No. 1 (2011): Phenomenology and Analytic Philosophy: Perspectives on Mind and Consciousness
Session 1. Phenomenology, Neuroscience and Analytic Philosophy

Beyond the Cartesian Self

Published 2016-11-27

Keywords

  • heterophenomenology,
  • neurophenomenology,
  • first-person,
  • third-person,
  • science

How to Cite

Baker, L. (2016). Beyond the Cartesian Self. Phenomenology and Mind, (1), 48–57. https://doi.org/10.13128/Phe_Mi-19643

Abstract

I review a number of approaches that attempt to deal with the gap that seems to exist between first-person and third-person accounts of consciousness, and some of the conceptual, epistemological, and methodological issues that surround this distinction. I argue, with reference to Carnap and Schrödinger, that one cannot simply reduce data from the first-person perspective to third-person data, without remainder, especially when the very subject matter of the science includes the first-person perspective.