Phenomenology and Mind <p><em>Phenomenology and Mind</em> is an international, interdisciplinary journal currently run by several Research Centres of Vita-Salute San Raffaele University.<br>Born as a space of arguments and comparison of phenomenological and analytical philosophical research.<br><em>Phenomenology and Mind</em> currently publishes the proceeding of the annual PhD School of Vita-Salute San Raffaele Faculty of Philosophy, with world-renowned invited speakers; and a second issue through call for papers on a special topics.</p> Firenze University Press en-US Phenomenology and Mind 2280-7853 <p>Authors retain the copyright and grant the journal right of first publication with the work simultaneously licensed under a <strong>Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International Public License (<a href="">CC-BY-4.0</a>)</strong>&nbsp;that allows others to share the work with an acknowledgment of the work's authorship and initial publication in P&amp;M</p> <p><a href="" rel="license"><img style="border-width: 0;" src="" alt="Creative Commons License"></a><br>This work is licensed under a <a href="" rel="license">Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License</a></p> Chief Editor’s Note <p>AAVV</p> Roberta De Monticelli Copyright (c) 2019-12-15 2019-12-15 17 9 9 10.13128/pam-8019 Introduction <p>AAVV</p> Sanja Bojanić Olimpia Giuliana Loddo Marko-Luka Zubčić Copyright (c) 2019-12-15 2019-12-15 17 12 16 10.13128/pam-8020 Athetic Validity <p>Starting from the analysis of three conceptual paradigms formulated by Theodor Geiger, this paper elaborates the concept of the athetic validity of a norm, in contrast to the concept of thetic validity. Thetic validity is the deontic validity that is the product of a thetic act of position, of an act of thésis, such as the enactment of a norm; athetic validity is conversely the deontic validity that is not the product of a thetic act of position. The concept of athetic validity sheds a light on the distinction between subsistent norms and deontic sentences and explains how a norm can exist and be valid independently of any act of position, and even independently of any linguistic formulation of that norm in a deontic sentence. It also makes it possible to dissolve a seeming paradox implied in Geiger’s notion of declarative deontic sentences, which ascertain the athetic validity and at the same time constitute the thetic validity of a subsistent norm.</p> Amedeo G. Conte Copyright (c) 2019-12-15 2019-12-15 17 20 31 10.13128/pam-8021 Conceptual Confusions and Causal Dynamics <p>This paper argues that rules and norms are conceptually distinct: what is norm is not thereby rule, and vice versa. Versions of conflating the two are discussed and an argument for distinction given. Two objections to the argument are responded to. It is accepted that rules and norms are often intimately related. They are so causally, not conceptually: what norms we live by can make a difference to what rules we accept and what rules we accept can make a difference to what norms we live by. This is a social, dynamic and continuous causal process of development of the social practices of community.</p> Patrizio Lo Presti Copyright (c) 2019 Patrizio Lo Presti 2019-12-15 2019-12-15 17 32 43 10.13128/pam-8022 Care, Social Practices and Normativity. Inner Struggle versus Panglossian Rule-Following <p>Contrary to the popular assumption that linguistically mediated social practices constitute the normativity of action (Kiverstein and Rietveld, 2015; Rietveld, 2008a,b; Rietveld and Kiverstein, 2014), I argue that it is affective care for oneself and others that primarily constitutes this kind of normativity. I argue for my claim in two steps. First, using the method of cases I demonstrate that care accounts for the normativity of action, whereas social practices do not. Second, I show that a social practice account of the normativity of action has unwillingly authoritarian consequences in the sense that humans act only normatively if they follow social rules. I suggest that these authoritarian consequences are the result of an uncritical phenomenology of action and the fuzzy use of “normative”. Accounting for the normativity of action with care entails a realistic picture of the struggle between what one cares for and often repressive social rules.</p> Alexander Albert Jeuk Copyright (c) 2019-12-15 2019-12-15 17 44 54 10.13128/pam-8023 Implicit Norms <p>Robert Brandom has developed an account of conceptual content as instituted by social practices. Such practices are understood as being implicitly normative. Brandom proposed the idea of implicit norms in order to meet some requirements imposed by Wittgenstein’s remarks on rule-following: escaping the regress of rules on the one hand, and avoiding mere regular behavior on the other. Anandi Hattiangadi has criticized this account as failing to meet such requirements. In what follows, I try to show how the correct understanding of sanctions and the expressivist reading of the issue can meet these challenges.</p> Pietro Salis Copyright (c) 2019-12-15 2019-12-15 17 56 68 10.13128/pam-8025 The Tacit Dimensions of Normative Rules <p>All rules are normative. Using Polanyi’s tacit integration, this article shows that all rules have tacit dimensions in their creation by recognition of regularities, application and modification, all of which cannot be made wholly explicit. J. Searle holds that some regular actions are not the following of unconscious rules, but ignores the fact that they have been tacitly formed by recognising of regularities. Tacitly known and practised rules are transmitted by apprentices observing the actions and judgements of masters, and then across generations by tradition. Thus knowledge and belief cannot be neither clearly distinguished nor separated. Justificatory, critical and foundational philosophies are to be replaced by a fiduciary and fallible one.</p> R.T. Allen Copyright (c) 2019-12-15 2019-12-15 17 70 78 10.13128/pam-8026 Corporeal Drawn Norms. An Investigation of Graphic Normativity in the Material World of Everyday Objects <p>Starting from the ontological question of norms, namely from the question “What do we talk about when we talk about norms?”, the author highlights the existence of thetic norms, that is, norms established through an act of normative production, which have not been formulated linguistically. Notably, the author focuses on drawn (or graphic) norms, that is those norms that do not arise from a linguistic formulation or from a linguistic representation, but from a graphic representation, from a drawing (for example, Ikea’s diagram instruction manuals and traffic signs). In conclusion, the author examines a particular set of drawn norms, corporeal drawn norms, and investigates their essentially deictic nature.</p> Giuseppe Lorini Copyright (c) 2019-12-15 2019-12-15 17 80 90 10.13128/pam-8027 Rules: A Toy Box <p>“Induction provides a path to first principles” (Aristotle): so we approach our topic by sampling three distinct sorts of data—rules in actions as exemplified in games; rules as directives for manufacture; as laws not only for maintaining order among people but also relations between citizens and governments—finding in each case the parts that nonverbal expressions of rules play. While words are essential to formulating constitutive rules defining sporting games, they seem less important than emulation for recreational uses. They drop out in children’s games of make-believe, which developmental psychology shows to be crucial to early development, since ours is a naturally rule making and following species. Industrial artifacts, thereby the modern world, depend on graphic systems, here exemplified by origami notation, which feature isolation and sequence in simultaneity, lacked by words. Such notations also exhibit a five-order pattern of intentionality, whose importance is demonstrated by communication breakdowns in road signage, undermining civic life.</p> Patrick Maynard Copyright (c) 2019-12-15 2019-12-15 17 94 111 10.13128/pam-8029 Promising Pictures: Depicting, Advertising, Instructing <p>Depictive pictures may be promising in at least three different senses, which are examined in this essay. The first concerns genuine acts of promising that involve pictorial representations, like gift cards displaying a present the promisor commits herself to give. In a second sense, advertising strategists use pictures to promise to consumers perfect pasta or empty beaches. A third sense amounts to pictures as promising if they are instructive. Such pictures can be used to learn some type of action, like the performance of a military salute or the crafting of some artifact. All three promissory uses of pictures exhibit normative forces related to commitments and entitlements regarding justified expectations.</p> Jakob Krebs Copyright (c) 2019-12-15 2019-12-15 17 112 120 10.13128/pam-8030 “Road Rules”: Analyzing Traffic Signs through a Socio-Cognitive Approach <p>Around 1.3 million people die every year because of road traffic crashes. Although safety rules, vehicle standards and post-accident health care, have all seen significant improvement, rising population and quick motorization rates have added to the casualty numbers. Road safety has been included among the Sustainable Development Goals, but the target set of halving the number of road deaths by 2020 will be missed. With the emergent attention to road safety, several approaches may be adopted. One is tightening penalties to induce more prudent behavior. The second is to improve protection devices and vehicles. The third is to adapt road designs, including roadside signs, to modern roads and vehicles and to human behavior. This last approach in particular is the one where I think that substantial improvements may still be achieved. One of the most interesting aspects in terms of impact and effectiveness of rules, may be understood by focusing on the cognition process of the rule that is incorporated into a road sign, and by how this cognition can be framed so that voluntary compliance is enhanced. Road signs have always made extensive use of explanatory images. But it is also the unconscious social pressure that one’s driving behavior is being watched that produces compliance. A normative-semiotic perspective should be integrated by a cognitive perspective, so that insights from both the natural and the social sciences may achieve higher degrees of precision and predictability.</p> Luigi Cominelli Copyright (c) 2019-12-15 2019-12-15 17 122 134 10.13128/pam-8031 Pictures, Content, and Normativity: The Semantic of Graphic Rules <p>In our daily lives, we can find that different kinds of representational media are employed in normative ways, to express different kinds of rules. Sometimes, this is overlooked by the primacy of discursive representations in our normative practices. However, a look into these practices often shows that they are more complex and richer, and particularly that they include more than one kind of representation. Regarding this, this paper will be focused on the capacity and limitations of different kinds of representational media to express normative contents, that is, to express the content of rules.</p> Mariela Aguilera Copyright (c) 2019-12-15 2019-12-15 17 136 149 10.13128/pam-8032 Deontic Visual Signs. Between Normative Force and Constitutive Power <p>The most of legal theories in the twentieth century have always asserted that rules are product of linguistic utterances and that they have nothing to do with “visual culture”. In this paper I show, on the contrary, that the visual dimension is crucial to understand and found some legal-philosophical discourse. The relationship between images and law is always bi-directional, by the first direction following the way from law to images, and by the second one, vice versa, passing from images into the universe of normative discourse. In these pages I do not explore the second direction; I limit myself to investigate the first way asking two questions relevant for the construction of the legal order: Are there visual signs in the normative language? And, if so, what function do they have?</p> Guglielmo Siniscalchi Copyright (c) 2019-12-15 2019-12-15 17 150 159 10.13128/pam-8033 Icons: Normativity and Gender Inequalities <p>This contribution is aimed at offering a disciplinary viewpoint on the “rules without words” for the purpose of investigating “non-linguistic” normativity from the Communication Design perspective. The intention is therefore to examine how Communication Design shapes social reality through the creation or strengthening of social, normative and tacit rules. The focus of the observation are the non-linguistic expressions, rules, that contribute to the development or maintenance of gender-based social inequalities. Specifically, the observation concerns the forms of schematic representation which permeate everyday life and have an informative and prescriptive function, characterized by a high degree of objectivity and addressed to the whole community - both men and women. The contribution inserts itself within an international framework in which the importance of gender equality is central and reaffirmed by the ONU Agenda 2030 and the Resolution of the European Parliament 2018 (2017/2210(INI)).</p> Valeria Bucchetti Francesca Casnati Copyright (c) 2019-12-15 2019-12-15 17 160 172 10.13128/pam-8034 Animal Normativity <p>Many philosophers think that human animals are the only normative creatures. In this paper, I will not provide reasons against such a claim, but I will engage in a related task: delineating and comparing two deflationary accounts of what non-human animal normativity could consist in. One of them is based on Hannah Ginsborg’s notion of primitive normativity and the other on my conjecture that some creatures may have first-order robust “ought-thoughts”, composed by secondary representations about how things should be or about how one should act. Once I have sketched both models, I will focus on identifying some cognitive differences between creatures merely having primitive normativity and those also having robust ought-thoughts. Finally, I will draw a few tentative remarks on the kind of empirical evidence that would suggest that an animal has one or another of these two kinds of normativity.</p> Laura Danón Copyright (c) 2019-12-15 2019-12-15 17 176 187 10.13128/pam-8035 Norms from Nature. Etiological Functions as Normative Standards <p>When we say that the function of a knife is cutting, we open the door to evaluating knives based on how well they cut. The aim of the paper is to investigate whether functions ground normative standards. This is an exciting question, as it would highlight the important existence of one instance of non-moral normativity and investigate to what degree it involves a trade off with it. Additionally, insofar as it depends on a naturalistic account of functions, functional normativity may be an obvious candidate of non-linguistic normativity that the special issue aims to investigate. The article will first investigate what functions are, providing an etiological account that explains functional attributions for artefacts, as well as biological and social functions. It then discusses how failing to discharge a function results in malfunctioning, not in losing the function. Finally, it argues that functions so understood provide normative standards, independent of moral norms.</p> Carlo Burelli Copyright (c) 2019-12-15 2019-12-15 17 188 197 10.13128/pam-8036 Grounding Normativity in Biology: The Unexpressed Rules of Core Cognition <p>Saul Kripke’s (1982) sceptical take on Wittgenstein’s rule-following paradox challenges us to find facts that can justify one interpretation of a symbol’s past use over another. While Ruth Millikan (1990) has answered this challenge by appealing to biological purposes, her answer has been criticized for failing to account for the normativity of rules like addition, which require explicit representations. In this paper, I offer a defense of Millikan. I claim that we can explain how we build intentions to add from the content of core cognition modules like the approximate number system, and argue that Millikan’s answer is better equipped to explain the origins of rules than communitarian approaches like that endorsed by Kusch (2006). I then explore the worth of pluralism about rules and try to find common ground between expressed and unexpressed rules in terms of expectations of how the world is supposed to behave.</p> Jean-Charles Pelland Copyright (c) 2019-12-15 2019-12-15 17 198 209 10.13128/pam-8037