Session 1. Phenomenology, Neuroscience and Analytic Philosophy
Published 2016-11-27
Keywords
- heterophenomenology,
- neurophenomenology,
- first-person,
- third-person,
- science
How to Cite
Baker, L. (2016). Beyond the Cartesian Self. Phenomenology and Mind, (1), 48–57. https://doi.org/10.13128/Phe_Mi-19643
Abstract
I review a number of approaches that attempt to deal with the gap that seems to exist between first-person and third-person accounts of consciousness, and some of the conceptual, epistemological, and methodological issues that surround this distinction. I argue, with reference to Carnap and Schrödinger, that one cannot simply reduce data from the first-person perspective to third-person data, without remainder, especially when the very subject matter of the science includes the first-person perspective.