Phenomenology and Mind

No. 2 (2012): Making the Social World: Social Ontology, Collective Intentionality, and Normativity
Session 2. Collective Intentionality and Social Cognition

The “Ought” Implies “Can” Principle: A Challenge to Collective Intentionality

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  • Guglielmo Feis
DOI: https://doi.org/10.13128/Phe_Mi-19631

Published 2016-11-27

Keywords

  • collective intentionality,
  • ought implies can

How to Cite

Feis, G. (2016). The “Ought” Implies “Can” Principle: A Challenge to Collective Intentionality. Phenomenology and Mind, (2), 114–121. https://doi.org/10.13128/Phe_Mi-19631
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Abstract

In my paper I investigate collective intentionality (CI) through the “Ought” implies “Can” (OIC) principle. My leading question is does OIC impose any further requirement on CI? In answering the challenge inside a Searlean framework, I realize that we need to clarify what CI’s structure is and what kind of role the agents joining a CI-act have. In the last part of the paper, I put forward an (inverted) Hartian framework to allow the Searlean CI theory to be agent sensitive and cope with the problems that emerged.

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