
HELMUTH PLESSNER

Translated by MATTHEW BOWER University of Memphis

University of Memphis

mbower@memphis.edu

THE OBJECTIVITY OF THE SENSES

Translator's Note

The following translation is of a short passage from *Die Einheit der Sinne* (*The Unity of the Senses*) by Helmuth Plessner (1892-1985), a leading figure of twentieth century philosophical anthropology in Germany along with Max Scheler and Arnold Gehlen. Originally published in 1923, *Die Einheit der Sinne* now appears in Volume III of Plessner's collected works (Plessner 2003). The passage translated here (Plessner 2003, 293-305, 313-315) is extracted from the last section of that work, which is titled "The objectivity of the senses". In this passage, Plessner recapitulates some of the major points of *Die Einheit der Sinne* in order to draw out their philosophical consequences. The theme of the work is what Plessner calls an "aesthesiology" of the senses. This project offers a philosophical account of the nature of sensory perception. Like some contemporary accounts of perception emphasizing its enactive and embodied character, Plessner's aesthesiology does not neatly map onto the classic intellectualist picture of perception as the reception of information by a disembodied and disengaged mind.

Plessner seeks to shed light on the nature of the senses by contextualizing their qualitative aspects (i.e., as phenomenally conscious) within the whole person. Besides being phenomenally conscious in sensory perception, a person is an agent of "sense-bestowal" (*Sinngebung*) and is always attuned to the world in a certain bodily "stance" (*Haltung*). The sensory modalities, on Plessner's view, are essentially interrelated with these mental and bodily phenomena, and only this integrated whole gives us genuine sensory perception. These ideas interestingly anticipate certain claims currently gaining more currency within philosophy of mind and cognitive science, like claims that action or the body is constitutively (rather than merely causally) bound up with perceptual experience. Severing the sensory modalities from their role in the mind's sense-bestowing activity and its expression in the lived body (*Leibkörper*) is a dead end that will only obscure the nature of perceptual experience.

On the basis of the intimate unity of body, mind, and sensory modality in Plessner's theory, the results of his aesthesiology are supposed to not only clarify the nature of sensory perception, but also the vexing and longstanding philosophical issues of how to understand the mind's relation to the body and to the world. Plessner argues here that conceiving the sensory modalities as the interface between the mind and the body or the world is the only way to

get past the difficulties inherent in various extant versions of dualism and monism. His proposal has the virtue that it brings mind and body or mind and world together without either interposing a dubious *tertium quid* or leaving unanswered precisely how all the terms in question interrelate. The sensory modalities are suitable for the task of crossing this metaphysical bridge due to their variety as types of intuition capable of making “objective” (presenting to phenomenal consciousness) both mental (in “encountering” intuition) and bodily or worldly (in “cognizant” intuition) events within a fundamentally unitary structure of intuition.

[293] With sensory cognition as a way of connecting <Verbindung> body and mind <Geist>, we have found the presupposition for the resolution of the initial problem of our investigation. It was correct [294] to connect the question of the objectivity of the senses, an age-old theme of philosophy, with the question of the basis of their multiplicity. For anyone unbiased, these themes surely belong together as aspects of one and the same issue. Through the course of the [present] treatise, admittedly, the epistemological problem stood entirely in the background. The theory of the modalities took all [of our] attention. Now we see that this task was not merely of use for the problem of objectivity, but is really the basis of its resolution. We would never be able to discern the peculiar sense of a sensory modality if we simply proceeded descriptively/analytically and attempted to parse the qualitatively different sensory impressions. A sound that carries over from the street, a ticking clock, a door slamming in the distance are certainly acoustic phenomena that can be observed with care. But one is hard pressed to discern the acoustic quality of such phenomena. Every attempt to clarify it will be disregarded as only a deferral of analysis, [since] it remains something irreducible, [something] merely felt in the impression, [and] perhaps one or another impressional character can be predicated of it, but typically only psychical and physical attendant appearances. Or suppose we turn to an optical lived-experience, the view of a house, for instance, or even a work of art. The analyst does not know what to do with it. If he has separated what is objective, what has a phenomenal character <den Anmutungswert>, [and] the physiological conditions, he will advance to what is ineffably qualitative and understand nothing further. That is how all philosophers hitherto have fared who were sincere enough to admit the incomprehensibility of the sensory qualities of directly accessible nature, but [who] unfortunately replaced direct access with something else. A question arises in that regard.

Had anyone ever made this observation, then the next logical step would be to devise an indirect method of inquiry for bringing nature to expression in this way. Just as Kant [295] attempted to replace an immediate theory of objects <Objekttheorie> with the *epistemology* of objects <Objekterkenntnistheorie> (and that meant for him a critique of exact natural science), likewise must the theoretician of sensory qualities introduce those accomplishments¹ <Leistungen> that are possible on the basis of one and only one quality (modality). Only the perspective of the accomplishment allows one to inquire meaningfully about the specific properties of a quality (modality).² Only what the senses specifically make possible constitutes the legitimate content of their critique. They should be understood by their fruits. For that reason, aesthesiology broadens the field of investigation and spreads it out over the entire domain of human activity, tracking down those consequences that come about with the help of only one sensory modality, only one sensory quality. The secret of the indirect method of inquiry consists in leaving the task of isolating a sensory quality not to the scholar's artifice, but allowing the isolation to be carried out by human culture and taking note of its results. In that case, philosophy does not have in its purview any useless analytical deferrals, but has viable, meaningful products of a synthesis of mind and sensory modality, and [it] can recognize its peculiarities in the specific forms of mental sense-bestowal <Sinnggebung> in this or that material. Is it not much more likely that mental life takes whatever is useful from the sensory content of everything, and [that] in the course of its history [it] will not very easily miss any possibility for deployment that is it is given by virtue of the nature of the senses? Even the greatest scholarly effort is ephemeral, compared to the ongoing labor of human generations. In the immeasurable urge for expression and ever new expression, in the constant need to replace past accomplishments with [something] unfamiliar, [something] original, [the urge] to improve upon and displace the old with what is new and fresh, the human spirit, as far as we know of it, is never satisfied and is in this manner the harshest critic of itself and its ways. What was to be achieved in this kind of existence must have been known to the human spirit long ago in its accomplishments. The bounds of its efficacy, understood as the limits [296] of its essence and its

1 There is no apt English equivalent to the German term *Leistung* (also importantly used by Husserl). The notion is meant to capture a performed action with a determinate end result. "Performance" and "achievement" are thus alternate renderings. "Accomplishment" has connotations of both an action undertaken and something achieved therein.

2 One should take note that Plessner frequently uses "quality" and occasionally "mode" as synonyms for "sensory modality." – Translator's note

manner of being, are the subject matter of philosophy, although perhaps not exclusively.

In the course of history and in our own time, the human spirit has developed with full vitality only geometrical sense-bestowal in the pure element of the optic mode [and] only musical sense-bestowal in the pure element of the acoustic mode. Painting, sculpture and architecture indeed move principally in the element of the optic mode, although not purely. Their sense-bestowal stops short of objective significance, [since it is] also partially formed in collaboration with several sensory qualities. The same holds for the verbal arts in all their levels of complexity, from lyrical poetry to theater. As polar configurations of the mind, geometry and music make possible for aesthesiology a decisive backward reference to the essence of the modalities in question, purely in the form of sense-bestowal (the former as schematic, the latter as thematic) [and] purely in the material of sense-bestowal (in the one case optic, in the other acoustic). Each mode affords use of a particular mental function in a particular sense.³ Musical expression, as people say, is addressed to feeling, [and] geometrical expression is addressed to the understanding. Both configurations thus correspond to the different values of different forms of conduct. The realm of aesthetic value employs a different kind of conduct for the person than the theoretical realm in order to make intelligible its specific sense of validity. That indicates that forms of conduct correspond to manners of mental sense-bestowal, that sense and [bodily] stance <Haltung> rigorously determine one another in accordance with the law of sequential levels of ordered functions, [and] so sensory quality and form of stance <Haltungsweise> stand in a precisely comprehensible essential connection.

The form of sense-bestowal and the form of stance always correspond to one another by means of a sensory quality, [since] the modality constitutes the basis for the possibility that a particular kind of mental function gains material shape <Gestalt>, employment in physical data, [or] expression in physical symbols. The modality, as the theory of accordance shows, is the form that is needed for a connection between the mind (as the unity of sense-bestowal in [297] its manifold functions) and the lived body <Körperleib> (as the unity of stance in its corresponding functional multiplicity). The immediate musical determination of bodily stance by means of sensory contents, which are naturally emphasized, is only possible in the acoustic mode, [and] immediate geometrical direction through

3 On this matter, see especially Chapter 2 and 3 of Part Three. – Translator's note

schemata for bodily stance (in actions) is only possible in the optic mode.

But is the essential analysis of the qualities exhausted with that? Life shows, in fact, that normal seeing and hearing do not in any way need to be connected with the presence of geometrical or musical aptitude and practice. Those can be erected above the[ir respective] modalities as mental superstructures. Animals also see and hear. Do the assertions of aesthesiology then hold only for the geometer and musician? We know that the blind also do geometry, and [we] have shown that the aesthesiological truth is not affected by such a failure of the modality to appear. Nor is it aesthesiologically significant if the mental utilization of sensory qualities fails. Only the fact that one sort of meaningful and pure utilization of certain qualities can arise in general, [that is, the fact that] sense-bestowal is connected in a determinate form to determinate achievements with determinate sensory material – this fact alone suffices to teach us to view the original phenomenon in the appropriate sensory modality. Music and geometry, as the specific mental employments of sensory modes, are for us only symptoms of what is possible, an aid for understanding what would otherwise hide its mystery from us in silent splendor.

We do not, by virtue of the fact that we interpret a sensory mode, take away the muteness essential to it, [that is,] what is qualitatively irreducible in an appearance or the sensory nature of what is sensibly [present] for consciousness. We insert nothing into it, as if we wished to say that the purpose of the optical mode is to mediate the archetypical directions of consciousness, the primal form of the anticipation of goals of movement, [and] the purpose of the acoustic mode is to make possible for the body meaningful motivations for expressive movements. That means seeing in the quality of every visual and acoustic impression [298] a germinal form for geometrical and musical sense-bestowal, perpetrating a falsification of the *lived experience* of the quality [in question] to which the psychologist must object with good reason.

The goal of the senses is to inform a psychophysical individual of bodily circumstances and natural events. How does it pull that off, since there exist, physiologically, only excitations of sensory surfaces and of the central nervous system and, physically, [only] quantitative alterations of the material as the stimuli of these excitations? How is it that consciousness, as a bearer of the mind, can perceive external to its body a world of physical objects <Körpern> in the excitations of [its own] body in a qualitative manifold? How can a body have an effect on a mind? The problem of the

objectivity of the senses breaks down into these three questions.

The resolution of the problem that forms the core of material epistemology (as distinct from formal [epistemology], which deals with the problem of validity) is provided with the clarification of the sensory modalities as modalities of the connection of mind and lived body <Körperleib>. Body and mind are bound up with one another in three distinct ways, [namely,] optically, acoustically, and conditionally <zuständlich>.⁴ These three connective possibilities, which are all realized in human beings, correspond to three kinds of sense-bestowal, [namely,] the schematic, syntagmatic, and thematic, although [the correspondence is] not generally direct. The mind is involved in the connection as a unity of sense-bestowal, holistically as in both its thematic and schematic function, [and, similarly,] the lived body <Körperleib> [is involved in connection] as a unity of stance, holistically as in both the forms of expressive stance and action. To speak of any metaphysics in what we have thus accomplished can only be a complete misunderstanding. Nothing about the sensory qualities is hypostatized, except what they grant, [namely,] what they themselves grant in the accomplishments of geometry and music. Here their nature as ways of connecting sense-bestowal (mind) and stance (lived body) reveals itself.

But once we have discovered this decisive step in the requisite connection of body and mind, then there can no longer be any fundamental difficulties in the clarification of the [299] original consciousness of objects. The mental and the physical sides of the human person are surely connected with one another, according to this theory, by means of the senses, namely, by means of their qualities, without any need for the epistemologist to take offence at this genuine *μετάβασις εἰς ἄλλο γένος* [*metabasis eis allo genos*, transition into another genus].⁵ The subject sees, hears, touches, smells, [and] tastes things with their properties in the modalities that are necessary for constituting mind and body in the conscious and self-conscious unity of a person, which [i.e., modalities], put precisely, represent the qualitative synthetic types of connection between mind

4 Plessner discusses this division in Part IV of the present work. The last of these terms, what is called *zuständlich*, has the sense of a "state" (*Zustand*), as in a mental state. Plessner singles out in particular with this terminology those sensory experiences that have purely subjective value, bearing on our psychophysical state rather than on the objects of experience (see especially Plessner 2003, 268). – Translator's note

5 This phrase, taken from Aristotle, denotes the error of treating a single subject matter within two intertheoretically incommensurate frames of reference. In this instance, Plessner is suggesting that it is not a fallacy (it is, he says, "genuine"). The justification for that claim follows shortly (see especially pp. 301-302). – Translator's note

and body. The bodily visual, acoustic, tactile, olfactory, [and] gustatory content are [also] explained according to their quantitative, spatiotemporal determinations on the basis of the physical and physiological process of stimulus and excitation. Their qualitative determination is explained as a way of connecting lived body <Körperleib> and mind. The perception or the sensation of a sensory object or datum, according to this theory, is warranted in its objectivity, [i.e.,] its capacity for grasping the thing, the source of stimuli itself.

Let us imagine perception for a moment using the image of a thread, one end of which is the subject of consciousness, [and] the other end of which is the thing or event in space. Then perhaps part of the string is extended as a purely physical process, as a radiating movement that is propagated in the medium of ether <Äther>, air <Luft>, [or] matter <Körper>. A series of nerves links up with it, first of all the excited area in the sensory organ, then in the nerves, [and] finally in the brain. Now there is still a part of the thread needing clarification. For the end does not lie in the brain. The latter is physical, [but] the former should be [something] mental. The monistic theory of parallelism entails that the end would be in the brain, although [that would] not [be] comprehensible for the external observer, but only for the bearer of this brain himself. The dualistic theory of spiritualism and interaction <Wechselwirkung> goes yet a step further, as it were, behind the brain and anchors the end of the thread in the non-spatial object of consciousness. Popular views of the problem are confined to this image of perception as a thread between object and subject.

[300]

Now, one can never avoid a *μετάβασις εἰς ἄλλο γένος* with this sort of mutually external and serial linkage <Neben- Hintereinanderschaltung> of the physical and the mental and one must thus operate with something entirely incomprehensible, whether one expresses it monistically or dualistically. The monist, the dual-aspect theorist à la [Gustav] Fechner, cannot reconstruct the conscious view of things, their qualitative appearance in the objective world, from the components of the physical stimuli and the physiological excitations, but remains in fact with these two views and asserts only their metaphysical unity. The physical and the mental are arranged alongside one another, but one cannot fold the one view over onto the other. Nor does the dualistic interaction theorist clarify the conversion

of nervous excitations into psychical or mental acts and contents, [that is,] the connection of the two kinds or orders of being, other than through a metaphysical hypostatization.

Our theory is in fact the only path. The sensory qualities are forms of connection, [they are] the bridges between the mind and lived body <Körperleib> and thus between the mind and the corporeal world. All theorems about projection and indication of localization used to explain our consciousness of an external world are symptomatic of the impotence of this way of inquiring about the connection of mind and body, and [they are] only one example of many. They are unnecessary once one understands sensory qualities in the manner we specify. The theorem that the presentation of a tree can be found in the hollow of consciousness and then exteriorized again in a “projection” is biased in the image of the serial linkage <Hintereinanderschaltung> of mental <geistig-seelischem> act and physical process; [so is the theorem] that we sense everything in ourselves, in our brain, [e.g., in the area] associated with the retina, etc., and [subsequently everything] is forced into this exteriorization and projection by means of acquired motor experience. The theorem that determinate processes in the retina or in the cerebrum could possess an original property of indicating localization for the psychical aspect [is] prejudiced in the same way.

A genuine understanding of perception then has to be attained above all first when one once and for all resolves the impossible coupling between [301] a physical process and a mind and sharply distinguishes the bearer of perception from the mind as the ideal unity of sense-bestowal. A conscious process can neither be “associated” with a physical stimulus/excitation process nor does it have any significance if one allows the two series of events [to be] in one metaphysical ontic relation <Seinsbeziehung>. At least, that does not resolve the problem of the possibility of perception. The physical process leads from the thing in space to the physical center of the perceiving person, whereas the psychical process, according to its sense, leads centrifugally from the psychical center to the content that intends and presents the thing. In the first place, the opposite senses <Gegensinnigkeit> of these two real component parts are essential to perceptual acts. For the reciprocity between the subjective advertence of the eye, ear, the skin, etc., toward the sensory field and the opposing subjective influx of light, sound, pressure, etc., is inherent to the sense of the [mode of] consciousness we call perception. Secondly, the opposite senses of the physical and the psychical

real components of perception follow from a reflection on their physical/physiological and psychological character.

But how – and this is the decisive question concerning the possibility of perception – can the psychical components be connected (in spite of their opposite directions <*gegensinnig*>) with the physical components? It would be fundamentally wrong to answer the question by seeking the *intermediary linkage* <*Zwischenschaltung*> of a mediating, connecting member. The bridge between the psychical and the physical cannot itself be yet another materially definable element, since this too must either belong to the physical or the psychical order of being <*Seinstypus*>. Furthermore, it must be remembered that the bridge has to be viable both for the intentional interrelation of the stimulus-source (the object) and the sensory content in the lived experience of perceiving as well as for the opposite sense of the real ontic relation <*gegensinnige Seinsbeziehung*> that is revealed in the scientific exploration of perception as an objective problem.

If one keeps these requirements in mind, then one arrives at the following sole possible result: the bridge between the psychical [302] and the physical can only be the sort in which both the psychical as well as the physical exist objectively <*objektiv gegenständlich*>. Objectively <*Objektiv-gegenständlich*> existing means, firstly, [for something] to exist in such a way that it can possibly be grasped by a subject, [in such a way] that it can become objective for a subject. What is possible for a subject is guided by the highest principle of meaningful relations, [namely,] the mind as the unity of possibilities. Objectively existing means, secondly, existing in such a way that it is possible for some matter <*einer Materie*> to come to presentation, to become objective. Matter becomes objective, comes to presentation, shows up, appears, namely, in the qualities of the senses.

Must matter appear straightaway in these and no other sensory qualities? Our investigation has answered that already in the theory of the harmonious system of the modalities: it is only possible in these modes as matter for a subject. All the diversity of what is possible in general, which means [what is] meaningful, forms a system, which coincides with the system of the sensory modalities in a determinately specified way. We have identified in the sensory qualities the manners of application <*Anwendungsweisen*> ([by that] we do not mean: forms of application or any material of application) of mental sense-bestowal to matter, the ways of

connecting mind and lived body <Körperleib>.

Thus we are forced to the conclusion that the sensory qualities (both on the side of what is formally possibly meaningful as well as on the side of what is materially possibly meaningful) present the types of objectivity, the possible modes of material existence. The optic, acoustic, and conditional <zuständlicher> domains of modality are the possible modes of our objective existence <Dasein>, that is, of our being as experienceable for consciousness. Both physical as well as psychical being are constituted in their qualities, that is, as genuinely exhibited content of our consciousness of nature or of the mind. Naturally, one should not think that this insight takes away the value of the claim that only what is physical is colored, has a sound, exerts pressure, etc., but what is psychical does not possess these properties. We can elaborate no further here about how and why the physical content of consciousness displays qualities as inherent properties of being colored, making a sound, having a smell, [and, likewise, how and why] the [303] psychical content, [such as] joy, temper, [and] thought, bears in itself qualities as specific phenomenal characters, as value characters and forms <Gestalten> hitherto hardly grasped. The widespread notion that the qualitative view of nature is, on the one hand, the sharpest criterion of its transsubjectivity and materiality, [and,] on the other hand, the subjective semblance <Schein> and manifestation <Widerschein> of the psychophysical organization of the subject refers in its ambivalence to the qualities' mediating role between mind and body. Moreover, all of our evidence for a close connection between sensory quality and bodily stance points to the consciousness of the body <Leibesbewusstsein>, to which people, especially since W[illiam] James, ascribe a central role in the construction of the psychical.

Although aesthesiology cannot deal with such themes extending into the realm of general psychology, not much imagination and competence in logical inference is needed to recognize the beginning of a resolution of the mind/body problem in the interpretation of the sensory qualities as ways of connecting mind and lived body <Körperleib>. Every content of consciousness – which means every content that can be characterized in its attributes, that presents itself as such – has, in accordance with what we said [above] about the essence and kinds of intuition,⁶ a matter, both physical as well as psychical. For the matter of the physical to be able to appear, it

6 This is discussed further on pp. 79-87 of this work. – Translator's note

must be graspable in the modalities of the senses. For the matter of the psychical to be presentable, which means manifesting itself to a subject who regards it from within *<innewerdenden Beachten eines Subjekts>*, it must likewise stand in these modalities of the senses, although in an entirely different manner than the physical. We encounter the former as a depicted *<darstellbaren>* content, as a figure, a form of appearance which the psychical never takes on, namely, as a thing with the structure of a core possessing properties. We discern the latter from within *<finden wir innerwendend>* as a determinable content, as an interpenetration of determinable properties *<Bestimmbarkeiten>*. The two [kinds of] matter, physical and psychical, however, are equally amenable to salience as contents in general.

This system of functions of intuition, which we have elaborated in more detail above,⁷ only takes into account in this respect the distinction between [304] physical and psychical contents when the possible functions of intuiting become visible in their peculiar character. We recognize the type of the encountering *<antreffenden>* intuiting precisely only in relation to the physical [matter], [and we recognize] the type of intuiting from within *<innewerdenden>* only in relation to psychical matter. On the other hand, this classification does not at all take into account the commonalities and distinctions of [the respective types of] consciousness of the physical and of the psychical. That is because [understanding] the actual consciousness of an actual natural object *<Naturding>* [or] an actual mental state does not yet enable us to specify the basic mode of presentation. Within this general basic form *<Grundgestalt>* of consciousness, the modalities ([i.e.,] the manner of seeing, the manner of hearing, the manner of conditionality *<Zuständlichkeit>*) first determine the possibility of the full perception of what is physical or of what is psychical.

One should not overlook here the fact that, in order to establish the senses in accordance with all the possibilities of the mind and of intuition, the grounding of a harmonious system of sensory modalities has to keep itself to the basic kinds of presentative, intuitive [consciousness], and of representative, understanding or, rather, sense-bestowing consciousness. First of all, a systematic

7 Plessner here refers to pp. 87-91. – Translator's note

topology of consciousness is needed. The sensory qualities are thus systematically interpreted on the basis of the laws of concordance between intuition, sense-bestowal, and stance, that is, in accordance with the contemplative receptive [side] as well as in accordance with the motor side. They are, further, interpreted on the basis of the laws of accordance between sense-bestowal and sensory material. Proceeding on that basis, the theory of perception passes over into drawing consequences for the relation between mind and material world <Körperwelt> that can be drawn with the aid of the interpretation of the sensory modalities as manners of connection of mind and matter.

Thus one need not additionally yoke oneself to the idea that matter and spirit <Geist> are the intermediary terms between body <Leib> and mind <Seele>, [i.e.,] that spirit extends, so to speak, into the mental components of perception [and] matter into the physical components, and [that] the connection of the two is brought about in that way. The real components and, similarly, the intentional components of perception are rather contents of consciousness and the [305] question of the possibility of their connection is capable of being resolved neither empirically nor metaphysically. It [i.e., the just-mentioned question] refers to the constitutive problem of the experience of what is physical or psychical and of their unification in one unitary consciousness.

Constitutional problems of the form “How is experience, the apprehension of something, possible?” can only be critically dealt with and resolved by the introduction of pertinent concepts. In this sense, Kant introduced into philosophy the “forms of intuition” of space and time [and] the “categories” as constitutive elements of the objective world. In our investigation, the qualities of sensibility <Sinnlichkeit>, which means [what is treated in] aesthesiology, put a new theory of the objectivity of nature, the central idea of which includes the theory of the modalities, in the place of the Kantian theory of the constitution of nature as it is laid out in the transcendental aesthetic, in the theory of the categories and in the schematism. A modality is, on the one hand, more concrete in intuition than [the Kantian forms of intuition of] space and time, [and,] on the other hand, more universal, since in it the mind comes to be exercised in all its types of sense-bestowal, whereas only the physical interpretation of nature had a place in the latter [i.e., Kant’s categories].

[...]

[313]

The theory of the modalities of perception and of perceptual cognition makes possible, first, the connection between consciousness and physical object <Körpergegenstand> or the *intentional* relation of subject and object. It makes possible, second, the connection of mind and lived body <Körperleib> or the *real* relation of psychical and physical factors in the unity of the human person as well as in the unity of the person with his environment <Umwelt>. As for the first, we have expressed ourselves on that matter sufficiently. Recalling Kant's transcendental factors ([i.e.,] the categories and forms of intuition) sheds light on the whole issue, but their interpretation should not [314] tempt us into further analogies. A modality is something fundamentally different from both a category and a form of intuition, although it accomplishes something similar (we do not say "the same"). Space is not the form of external intuition. Rather, the modalities are, to the extent that they can really encounter <antreffende> [something] in intuition. [And] time is not the form of internal intuition, of inner sense. Rather, these same modalities [are], to the extent that they can really intuit from within <innewerdende>. Nature and mind are constituted in these same modes of sensibility <Sinnlichkeit>, only in various intuitive directions. But since, as we have shown, the sensory modalities are concordant [with] the possible stances of the body <Leibes>, it therefore follows that the body as a unity of stance is the qualitative form and structure <Gestalt> in which body and mind exist anchored in one another. This insight shows that our critique of the senses immediately includes a theory of body and mind, the elaboration of which will be our next concern.

Since realism is beginning to take hold in psychology and the identification of the subjective with the psychical [or of] consciousness with the mental has been clearly seen to be untenable, significant problems for the present are returning that one believed to have been done away with long ago. A self-sufficient mind – whether it now appears substantial like a thing or like a whole world of things, [or] whether it appears functional – must satisfy determinate conditions as objective actuality. In the first place, among such conditions belongs a perceptual type appropriate to its essence, a manner of grasping that is of use only for the psychical. An inner sense (See Scheler 1955 [1919]; Scheler 1954 [1913-1916], especially pp. 393-342) is

coordinated with the external senses, internal (psychical) sensory organs are coordinated with external sensory organs, as in [Wilhelm] Haas (1921, Chapter II (pp. 45-92), especially p. 81). As a consequence of the basic idea of securing the objective reality of psychical phenomena, theoretical psychology arrives at insights that are of ancient origin. At all times, the mystic consciousness [315] has recognized the sensory life of the soul free of the body *<leibfreies>*. In the Middle Ages, the theory of the mind's five senses had the character of an assertion about experience; this tradition has never been entirely demolished and has even had an influence on profane philosophizing. Our theory of the senses simplifies, in a certain way, the state of affairs touched on in those views, although without having them as a resource for rendering the profundity and peculiarity of the connection of body and mind in the unity of bodily stance.

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