No. 10 (2016): Consciousness and Cognition. The Cognitive Phenomenology Debate
Consciousness and Cognition

The Conscious and Phenomenal Character of Thought: Reflections on Their Possible Dissociation

Published 2017-01-03

Keywords

  • cognitive phenomenology,
  • phenomenal character,
  • cognitive access,
  • co-extension

How to Cite

Jorba, M. (2017). The Conscious and Phenomenal Character of Thought: Reflections on Their Possible Dissociation. Phenomenology and Mind, (10), 44–56. https://doi.org/10.13128/Phe_Mi-20091

Abstract

In this paper I focus on what we can call “the obvious assumption” in the debate between defenders and deniers (of the reductionist sort) of cognitive phenomenology: conscious thought is phenomenal and phenomenal thought is conscious. This assumption can be refused if “conscious” and “phenomenal” are not co-extensive in the case of thought. I discuss some prominent ways to argue for their dissociation and I argue that we have reasons to resist such moves, and thus, that the “obvious assumption” can be transformed into a grounded claim one can explicitly believe and defend.