No. 13 (2017): Norm: What Is It? Ontological and Pragmatical Perspectives
Section 2. Phenomenology of the Normative

Vers une phénoménologie de la normativité. Une circonscription préliminaire du domaine

Pedro Alves
Universidade de Lisboa
Published December 30, 2017
Keywords
  • phenomenology of law,
  • norms,
  • judgments thetic acts
How to Cite
Alves, P. (2017). Vers une phénoménologie de la normativité. Une circonscription préliminaire du domaine. Phenomenology and Mind, (13), 66-85. https://doi.org/10.13128/Phe_Mi-22430

Abstract

I discuss, from a phenomenological point of view, the distinction between judgments and norms. I stress the limits of the Husserlian canonical analysis in order to rightly account for the sense and content of normative intentionality. Based on some Kelsenian insights, I draw a clear distinction between judgments and norms, criticizing some classical trends coming from Husserl himself that consider norms as a kind of intentionality founded upon objectifying acts. However, taking distance from Kelsen, Kaufmann, and Cossio, I stress that the ought-proposition (Sollsatz) cannot be a good rendering of the sense-content of norms, based on the phenomenological distinction between the intentional matter and the quality of intentional acts. Finally, I propose my own account based on the concept of “ductive force”. I stress that the ductive force of norms cannot be identified with simple coercion. I show that there is, even inside the juridical sphere, a variety of ductive forces, going from sheer coercion to council and recommendation. To end, I stress the centrality of the concept of “ductive force” for a phenomenology of the social world.

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