No. 12 (2017): New Trends in Philosophy
Submitted Contributions

Contextualist Answers to the Challenge from Disagreement

Dan Zeman
University of the Basque Country

Published 2017-08-09


  • contextualism,
  • disagreement,
  • disagreement in attitude,
  • pragmatic disagreement

How to Cite

Zeman, D. (2017). Contextualist Answers to the Challenge from Disagreement. Phenomenology and Mind, (12), 62–73.


In this short paper I survey recent contextualist answers to the challenge from disagreement raised by contemporary relativists. After making the challenge vivid by means of a working example, I specify the notion of disagreement lying at the heart of the challenge. The answers are grouped in three categories, the first characterized by rejecting the intuition of disagreement in certain cases, the second by conceiving disagreement as a clash of non-cognitive attitudes and the third by relegating disagreement at the pragmatic level. For each category I present several important variants and raise some (general) criticisms. The paper is meant to offer a quick introduction to the current contextualist literature on disagreement and thus a useful tool for further research.


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