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The papers collected in this issue of *Phenomenology and Mind* were presented at the Spring School on "Naturalism, First-Person Perspective and the Embodied Mind" that was held at San Raffaele University, Milan in June 2014. As in the tradition of these philosophical schools, the meeting centred on the work of an outstanding living philosopher, namely, on Lynne Rudder Baker's philosophical views, and particularly on her recent book on *Naturalism and the First-Person Perspective*.

Beside the keynote speaker, there were seven invited speakers from four different countries, and ten contributed papers by scholars from five different countries, that were selected in a double-blind review process from a set of twenty-eight abstracts. The contributed papers subsequently underwent a double-blind review process when submitted in their full version.

Baker's 2013 book deals with a considerable number of important philosophical issues: most directly, the metaphysical one concerning the tenability of a scientifically-driven general worldview such as strong naturalism, but then also on many other topics: from the definition of our essential identity as persons to the specific characterisation of a robust first-person perspective in terms of "I-thoughts", from the criticism against eliminativist theories of the self, such as Metzinger's and Dennett's, to the discussion on Frankfurt-style compatibilism and moral responsibility. The papers presented at the conference discussed all aspects of Baker's proposal, and the presence and generosity of the author stimulated much lively discussion among senior and junior scholars.

This was not the first time that Lynne Baker came to visit the Faculty of Philosophy at San Raffaele: she had already been with us in May 2007 and, since then, relationships have strengthened, particularly with the main organiser of the School, *i.e.* Roberta De Monticelli. The papers collected in this volume are therefore a homage to the significant work of a philosopher and also an act of gratitude for an ongoing and lasting friendship.

In the first paper of this issue, Lynne Baker presents an overview of the main idea of *Naturalism and the First-Person Perspective*, particularly stressing the distance between her defence of an irreducible first-person perspective (FPP) against strong naturalistic and reductionist approaches, and the traditional Cartesian view according to which the mind is a separate substance, autonomous from the body. The difference between humans

and non humans, she claims, lies in the possession of a robust first-person perspective by the human individuals who master language, and in the remote capacity to develop linguistic abilities that characterises human infants. Contrary to Descartes', this approach insists that persons are not isolated thinkers or non-social entities, but members of linguistic communities; it does not view persons as pure minds, but as necessarily embodied; it does not attribute to the FPP any epistemic primacy, since its aim is ontological and not epistemological; it does not claim to be without presuppositions; it is not dualist; it accepts that many of the primary kinds of things are intention-dependent; it does not postulate any inner transparent realm to which every individual has infallible access. The remoteness of Descartes' perspective from hers would be even greater, Baker claims, if we should accept that Descartes was committed to the goal of the absolute conception of reality, as claimed by Williams.

Baker defends a metaphysical view that she calls "quasi-naturalism". In the following paper, Dermot Moran defends a much more anti-naturalistic approach to the person or self: the phenomenology view, which is characterised not only by the content of experience, but mainly by the modes of experience. Phenomenology, in fact, is a non-naturalistic, transcendental approach, according to which objects reveal themselves from the standpoint of attitudes. All kinds of objectivity, therefore, are constituted accomplishments, reached by a certain kind of intentionality. This is why, according to phenomenology, persons cannot be wholly naturalised, for it takes a personalistic attitude to recognise and understand them, and a naturalistic attitude fails to do the job. From the personalistic attitude, persons can be seen as sense-makers and position-taking individuals, who have a relation to their history and are embodied, social and intersubjective agents. It is mainly the capacity to take a stance on oneself and one's life, according to Husserl, that characterises persons: the ego, as he said, is a centre of affections, actions, interests and habits, on which it exerts ownership and control. Persons are intentional agents and embodied sense-makers, who are involved in an intersubjective horizon of other persons. Persons, moreover, cannot be understood only as autonomous, rational beings, for, as embodied beings, they share a world of feelings and emotions.

On the opposite side of the spectrum of philosophical positions, Michael Pauen defends the view according to which naturalism need not endorse an eliminativistic position on the self: on the contrary, it can save its concept, analysing it in terms of the lower-level phenomena that contribute to its implementation. The main problem with the self, according to Pauen, is

that every act of reflective identification presupposes self-awareness; this means that the self cannot emerge from reflection, but must be originally given in some kind of pre-reflexive self-awareness. This in fact happens, first, through the body-scheme of the core-self, *i.e.*, the pre-personal, affective capacity to recognise our body as our body, and to integrate its parts; second, through the theory of mind, that is, the capacity to adopt someone else's perspective and contrast it with our own. This perspective-taking strategy is much more cognitive than the body-scheme one, for it presupposes the ability to distinguish beings whose perspective you can take – *e.g.* humans and non-human animals – from those whose perspective you cannot take. Now, small children are able to make distinctions between the living and non-living, the human and non-human at a very early, pre-linguistic stage of development; and the same goes for mimicking con-specifics' behaviour and distinguishing emotions in facial expressions. All this comes well before twelve months of age, before the self-awareness evidenced by the traditional mirror test, before the capacity to master first-person pronouns and other forms of language, and before the capacity to correctly attribute beliefs to others. The conclusion is that a naturalistic defence of the self takes as central the capacity to recognise yourself as yourself: this is not a single ability, but a graduate one, progressively developing for emotions, perceptions and beliefs.

The metaphysical discussion between different forms of naturalism and other general philosophical approaches is tackled by Mario De Caro, who provides a very detailed overview of the different positions in the spectrum of general metaphysical worldviews, from strict naturalism to supernaturalism. Clearly sympathising with liberal forms of naturalism, De Caro explores the differences between this widely held philosophical position and Baker's proposal of "near-naturalism". He underlines several points of agreement between Baker and liberal naturalists such as Putnam, pointing to Baker's neutrality concerning the existence of supernatural properties as the main feature of genuine disagreement: this neutrality, he contends, is too liberal, and cannot be accepted even by liberal naturalists.

The metaphysical issue of supernaturalism also echoes in Katherine Sonderegger's paper that offers a theological discussion of the Biblical doctrine of creation in the light of modern and contemporary naturalistic approaches. She notes that a line of 'reductionism' concerning the conception of nature has always influenced the discussion on the interpretation of God's work in the creation: the ancient atomistic doctrine, trying to identify the deepest building blocks of reality, is mirrored by the attempt to understand God's work as the creation of basic particles or

elements, from which all particular objects are derived. This reductionist approach is also echoed in the medieval notion of 'prime matter', as the simple element entering into the composition of every created entity, and largely influences the philosophies of the modern era and the contemporary thermodynamic conception of the cosmos. In the face of this all-embracing naturalism, Sonderegger contends that Christians have reasons to continue to talk of God's work as the creation of individuals, not of particles, force-fields or natural laws: this is because theology must not aim at harmonising the Bible with astrophysics, but at guiding humans in the acknowledgment of the grace and gift that comes from the richness and plurality of the natural world.

A different kind of metaphysical question is taken on by Roberta De Monticelli who discusses Baker's theory of personal identity. According to Baker, all informative theories of personal identity are third-personal, and therefore miss the importance of the FPP; this is why Baker's theory accepts circularity as a consequence of the fact that the conditions of personal identity cannot be stated in non-personal terms. De Monticelli, on the contrary, believes that a first-personal but informative theory can be formulated if the issue of personal identity is understood in the context of a wider account of personal individuality. De Monticelli's main point against Baker is that there is more to having a first-person perspective than a capacity for self-reference, since pure self-reference is uninformative about whose self it is referring to, and Baker's reference to haecceity as the decisive property for being a particular person is blatantly circular. Self-*knowledge* transcends self-*consciousness*, and aims at clarifying the individual 'whatness' of a person. De Monticelli argues for a different sort of 'haecceitism', according to which having an individual nature is just as much essential to one's personhood as having a first-person perspective. In the wake of Leibnizian 'superessentialism', she views haecceity as an individual essence, *i.e.* a constraint on possible (co)variations of the properties that a person may possess while remaining that same individual; accordingly, personal identity across time consists in sharing this substantial unity, or 'Scotistic heacceity'.

A very different perspective is embraced by Michele Di Francesco, Massimo Marraffa and Alfredo Paternoster who jointly author a paper on *Real Selves? Subjectivity and the Subpersonal Mind* that was presented at the School by Di Francesco alone. Their aim is to discuss the issue of subjectivity putting aside any metaphysical perspective, and adopting an epistemological and explicative attitude. Contrary to Baker's approach (but sharing her basic intention), they build their vindication of the self not on a metaphysical

defence of the first-person perspective, but on a pluralistic reading of the nature of the science of the mental and on the assumption of pluralism at the explanatory level. Following the bottom-up approach common to contemporary cognitive science – an approach that moves from the automatic and pre-reflexive construction of representations of the external world, through the bodily self-monitoring, to self-consciousness – the authors suggest that a robust theory of the self must not understand the conscious subject as a primary subject, rather as emerging from the mechanisms of the neurocognitive unconscious. This, however, is not to accept its epiphenomenality; a robust self, emerging as the ongoing result of a narrative self-constructing process, is in fact necessary to explain the phenomena of intentional action and self-understanding presupposed by commonsense psychology and social science. Moreover, according to the authors this theory is fully consonant with contemporary (neuro)cognitive science, that acknowledges the psychodynamic component of the process of narrative self-construction and the stable internalisation of our narrative identity in the structures of our personality.

In my own paper, I explore some aspects of Baker's distinction between a rudimentary and a robust first-person perspective, and show that moral agency requires the second, more complex property. The failure to acknowledge the first-personal, reflective character of moral judgment accounts for the weakness of most contemporary naturalistic reconstructions of morality, that identify the automatic responses of our "sentimental brain" as the basic fact of our moral experience. I suggest that an appropriate view of morality should emphasise the genuinely first-personal element of possessing a conscience, as distinct from the possession of a moral sense, interpreted in a Humean fashion. I then proceed to criticise the neatness of Baker's distinction between the rudimentary and the robust FPP, suggesting that Baker excessively downplays the role of embodiment in her account of what it is for the same first-person perspective to be instantiated across time.

A variety of philosophical questions emerging from Baker's work is also faced by the ten contributed papers that follow. In the first of these, Alfredo Tomasetta tackles the metaphysical questions posed by Baker's contention that "person" is a primary kind and, specifically *our* primary kind. The thesis implies that we are fundamentally persons, and that we cannot fail to be persons without ceasing to exist altogether. If this were true, Tomasetta claims, human persons would have the same persistence conditions of God, the angels, and Cartesian souls, which allegedly are persons as well. But this implication is indefensible, since it is clear that these other entities cannot

share our persistence conditions. Baker needs an argument to deny that the possession of a common primary kind implies having the same persistence conditions. However, the three arguments discussed by the autor fail, and this suggests that Baker's main thesis is unsubstantiated.
A different metaphysical point is raised by Marc Andree Weber, who argues that Baker's conception of the FPP is not a clear and natural view as it may seem. Firstly, she does not distinguish between synchronic and diachronic self-attributions of first-person reference: she clearly presupposes our persistence through time, but this is not necessarily implied by the FPP. Moreover, it is not clear that the capacity to make self-attributions guarantees the truth of this self-attribution, or that it implies indivisibility or unduplicability. In hypothetical scenarios of fission cases Baker suggests that there is a fact of the matter as to which person shares the original person's FPP (even though we may not know the right answer), simply presupposing that being the same person is having the same FPP; but in such cases, to decide which later person shares the original FPP is theoretically undecidable and practically unhelpful. Weber suggests a different account, according to which an FPP is predicated of a mereological sum of moments of consciousness, with no entity unifying them: this would be a reductive account, in that it reduces the persistent to the momentary, but would preserve Baker's irreducibility of the mental to the physical.
Two more papers are devoted to Baker's treatment of action. Sofia Bonicalzi discusses Baker's view concerning moral responsibility, suggesting that Baker's insistence on the first-person perspective improves on standard Frankfurt-style compatibilist accounts, which fall prey to the syndrome of the disappearing agent, *i.e.* make the agent a mere bystander of causal factors over which she has no control. However, Bonicalzi claims that, even though Baker's insistence on the FPP allows to refer opposing mental states to oneself, thus generating the impression of causing one's choices, nothing proves that this picture is not a *post-factum* illusory reconstruction. Also in Baker's reformulation, therefore, compatibilism cannot make sense of the concept of accountability, which is essential for an adequate understanding of responsibility. Responsibility implies that the agent has control on her actions and this seems to require the assumption of irreducible agential properties.
Alan McKay criticises Baker's view on downward causation between intention-dependent (ID) causal property-instances and the objects and properties of non-ID, physical world, suggesting that the idea that mental content, *qua* content, has effects in the physical world is incoherent. According to McKay, our manifest view of a physical causal relation implies

a transfer of energy of some kind: this paradigmatic causation is norm-free, causally closed, productive, intrinsic, and involves the operation of mechanisms, whereas an ID causal relation presents none of these characteristics. Baker's insistence that ID causation is of the same basic kind as lower-level causation obscures deep differences between the two. This is not to deny our ordinary intuitions about the existence of ID causation: according to McKay, these intuitions can be defended by claiming that the causal *relations* between ID causes and effects are constituted by manifest physical causal relations in favourable circumstances. This means that the physical causal relations are transformed, in the context of a complex relational milieu, into a quite different causal nexus, constrained by such factors as inference, justification, purpose, and desire.

A peculiar, non ontological strategy for providing a justification of our belief in the self is explored in the paper by Treasa Campbell: it is the epistemic strategy that builds on Hume's descriptive account of "natural beliefs" to show that the belief in the self enjoys a peculiar kind of epistemic justification. Campbell shows that natural beliefs play the role of hinges, on which all our other questions and doubts turn; this is why, with Wittgenstein, we cannot but grant them non-evidential warrants. This strategy promises to develop adequate warrant for our belief in the self while circumventing the ontological domain.

Acknowledging the importance of Baker's defence of the phenomenon of the FPP from naturalistic attacks, Bianca Bellini stipulates three criteria for what she calls a faithful description of a phenomenon: consistency with the experience of the phenomenon, consistency with the phenomenon's appearance and transcendence, and consistency with the essential traits of the phenomenon, as considered from the viewpoint of the phenomenological reduction. Her discussion charges Baker's account for failing to satisfy the second and third criterion: indeed, the FPP, as reconstructed by Baker, does not embrace an *essential* trait of the first-person perspective phenomenon, that is, the *phenomenological* distinction between *Leib* and *Körper*.

A distinctive phenomenological approach is also at the heart of Patrick Eldridge's paper that builds on Husserl's phenomenology of recollection, and particularly on his distinction between intentional and inner consciousness, to tackle the problem of observer memories. Observer memories are ordinarily distinguished from field memories in that they are not recollections from the first-person point of view, but from the third person perspective, that is, memories in which we are spectators of ourselves. Philosophers like Husserl, who insist that the FPP is a necessary feature of

mental phenomena, have a problem in explaining this kind of memories, and may be tempted to deny their existence. According to Eldridge, however, observer memories are genuine forms of recollection that involve an original and peculiar form of self-intention, which is self-objectification. Therefore, this phenomenon is not a counter-example to Husserl's view that self-identity and pre-reflective self-consciousness are vital structuring elements of mnemic experience. Notwithstanding, it shows that self-consciousness is displayed on a spectrum from immediate, immanent self-identification to quasi-exterior-representation.

A more empirical inclination can be found in Gaetano Albergo's paper, analysing the phenomenon of pretense play in children, which he considers as an early manifestation of the first-person perspective. In the wake of some points also stressed by Pauen, he suggests that the activity of pretense presupposes intentionality and is evidence of an early manifestation of self-awareness. In fact, the rich phenomenology of pretense and the priority of agency over both cognitive representation and the conceptualisation of the self-world dichotomy, suggest that a primitive self-consciousness is present in pre-linguistic stages of human development. According to Albergo, therefore, Baker's insistence on the central role of language for the acquisition of self-consciousness is not justified by the facts.

Also devoted to the empirical side of the debate on the FPP is Giuseppe Lo Dico's paper, discussing the naturalistic rejection of introspection as an unreliable method in psychology. A large part of the psychological literature, he reports, assumes the self/other parity account, according to which knowledge of one's own and of others' mental states is equally indirect – the argument for this conclusion being that most of our mental life is unconscious and that verbal reports are *post-hoc* theories of what is supposed to happen in the mind. Lo Dico reviews evidence showing that data coming from verbal reports, if adequately treated, cannot be defined as illusory or confabulatory and can be legitimately used in psychological theory. He concludes that subjects' introspective or verbal reports should be taken much more seriously than they presently are, and that the subject's ability to adopt a FPP should be considered as well. This probably means that the idea of psychology as a fully naturalised science must be seriously revised.

The last paper, also dealing with empirical issues, is Valentina Cuccio's discussion of the relationship between the mechanism of embodied simulation and the notion of mental representation. Embodied simulation is the activation of the neural circuits controlling certain actions and perceptions, when the subject is not actively engaged in them. The recently

proposed notion of mental representations in bodily format suggests the identification of these representations with the activation of the mirror mechanisms that give rise to embodied simulation. According to the author, the definition of embodied simulation in terms of mental representations is problematic, because embodied simulation does not allow to clearly distinguish between the content and the format of the representation, or to identify the subject of the mental representation. Mechanisms of embodied simulation are sub-personal processes, crucially involved in our understanding of others; to define them in terms of mental representation presupposes a strongly reductionist view that, in the light of Baker's work on FPP, is unsubstantiated.

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