No. 12 (2017): New Trends in Philosophy
Submitted Contributions

Empathy, Simulation, and Neuroscience: A Phenomenological Case against Simulation-Theory

Timothy A. Burns
Loyola Marymount University

Published 2017-08-09

Keywords

  • empathy,
  • phenomenology,
  • simulation-theory,
  • mirror neurons,
  • intersubjectivity

How to Cite

Burns, T. A. (2017). Empathy, Simulation, and Neuroscience: A Phenomenological Case against Simulation-Theory. Phenomenology and Mind, (12), 208–216. https://doi.org/10.13128/Phe_Mi-21119

Abstract

In recent years, some simulation theorists have claimed that the discovery of mirror neurons provides empirical support for the position that mind reading is, at some basic level, simulation. The purpose of this essay is to question that claim. I begin by providing brief context for the current mind reading debate and then developing an influential simulationist account of mind reading. I then draw on the works of Edmund Husserl and Edith Stein to develop an alternative, phenomenological account. In conclusion, I offer multiple objections against simulation theory and argue that the empirical evidence mirror neurons offer us does not necessarily support the view that empathy is simulation.

Metrics

Metrics Loading ...