truth of the proposition in the if-clause: for an optative to be felicitous the speaker must not know that the proposition in the antecedent is true”.

It is clear that at a certain point new uses became available to the item. The core semantics of *magari* must be the least common denominator of these uses. *Magari*’s contribution to optative construction has been taken to be rather dim. It is hard for speakers to analyse optative *magari* as an adverb whose purpose is marking optative mood.

What is the contribution of *magari* to the sentence, then? A fundamental component, which emerged from the previous analysis, is the presence of a scale. So, the next research question is which type of scalarity is involved with *magari*. A minimal pair with *forse* and *magari* can give a clue to this:

- (26) a. I liutai usano l’abete e l’acero, forse il salice
 the luthiers use the.spruce and the.maple maybe the willow
 b. I liutai usano l’abete e l’acero, magari il salice
 the luthiers use the.spruce and the.maple maybe the willow
 ‘Luthiers use spruce and maple, maybe willow’

(26a) means that it is possible that luthiers use willow beside spruce and maple, but that it is not known for sure whether they do so or not. Instead, (26b) means that luthiers possibly use willow. (26a) cannot be uttered felicitously by a speaker who knows for a fact that a given set of luthiers use willow. (26b) does not necessarily mean that the speaker does not know whether luthiers use willow, and can still be uttered if the speaker knows that luthiers use willow, but only seldom. *Magari* in its hypothetical use appears to have a sort of additive nature: it signals that the set of possible propositions can be expanded to include those in which luthiers use willow.

In the case of *magari*, we have seen that this element is first found in a context, optatives, in which a scale plays a very important role. When scalarity is absent from desiderative and optative sentences, as in curses, *magari* is no longer allowed, because a scale, that is, an ordering of propositions, is required. In order to account for the difference between *magari* in optatives

and its hypothetical use it is enough to consider the relevant scale not in terms of preference, but of likelihood. Actually, an inverted scale of likelihood or a scale of unlikelihood. In the example above, the speaker means that in w the proposition in which luthiers use willow is less likely to be true (less expected) than propositions in which they use spruce or maple. Willow is added to the set of woods though being less expected than other wood types. This means that, expectedly, *magari* is a chiefly epistemic element. Nonetheless, differently than in the case of *even*, willow does not have to be the least expected: we can imagine a context in which cocobolo is used, but to an even lesser extent. Simply, willow is used beyond a contextually given threshold in a scale of (un)likelihood. In this case, as in the case of optatives studied by Grosz (2012), reference to a scale is disjoint from reference to an extreme degree.

Still, this view suffers from two all too evident problems: i) how is the Irrealis nature encoded in *magari*? After all, (26b) is legitimate even in cases in which some luthiers do use willow, or in which all of them use it but only rarely. Couldn't the Irrealis hypothesis be weakened altogether to the reference to a scale likelihood, with other features of the clause providing the Irrealis nature? ii) is *magari* itself additive or scalar?

While the second question will be dealt with in the next paragraphs, an answer to the first question can be anticipated here. The content of the *magari* clause above is underdetermined with respect to the previous part of the utterance. Suppose that what *magari* does is signal that the propositional content lies beyond a given threshold in a scale of (un)likelihood, just as it happens in optatives with a scale of preference. As a matter of fact, nothing but *magari* is responsible for turning an assertion into a hypothesis. Take the sentence *Gianni ha vinto*, 'Gianni won'. Adding *magari* to this assertion weakens it: *Magari Gianni ha vinto* roughly translates as 'It is possible that Gianni won and it is possible that he did not win'. If we take that *magari* simply signals that the proposition is less likely along a contextually salient scale, then the feeling that the sentence is a hypothesis may be derived pragmatically. An interlocutor knows that the speaker might have chosen a stronger proposition (e.g. *Gianni ha vinto*), but chooses not to. The fact that the speaker signals that the proposition lies below a certain threshold of likelihood means that she cannot be any more precise about it, hence the assertion is perceived as a hypothesis or as a possibility. It is arguable that *magari* triggers something similar to an ignorance implicature: the speaker utters weaker p because she has no evidence to affirm stronger p' . The interplay of the Maxim of Quantity (be precise) and that of Quality (be truthful) is responsible for this implicature.

With the data collected so far, it is time to propose a semantic sketch of the meaning of *magari* in these seemingly hypothetical cases:

- (27) *Semantics of magari*:
 Given a proposition p , a scale S and a context c ,
 $\|magari\|$ is defined iff
 $\exists q \in C [q \neq p \text{ and } q = 1]$ and
 $\forall q [\text{THRESHOLD}(c) >_S q \rightarrow p >_S q]$

The first condition refers to additivity. In (26), the proposition with *magari* has alternatives (luthiers use spruce, luthiers use maple) that are true in the CG.

The second refers to the fact that the proposition of *magari* is always above the threshold along the scale S with respect to the alternative propositions. In the case of assertions, the scale involved is one of likelihood, instead of the scale of preference involved with optatives. This has the effect of mitigating the assertion: the first condition on additivity, *per se*, would not imply that the proposition of *magari* is weaker than the other ones.

When considering optatives, (27) appears to create a problem. Is additivity at play in optatives as expressed in the first conjunct? The present suggestion is that it is. Optatives are Irrealis because they concern a wish, but they set the wish against the background of the actual world, which is a set of true propositions. In other words, the proposition of an optative will always be uttered with reference to the state of things, that is, to a set of alternatives which are true but not satisfactory with respect to the speaker's wish. So, *p* is uttered with respect to a set of true propositions in optatives as well. But, none of these are satisfactory when it comes to preference. Optative *magari*, which is neither an optative licenser nor a truth-conditional element, is simply there to disambiguate the pragmatic import of the utterance, making it unmistakable that a scale of preference is involved (and that the speaker is not, for example, simply uttering the antecedent of a conditional, inviting the hearer to draw her conclusions).

Before moving on to a few more cases which confirm the insights above, it is worthwhile to look back at the premises of this analysis, namely Manzini's (2015) theory, and to consider how the definition outlined here interacts with it. First of all, the two views definitely confirm and even complement each other: the fact that Manzini (2015) assumes ontological identity between the adverb and discourse particle (that is, polysemy rather than homonymy or lexical proliferation) translates as assuming identity for the semantic import of the element across its uses. What Manzini describes as a syntactic and pragmatic property, with different interpretations arising in terms of scope which varies between a propositional and sentential reading, receives here a semantic treatment. To summarise this point, Manzini describes what happens at the syntactic level when an adverbial element receives variable readings depending on variable scope. The present work, on the other hand, demonstrates how a formal semantic analysis of one such element is compatible with that view. Given Manzini's premises, what is expected at the semantic level is that particles of adverbial origin will not have different semantics for each of their uses (which would amount to not being the same element) but rather a core semantics which gives consistent results across the specific contexts to which it is applied. Thus, Manzini's view and this analysis can be seen as complementary, confirming each other and demonstrating how a "look from the inside" at the adverbial item fully confirms the analysis and treatment given at the syntactic and pragmatic level. A few more cases will further clarify this point, showing that the definition in (27) can account for a number of uses of *magari* in which the interplay of scalarity and additivity is very evident.

2.4 Concessive *magari*: a look at Sicilian *macari*

(Old) Sicilian offers a very interesting viewpoint on how the concessive reading might have arisen and seems to point to a different path of development of Sicilian *macari*. An analysis of this case may well start with the *even* reading in which *magari* finds itself in concessive clauses.

The concessive use requires additional assumptions concerning the semantics of *magari*. As mentioned, this use of *magari* is typical of (some) colloquial varieties of Italian. (11) is repeated here as (28):

- (28) Supererò l'esame, magari dovessi studiare di notte
 I.will.pass the.exam even.if I.had to.study of night
 'I will pass the exam, even if I had to study by night.'

As can be seen in its English translation, a concessive sentence like (24) has two main components: the *if*-component and the scalar one (English *even*). Concessive *magari* does not

correspond to English *though* (which simply puts the main clause against the background of an embedded clause expressing contrariness to the content of the main clause), rather it is found in clauses like those introduced by *even if/though* in English, expressing both the hypothetical and the scalar quality.

Although the OVI corpus lists few examples for the item under exam, the related ArTeSiA Corpus, a corpus of Old Sicilian texts, has quite a bunch of them. The word under exam is *macari*. This word means 'also' in present-day Sicilian, and this seems to be the case with Old Sicilian as well. None of the examples listed below predates the 13th century, which confirms that optative magari is the oldest use in Sicilian.

- (29) non sulamenti di audirili et vidirili, ma macari di auridili nominari
 NEG only to hear.them and see.them but also to hear.them mention
 'not only to hear them and to see them, but also to hear them mentioned.'
 (*Libru di lu transitu et vita di misser sanctu Iheronimu*, anonymous, ch. 61,
 second half of the 15th century)
- (30) per non allargari macari d'un pocu di ligumi la sua stritta astinentia,
 for NEG slacken also of.a little of legumes the his strict abstinence
 non venia a tali spirituali convitu
 NEG came to such spiritual feast
 'in order not to slacken his strict abstinence even with a handful of legumes, he did not
 come to such spiritual feast.'
 (*Raxunamentu di l'abbati Moises e di lu beatu Germanu*, anonymous, 5.6.,
 first half of the 16th century)
- (31) E si macari a quistu modu non sanirà, tandu l'abbati servasi
 and if even at this way NEG heal.FUT then the.abbot serve.SUBJ.himself
 di lu ferru chi tagla
 of the iron that cuts
 'And if even in this way he won't heal over, let the abbot use the cutting iron.'
 (*Santu Benedittu abbati, Regula*, anonymous, ch. 28, first half of the 16th century)

In (29) *macari* is found in a sentence which corresponds to 'not only... but also...' in English. In (30) *macari* means 'not even' in the presence of negation. (31) presents a clear example of a concessive clause.

A quick online search (performed using the *glosbe.com* dictionary of Sicilian and a glossary of Camilleri's literary language) showed the following translations for Sicilian *macari*: 'also', 'even', 'moreover'. Let us turn to the *even*-part of concessives. *Even* creates a scale of likelihood, indicating that the circumstance involved in the predication is the least expected (of a given set of discourse-relevant elements). *Even Mark came* amounts to 'Mark came as well' plus the presupposition that 'Mark was the least expected to come'.

A concessive clause like (28), in which the content of the clause is presented as non-factual, means that, even allowing for an extreme condition (having to study by night), the speaker will pass the exam. Concessive clauses with *magari* cannot be true in the actual world in contexts in which the background of the concessive clause is true and it is not used with the indicative mood. It is only

used with the subjunctive mood. This means that in this case as well *magari* is barred from actual contexts. Anyway, *magari* does not have a concessive quality in and of itself. Compare (28) with (32):

- (32) Supererò l'esame, dovessi studiare di notte
 I.will.pass the.exam I.had to.study by night
 'I will pass the exam, even if I had to study by night.'

A concessive in Italian does not require the presence of *magari*, which seems to be redundant from a comparison between (28) and (32). Then, in the case of Italian it is not even necessary to assume that *magari* is endowed with a specifically concessive meaning. Concessive *magari* is more easily examinable as regular *magari*, applied to the concessive clauses with a non-factual propositional content. Concessive meaning comes about independently in Italian, as in (32). In this case, it is reasonable to think that a covert *even*-operator provides the scale and puts the propositional content at the endpoint of it. Whatever the exact dynamics of this process are, what is relevant is that a scale is created and that the extreme-degree reading is independent of the presence of *magari*. Once more, *magari* appears not to be truth-conditional. *Magari*, in a way, comes for free: if its purpose is that of relating a proposition that exceeds a certain threshold along a scale of likelihood with the true alternatives already present in the CG, it is obvious that the extreme degree of this scale, referred to by the covert *even*, will overcome that threshold, at whatever point it is set. In fact, *magari* is only there to act as a cue or, as Grosz (2012) puts it in the case of optional optative markers, as a disambiguator: (32), with no further characterisation, could be taken to be a conditional ('in the case I were to study by night, I would pass the exam'). In this latter reading, no scale arises: an effect (passing) follows from a cause/state of things (studying by night). This is a relation between a background and a foreground, no scale is defined. But if *magari* requires a threshold along scale to be used, then its presence is there to mark that a scale is at play, and thus that an extreme-degree reading, connected with a concessive one, is involved. Its purpose is leaving the concessive reading as the only available one. It is a prime example of a discourse particle use: it is non-truth-conditional (and in fact it can be removed without consequences) and its purpose is that of guiding the hearer towards a correct interpretation of the utterance.

On the other hand, it is not necessary to assume that Sicilian *macari* has a concessive quality to it either. Given that it means 'also', *macari* in conjunction with *si* ('if') corresponds to Italian concessive compound *anche se*, (literally, 'also if'). Rather, it is more interesting to speculate on how *macari* came to mean 'also' in the first place.

An answer to this question is, in a way, an answer to the second question above: is *magari* simply additive or is it scalar as well? First off, other elements from the *makari* family tend to expand their uses. In Romanian, for example, *măcar* has come to mean *at least* and *even* (!). These are clearly scalar uses. Anyway, what happened with Sicilian *macari* is probably different: it looks like this element, which is no longer used in optatives, simply lost the threshold condition, and only retained the additive one while lowering its scope. The exact nature of this loss would be the subject of an interesting research on Sicilian *macari*, which cannot be pursued here; let it suffice to say that the first conjunct of (27) is enough to account for its behaviour in present-day Sicilian. The fact that it means both 'also' and 'moreover', instead, suggests that scope played a role in its history: as an element meaning 'also' it can scope over constituents which are smaller than those involved with its Italian counterpart (*magari* is in fact limited to sentential scope). As an element meaning 'moreover', it developed the function of a discourse marker, whose function is purely that of relating the utterance to the previous context.

2.5 Imperative magari

Consider the following examples:

- (33) a. (Magari) prova (magari) in questo modo (magari)
 magari try magari in this way magari
 'You may try this way.'
 b. (*Forse) prova (*forse) in questo modo (*forse)
 perhaps try perhaps in this way perhaps

In (33a) *magari* is used in an imperative. *Magari* makes an imperative more of a suggestion than an order, or even an invitation. A *magari* imperative, like a *pure* imperative, apparently sounds more polite in offering a possibility rather than an order. *Forse* is incompatible with the imperative and (33b) simply makes no sense. It is clear that *magari* cannot be equivalent to *forse*: its contribution must be different.

This use of *magari* displays a behaviour which is very similar to that of German MPs. The very fact that it appears to mitigate an order underlines its similarity with German Abtonungspartikeln, like *bloß*, or Italian *pure*. Moreover, it does not alter the truth conditions of the proposition either by its presence or absence.

A comparison with *pure* suggests itself at this point. In *Prova pure in questo modo*, *pure* operates on the illocutionary force, presenting the order more as a permission than a command. On the other hand, *Prova in questo modo*, *magari* presents the proposition as possible: it does not invite the hearer to 'try that way if she will', rather it shows her that the option exposed in the propositional content is available. Since imperatives have either a bouletic or a deontic reading, showing the hearer that the propositional content of the imperative is possible rules out the second reading, as with *pure*.

So far, the contribution of *magari* is similar to that of *pure*. Nevertheless, the difference between the contribution of *pure* and *magari* to imperative sentences must be kept separate. The fact that they are not equal is confirmed by these examples:

- (34) a. (Magari) prova (magari) in questo modo (magari)
 magari try magari in this way magari
 b. (*Pure) prova (pure) in questo modo (*pure)
 pure try pure in this way pure

First of all, *magari* retains its usual positions as an adverb, while *pure* is syntacticised in MP position, which arguably accounts for its sentential scope. There are readings in which *magari* appears to scope over a specific constituent (for example, (34a) is compatible with a reading in which *magari* emphasises *in questo modo*). This is quite similar to what has been suggested in the previous paragraph, when talking about the additive properties of *magari*. The proposition of the imperative is added to the number of possibilities open to the hearer.

Magari appears to have some connection to the existence of alternatives, in a way different than *pure*. While *corri pure* ('run if you please') seems to be related to the alternative of not running (i.e. 'you may run and you may also not run'), *corri, magari* seems to suggest that running is a possible action to perform, not simply opposing it to 'not running'. Consider this example:

- (35) *A child asks his parent if he can run in the park, and the parent grants him permission:*
 a. Corri pure
 b. #Corri, magari
- (36) *A man is about to miss a train. He walks hurriedly. A friend who is with him understands that the man's pace is not enough for him to make it:*
 a. #Corri pure
 b. Corri, magari

(35a) is felicitous, because it provides an answer to the child's request, consisting in knowing whether he can run *or not*. This means that both the options of running and that of not running are present as possibilities in the context defined by the question. In fact, *pure* simply makes them both possible by allowing the child to run. Moreover, in (35) the speaker has an authority: he can effectively allow or disallow the child to run. In (36), such authority is not perceived but, most importantly, running is perceived as a new topic: *magari* imperatives appear to add something. The friend of (36) refers running to a set of options which are already part of the CG.

Both *pure* and *magari* are additive in a way, but *magari* appears once more to refer the content of the proposition to a threshold along a scale, which has been overcome. In (35), no such threshold is present: *pure* is more than enough to allow the child to run or not run: in that case, the matter under exam is 'running'. (36), on the other hand, is not just about allowing the man to run: it relates the content of the utterance to a previously (and, of course, implicitly) defined set of actions which are ordered with respect to each other. If (35) means 'you can run and you can not run', (36) means 'of all possible actions that are relevant in this context, you can also run'. There is a requirement for the suggested action not to be part of the shared knowledge for *magari* to be felicitous, which corresponds to the additivity requirement seen above. The possibility (bouletic) reading of the imperative derives from the fact that, as the speaker adds the content of the imperative to the set of possible actions, she does so by relating it to the previous knowledge.

This makes one wonder what sort of scale is involved in this case and which threshold is overcome. While the nature of this scale is not so apparent as in the other cases, a speculative analysis will be provided. It can be suggested that, similarly to optatives, these sentences involve a bouletic scale: an inverted scale of preference which, in this case, appears to be hearer-oriented. *Magari* imperatives point out to the hearer that another possibility is there to be tried. If the relevant set of propositions is made up of those ones which are possible for the hearer to perform, then their ordering can be made to derive from the hearer's preference. Though an imperative is neither true nor false, it can be true or false that the hearer has the possibility of performing an action. A bouletic imperative can well add a proposition to this set of *p*'s such that the interlocutor can do *p*.¹⁰ These propositions are then ranked in terms of preference, and *magari* is used by the speaker to acknowledge that the suggested *p* ranks lower. Again, *magari*

¹⁰ In this view, bouletic *Corri* would be more or less equivalent to 'it is true that x can run'. I think that a scale of preference is more viable than a scale of likelihood. In *Corri, magari*, the speaker emphasises that, despite having been considered less relevant, *p* is available. She does not put in doubt that the hearer is able to perform *p*. Actually, the speaker presupposes that the hearer is perfectly able to perform *p*. Given that *magari* is hearer-oriented, the easiest way to account for the relevance above is preference on the part of the hearer. It means more or less: 'you don't have to run, but if you want, you may'.

does not make the imperative bouletic in and of itself: rather, it excludes the deontic reading and situates the *p* with respect to other true propositions (such that the hearer can perform them), considering it beyond a certain degree of the hearer's preference (hence the politeness effect).¹¹

2.6 Romagnol magari

In the regional variety of Italian spoken in Romagna (from now on called Romagnol Italian for ease of exposition),¹² *magari* has taken on a very specific reading as a MP. Before moving on to Romagnol Italian, a look at Romagnol proper will show the origin of this expression. Libero Ercolani's dictionary of the Romagnol language, which cites Cielo d'Alcamo as an early attestation, lists *magara* as having the aforementioned optative meaning, but then goes on to present the example in (37a). Broadly speaking, *magara* in (37a) is a reinforcer: it is used to convey that the speaker is very confident of the truth of the proposition and it is used either as confirmation or as correction of a previous utterance. Adelmo Masotti's dictionary also cites the existence of a hypothetical usage of *magara* (37b). It must be noted that in this use *magara* occupies the same position as in (37a), below T.

- (37) a. L'è magari vèra! È proprio vero!, ma anche: È purtroppo vero!
 'she.is magari true! It is quite true!, but also: Alas, it is true!'
 b. E' srèb magari bôn ad dir ad nò
 he would.be perhaps good C say C no
 'He would perhaps/even be capable of saying no.'

Ercolani cites *magara* as a short answer as well. Here are some more Romagnol Italian examples. Note that B and B' are legitimate answer to both A and A':

- (38) A: Non lo sai perché non lo hai visto.
 NEG it.ACC you.know because NEG it. ACC you.have seen
 'You don't know because you haven't seen it.'
 A': Lo sai perché lo hai visto
 it. ACC you.know because it. ACC you.have seen
 'You know it because you saw it.'
 B: Lo so magari!
 It. ACC I.know magari
 'But I do know!'
 B': L'ho (magari) visto (magari)!
 it. ACC I.have magari seen!
 'But I have seen it!'

¹¹ I wish to thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing out to me that Greek *makari*, while mostly mirroring the Italian distribution, is incompatible with imperative morphology. Interestingly enough, the reviewer notes that it is attested with *na+V* in the negative form. Looking into this matter, I found that Modern Greek, replicating a pattern also seen in other languages including Italian, has a suppletive form for the negative imperative, which in the case of Greek involves the Subjunctive mood (as is the case in Spanish). Once the imperative is deprived of its specific morphology, no clash arises between *makari* and the imperative clause. This means that Greek *makari* does not only depend on semantics or speech act/clause type, but also on morphological and possibly syntactic conditions, something which would deserve specific attention in further research.

¹² "Romagnol Italian" is just a label for the Italian as it is spoken in the Romagnol provinces. Ontologically imprecise as it can be, it nevertheless identifies a use of the particle, which as such can be accounted for.

The present proposal is that Romagnol *magari* (henceforth RM) has gone down a different path than its Italian counterpart, pushing forward its modal potential, and it is developing into an MP-like element.

As to its MP status, first of all, RM does not have any effect on truth conditions. Removing it from the examples above does not change the meaning of the propositions, which shows that its interpretation is compatible with that of discourse particles.

Secondly, as Fraser puts it, its meaning is procedural rather than conceptual: it helps situate the utterance in the wider communicative context. Its pragmatic import is evident in that the speaker wants to communicate her stance with regard to her assertion. When it reverses a negative assertion, it is used by the speaker to signal that the proposition cannot make its way into the Common Ground, and that truth about the topic of the previous utterance must be re-negotiated. This means that RM has a specifically modal import which, paired with its non-truth-conditional meaning, points to an MP reading.

Thirdly, its syntactic position is relatively fixed and below T°. This property has already been presented as a marked similarity between Italian and German MPs, showing that the mid-position of MPs does not have to do with the presence of a *Mittelfeld* *per se*, since no such concept is current in Italian syntax. Moreover, just like German MPs, RM scopes well out of its position, over the whole sentence. This is true of (38B') as well, regardless of the position of the MP¹³ Moreover, *magari* cannot take its MP meaning if it is leftmost: **magari l'ho visto* is definitely ungrammatical with the reading under exam. This is a further clue to its MP status, since that of being fixed in a middle position is a well know property of MPs.

Fourth, RM does not take the desired meaning in isolation, nor can it be coordinated with adverbs:

- (39) a. A: Non sai fare.
 NEG you.know do
 'You can't do it'
 B: *Magari! (=instead I can)
 b. *Lo so decisamente e magari fare!
 it.ACC I.know definitely and magari do
 'I can definitely do it!'

(39a) shows that like German MPs, RM cannot be used as a short answer. This eventually boils down to the fact that, according to Merchant's PF-deletion view of ellipsis, particles would have to be moved to the left periphery in order to survive ellipsis, but since this is not possible because MPs do not move at all, RM simply cannot stand alone as an answer and the only possible interpretation is short-answer *magari*. (39b), on the other hand, touches on a much more delicate matter, the head vs Spec status of MPs. Without venturing into such intricate matters, let it be noted that, like German MPs, RM has the head-like property of not being coordinated with adverbials since, as heads, MPs could not be coordinated with full phrases.

¹³ Actually, a difference is to be noted: German MPs are not found below the past participle. Nevertheless, RM cannot occur below lower adjuncts:

- (i) L'ho (magari) visto (magari) col binocolo (*magari)!
 it.I.have magari seen magari with.the binocular magari
 'But I have seen him with the binocular.'

One more thing German MPs and RM have in common is that they cannot be modified: **l'ho visto ben magari* is ungrammatical.

2.6.1 *The pragmatic and polarity features of Romagnol magari*

Some formal features of the item confirm the data which come from its MP behaviour. Just as German MPs are clause-type and polarity sensitive, RM needs to be used in a positive assertion. This sets it apart from its other uses:

- (40) a. *Non l'ho (magari) visto (magari)!
 NEG it.ACC I.have magari seen magari
 'I haven't seen it!'
 b. *L'hai magari visto? (in the desired meaning)
 'Have you quite seen it?'
 c. *Fallo magari!
 Do.it magari
 'Do it!'

RM then aligns itself with Coniglio and Zegrean's (2010) assumption that clause-type is relevant for MP licensing. Note that no such effects as those in (40) obtain with regular Italian *magari*.

Another interesting feature of RM are its requirements with regard to the information status of the material in which the particle is found. As mentioned before, RM cannot be used out of the blue in order to strengthen an assertion: it either vouches a previous assertion from the interlocutor or contradicts it. Thus, it has a very prominent modal function, its purpose being that of manifesting the stance of the speaker toward the content of utterance.

- (41) A: Gianni non è venuto alla festa
 Gianni NEG is come to.the party
 'Gianni didn't come to the party.'
 B: È (magari) venuto (magari)!
 is magari come magari
 'He came indeed!'

As Coniglio (2008) points out, *mica*, which has been defined as presuppositional negation by Cinque (1976), displays a similar MP behaviour. Actually, RM could be considered the positive counterpart of *mica*. The latter can only be used in negative contexts, it is presuppositional (it requires the truth of the proposition in which it is found to have been put in doubt) and it does not alter truth conditions (not being the actual negative marker; a sentence with *mica* has the same truth conditions as one without it).

- (42) A: Hai sbagliato tutto
 you.have got.wrong all
 'You got it all wrong.'
 B: Non è mica vero!
 NEG is mica true
 '(Instead) that's not true!'

2.6.2 An explanation for the behaviour of *magari* in Romagnol Italian

What happens when RM is used is that the speaker either confirms something which the interlocutor has said or corrects it. In both cases, a topic is presented by the interlocutor and the speaker ends up strongly affirming, and committing herself to, the fact that the uttered proposition is true. When the previous utterance is negative, the speaker wants to stress that its content must be brought back into the Common Ground. When it is positive, the speaker vouches the assertion by committing herself to adding it to shared knowledge.

A similar case, German MP *ja*, is examined by Gast (2008), who couches his research in Relevance Theory. The German MP *ja*, which roughly means ‘as we know’, has some similarities with RM when the latter is used to confirm the previous assertion.

Concerning the function of *ja*, [...] this particle is used when a speaker presupposes that the hearer will not contradict or object to what s/he says [...] The function of *ja* can be characterised in terms of the present model as follows: *ja* indicates that an utterance constitutes a ‘trivial update’, i.e. an update in which a TP context C_i containing a Fact is mapped onto an output context C_o which is identical to the input context. (Gast 2008: 10)

Actually, the parallelism between *magari* and *ja* goes beyond that:

[T]rivial updates are made because they trigger specific contextual effects [...] More often than not, they strengthen existing suppositions or trigger ‘contextual implications’ [...] What *ja* does in such sentences is make a background assumption explicit which is (supposed to be) taken for granted (a Fact), thus enabling the reader to reach the right conclusions. (Gast 2008: 10-11)

Moreover, *ja* shares with *magari* the emotional and emphatic quality and “cannot be used in questions or conditionals, i.e. in any type of sentence or utterance which expresses Hypotheses rather than Facts” (Gast 2008: 12). Thus, Romagnol *magari* can be taken to be, like *ja*, an indicator of trivial updates in specific communicative contexts. This is why, as noted by Gutzmann and Turgay (2016: 11), *ja* is incompatible with new information: “In einem Kontext, in dem offensichtliche neue und nicht sofort ersichtliche Informationen präsentiert werden, ist die Verwendung von *ja* unangemessen”. One more factor which brings together *ja* and *magari* is that they are both propositional MPs in the terms of Gutzmann and Turgay (2016), which comment on the propositional content but do not operate on clause-type like Satzmodus-MPs. In fact, what is relevant in the use of RM is not that the utterance is an assertion (at least, not as far as the meaning of RM is concerned). Rather, what RM stresses is that the proposition is true.¹⁴

¹⁴ This difference is clear in the opposition between these two sentences: *Hein is wohl auf See* and *Hein is vermutlich auf See*. Both mean ‘Hein is probably at sea’, but while *vermutlich* comments on the propositional content of the assertion, like this <ASSERT(Hein is vermutlich auf See)>, and is thus a propositional MP, the other scopes over the illocutionary node, thus turning the assertion into a guess, in this way: <wohl(ASSERT)(Hein ist auf See)>. Since it involves a change in the illocutionary force of the clause, *wohl* is a Satzmodus-MP. These are the two partitions in the class of MPs: “Zum einen gibt es MPs wie wohl, die Satzmodusmodifikatoren sind, zum anderen die durch ja exemplifizierte Klasse, die man als ‘direkte, propositionale Modifikatoren’ bezeichnen könnte, da sie den propositionalen Gehalt direkt kommentieren. Wir bezeichnen diese beiden Gruppen der Einfachheit halber als Satzmodus-MPs bzw. propositionale MPs” (Gutzmann and Turgay 2016: 11). Since an assertion with RM is still an assertion, RM can be taken to belong to the first group.

The fact that *magari* is only found in positive assertions is more easily explained in terms of Coniglio and Zegrean's (2010) split between ILL and CT. While RM has a pragmatic and modal effect (that of reinforcing an assertion and of declaring the speaker's commitment towards it) which relates to ILL, this item has additional requirements concerning clause-type, encoded in the requirement that the CT of the sentence in which it is found be assertive and positive. In this view, it can be assumed that the illocutionary properties of RM and its clause-typing requirements derive from two different sources, that is, from its relation with two distinct functional projections in the split ForceP.

For the rest, *magari* is remarkably similar to *pure*:

- | | | | | |
|------|----|---|----|--|
| (43) | a. | A: Gianni non è venuto.
Gianni NEG is come
'Gianni didn't come' | B: | Gianni è magari / pure venuto!
Gianni is magari pure come
'Gianni came indeed!' |
| | b. | A: Gianni è venuto.
Gianni is come
'Gianni came' | B: | Gianni è magari / #pure venuto!
Gianni is magari pure come
'Gianni came indeed!' |
| | c. | A: Gianni è venuto?
Gianni is come
'Did Gianni come?' | B: | Gianni è magari / #pure venuto!
Gianni is magari pure come
'Gianni came indeed!' |

Both *pure* and *magari* have an additive function, so it comes as no surprise that their particle uses are similar. Neither can be used out of the blue, and both remark that the proposition must be added to shared knowledge. Still, *pure* only has a corrective meaning: it cannot be used in response to a question or to a positive assertion. *Magari* is fine even in the latter cases.

Our last suggestion is that RM serves another purpose. A standard Italian paraphrase of *Gianni è magari venuto* could be given along these lines:

- (44) Eccome se Gianni è venuto! / Gianni è venuto eccome!
and.how if Gianni is come Gianni is come and.how
'Gianni came indeed!'

(44) is as good an answer to the cases above as *magari*: it can be used with positive and negative assertions and as an answer to questions. *Eccome* literally means 'and how' and can be followed by a *se* complementizer, which both means *if* and introduces embedded yes-no interrogatives. *Eccome* is formed by a discourse marker, *e*, which like English 'and' relates the utterance to the previous context, and a word meaning *how*. It is not comparable to interrogative *how*, though; rather, it is similar to Zanuttini and Portner's (2003) exclamative *wh*-words. These are not (always) acceptable as *wh*-words in questions, but they serve a fundamental scalar purpose in exclamatives:

- (45) a. *Come è alto?
how he.is tall
'How tall is he?' (cf. *Quanto è alto?*, lit. 'how much tall is he?')
- b. Come è alto!
'How tall he is!'

In Zanuttini and Portner's (2003) terms, exclamation map a context D1 to a new context D2 in a process of widening, meaning that a new, higher degree of a given property is provided which was not contemplated before. In the case above, the context is widened to allow for a height which was not yet part of the degrees contemplated in D1. Like questions, exclamation denote sets of propositions (which is probably why *eccome* can be followed by an embedded interrogative starting with *se*). The *wh*-operator binds a variable for which an appropriate value cannot be found in the Common Ground. The new proposition is ranked with respect to its alternatives in the Common Ground along a scale which allows for a higher degree of the salient property. Thus, exclamation are inherently scalar.

The suggestion is that RM does more or less the same thing. RM, like *eccome*, remarks that the degree of certainty with which *p* can be asserted is high. What *magari* and *eccome* do is relate the assertion to a degree of certainty with which the speaker can assert that $p = 1$. *Eccome* quantifies the degree of certainty with which the speaker affirms *p*, and the same can be assumed for *magari*: along an epistemic scale, the speaker means that *p* lies beyond a threshold so that she safely assumes *p* to be true. What *eccome* and *magari* do, then, is in line with the behaviour of modal particles: when *magari* is added to a proposition, it brings about a modal reading which sets the proposition itself against the epistemic beliefs of the speaker. That is also why RM is redundant: the speaker could simply say *Gianni è venuto* to contradict the hearer, perhaps with the addition of Verum Focus. But Verum Focus, while being a powerful informational tool, does not bring in the speaker's beliefs in the way RM does. By adding *magari*, the speaker wants to stress that *p* is not only true (rather than false, which is what Verum Focus primarily does), but also that it lies beyond a 'safe' threshold in a scale which is defined on epistemic grounds (likelihood being based on the speaker's beliefs). This analysis is once more compatible with a definition of *magari* as a discourse particle and, more specifically, as an MP.

3. Conclusions

The aim of this paper was to define in which way a unified analysis of the several uses of *magari* can be provided. This amounts to finding its core semantics and verifying how they interact with propositional content and with pragmatic and informational aspects, like speaker's intentions and presuppositions. The results point to an analysis in which *magari* has two components: one is an additive function and the other is a peculiar scalar function. This function refers the proposition to a contextually given scale of propositions ordered according to a property, and crucially signals that, with respect to this scale, the proposition lies beyond a given threshold. The nature of the scale, contextually defined, is responsible for what *magari* means in the respective cases.

A final remark is in order here. *Magari* originated in optatives, clauses in which the presence of a threshold along a scale is fundamental for the correct discourse inferences to be made. Its optative origin appears to have been the single most influential factor in its further developments. It could be said that *magari* has not developed after all: it has maintained its additive and scalar import, adapting itself to situations in which an epistemic scale is relevant for the hearer to correctly interpret the utterance. This means that *magari* can be viewed under the label of a discourse particle with an epistemic characterisation, and reference to its additive-plus-threshold nature has been suggested to be an effective description of what it does, or rather what it means. More research may be required in some cases (as in the case of imperative *magari*, in which the effect of the particle must be described with respect to the semantics of the imperative, which are likely to be a little less obvious than what our sketch in 2.5 suggested),

but we hope that we have been able to shed new light on some old questions and to pose some new ones. For one thing, this paper has shown how reductive the term 'adverb' can be, and what influence a mood or clause-type can have on the particles that are associated with it and on their further developments.

In all cases, *magari* has been proven not to be truth-conditional: its semantic contribution derives either from the interaction with presuppositions and shared knowledge, or from the implicatures it causes and the pragmatic inferences on the part of the hearer. In all cases, *magari* has been taken to have a primarily discourse-related function, which again shows how blurred the boundary between the category of adverbs and discourse particles is (if needed at all).

References

- Bayer, Josef and Hans-Georg Obenauer. 2011. "Discourse particles, clause structure, and question types." *Linguistic Review* 28: 449-491.
- Beaver, D.I. and B.Z. Clark. 2008. *Sense and Sensitivity: How Focus Determines Meaning*. Malden: Wiley-Blackwell.
- Biezma, María. 2011. *Anchoring Pragmatics In Syntax And Semantics*. Doctoral dissertation, Amherst: University of Massachusetts Amherst.
- Cardinaletti, Anna. 2015. "Italian verb-based discourse particles in a comparative perspective." In *Discourse-oriented Syntax*, ed. by Josef Bayer, Roland Hinterhölzl and Andreas Trotzke, 71-91. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company.
- Cinque, Guglielmo. 1976. "Mica." *Annali della facoltà di lettere e filosofia, vol. 1*, 101-112. Florence: Leo S. Olschki Editore.
- Cinque, Guglielmo. 1999. *Adverbs and Functional Heads: A Cross-Linguistic Perspective*. Oxford: Oxford UP.
- Coniglio, Marco. 2008. "Modal particles in Italian." *University of Venice Working Papers in Linguistic* 18: 91-129.
- Coniglio, Marco and Iulia Zegrean. 2010. "Splitting up Force: Evidence from discourse particles." *University of Venice Working Papers in Linguistics* 20: 7-34.
- Ercolani, Libero. 1971. *Nuovo vocabolario romagnolo-italiano italiano-romagnolo*. Ravenna: Edizioni del Girasole.
- Fraser, Bruce. 1991. "Types of English discourse markers." *Acta Linguistica Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae* 38, 1: 19-33.
- Gast, Volker. 2008. "Modal particles and context updating: The functions of German 'ja', 'doch', 'wohl' and 'etwa'." In *Modalverben und Grammatikalisierung*, ed. by Heinz Vater and Ole Letnes, 153-177. Trier: Wissenschaftlicher Verlag.
- Grosz, P.G. 2012. *On the Grammar of Optative Constructions*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company.
- Gutzmann, Daniel and Katharina Turgay. 2016. "Zur Stellung von Modalpartikeln in der gesprochenen Sprache." *Deutsche Sprache* 42, 2: 97-122.
- Haegeman, Liliane and Virginia Hill. 2013. "The Syntacticization of Discourse." In *Syntax and its Limits*, ed. by Raffaella Folli, Christina Sevdali and Robert Truswell, 370-390. Oxford: Oxford UP.
- Holmberg, Anders. 2013. "The syntax of answers to polar questions in English and Swedish." *Lingua* 128: 31-50.
- Kehayov, Petar. 2009. "Taboo intensifiers as polarity items: evidence from Estonian." In *STUF – Language Typology and Universals*, 62, 1-2: 140-164.
- Krifka, Manfred. 2007. "Basic Notions of Information Structure." <<https://edoc.hu-berlin.de/handle/18452/10137>> (06/2020).
- Larrivé, Pierre and Cecilia Poletto. 2018. "Mapping the Syntacticisation of Discourse: The Case of Sentential Particles." <<https://www.researchgate.net/publication/328077762>> (06/2020).

- Manzini, M. Rita. 2015. "Italian adverbs and discourse particles: Between recategorization and ambiguity." In *Discourse-oriented Syntax*, ed. by Josef Bayer, Roland Hinterhölzl and Andreas Trotzke, 93-120. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company.
- Masotti, Adelmo. 1996. *Vocabolario romagnolo-italiano*. Bologna: Zanichelli.
- Merchant, Jason. 2004. "Fragment Answers." *Linguistics and Philosophy* 27: 661-738.
- Pesetsky, David and Esther Torrego. 2007. "The Syntax of Valuation and the Interpretability of Features." In *Phrasal and Clausal Architecture: Syntactic Derivation and Interpretation. In honor of Joseph E.monds*, ed. by Simin Karimi, Vida Samiian and W.K. Wilkins, 262-294. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company.
- Pianigiani, Ottorino. 1907. *Vocabolario etimologico della lingua italiana*. Rome: Società Editrice Dante Alighieri. <<http://www.etimo.it/>> (06/2020).
- Rizzi, Luigi. 1997. "The Fine Structure of the Left Periphery." In *Elements of Grammar*, ed. by Liliane Haegeman, 281-337. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
- Roussou, Anna. 2015. "Is particle a (unified) category?" In *Discourse-oriented Syntax*, ed. by Josef Bayer, Roland Hinterhölzl and Andreas Trotzke, 121-158. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company.
- Speas, Peggy and Carol Tenny. 2003. "Configurational properties of point of view roles." In *Asymmetry in Grammar: Syntax and Semantics*, ed. by A.M. Di Sciullo, 315-344. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company.
- Zanuttni, Raffaella and Paul Portner. 2003. "Exclamative Clauses: At the Syntax-Semantics Interface." *Language*. 79, 1: 39-81.

Sitography

- Corpus ArTeSiA. Archivio Testuale del Siciliano Antico <<http://gattoweb.ovi.cnr.it/>> (06/2020).
- Corpus OVI dell'italiano antico. Istituto Opera del Vocabolario Italiano < <http://gattoweb.ovi.cnr.it/>> (06/2020).

