PHENOMENOLOGY AND MIND

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PHENOMENOLOGY AND ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY: PERSPECTIVES ON MIND AND CONSCIOUSNESS

Edited by Roberta De Monticelli and Francesca De Vecchi

Editrice San Raffaele

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INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION

ROBERTA DE MONTICELLI, FRANCESCA DE VECCHI

PHENOMENOLOGIZING COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE?

We should phenomenologize cognitive neuroscience rather than naturalizing phenomenology[1].

1. The Winter School "The phenomenological Mind"

It is our pleasure to introduce the first issue of *Phenomenology and Mind – The online Journal of the Center in Phenomenology and Sciences of the Person.* This first issue is devoted to the proceedings of the Winter School *The Phenomenological Mind* (January 26-28, 2010) organized by the Research Center in Phenomenology and Sciences of the Person at the Università Vita-Salute San Raffaele and by the Phenomenology Lab (www.phenomenoloylab.eu) with the collaboration of the Università degli Studi di Milano.
As everybody knows, *The Phenomenological Mind* is also the title of the book by Shaun Gallagher and Dan Zahavi (Routledge, London 2008; Italian translation by Patrizia Pedrini, Raffaello Cortina Editore, Milano 2009). The Winter School *The Phenomenological Mind* aimed to discuss the main topics of *The phenomenological Mind*: first of all the phenomenological perspective on Mind, Cognitive and Neurosciences, including the relation between phenomenology and analytic philosophy, and secondly, some crucial themes like Action and Agency, Social Cognition and Consciousness, Pathology of the self perception.
We would like to thank the Scientific Board which reviewed the submitted papers: Clotilde Calabi (Università degli Studi di Milano), Roberto Mordacci (Università Vita-Salute San Raffaele), Massimo Reichlin (Università Vita-Salute San Raffaele), Elisabetta Sacchi (Università Vita-Salute San Raffaele), Roberta Sala (Università Vita-Salute San Raffaele), Corrado Sinigaglia (Università degli Studi di Milano).
We would like to thank also the invited speakers and invited contributors who have sent their papers for the publication in the present issue: Vittorio Gallese, Shaun Gallagher, Lynne Baker, Elisabetta Sacchi.

2. The structure of the volume

The issue collects nineteen papers about three topics:

(i) Phenomenology, neuroscience and analytic philosophy;
(ii) Action and Agency;
(iii) Social Cognition and Consciousness.

The first section of the volume collects the invited speakers' papers (Vittorio Gallese and Shaun Gallagher) and further invited contributions (Lynne Baker and Elisabetta Sacchi) as well as two papers by the editors of the volume (Roberta De Monticelli and Francesca De Vecchi). The focus of this session is

[1] Gallese (2006, p. 294).

the relation among phenomenology, neuroscience and analytic philosophy. The main topics the section deals with are: neurophenomenology; first-person vs. third-person perspective; embodied simulation; social cognition, collective intentionality and social ontology; phenomenal modes of presentation.
The second section of the volume gathers the selected papers investigating the topic "Action and Agency" together (Luca Casartelli, Donald O'Conaill, Beril Sözmen Idemen, Philip Tonner, Lodovica Maria Zanet, Silvano Zipoli Caiani). The papers of this section deal with such questions as: what is an action? What is the sense of agency for our actions? Which is the relation between agency and awareness? These questions are crucial to phenomenology, according to which actions, practical concerns and practical reason drive our everyday life much more than theoretical wondering and thinking.
The third section of the volume collects the selected papers concerning the topic "Social Cognition and Consciousness" (Anna Bortolan, Emanuele Caminada, Marco Fenici, Gloria Galloni, Marco Tedeschini, Nicola Zippel, Beatrice Kobow). In philosophical, cognitive and neuroscientific debate "social cognition" and "consciousness" are said in many meanings. Starting both from phenomenological, neurobiological and cognitive data, the contributions of this section argue out several crucial aspects of "consciousness" – affective, cognitive and linguistic – and "social cognition" – empathic feeling, higher order persons, intersubjective intentionality.

3. Phenomenology and cognitive neurosciences

We would like now to focus on the *Leit Motiv* of the first issue of *Phenomenology and Mind* which also characterises, even if in different ways, the contributions of Vittorio Gallese, Lynne Baker and Shaun Gallagher.
"We should phenomenologize cognitive neuroscience rather than naturalizing phenomenology"[2]. Let us adopt this often quoted statement as a maxim for what proved to be a hard endeavour: editing this first issue of *Phenomenology and Mind*, the online journal of the Research Center for Phenomenology and Sciences of the Person. Let us choose it as something more substantial and at the same time less solemn than a maxim or a motto: a word of moral support, so to speak, coming from a researcher and a scientist among the very few who are presently well known all over the world – and particularly well known to philosophers. Its author, as many remember, is Vittorio Gallese, whom we thank again both for having been among the protagonists of 2010 Università Vita-Salute San Raffaele Winter School "The Phenomenological Mind", and for enduring urgings and postponements, in order that his text could be ready for publication in this issue. Two other main contributions will be specially, even though too cursorily, addressed in this short presentation. This choice has been done to make a virtue of necessity, in a way: that is, to express our special thanks to their authors, who, for different reasons, were not present at the Winter School but accepted to send their papers for our journal, in spite of its virtuality. Sending a paper to a journal which is virtual, not just in the sense of being essentially an online journal, but in the more embarrassing sense of not being born yet – this is an act of true generosity, for which we would like to express deep appreciation.
But there is a deeper, more theoretic reason to confine the more explicit part of this introduction within the triangle of three main contributions – namely Lynne Baker's and Shaun Gallagher's, beside the already quoted one by Vittorio Gallese. This, we hope, will be made clearer by the remainder of this introduction, which is so partial for a third and last reason too: that the very research project animating our Center and its ventures, as well as – we hope – this journal, is outlined in De Monticelli's own contribution to this issue, along with a piece of history of European and Italian phenomenology – that piece which our Center more directly stems from, and hopes to carry on.
Vittorio Gallese gives two good reasons supporting the attempt of phenomenologizing neuroscience. Since we all agree on one of them – namely that a dialogue and an attempt to translate the different notions employed by both disciplines, neuroscience and phenomenology, is just necessary – let us focus on the other one:

[2] Gallese (2006: 294).

Why should we try to phenomenologize Neuroscience? Because if one of the aims of Cognitive Neuroscience is to shed light on the human condition, we certainly cannot but start from how the world is constituted within our own phenomenal appreciation [3].

We cannot but start from the phenomenal world, or the life-world, in the strict sense of the world which is each time given within the horizon of any given subject of consciousness or experience, namely any person. This is formally the horizon of a first person perspective – more specifically the noematic or objective pole of it, its noetic or subjective pole being the origin of such a perspective. Now, the concept of first person perspective is the subject of both Baker's and Gallagher's papers. What we found striking is the measure in which the results of Baker's and of Gallagher's independent analyses converge. As if getting closer to truth did diminish the distance between Pragmatic Realism and Experimental Phenomenology – as this convergence was not looked for, nor was it to foresee, in advance.
In order to argue for this convergence thesis, we shall start from a Husserlian text, a not so quoted one, which we find particularly inspiring as it links consciousness and normativity – a concept which both Baker and Gallagher use (the former quite explicitly, the latter at least implicitly) to refute reduction of (phenomenal) consciousness to sheer subjectivity.
Normativity is an essential feature of intentionality, though a very neglected one both in continental and analytic philosophy of mind: yet it pervades the whole extent of our mental life. This is a deep insight phenomenology offers, suggesting that we should look at personhood as the condition of what we may call "the normative animal". A description of what we mean by "normative animal" can be found in this remarkable passage by Edmund Husserl:

Animals live by sheer instinct, humans are also subject to norms. All kinds of conscious states are crossed by and interwoven with a normative consciousness of right and wrong (appropriate, inappropriate, handsome, ugly, suited, unsuited and so on), which motivates corresponding competent actions, with effects on reality and social reality, on the basis of knowledge and evaluation [4].

Consciousness and normativity are essentially bound in our life. For, according to this description, we do not first perceive, feel or act and only later learn to perceive, feel or act adequately; we are subject to normativity from the very beginning. We experience the world in such a way as to be at least able to learn from our errors, to correct them. We are bound to be reasonable from the very outset of our life. How is *that* possible?
Husserl's answer to this question sheds light on many peculiarities which distinguish our very early dispositions to social cognition from those of other primates, as described in the pioneering work of Michael Tomasello[5], quoted by Baker and surely known to Gallagher[6]. We shall not go into details here, but one more quotation might be useful: it will help us to recall that central achievement of Husserl's which is his *unified theory of reason* (theoretic, axiological, practical), as the realm of acts subject to normativity, or the distinction right/wrong. Here is a passage nicely summarizing that achievement:

Let me notice for the sake of clarity that the word "reason" is not understood here as meaning a human psychological disposition, but as a general term for the essentially closed class of acts and corresponding objects,

[3] Gallese (2011)
[4] *Das Tier lebt unter bloßen Instinkten, der Mensch auch unter Normen. Durch alle Arten von Bewußtseinsakten geht ein damit verflochtenes normatives Bewußtsein von richtig und unrichtig (schicklich, unschicklich, schön, häßlich, zweckmäßig, unzweckmäßig usw.) und motiviert ein entsprechendes erkennendes, wertendes, dinglich und gesellschaftlich wirkendes Handeln*. Husserl, *Fünf Aufsätze über Erneuerung. Formale Typen der Kultur in der Menschheitsentwicklung*, in Husserl (1922-1937, p. 59).
[5] Tomasello (1999), *The cultural Origins of Human Cognition*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts; (2008) *Origins of Human Communication,* MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts; (2009) *Why we cooperate*, MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
[6] Tomasello (1999) belongs to the References of Gallagher-Zahavi (2008).

that fall under the ideas of right and wrong, respectively of true and false, being there or not being there etc. As many basic kinds of acts subject to these ideas can be distinguished, so many kinds of reason there are [7].

Going back to our main invited contributions: both Baker and Gallagher focus on first person perspective, respectively as a mode of (self)consciousness essentially characterizing persons as such, and as a mode of (self)consciousness irreducible to third person perspective, or "neutral", "objective" reports of a subject sayings and behaviours. Both authors, we said, make explicitly or implicitly use of a concept of normativity to prove their theses. Let's see.

Baker's argument rejects a Cartesian foundation of first person perspective. Descartes was right about the importance of the first person perspective point of view. He was wrong in claiming that such a perspective required a separate, substantial mind or self as its subject, being both independent of other selves and opposed to the material world, understood as, in its turn, mind-independent.

A phenomenologist can but agree with both sides of the thesis: disembodied solitary selves are impossible, and the ordinary world – the world of encounters, or the life-world – is not mind independent. Now what is extremely interesting is Baker's argument for the "social" part of the first thesis, needed as a premise to support the second as well. A (robust) first person perspective, which, Baker argues, is already enjoyed by a very young child able to claim ownership of "her" toys, could not possibly be there in case the child were the only inhabitant of earth, since the ability to refer to oneself as oneself, "from inside" so to speak, requires an ability in discriminating objects (toys and fragile vases, "mine" and "not mine") which cannot be acquired without a public language. The reason is that a public language is – in a wittgensteinian mood – the source of normativity. The child "has to stand to be corrected" in order to acquire the empirical concepts of, say, "toy" and "vase". For, if whatever seems right to her is right, "that only means that here we cannot talk about 'right'". But to stand to be corrected is to have social and linguistic relations. So, Descartes solipsism is "a fantasy". That means, the very oblivion of a precondition of his thinking: he can think himself as disembodied, but if this thought were true, he could not have articulated it.

While agreeing with Baker on her main lines of argument, a phenomenologist would resist a wittgensteinian tendency to see language as the only origin of normativity. That is the reason why comparison with Gallagher's thesis is so interesting. Gallagher's question comes back to what we presented as Gallese's "phenomenolologizing" suggestion: we cannot but start from how the world is constituted within our own phenomenal appreciation. Are we sure we cannot but do that? The issue saw Ernst Schrödinger and Rudolf Carnap on opposite sides during the 1930s. Schrödinger was sure that we cannot do otherwise, the first-person framework being more basic that the third-person one. For science "is always accomplished by scientists who occupy, by necessity, their own first-person perspective". Science, bound to leave first-person perspective aside and to act as if there were a point of view from nowhere, or as if there were only a third-person perspective, depends on a "fundamental axiom" – namely, that the world is basically given from first-person perspectives – which cannot be scientifically known – for is not empirically testable, nor it is simply a matter of convention. So, science depends entirely from a truth not accessible to it!

Carnap opposed this thesis along behaviouristic lines (we can infer that other people have minds on the basis of their exterior behaviour). In a way, this reproduces exactly a debate between a phenomenologist (was Schrödinger aware of Husserl's argument against some dogmas of

[7] "Der Deutlichkeit halber bemerke ich, dass das Wort Vernunft hier nicht im Sinne eines menschlichen Seelenvermögens, sondern einen Titel für die wesensmässig geschlossene Klasse von Akten und ihre zugehörigen Aktkorrelaten befasst, die unter Ideen der Rechtmässigkeit und Unrechtmässigkeit, korrelativ der Wahrheit und Falschheit, des Bestehens und Nichtbestehens usw. stehen. Soviel Grundarten von Akten wir scheiden können, für welche dies gilt, soviel Grundarten der Vernunft" (Husserl, 1908-1914, p. 68).

empiricism in *Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft?* (1911) or *Ideas I* (1913), Section I, Chapter II) – and an eliminativist metaphysician of the present time, for example Daniel Dennett.
Where does normativity come in? In a discussion Gallagher introduces about some brain imaging experiments designed to study brain areas activated when subjects enjoy their own first-person perspectives on some actions they are requested to engage in, or observe others engaging in such actions, or just imagine to engage in such actions. To make a long story short, the experimental design is criticised for neglecting to test another situation, namely that in which we imagine ourselves *in the place of others*.
Why is focusing this form of social cognition so enlightening? Because it identifies a form of social cognition-interaction which is also an origin of pre-linguistic normativity, or of proto-normativity, so to speak.
While Gallagher's argument, that we leave to the reader for a pleasant discovery, has no need of scholarly references, it is interesting to notice that ability to transpose one's own egocentric coordinates in other's own (as when we give street directions in terms of our interlocutor's right and left hand, for example), being the very condition of an objective space constitution, is first made possible by a "motor" activity of actually changing one's present point of view, or just imaging that change: an example *par excellence* of an action-embedded, world-driven, pre-linguistic normativity. We often get this transposition wrong – we learn how to do it at about the same age we learn to use first person language. But it seems a more fundamental kind of socially learned normativity. For without it, we could not regard ourselves as objects – along with the other things and persons – in a common objective space.
And it is most striking that Dennett remark about phenomenology, bound to remain a fantasy is turned against him by Gallagher, in the same strict sense in which a Cartesian solipsism is a "fantasy" according to Baker: as oblivion of a necessary condition for something to be conceivable. A science without scientists rooted in the lived space and following the very norms to reach to objective space would simply be impossible.

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SESSION

SESSION 1

PHENOMENOLOGY, NEUROSCIENCE AND ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY

Roberta De Monticelli (Università Vita-Salute San Raffaele)
Phenomenology today: a good travel mate for analytic philosophy?

Vittorio Gallese (Università degli Studi di Parma)
Neuroscience and phenomenology

Shaun Gallagher (University of Central Florida; University of Hertfordshire)
Fantasies and facts: epistemological and methodological perspectives on first- and third-person perspectives

Lynne Baker (University of Massachusetts Amherst)
Beyond the Cartesian Self

Elisabetta Sacchi (Università Vita-Salute San Raffaele)
A phenomenologically oriented account of the phenomenon of aspectuality in propositional attitudes

Francesca De Vecchi (Università Vita-Salute San Raffaele)
Collective intentionality vs. intersubjective and social intentionality. An account of collective intentionality as shared intentionality

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PHENOMENOLOGY TODAY: A GOOD TRAVEL MATE FOR ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY?

abstract

On the basis of a short summary of phenomenological aims and methods, this essay describes the present state of relationships between phenomenology and analytic philosophy, pointing out the progress done in the last years on the way of their rapprochement, after a long time of reciprocal scorn and misunderstandings. In the way of a presentation of the Phenomenology Lab and Center's present and future research program, it recalls some relevant chapters of past and present phenomenological research in Europe, and quite particularly in Italy. After discussing some aspects of contemporary debates in phenomenology and philosophy of mind, it attempts at establishing a convergent line of argument toward the assessment of an anti-reductive ontology of concreteness, or the life world.

keywords

Epistemic trust, scepticism, phenomena, anti-reductive ontology, fundierung

The principle of epistemic trust

Phenomenology has been here for a century, and yet not so many philosophers, among both traditional supporters and opponents, do really understand its novelty. Too many scholars, also, have usurped its beautiful name, without sharing its spirit, without applying or developing the methods for philosophical *research* on vital topics in our contemporary world, for which it had been devised.
What is, in fact, the spirit of phenomenology? I wish to propose a sort of key-principle which is just meant to point to that spirit, or rather to remind us of a style of thinking, which might be clarified through some more definite methodological principles[1]. In this introduction I do not want to get into methodological details, though: for the sake of this general presentation, I shall first try to evoke that style of thinking by a formula which I shall term the *Principle of Epistemic Trust*:

(ET) *Nothing appears in vain* (without a foundation in reality) – of course the reverse is not true: there is much more to discover in reality than what appears (otherwise no *research* would be needed, and we would be omniscient).

The first thing I want to convey by this formula is that phenomenology has been so widely misunderstood, because we have not yet – not in the least – understood the whole depth of Plato's summons: *sozein ta fainomena*, to "save" phenomena. That is, things which are seen, things which appear.
Phenomenology so characterized seems to radically escape what the French philosopher Paul Ricoeur termed the "culture of suspicion". Under such a phrase I understand the mental attitude quite opposed to epistemic trust: a complete lack of confidence in the world of phenomena, that is in the ordinary world of our daily experience.
Now, quite independently of Ricoeur's references ("The masters of suspicion"), this lack of confidence in the truthfulness of experience itself seems to characterize a new and radical form of scepticism. Our age is, as I believe, an age of scepticism: but of a quite peculiar kind. It is a form of life and consciousness, a mentality much more than a sophisticated theory. It is a paradoxical form of life, in which our ordinary experience – sensory, emotional, "cognitive" and "moral" – seems such that we can avoid taking it seriously.

[1] Conni, De Monticelli (2008).

1. Scepticism and phenomenology

Over the last century, philosophy of culture as well as philosophy of nature have proposed many reasons to doubt that things are as they appear. A majority of continental philosophers of the twentieth century on the one side, and the mainstream naturalism striving toward an image of the world compatible with contemporary science on the other, suggest that our experience (and our moral experience quite particularly) is a pervasive, systematic illusion. They could be right. Why has this happened? The story would be too long to tell: we shall limit ourselves to pointing to the two mentioned contemporary forms of scepticism concerning visible things – or the visible and sensible life-world – which we may term Post-modern Relativism and Reductive Materialism.
The first one has been the dominant philosophy of culture, whereas the second one has been the dominant natural philosophy of mind and nature. Both represent a form of scepticism relative to the immediately given things of our life-world, including ourselves, human persons, and *our* world: the life-world, as a phenomenologist would have it, or the world of encounters, according to a nice expression proposed by Lynne Baker.
According to Post-modernism no real epistemic credit can be given to immediate cognition or consciousness – no form of intuition, acquaintance, perception, feeling is a mode of veridical experience, the world being as it were wrapped up in language, culture, interpretations.
But according to Reductive Materialism, phenomena are epi-phenomena, just shadows or dreams caused by a completely different reality. Take for example Dennett's *Consciousness explained*, which has a nice chapter, "The phenomenological garden"[2]: we do not find a description of a real scene like the one surrounding the reader, or of a fictional one, similar enough to a human life-world environment of the XXth century on earth, but just a list of qualia, or sense data, in three classes:

1. "Experiences" of the outer world, such as views, sounds, smells, sensations of slippery or rough, of warm and cold, and of our body's position;
2. "Experiences" of the inner world, such as imaged views and sounds, memories, ideas and insights;
3. "Experiences" of emotions and feelings.

All that is purely "subjective", that is belonging to what contemporary philosophers of mind call phenomenal consciousness.
Actually, questioning the reliability of sensory and sensible experience has been a main trend in the history of modern philosophy, starting indeed from Descartes doubt, going on with Galileo and Locke's expulsion of secondary qualities from the furniture of the real world, and so on. Yet the "age of suspicion" which induced modern science to doubt the world of everyday experience was at its beginnings in Descartes' days. Nowadays we can perfectly conceive of a world such as that *of Matrix*, where no experienced object is really as it appears: steaks are nothing but tasty *qualia* and people themselves are nothing but the characters of a (shared) dream, while their true life is lived somewhere else...
In fact, the "phenomenological garden" of Dennett or the world of *Matrix* are just sets of beautifully arranged *qualia*, which would support the universal negation of our Principle of Epistemic Trust:

(N) All appears in vain

(N) supports a version of (epi)*phenomenalism.* And phenomenalism is surely no phenomenology, but the very opposite way of thinking: a radical form of scepticism about phenomena.

Take any issue in contemporary philosophy of mind: the "hard problem"of consciousness, that is the

[2] Dennett (1993).

nature of any form of direct cognition, such as perception, emotion, empathy, self–perception; or the nature of the self and personal identity; or – most important for meta-ethics and legal philosophy, the issue of free will. All of them can be reduced to the general problem of epistemic trust, that is, of reliability of ordinary experience.

What is the status of epistemic trust? It would be sad if the principle just were meant as a dogma. But, as we said, it is at most a heuristic principle, or the expression of a style of philosophical research, engaging a philosopher, above all, to a most faithful conceptualization and precise description of any phenomenological feature appearing to be relevant to the very nature of the concerned thing. It is the outset of a (non-sceptical) thought practice, more than a statement looking for an argument.

On the other hand, no argument seems to be conclusive against this scepticism about appearances. What is needed is a deep change in our customary way of thinking. A change not only relative to modern philosophy, but to ancient philosophy as well (there is no interesting way back to the past). Phenomenology is this kind of "revolution". The Principle of Epistemic Trust is about the relations between appearance and reality. Now, we are inclined to think that the true reality of a thing resides more in the hidden that in the apparent part of the thing. That the thing actually is what is its hidden part. A stone, for example, *is* ultimately its physical structure, the particles out of which it is composed and the forces which keep them together. But even if you are no materialist concerning human persons, even if you think that the real substance of a human person is her soul, you are inclined to think of this substance as a hidden reality.

In any case the true reality of a thing is thought of by opposition to its appearance. Ordinary language suggests this almost inevitably. Moreover, we are inclined to conceive of this relationship in terms of causation: reality "causes" or "determines" appearance, the latter is a "resultant" of the former, the surface is a product of the underlying reality.

In short, what is founding is ontologically more important than what is founded; the "basis" or the "inside" is more real than what "emerges" at the surface. A kind of atavistic mental grammar tacitly induces us into thinking that the entity and identity of a thing reside more in its hidden "basis" than in its "emerging" properties: water is really in its molecules rather than in its liquidity and transparency, a person's reality in her biological basis than in her personal flourishing, and so on...

This atavistic grammar is what we call ontology: reductive materialism and dualism are but different versions of it, sharing the above mentioned foundational principle. But in fact, what we customarily mean by ontology is *just an* ontology, and one which is to be deeply revised. This deep revision is phenomenology. Phenomenology completely redefines the relations between appearance and reality. "Phenomenon" is no longer a synonym of "sheer appearance", nor of course of "subjective distortion". The word refers to what we shall call *the emerging structure* of a thing.

This emerging structure bears the essential properties of the thing itself and hence manifests its specific identity. It tells us what type of thing the thing is. There is no possible world where a sound – a full fledged sound as the ones we can hear – would not have some pitch, some timber or tone-colour, some duration – or else it would be no *sound.* So, the typical identity of a thing – of a state of affairs, of a relation, of an event – is given, so to speak, by its "surface". This surface – the "phenomenon" can be conceived as the very manifestation of the ontological significance (and richness) of the thing itself.

This way of thinking seems to be inspiring most of the papers published in this issue, deep down into their specific subjects – whether the authors refer or not to the phenomenological tradition – so that my general hints can be verified on each of the concerned topics, across such different concrete app roaches as Vittorio Gallese's embodied simulation theory, Shaun Gallagher's anti-reductive thesis on first person perspective, Lynne Baker's constitution theory of persons, Elisabetta Sacchi's phenomenological account of aspectuality and Francesca De Vecchi's analysis of three essentially different phaenomena of shared intentionality – not to mention many relevant contributions by younger researchers.

The fruitful results of this anti-sceptical approach are among the reasons why phenomenology is experiencing a new life, the life of a philosophical method devised to address those classical topics in philosophy of mind and the sciences of the person, that recent progress in the cognitive neurosciences have made even sharper and more urgent. A method, though, devised to address them with analytical rigour and disciplined experience, in a close cooperation with experimental research, as it was the case during the first decades of its life. *The phenomenological Mind*, a book from which we borrowed the title and the general subject of the first one of the international meetings to be promoted by our Research Center, does express and thoroughly exemplify this new attitude. It powerfully contributes to making phenomenology respectable again among philosophers who don't share in the least that ignorant contempt for science, logics and conceptual analysis, which has been so disastrous for the intellectual reputation of too many alleged heirs of the phenomenological tradition. It gives us a common language, without forcing us to give up our methods of experience's description and essential discovery. It makes phenomenology a good travel mate for analytic philosophers – or, this is the future we try to make possible. This is why we are grateful to Dan Zahavi and Shaun Gallagher, for being there, respectively, as a keynote speaker at our 2010 Winter School and as a central contributor to the first issue of *Phenomenology and Mind*.

2. A new international research community?

Edmund Husserl used to dream of a philosophical community as universal as the scientific ones of the modern world, and yet as personally absorbing, as intellectually, morally, even existentially motivating as a Platonic symposium. Perhaps any true phenomenological philosopher since has tried to found such a community – and we are trying too, once again. I am persuaded that time is much more favourable to such an endeavour now, than it has ever been after World War Two. I shall try to explain why. On my way of doing so, I first wish to present the young and dynamic research community which happened to find in the Research Center in Phenomenology and the Sciences of Person, based at Università Vita-Salute San Raffaele, and in the associated Phenomenology Lab, a first place of virtual encounter and a means of communication. This had a first opportunity of actual encounter and common work during the 2010 Winter School, where most papers now published on this journal where first presented and discussed. The whole enterprise was brought about in a spirit of freedom and self-organization, created so to speak spontaneously by its very participants. That Winter School worked as a real place for *synphilosophein*, and seemed to have inherited a spark at least of the enthusiasm which used to animate the first phenomenological circles. What I say must not be understood in a nostalgic mood: I do believe that we are living a new beginning.

To see why, we must widen the horizon from our small community to the whole phenomenological renewed movement which is reviving all debates about consciousness, mind, embodied mind, action and agency, feeling and willing, social cognition, self and person, values, norms, social ontology – all over the world. We shall widen the horizon gradually, by larger and larger circles so to speak, pretty much in the spirit of Husserl's famous piecemeal description of wider and wider skylines of the surrounding life-world – perceptual, geographical, historical, social – in *Ideas I*[3].

So let me start from a first wider circle, encompassing our present community as its historical and geographical context of birth – the Italian phenomenological tradition, rooted in this city, and quite particularly in the Alma Mater of some of us, the Università degli Studi di Milano. This not only has been represented at our Winter School by the phenomenological- experimental work of Corrado Sinigaglia, but actually was, through him and his research group, among the organizers and sponsors of the School.

It is no redundancy, in the present international context, to recall the fact that the Università degli Studi di Milano has been the most important center for the study and the spread of phenomenology (mainly Husserlian one) in this country, since Antonio Banfi (before the Second World War) and Enzo Paci (from

[3] Husserl (1913, 1928), *Ideas I*, §§ 27-29.

the Fifties onward). I myself was but a schoolgirl when I first heard a lecture held by Paci: therefore I am old enough to have met Paci's more brilliant pupils, and to have learned a lot from them. Paci's students developed different interests from the same phenomenological stump: among them two of my masters had already shown the ways to approach analytic philosophy from a phenomenological background, and this line of continuity with what we are trying to do here makes it a duty and a pleasure for me to mention them: Andrea Bonomi, who became a philosopher of language and logics, and Giovanni Piana who practiced a sort of experimental phenomenology on several modalities of perception and related objects (especially sounds and musical objects), imagination and experience generally. Both were well acquainted with Frege, Wittgenstein, the Gestalt Psychologists and their Italian heirs such as Gaetano Kanizsa and Paolo Bozzi, who introduced James Gibson to Italian students. But I also wish to mention at least Dino Formaggio, the father of Italian Phenomenological Aesthetics, which promoted research both in general and in special philosophy of art, partly in collaboration with Mikel Dufrenne, without neglecting aesthetics as phenomenology of each specific sensory modality, in Dufrenne's spirit, and the Italian school of phenomenological psychiatry, with Lorenzo Calvi, Bruno Callieri, Arnaldo Ballerini and their pupils[4]. Mentioning this tradition, well represented in the scientific board of our Research Center by these masters' successors (Elio Franzini, Paolo Spinicci, Vincenzo Costa, Carlo Serra) is more than a due act of gratitude. It is the premise of an engagement, that our Lab feels also due, to support any attempt to the effect of making the best works of those masters easily available again, and above all of making them known and accessible to the international phenomenological community. Much is waiting to be rediscovered and shared in the light of our research's present developments – not only in this purely philosophical tradition, but in some of its applied expansions as well: phenomenological psychology, phenomenological psychiatry, phenomenology of education[55].

The next horizon to be considered is much wider. Let me introduce it by considering the span between two poles that were for a long time considered as opposed to each other: phenomenology and analytic philosophy.

We hope to be the founders of a community of analytically minded phenomenologists. I understand the expression "analytically minded" in a broad sense, which is best clarified by a statement made by the Munich phenomenologist Moritz Geiger (a pupil of Alexander Pfaender): "Phenomenology is a passion for differences".

But I also mean the expression in a stricter sense, more or less in the spirit of Dan Zahavi and Shaun Gallagher's book. Its authors seem to be succeeding in an enterprise in which many others failed across the years, namely, to make phenomenology again intellectually respectable in the opinion of the scientific minded philosophers. No longer a muddled set of question-begging generalities, or – even worse – a post-Derridean conversational art, frivolously spurning logic and sometimes ethics, but a technique to provide valuable insights in the study of most widely debated topics in contemporary philosophy.

This was a big achievement, for most analytical philosophers of my generation would have agreed with Thomas Metzinger when he proclaimed phenomenology to be "a discredited research program... intellectually bankrupt for at least 50 years"[66]. (One relevant exception was Michael Dummett in Oxford: he was well acquainted with Lotze and other predecessors of Frege, but did not ignore, as most of his colleagues, Husserl's *Logical Investigations*. His encouragement on occasion of the preface he wrote to the printed Italian version of my thesis[77] was decisive in persuading me that a phenomenologist could be a good research partner for an analytical philosopher. I never had doubted the other way round, of course).

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[4] Cfr. at least the issues 1988-2010 of the journal founded by Lorenzo Calvi, "Comprendre – Archive International pour l'Anthropologie et la Psychopathologie Phénoménologiques", Padua.

[5] One should mention at least the work by Piero Bartolini: cfr. Tarozzi (Ed.), (2006), and the remarkable work by his pupil M. Tarozzi, editor of "Encyclopaideia - Rivista di fenomenologia, Pedagogia, Formazione", Clueb, Bologna.

[6] Gallagher, Zahavi (2008), 2.

[7] Dummett (1982), XI-XXX.

Many important things happened since. Among them Gallagher and Zahavi (2008) point out three developments in cognitive science, which brought about a possible rehabilitation of phenomenology: 1. A revived interest in phenomenal consciousness; 2. The advent of embodied approaches to cognition; 3. The amazing progress in neuroscience and – I would add – the increasing need for accurate description of life-world phenomena whose neurobiological correlates one wants to investigate.

About 150 years have gone by since Husserl's birth: but, as Gallagher and Zahavi point out, no divide comparable to the one who took place later on occurred during the first decades of last century. Franz Brentano, Gottlob Frege, Edmund Husserl, William James, Bertrand Russell – to quote only some major figures – were all directly or indirectly aware of each other's works.

We should also recall many predecessors of Zahavi and Gallagher in the above mentioned rapprochement between philosophy and sciences of the mind – and of the embodied mind, or person. Among them are many former members of the Munich and Goettingen early phenomenological circles (from Herbert Spiegelberg to Dietrich von Hildebrand, from Roman Ingarden to Alfred Schutz – and many others). Having survived Nazi persecution through emigration, they spread our way of thinking and methods of research all over the world. To this direct inheritance belongs the uninterrupted tradition of phenomenology and experimental phenomenology within psychology and psychiatry, represented by the Dutch School, Erwin Straus, Ludwig Binswanger, Eugène Minkowski, Georges Lantéri-Laura, Wolfgang Blankenburg, Kimura Bin, and their followers down to the experimentally and philosophically impeccable present researches of Amedeo Giorgi, Matthew Ratcliffe's and Giovanni Stanghellini[8].

We should not forget, of course, the relevant developments in formal and material ontology rooted in Husserl's III *Logical Investigation* (on Parts and Wholes), quite particularly Peter Simons' mereology and Barry Smith's biomedical ontology; as, more generally, Kevin Mulligan's pioneering works about the so called *Austrian-analytic philosophy*[9]. Nor should we ignore all the scholars and researchers who contributed to a better understanding of our classics in the phenomenological Archives of Europe, Löwen, Freiburg, Munich, Cologne and Paris (among them three members of our scientific board, Verena Mayer, Dieter Lohmar and Jocelyn Benoist).

Last but perhaps not least, the rich variety of Italian phenomenological schools which our website, Phenomenology Lab, was born to give voice to. Some hints to the former phenomenological school of Milan were given above. Among the other Italian traditions in this field, it seems worthy of notice that our most important philosopher of law and politics (Norberto Bobbio, 1909-2004) wrote his first important book on social and legal philosophy within the phenomenological movement[10]: his pages on Husserl, and those on Scheler, Reinach and Kaufmann still retain their unequalled lucidity. Social ontology, on the other hand, which was first – and far before John Searle – outlined as an independent material ontology by Adolf Reinach, as well as by the polish philosopher Czesław Znamierowski (introduced in Italy by two members of our Center, Wojciech Żełaniec and Giuseppe Lorini) has found in Pavia and Milan a flourishing prosecution within the school of Amedeo G. Conte (Gianpaolo Azzoni, Paolo Di Lucia, Lorenzo Passerini Glazel, Stefano Colloca). The so-called "realist" phenomenology has been explored through essays and translations at the University of Bologna, where the legacy of Ezio Melandri is still alive (Stefano Besoli and others)[11]. Some women phenomenologists – from Edith Stein to Edwige Conrad Martius and Gertha Walter have been a privileged object of study within the school of Angela Ales Bello at the Pontificia Universitas Lateranensis in Rome, where Ales Bello founded the Centro Italiano di Ricerche Fenomenologiche in 1974.

[8] Giorgi (Ed.), (1985); Ratcliffe (2008); Stanghellini (2004).
[9] Simons (1987); Mulligan, Smith (1982). See also http://ontology.buffalo.edu.
[10] Bobbio (1934).
[11] Besoli, Guidetti (Eds), (2000).

Finally, I shall hint at those research fields which seem – up to now – to be the best covered by our Research Center. Persons and social objects make up the two main regional ontologies on which our work has focused. Two out of the three traditionally described spheres of consciousness – or rather personal life (cognitive, emotional and conative acts) – have been privileged and are being studied, both in their fundamental structures and relative to recent neuroscientifical findings. The nature of decisions and of freedom of action and/or will, neurophenomenology, empathy and structures of the emotional sensibility are current subjects of research and discussion, as well as social cognition, social acts, ontology of institutions and artefacts, theories of values and norms, foundations of practical rationality and personal responsibility, foundations of ethics[12].
After the Winter School 2010 we have been working at the organization of a Spring School (June 7-9, 2011) centerd on Social Ontology and John Searle's last book – *Making the social world*. Here are our present contributions to what we hope is going to renew the spirit of early phenomenology – on a planetary level.

3. A new beginning?

Let me conclude on the possible upshot of all that. Europe, from Cracow to Oxford, passing through Copenhagen and Paris does share a common philosophical language again. Or at least it could. We do master one again.
We have gone through the very beginning of a major philosophical turn in this century: the outset of a gradual reciprocal understanding between modern cognitive (neuro)science and phenomenology. We are learning to conceive of them as two complementary efforts aiming at – respectively – the study of the necessary neurological basis of a personal life, and their embeddings in *the relevant whole* of a living (human) person, which is the last subject of all our scientific inquiry. Phenomenology has shown the importance of replacing vague everyday talk about such pseudo-entities as "representations", "sense data", "qualia" or even about unanalyzed, complex phenomena such as the mind, the soul, the body and the natural, artificial and social objects of the life world, with rigorous, true to life, "*phänomengerecht*" descriptions of those things as experienced, and of the experience we make of them. For experience and the experienced world are the very background of our scientific enquiry, as well as the concrete embeddings of all normativity: logical, axiological, practical. They are the very foundations of our "normal" reason – theoretical or practical.
While many of the best analyses *on* phenomenology are methodological essays presenting a possibly fruitful new approach to the cognitive sciences and the philosophy of mind, many of the best analyses *in* phenomenology are, so to speak, essays in the ontology of concreteness – of life and of the experienced world.
Epistemic trust has proved itself a fruitful attitude via the rich variety of material ontologies which have been addressed since Husserl and Scheler's times. Whenever single types of "things themselves" – ideal or mathematical objects, special art domains, kinds of social objects, artefacts or institutions, material and formal axiology and so on – have been investigated, most sterile scholarly disputations on the kind of *Weltanschauung* compatible with phenomenology have tended to die down. Meanwhile, a shared theoretical and methodological principle seems to have imposed itself within and beyond the phenomenological circles: being founded on something does not mean being reducible to it. Along with rigour in descriptions, the major contribution of phenomenology to philosophical knowledge seems to be the concept of ontological dependence or *Fundierung*, developed on a formal level by several researchers on the basis of Husserl's pioneering logical investigation on parts and wholes[13]. This most useful tool of "antireductive metaphysics", constituting a relevant contribution to analytic ontology, enables us to escape both dead ends of the alternative between dualisms and reductionisms of all sorts. It also proves

[12] De Monticelli (2003, 2007; 2008a; 2008b; 2008c; 2009).
[13] Meirav (2003); De Monticelli (submitted).

precious in making sense both of our increasing knowledge of nature in ourselves and of the increasing demands of practical reason (justice) in our personal and social world.
To sum up, I really hope that some at least among the contributions to this issue will work as basic bricks of a building which we have dreamt of for a very long time: a common house for phenomenologists from all countries, maybe brought up in different traditions, maybe trained in different philosophical or scientific disciplines, but all sharing that deep wish for clarity and evidence and that incessant quest for rigor in arguing and "Sachlichkeit" of issues, which are constitutive of phenomenology as a method of philosophical research, along with the caring attention to the richness and irreducible subtlety of the apparent world, and the engagement to "save the phenomena", which distinguish phenomenology as a philosophical attitude. Here are some of the reasons we have to believe that we are facing a new beginning in philosophy. Thank you for helping us to realize this hope.

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NEUROSCIENCE AND PHENOMENOLOGY

abstract

This text contributes to a necessary dialogue, and possibly a translation of the different notions employed by neuroscience and phenomenology. This effort is particularly significant for cognitive neuroscientists whose main topic is social cognition and the related notion of intersubjectivity. What I qualify as "embodied simulation" (which exploits, not only but mainly, the intrinsic functional organization of the motor system) is a crucial functional mechanism in social cognition, not confined to the domain of action, but encompassing other aspects of intersubjectivity such as emotion and sensation. It is "embodied" because it uses a pre-existing body model in the brain: all the brain areas showing mirror mechanisms model our interaction with the world. This model of interaction, this praktognosia, turns out to be highly relevant not only when the task is to guide our own behavior, but also to understand the behavior of others. The very last part of the text is devoted to reply to some arguments against embodied simulation coming from phenomenologists themselves.

keywords

Cognitive neuroscience; embodied simulation; mirror neurons; peri-personal space; phenomenology; praktognosia

I'd like to start by thanking Roberta De Monticelli and the Center of Research in Phenomenology and Sciences of the person of Università Vita-Salute San Raffaele – Milan for giving me the opportunity to be here and take part to this very interesting – and innovative, for Italy – enterprise. We all believe that this is just the beginning of a future series of meetings where people from different disciplines but nevertheless sharing the same questions will have the opportunity, like we are doing during these three days, to meet and discuss.

I'll start with few opening remarks to make it clear where I am positioned with respect to this specific topic: the relationship between Phenomenology and Neuroscience. As already kindly quoted by Roberta De Monticelli, few years ago I wrote this statement: "we should phenomenologize Cognitive Neuroscience rather than naturalizing phenomenology" (Gallese 2006, p. 294). Both enterprises at first sight might look a bit spurious at least to the phenomenological tradition, which during the early phases of its development was very critical towards an approach meant to psychologize the content of our phenomenal world. I must say that I am a bit sceptical too about the possibility to naturalize Phenomenology, especially if one aims to do that by translating Phenomenology in the quantitative language of Mathematics, which is one of the possible ways of accomplishing such naturalization, fully endorsed by some of the people who were at the origin of the now famous book "Naturalizing Phenomenology" (Petitot *et al.* 1999).

Why should we try to phenomenologize Neuroscience? Because if one of the aims of Cognitive Neuroscience is to shed light on the human condition, we certainly cannot but start from how the world is constituted within our own phenomenal appreciation.

Further, I strongly believe that a dialogue, an exchange of views, possibly an attempt to translate the different notions employed by both disciplines, Neuroscience and Phenomenology, should not only be hoped for, but it is necessary. Certainly it is necessary for the cognitive neuroscientists whose main topic of investigation is the notion of intersubjectivity. And I think that the research agenda of Cognitive Neuroscience in the near future should certainly encompass the first-person aspect of human experience, but also the personal characteristic of the individual subject of that experience. We shouldn't forget that much of what we know about brain function, when we are dealing with "garden variety" participants, most volunteers will come from a not better specified cohort of Psychology students – this is the truth. Thus, I think we could do a lot more than that by trying to

correlate the brain function with the personal life history of the individuals we are employing in the vest of volunteer to enquire, to understand more about the relation between behaviour, between the life of the mind and the contribution of the brain-body system.
What has to be done is to much better specify who are the volunteers we are convincing to enter the fMRI. We must correlate how the specific being-in-the-world of the individual can be translated into a specific way of functioning of her/his brain-body system.
The larger field I would like to enter now is that of the project of naturalizing social cognition and we learned from Michele Di Francesco how we should envisage such enterprise, what do we mean by naturalizing.
Let's start from the mainstream view: according to the mainstream classic cognitive view, action and intention understanding, which constitute a very important part of our intersubjectivity, consist in interpreting and explaining in mental terms the behaviours of others. These behaviours, according to this perspective, are intentionally opaque, because they consist of biological motion. So, the way someone moves or behaves or acts is intrinsically intentionally opaque unless I can identify a hidden internal mental state that most likely caused that behaviour, and it is through this sort of ascending routine starting from behaviour, but aiming to reach the hidden internal mental state, that I can possibly, and only in this way, make sense of the behaviour of the other. This explanatory process is referred to as "mind reading", that is, the attribution to others of internal mental states mapped in the mind of the observer as internal representations. For most people this representation is conceived as being implemented in a propositional format. Here is a quote from Alvin Goldman's (Goldman 2008, p. 3): "In other words, to mind read is to form a judgement, belief or representation".
The problem for people like me is to translate this perspective into the working of the tiny little things we have in our head – neurons – which collectively we name the brain. And here we should acknowledge that we know very little of what is going on, in spite of the fact that many colleagues of mine believe they really know what's going on. Because the problem is this: we do not have a clear neuroscientific model of how humans can understand the intentions and other mental states promoting the behaviour of others: what we have is a series of brain imaging studies showing the activation of a set of cortical regions, mesial frontal areas, the temporal parietal junction etc., during explicit mentalizing tasks. No one to date was able to provide a convincing explanation about why those specific areas do activate during mentalization, beside – I want to be very outspoken – the tautological statement that mind reading is implemented in those brain areas. What we are left with is just a mere correlation which in science is not the ultimate goal, it is the beginning of the story, it is not the end. TQZhis is one out of many examples which really epitomizes this huge problem we are facing in Cognitive Neurosciences.
These tiny little squares shown on the mesial aspect of the frontal cortex portray activation foci activated in healthy volunteers while engaged in explicit mentalizing tasks, like for example attributing false beliefs to a fictitious character. The systematic activation of these parts of the mesial aspect of the frontal cortex let many scholars to make the statement: bingo, we found the home in the brain for the theory of mind module since what these people are doing is to mind read someone else. This part of the brain is systematically activated during explicit mind reading, hence it follows that this is where mind reading occurs at the level of the brain.
However, this is not the brain of a healthy individual, but it's the brain of a lady who suffered a bilateral damage to the supposed theory of mind module and the problem lies in the fact that this lady, in spite of having faced the complete destruction of the supposed theory of mind module, is fully competent in making sense of the behaviour of others (Bird *et al.* 2004). So that the authors of this paper conclude that their findings urge caution against using functional imaging as the sole method of establishing cognitive neuroanatomy. There is another problem: we are told that certain

sectors in the brain are specifically active with a unique series of tasks, namely tasks that ask people to explicitly mentalize, mind read, attribute propositional attitudes to others. But we are not even sure of the specificity of this activation. One crucial area in the domain of the neural correlates of mind reading is the temporal parietal junction (TPJ), the *carrefour* at which the temporal and the parietal lobe merge. For many years authors like – I quote one for many – Rebecca Saxe, made the claim that this area is solely and uniquely active in mind reading tasks. We learn – from the work of other colleagues of Saxe, for example, Jason Mitchell who is at Harvard – that this is not true, because the very same TPJ which is active when I attribute false beliefs to others is also active when I am engaged in an attentional task which has nothing to do with explicit mind reading. Even sexual arousal can lead to its activation. Well, we can always say that there are highly sophisticated persons who can get sexually aroused only through mind reading but – I mean – I would rate this as a very weak argument.

So, beside the reification of mentalistic notions like belief and intention into things to be found at specific locations in the brain, the main problem with this approach consists in the fact that the mind reading specificity of this activation is at best highly debatable. Then I ask myself and ourselves a rhetoric question: do we really believe there are mind reading specific neurons in the brain? We know what a neuron is all about: basically is a machine producing action potentials. Mentalizing though, whatever it is, is a personal level competence and therefore it cannot be fully reduced to the subpersonal activity of mind reading specific clusters of neurons wherever they might be located. We should remind ourselves that neurons are not epistemic agents, insofar as they only "know" about the ions passing through their membranes, giving them the property they have, being excitable cells. Neurons, and of course *a fortiori* mirror neurons or brain areas, are necessary but not sufficient conditions for mentalizing, because in order to mentalize we need an individual. Let me offer you my reductionist definition of what an individual can be reduced to: a properly wired brain-body system interacting with a specific environment populated by other brain-body systems. A further aspect I would like to emphasize is that when we refer to the brain we should always bear in mind that the brain is not a sort of magic box, the brain is a subpersonal constituent of our body which gets all the possible information about the so-called external world through an interface which is the body, which is a very peculiar interface which develops to acquire the given shape we now have because of the adaptation to a specific environment which obeys to specific physical laws etc. So it is a situated brain-body system, the one which is the target of the investigation of people like me.

I endorse a "bottom-up" approach to social cognition and I would like to start by quoting the authors of the book which is the main topic of this Winter School: "The other is given in its bodily presence as a lived body" as Gallagher and Zahavi write, "a body that is actively engaged in the world". "Empathy is defined as a form of intentionality in which one is directed towards the other lived experiences [...]". "In empathy we experience the other directly as a person, as an intentional being whose bodily gestures and actions are expressive of his or her experiences or states of mind" (Gallagher-Zahavi 2008, p. 183). Great!

My problem starts now: how do we accomplish this? My point: at the basis of the capacity to understand others' intentional behaviour in such a direct way, both from a phylogenetic and an ontogenetic point of view, there is a basic functional mechanism which I qualify as *embodied simulation* which exploits, not only but mainly, the intrinsic functional organization of the motor system. So the natural evidence of the world stems from our potentialities for action: this is a topic that I assume will be much more detailed and developed in the following talk given by Corrado Sinigaglia. Here is a quote from Aron Gurwitsch, in a paper which appeared in 1941: "The world in which we live and act is peopled with items endowed not only with colors, warmth, smells, shapes etc., but also with qualities like attractive, repulsive, agreeable, [...], fit for some purpose or

other, and so forth. In this world there are actions done or to be done, and these actions deposit themselves like qualities upon the things with which they are connected" (Gurwitsch 1941, p. 328). Merleau-Ponty: "my body appears to me as an attitude directed towards a certain existing or possible task. And indeed its spatiality is not, like that of the external objects or like that of *spatial sensations*, a *spatiality of position*", we are not dealing with geometrical space here, "but a *spatiality of situation*" (Merleau-Ponty 1962, p. 100). And a few pages later he develops this and clarifies what by spatiality of situation one has to mean. The body "provides us with a way of access to the world and the object, with" what he denotes, refers to, as "a *praktognosia*, which has to be recognized as original and perhaps as primary" (Merleau-Ponty 1962, p. 140).

And just to give you a flash of how true I take to be such a statement, an example comes from the investigation of one of the many parallel cortico-cortical networks that reciprocally connect distinct fields within the posterior parietal cortex and the ventral premotor cortex of the macaque monkey brain. We are dealing with one specific field within the premotor cortex of the macaque, area F4, which is immediately facing the primary motor cortex, so, if you recall the neural properties of the neurons sitting there, these are motor neurons and they control the execution of goal-related purposeful movements like stretching out the arm to reach something within the peripersonal space or turning the head to orient towards or move away from something which is approaching the macaque monkey's body. These neurons combine motor properties – they control the reaching of the arm or the orienting or avoidance movement of the head – with tactile properties on the same region whose movements the same neuron controls, and visual properties. But the most interesting feature of these visual properties is that the visual receptive field, the part of the visible space observed by the monkey that is effective in driving the discharge of the neuron, is not only bidimensional, but has also the dimension of depth. A visual stimulus is effective in driving this motor neuron only if it is presented within the peripersonal space. Peripersonal space is the outcome of the motor potentialities our body instantiates. Premotor neurons map objects within peripersonal space as potential targets and, if you allow me, we could define these objects in heideggerian terms as "*zu-handen* objects" of goal directed motor behaviour. Premotor neurons accomplish such mapping by means of simulation because when the neuron that normally controls the reaching of my arm is activated by a visual stimulus within my reaching space, within the potentiality of reaching of my arm, then, that object activates a motor program which nevertheless doesn't lead to an overt movement on the side of the observer. The observer is merely watching that object approaching to a given body part. This motor activation devoid of any actual movement, at least in my opinion, can fully qualify as a motor simulation, because it is the activation of a motor neuron which nevertheless doesn't lead to produce overt movement. And here there is another quote of a phenomenologist – Jan Patocka – who moves one step further with respect to Heidegger, giving to the practical knowledge of the world envisaged by Heidegger, the flash and bones of the living body, so to speak. Patocka in *Body, Community, Language, World* writes: "Our primary experience of ourselves is an experience of primordial dynamism that manifests itself in our awareness of our existence as a moving, active being. This dynamism appears as distinctively linked to that which orients us in our movements [...] in such a way that our energy is always focused on something, on what we are doing" (Patocka 1998, p. 40). So, if we go back to intersubjectivity, the conclusion we may provisionally draw is the following: we should abandon the Cartesian view of the primacy of the ego and adopt a perspective emphasizing the fact that the other is co-originally given as the self. Both self and other appear to be intertwined because of the intercorporeity linking them. Intercorporeity describes a crucial aspect of intersubjectivity not because the latter is phylogenetically and ontogenetically grounded on a mere similarity between our body and the body of others, because the pictorial similarity, as we will see in a minute, is not the crucial point here. Intercorporeity describes a crucial aspect of intersubjectivity, because we and others all

share the same intentional object – obviously to a certain degree - and our situated motor systems are similarly wired to accomplish similar goals. It is the sharing of the same situatedness and the sharing of the same intentional goals that makes intercorporeity a privileged access to the world of the other.

What we learn from Cognitive Neuroscience is the following: the motor system of primates is primarily organized not in terms of movements, but rather in terms of goal-directed motor acts. Goal-directed motor acts are the nuclear building blocks around which action is produced, perceived and, to a certain degree, at least, understood. What makes of a movement a motor act? The presence of a goal. The same movement can accomplish different goals – a typical example I am always reiterating is that of flexing the finger of my hand. So, this is a movement. However, this movement can be put into service of completely different goals: scratch my hand, grab this mike, say hello: the movement is the same, the purposes are different. For many years we thought that the defining feature of the motor system is to enable the execution of movements; in order to attain to the teleological level we should put into action other parts of our brain. Most likely, the most anterior you go, the more cognitive you get, people claim, so, probably the pole of the frontal lobe is where goals are living and where goals are communicated to the motor system whose main task is to set different muscles into action, thus enabling movement. I believe this characterization of the motor system is wrong or, at best, captures only one aspect of the functionality of the motor system. Why do I say that?

Because now we have the empirical evidence enabling us to justify the statement I've just made, namely that the motor system is best understood as enabling the accomplishment of motor goals. Neurons recorded in the ventral pre-motor cortex area F5 by Giacomo Rizzolatti and co-workers in the late eighties of last century (Rizzolatti *et al.* 1988), have the distinctive feature of being driven by goal-related motor acts like grasping a piece of food, with the mouth, with the right hand, or with the left hand. Different movements, different effectors. Nevertheless, these different movements lead all the same to the activation of the very same neuron. The great discovery of Giacomo Rizzolatti was to interpret such a firing as the outcome of goal coding: so these neurons do not code movement, they code the goal of taking possession of an object, no matter if with the mouth, right or left hand. We can resist, and indeed many people resist this hypothesis, many people still resist this interpretation, even after the data I am going to present.

You can reason in the following way: why do you need to invoke mentalistic notions like that of *télos*, of goal? These neurons could be easily interpreted in a much more parsimonious way by making the statement: what these neurons are doing is sending divergent inputs to motor neurons sitting in the primary motor cortex which in turn control the closure of different effectors, the mouth, the right hand or the left hand. So we wouldn't need to invoke the notion of a goal to make sense of these neurons. How can we falsify this parsimonious interpretation? By dissociating the movements from the goal, and this is exactly what we did.

In this experiment (Umiltà *et al.* 2008) we have a dissociation: in order to accomplish the goal of grasping something, the monkey is no longer required to close the finger, but to open them while using a reverse type of pliers. The same neuron that fires when the monkey grasps with the bare hand or with normal pliers, in which goal accomplishment always coincides with finger flexion, also fires when the goal is accomplished by performing exactly the opposite type of movement, namely extending the fingers instead of flexing them. These neurons implement a goal state motor representation whose content is both intentional and motor in nature. Why intentional? Because it is a goal-centered motor representation that although referring to movement, cannot, as we have seen, be reduced to a single sequence of movements. But it's also motor because the goal is mapped in motor terms. In other words, as the end point of a motor act, and although this motor representation can differ with respect to single movements, nonetheless it must have a coherent

motor content enabling it to determine a given behaviour and to control its execution, because we are in the motor system. Mirror neurons add to this property of goal relatedness the multimodal property of being active not only when the goal is accomplished by the owner of the mirror neuron, but also when a similar motor goal is accomplished by someone else.
So, the neuron fires both when the monkey grasp, but also when the monkey is witnessing the grasping being made in front of it by another individual, being a human being or a monkey. There is the coding of a similarity which is not a similarity of shape – curiously Edith Stein uses specifically the example of the hand – so a child hand, a monkey hand, a human adult hand is always a hand. What makes of this physical entity a hand? Well, among other things, the possibility, the intrinsic possibility of being instrumental to the accomplishment of a motor goal.
Here I want briefly to condense some novel findings on mirror neurons: the first is that the motor goal-relatedness of grasping motor neurons also applies to mirror neurons. As demonstrated by the recent study of Rochat (Rochat *et al.* 2010), the same mirror neurons that fire when the monkey grasps by hand, or with reverse pliers, also fire when observing a grasp being made by a hand or by means of reverse pliers. It's symmetric. The peak of the discharge is reached by mirror neurons at the accomplishment of the goal. However, if you confront the level of activation when the action is executed by the monkey, with respect to when the monkey is observing the action being performed by the other – although the pattern of discharge is identical, the intensity of the discharge in the latter case is significantly lower. This is crucial – I will come back to this point – because we have a neural mechanism that is mapping the same goal, no matter who is accomplishing it. However, mirror neurons react differently when the action is actively executed with respect to when it is only observed.
But there is more. The monkey, in order to perform this task, needs to be trained. So we trained these monkeys for five months, in order to teach them how to control these crazy instruments. However, we investigated the discharge of mirror neurons also during the observation of objects being "grasped" by means of sticking them, a motor strategy monkeys never learned to execute.
If you compare the temporal development of the discharge of mirror neurons during action observation, you see that the discharge occurs much earlier on to the extent that the observed action belongs to the motor repertoire of the monkey. The more the observed action belongs to the motor repertoire of the observer, the earliest occurs the response of the mirror neuron. This finding suggests two things: 1) motor expertise plays a role in modulating the response of the mirror mechanism; 2) the mirror mechanism has the potentiality to generalize, to map the very same goal also in observed behaviours that monkeys are not capable of performing.
Similar results were recently obtained in humans by Cattaneo and colleagues (Cattaneo *et al.* 2010) with transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS). By means of TMS one can stimulate in a somatotopic way the motor system. According to where one places the stimulating coil, a very strong magnetic field excites a relatively limited population of neurons sitting below the location where the stimulator is placed. So, if you put the stimulator in correspondence with the region of the primary motor cortex that controls the movement of distal muscles, you can evoke a twitch in the muscles being controlled by the spinal neuron which in turn is controlled by the cortico-spinal neuron that you are stimulating. So, you are activating the piramidal tract and you lead to the activation of a muscle. Here, this kind of experiment, wants to learn how much the excitability of the motor system is influenced by viewing someone else doing something. In this particular case, people while being subjected to the stimulation were looking at an actor either playing with reverse pliers, similar to that employed by the monkey, or accomplishing a goal, taking possession of an object.
To make a long story short, the motor facilitation has a completely different profile, according to the stimulus that was observed during the stimulation. If you stimulate the motor cortex while participants are watching a movement, opening and closing the gripper, you see a facilitation

which is congruent with the movement: you facilitate the flexor muscles during the opening phase and you facilitate the extensor muscles during the closing phase. In this case motor facilitation is synchronous with the observed movement. However, if you are observing gripper being operated to accomplish a goal, e.g. to grasp a peanut, the facilitatory effect coincides with the accomplishment of the goal. The observation of a *tool movement* activates the cortical motor representation of the hand *movements* involved in the observed motor behaviour, but the observation of the *tool goal-related motor act*, activates a cortical representation of the observed *motor goal*, irrespective of the individual movements and the order required to accomplish the very same goal. In conclusion, we see in the human motor system the very same effect that we were able – with a much higher level of granularity – to measure in the macaque monkey brain.

Next is another recent experiment (Caggiano *et al.* 2009) that was done in joint collaboration between the University of Tubingen and the Università degli Studi di Parma. This study demonstrates that the firing of mirror neurons is modulated by the proxemic relationship between actor and observer. You already know what peripersonal space is, it's a motor space, the space I can reach by outstretching my arm. When we first described mirror neurons, we didn't systematically test if peripersonal modulation could be uncovered, which is specifically what is at stake here. In this study the action observed by the monkey is executed by the agent either within or outside the peripersonal space of the monkey. These authors discovered that while 50% of mirror neurons are not modulated by the distance at which the observed action occurs, the remaining 50% is modulated by this manipulation. So there are mirror neurons that are driven by the observation of the grasping only if it occurs in the extrapersonal space of the monkey, and others showing the opposite modulation. Some neurons are even more interesting, because they don't fire if the experimenter grasps within the peripersonal space of the monkey. However, if the grasp is observed being performed at the very same spatial location but with the interposition of a transparent barrier which makes that object unreachable by the observing monkey, these neurons resume their activation. Although, geometrically speaking, the location is the same that before was totally uneffective in driving the cells, the potentiality for action is strongly modulated by this interposition of a transparent barrier and this manipulation of the potentiality for action of the observer modulates the discharge of the very same neuron. I think that this is very important and could lead to a new line of research on humans and there are people actively seeking to investigate this effect by means of virtual reality in humans.

To sum up: mirror neurons discharge when the action is executed or observed and when the consequences of the action can only be predicted. Even the noise produced by the action is sufficient to specifically trigger mirror neurons, so the neuron that fires when the monkey breaks the peanut also fires when the monkey sees someone else breaking the peanut but will also fire when the only sensory information the monkey receives is the noise of the peanut being broken by someone else. We believe that all these properties entitle us to interpret the mirror mechanism as a non-metarepresentational form of action understanding. Or better: this mechanism underpins, enables, makes it possible for us to directly understand the *what*, the motor goal, and – at least to a certain degree – also the *why*, the motor intention, of the observed behaviour of others. By motor intention I don't imply the reasons causing a given behaviour. This is a grasp, ok? So mirror neurons, in my opinion enable us to understand directly that such biological motion is a grasp. Why do I grasp this? To drink, and we believe that this is still within the potentialities of this mechanism. Why do I drink? This is beyond, at least so far we have no empirical evidence enabling us to claim that the why of this motor intention is within the coding capabilities of the mirror mechanism. Because I am thirsty, because I am anxious and my salivation is reduced to zero and then I need to restore the hydric equilibrium within my mouth. I mean, this is beyond, but the what and the motor why, we believe, are within the mirror mechanism capabilities, is something that this mechanism can buy you.

Let's turn now to the mirror mechanism in humans. A meta-analysis of several brain imaging studies show that different regions within the premotor and posterior parietal cortices of the human brain are activated both during motor execution and action observation. Furthermore, there are other brain regions that show the same double pattern of activation. Not anymore in the domain of action, but in the domain of emotion or sensations. There are cortical sites that are activated during both the first-person experience and the observation of emotions or sensations. My model aims to provide a coherent framework and functional explanation of this variety of mirror mechanisms that nevertheless seem to share something: a functional mechanism that I characterize, unfortunately it turned out, as 'embodied simulation'.

What is embodied simulation in short? Is a crucial functional mechanism in social cognition, not confined to the domain of action, but encompassing other aspects of inter-subjectivity such as emotion and sensation. Why embodied? Because it uses a pre-existing body model in the brain. I mean: all of these brain areas showing mirror mechanisms, what they are doing? They model our interaction with the world. Well, this model of interaction, this *praktognosia*, turns out to be highly relevant also when the task is not to guide our own behaviour, but to interpret, to decode, to understand, the behaviour of others.

Why simulation? Because we have an isomorphic representational format – indeed we map the actions of others onto our own motor representation as well as other emotions and sensations onto our visuomotor and sensorimotor representation. My disgust: I activate my insula. Your disgust: I still activate my insula. The term "representation" of course is employed in a very different way from its standard meaning. I refer, when I speak of motor representation, to a type of content which is generated by our interactions with the world, that is pre-theoretical and pre-linguistic, but that nonetheless has attributes or some attributes normally referred to conceptual content (Gallese 2001, 2003).

The very last part of my talk is devoted to reply to some arguments against embodied simulation. Not those coming from the field of Classic Cognitive Neuroscience, but, unfortunately, from phenomenologists. Life is never easy. Okay, here at the end I quote Dan Zahavi and Shaun Gallagher. "The sub-personal simulation process", – they refer here to Alvin Goldman – "like its explicit cousin", embodied simulation, "involves a multi-step process. First, we perceive a certain behaviour; this is followed immediately by activation of shared representations – in neutral mode; and this is followed by a determination of agency" (Gallagher-Zahavi 2008, p. 178). My reply: such steps are unwarranted both at the phenomenal level – and we all agree on that – but also at the sub-personal level. I dispute that a given behaviour, like my grasping the microphone, can be directly perceived as such unless by evoking the activation of its motor content. What makes of the physical displacement of this physical entity which you call "my hand" contacting this other physical entity, the microphone, a grasping hand, is motor simulation. You must activate the motor system in order to have a direct appreciation of this biological motion as a grasping hand. But since the activation of such motor content occurs in the brain of the observer without any explicit movement, such activation in my opinion qualifies as motor simulation.

But apparently there are more simulation troubles. *Simulation trouble* (2007) is the title of one paper from Gallagher, but the same argument I think is employed in the joint co-authored book we are discussing today. According to Gallagher and Zahavi the phenomena that occur during the activation of mirror neurons should not be understood as a simulation for multiple reasons. These reasons include the "as if" quality of mirror mechanism, reportedly at odds with the fact that mirror neurons map intentional relations in a fashion that is neutral about the identity of the agentive/subjective parameter.

My reply: it is certainly true that mirror neurons fire no matter whether the action is executed or perceived. However, it is also true that the intensity of their response is not the same in these two

different situations. More generally, embodied simulation doesn't imply that we experience others the way we experience ourselves. The I-Thou identity relation constitutes only one side of the inter-subjectivity coin. The cortical circuits at work when we act, neither completely overlap nor show the same activation intensity as when others are the agents and we are the witnesses of their action. The same logic applies to sensations and emotions. There is a very recent paper by Christian Keysers and co-workers (Jabbi *et al.* 2008), whose main target is the appreciation of disgust in others. So, again, like in our original experiment, voluntary participants in the fMRI are either being subjectively disgusted – this time by tasting some disgusting liquid – or view the expression of disgust of someone else or – third condition – read a narrative about somebody else's disgust. The results of the experiment are the following: no matter whose disgust is at stake, the anterior insula always activates. At the very same location that we discovered in our original disgust experiment (Wicker *et al.* 2003). However, this is only one part of the story. Together with this common, shared activation focus, there are other brain regions which uniquely activate during my disgust but not during your disgust or the disgust of a fictitious character in the narrative, and the other way around.

Second, I don't share Gallagher and Zahavi's view that embodied simulation – this is a more philosophical argument – must necessarily be characterized as simulation exclusively based upon the resemblance between target and simulator. As argued by the late Susan Hurley simulation can be more plausibly characterized in terms of *reuse* (Hurley 2005). According to the reuse notion of simulation, which I advocate, what distinguishes embodied simulation from theorizing is the reuse of a process for generating knowledge about that process. Neuroscientific evidence shows that motor neurons reuse motor processes enabling direct understanding of the actions of others and, similarly, viscero-motor or somatosensory neurons reuse emotion- and somatosensory-related processes enabling direct understanding of others' emotions and sensations.

What qualifies simulation as embodied is specifically this notion of reuse describable as an isomorphic type of mapping between target and simulator. What makes the activation of mirror neurons or mirroring mechanisms in the human brain during the observation of the actions of other an "as if" process, is not its resemblance aspect. This cannot be the case because we have seen at the level of the single neuron that there is nothing resembling the movement of the hand operating with the reverse pliers with the way macaque monkeys' hand appears when accomplishing the same goal. What makes the activation of mirror neurons during the observation of the actions of others an "as if" process is not the resemblance aspect, but the fact that in spite of an activation of the motor system in the observer's brain, the action is not executed. Thus, I cannot find a better word than qualifying it as a "motor simulation". This is the reason why I disagree with the claim that in order to invoke simulation mirror neurons "must generate an extra copy of the actions as they would be if they were the perceiver's own actions" (Gallagher 2001, p. 102). Mirror neurons' activation is the activation of the motor representation of that action, so there is no extra step to be invoked in order to explain it.

That said, I think that our perspectives share a lot more than what transpires from Gallagher and Zahavi's critique of embodied simulation. We all think that mind reading should not be identified with the mostly theoretical enterprise usually defined as Theory of Mind. We all think that the primary way of understanding others is direct in nature.

However, I do believe, pace Gallagher and Zahavi, that such directedness is completely compatible with the reuse notion of simulation I am advocating. Claiming that the understanding of others is mediated by mirror-based embodied simulation is not tantamount to saying that a sort of pretence mediates the perception of others' behaviour. All of these considerations make it difficult to account for mirroring phenomena as form of "direct perception". Social cognition is not only explicitly thinking about the contents' of someone else's mind. Our brain has developed a basic functional mechanism which I qualify as embodied simulation which gives us an experiential insight of other

minds. The specific nature of such experiential insight is still very loosely defined, and there is a lot of very meticulous philosophical work in parallel with neuroscientific work to much better specify what we qualify as "experiential". The shared "we-centric" space mapped by mirror neuron mechanisms generates the implicit certainties – which I think somehow overlaps with the notion of background as spelled out by John Searle – we entertain about others.
Before and below mind reading is intercorporeity as the main source of knowledge we directly gather about others (Gallese 2007). Embodied simulation is one crucial ingredient of intercorporeity. The social cognitive endowements of our species could be the evolutionary outcome, the exaptation of mechanisms that are not mind reading specific. The I-Thou relation provides the basic ground for our cognitive/affective development, hence for our intimate being social individuals capable of mutual recognition and understanding. I would like to end with a quote from a book that should perhaps be retranslated in Italian, *Ich und Du* by Martin Buber (1923): "In the beginning is relation". By empirically investigating the ontogeny of action you don't know how true this statement is. But this is a different story. Thank you.

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FANTASIES AND FACTS: EPISTEMOLOGICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON FIRST- AND THIRD - PERSON PERSPECTIVES

abstract

I review a number of approaches that attempt to deal with the gap that seems to exist between first-person and third-person accounts of consciousness, and some of the conceptual, epistemological, and methodological issues that surround this distinction. I argue, with reference to Carnap and Schrödinger, that one cannot simply reduce data from the first-person perspective to third-person data, without remainder, especially when the very subject matter of the science includes the first-person perspective.

keywords

Heterophenomenology; neurophenomenology; first-person; third-person; science; Carnap

FANTASIES AND FACTS: EPISTEMOLOGICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON FIRST- AND THIRD-PERSON PERSPECTIVES

In philosophical and scientific discussions of consciousness one often finds a distinction made between first-person and third-person perspectives. Indeed, traditional and contemporary definitions of the mind-body problem, the "hard" problem, or the problem of the explanatory gap have often been framed by this distinction. Scientific objectivity, it is said, requires a detached, third-person approach to observable phenomena, and we have such access to things in the environment, some of which are brains. Brain science depends on taking a third-person perspective. In contrast, we have direct knowledge of our own experience only in a first-person perspective, but this is thought to be too subjective to generate scientific data. Thus Daniel Dennett (2001) has remarked: "First-person science of consciousness is a discipline with no methods, no data, no results, no future, no promise. It will remain a fantasy". If this is so, then the problem is clear. Seemingly there can be no science of consciousness per se since (1) consciousness is intrinsically first-person; and (2) any attempt to explain something that is first-person in third-person terms distorts or fails to capture what it tries to explain. Furthermore, (3) first-person phenomenology cannot be a science of consciousness, if in science there is only room for third-person data. I want to review here two aspects of this problem. The first is methodological, the second is epistemological.

1. Methodologies

One methodological proposal is to reduce the first-person perspective to third-person data and to integrate it with other third-person data from experimental science. This is a strategy that Dennett calls "heterophenomenology" (1991, 2001). Heterophenomenology itself, however, involves something of a fantasy, to use the term that Dennett applies to first-person science. The fantasy here is that science can leave the first-person perspective behind, or neutralize it without remainder. First-person data are supposedly averaged out in statistical summaries, and treated as third-person facts. According to this approach, a fact would be, not the first-person datum "The subject experiences X", but the third-person datum "The subject reports that she experiences X". This fact is then to be interpreted and analyzed using pre-established categories. Dennett suggests that it should be interpreted as a text or a piece of narrative. So, for example, one question would be, what do people usually mean when they say that they experience X. But it is just here that one can see how this procedure is actually naïve, and ultimately non-scientific. In attempting to say something about consciousness (or specifically about the experience X), heterophenomenology fails to acknowledge that its

interpretations of first-person reports must be based, in part[1], and ultimately, on either the scientist's own first-person experience (what he understands from his own experience to be the experience of X), or upon pre-established (and seemingly objective) categories that are, however, ultimately derived from folk psychology or from an obscure, anonymous, and certainly non-methodological phenomenology[2]. The intentional stance required for the scientist's interpretation of the subject's report is not itself something that has come under scientific controls; it is thus infected, directly or indirectly, by the first-person perspective (see Gallagher 1997, 2003a).

A different methodological approach is to take the first-person perspective seriously and to seek out methodological controls that can apply to that data. One version of this approach is Francisco Varela's notion of "neurophenomenology". As it has been employed in recent experiments this involves training experimental subjects to develop their own report categories, and then using those categories as an analytic tool for the interpretation of data (see Lutz *et al.* 2002, and Lutz 2002). A related approach, "frontloaded phenomenology" involves using phenomenological insights that have already been worked out in a formal analysis of the sort found in the work of Edmund Husserl, Maurice Merleau-Ponty or other phenomenologists, as the basis for experimental design (Gallagher 2003a; Gallagher and Brøsted Sørensen 2006; Gallagher and Zahavi 2008).

Let me discuss just one example of this latter approach. The example is drawn from experiments that have already been performed (Blakemore and Decety 2001; Decety and Grèzes 1999; Jeannerod 1997; Ruby and Decety 2001; and other studies reviewed by Grèzes and Decety 2001). The phenomenological insight, however, would suggest a revised experimental design. This example also relies on the distinction between first-person and third-person perspectives (see Gallagher 2003b for further discussion).

A number of brain areas (including the supplementary motor area, the dorsal pre-motor cortex, the supramarginal gyrus, and the superior parietal lobe) are activated when a subject

- *Engages in intentional action*
- *Observes others engaging in such action*
- *Consciously simulates (or imagines) performing such action*
- *Or prepares to imitate such action*

Certain of the same brain areas are activated under all of these conditions. The experiments that have established these intriguing shared neuronal representations suggest that the overlapping activations of brain areas constitute an important part of how we come to understand others. We activate parts of our own motor and cognitive systems in a simulative way, and this neural reverberation may be a partial basis for insight into what the other person's experience is like.

Some of these same brain areas are activated under one or two of the conditions, but not under all of them. These non-overlapping areas are also of importance, however. Jeannerod (2001) proposed that the non-overlapping areas may account for our ability to distinguish our own activities from those of others, and thus may contribute to a sense of self-agency (also see Jeannerod *et al.* 2003; Ruby and Decety 2001).

The brain-imaging experiments that help to establish these facts are based on important operational

[1] In Dennett's most recent version of heterophenomenology, he explains that it is not just the verbal reports that constitute the data for heterophenomenological analysis, but behavioral and other objective (physiological) data. So some part of the interpretation of the verbal reports would likely be based on the other objective data.

[2] E. Schrödinger (1935), the famous physicist, writes: "Another person's sensory perceptions are something I can never experience myself. Still, I do not hesitate to interpret them by remembering what I call my own *similar* perceptions".

definitions of first-person perspective and third-person perspective worked out in an influential paper by Barresi and Moore (1996).

> **First-person perspective:** Subjects are asked to imagine themselves performing a given action, for example, reaching to grasp a glass.
>
> **Third-person perspective**: Subjects are asked to imagine the experimenter performing the same action.

At this point, however, a closer phenomenological analysis suggests some qualifications that should have been, but were not considered in the experimental designs. Attending first to the definition of the first-person perspective, one can distinguish phenomenologically (that is, by appealing to one's own possible experiences) between

> **First-person/egocentric perspective:** I am located here, and I imagine moving my hand to grasp the glass in front of me.
>
> **First-person/allocentric perspective:** I imagine myself sitting over there, and I can visually imagine how that person, who happens to be me, would reach to pick up a glass that is nearby.

Likewise, for the third-person perspective, it is possible to distinguish between

> **Third-person/allocentric perspective:** I imagine seeing her over there reaching for the glass.
>
> **Third-person/egocentric perspective:** I imagine being over there in her place doing the action "from the inside"[3].

Since there were no controls for these distinctions in the experiments, it seems likely that the original experimental results and their interpretations require some qualification. When subjects are asked to simulate (or imagine) an action from the first-person perspective (or third-person perspective) do we know whether they are taking an allocentric or egocentric perspective, and is neural activation the same or different across these different perspectives? Employing these phenomenological distinctions and answering this question may help to make the concept of neuronal simulation and the differentiation between self-agency and other-agency more precise.

These phenomenological distinctions are based on the possibility of an imaginative variation – that is, the fact that I can rehearse these various perspectives in my own experience (see Froese and Gallagher 2010). But this points to a further complication. The complication involves what we might call the primary first-person framework that structures all of a subject's experience. That is, in all cases, even in the third-person allocentric framework, I am the one doing the imaginative enactment – third-person perspectives are still accomplished within the first-person framework of my own experience. One might say that there is something it is like to be imaginatively enacting an action from a third-person perspective. I never lose track of who is simulating and who is simulated? A more basic first-person framework seems to define the very possibility of taking a third-person point of view.

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[3] Farrer and Frith (2002) claim that this is not possible: "it is not possible to represent the actions of others in the egocentric coordinates used for generating our own actions" (p. 601). It is not clear to me why this is impossible.

2. The epistemological Issue

This point about a more basic first-person framework is an epistemological issue that can be taken back to our original problem about the possibility of doing a science of consciousness. Science is always accomplished by scientists who occupy, by necessity, their own first-person perspective. They take up a third-person perspective from within the perspective of the first-person.

It is clear that this is not a new issue, and that it has been well debated before. Schrödinger and Carnap, for example, in the 1930s, took up this issue on opposite sides[4]. Schrödinger maintained that science depends on a "fundamental axiom" which is neither empirically testable nor simply a matter of convention. He formulates this axiom in a way that points to both the irreducibility of the first-person perspective and the unavoidability of the second-person (intersubjective) perspective in the practice of science, and he calls it "Hypothesis *P*", where *P* stands for the personality of the scientists. Hypothesis *P* can be stated in this way: I am not the only one who has experiences (including thoughts, feelings, memories etc.); others also have them[5]. In doing science, however, scientists are required to ignore this axiom. One is required to conduct science as if there is only a third-person perspective.

> The scientist subconsciously, almost inadvertently, simplifies the problem of understanding Nature by disregarding or cutting out of the picture to be constructed, himself, his own personality, the subject of cognizance. (Schrödinger 1967, p. 90)

Despite this methodological elimination of the first-and second-person, "science in its totality depends on Hypothesis P". The scandal (although Schrödinger rightly says it is not a scandal, but simply the way it is) is that science is accomplished by human beings who live lives that are ultimately non-scientific. On Schrödinger's view, Hypothesis *P* cannot be subjected to scientific investigation.

Carnap accepts some version of Hypothesis P. He concludes his 1936 response to Schrödinger in this way: "All the premises on which science depends, when they are not purely conventional in nature, rest on experience". More importantly, however, Carnap believed that Hypothesis P, at least the version that is genuinely presupposed in scientific research, is subject to scientific examination. Specifically, he suggests, the fact that other persons have experiences is testable on the assumption that there are exact relational laws that link mental states and observable behaviors[6].

As far as I can see, however, this still leaves in play the first-person experience on which we base our understanding of what these behaviours mean. This is not the place to consider whether the first-person or the second-person perspective has priority, or to discuss contemporary theory of mind approaches to such questions (see Gallagher and Zahavi 2008). The point that we want to make here, however, follows Carnap's idea that "all the premises on which science depends ... rest on experience", and still in some way experience itself is subject to scientific investigation. This epistemological claim, however, leads us back once again to the methodological issues of precisely how science can study first-person experience.

Both the epistemological and the methodological considerations suggest that there is no easy

[4]Michel Bitbol (1999) provides an excellent discussion of this debate. Also see Bitbol (2000).
[5] Carnap (1936) states it in this way: "Hypothesisp. I am not the only one who has sensations (and, as a result, thoughts, feelings, memories etc.); other people also have them".
[6] As Bitbol (1999) points out Carnap borrows an argument from Neurath, based on the latter's "social behaviourism". For Carnap, it is legitimate to infer that someone possesses feelings, thoughts, memories and perceptions on the basis of a "determinate exterior behaviour".

resolution to this problem, or at least, no solution that will gain easy consensus. But this debate is philosophically central to understanding the nature of science, especially when we are attempting a science of consciousness, which is the scientific investigation of experience. One cannot simply reduce data from the first-person perspective to third-person data, without remainder, since not only is there always an experiencing scientist and in many cases an experimental subject, but, when the science is the science of consciousness, the very subject matter of the science includes the first person perspective. In the case of the science of consciousness, this makes Hypothesis *P* an explicit fact that cannot be ignored. To ignore the first-person perspective that is implicit in all attempts to take the third-person perspective may be a perfectly acceptable, and even necessary way to do physics. But to try to ignore the first-person perspective or to fail to take it seriously in its own terms, when what is at stake is consciousness – that is, precisely first-person experience – and to be satisfied with the idea that one can reduce this to third-person data – is to be *un*scientific. Science cannot ignore the facts, and the facts of the matter in this case are facts of the first-person perspective.

To think that science can be exclusively a third-person procedure is itself something of an epistemological fantasy. To paraphrase Dennett, in a way that apparently would be unacceptable to him: a purely third-person science of consciousness is a discipline with inadequate methods that fail to capture the data of consciousness. By definition, it necessarily produces impoverished results. It is not good science, but simply the fantasy of a science.

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BEYOND THE CARTESIAN SELF

abstract

In this paper, I challenge two Cartesian assumptions. The first assumption to be challenged is that there is an independent solitary self (material or immaterial) that is a proper part of a person (i.e., a human being). I challenge this assumption by setting out a materialistic alternative to Descartes – one that, on the one hand, abandons solitariness, yet on the other hand, retains the significance of the first-person perspective so prominent in Descartes' account. On my view, persons have first-person perspectives essentially, and first-person perspectives provide persistence conditions for persons. However, persons have no inner selves or inner agents; they have no parts that are selves at all. The second assumption that I challenge is one that equates what is real with what is in some strict sense mind-independent. The assumption, so widespread today, is that what has ontological status can exist in a world without mentality. On this assumption, nothing mental or intentional belongs in the basic ontology of the world. I'll try to show that this assumption is traceable to Descartes' view of minds and bodies, and that it is wrong.

keywords

Descartes, self, first-person perspective, person, metaphysical realism

BEYOND THE CARTESIAN SELF*

The legacy of Descartes' view of the mind has influenced contemporary philosophy in ways that extend far beyond Descartes' own beliefs. The received interpretation is that Descartes took mind and body to be distinct substances, each of which bears its own kind of property, mental or material. Bodies are characterized by being extended in space, and minds are characterized by being the locus of all thought and consciousness. According to Descartes, no conscious being is extended in space and nothing extended in space is a conscious or thinking thing.

After arguing that the mind is spiritual, Descartes assumed that the mind is identical with "the self" (Gaukroger 1997, p. 347). So, I shall assume that the words 'self', 'mind', 'ego' and 'soul' purport to refer to the same thing. Also, like Descartes', my interest is ontological. I am not here concerned with a narrative self or a self as an experiential dimension. Rather, my concern is with a self, mind or soul as an entity that is part of a human being[1].

Many philosophers reject the distinction between mind and body that Descartes draws, but not all do. For example, John Foster takes us fundamentally to be non-physical subjects. He says, "Jones and the non-physical subject to which the pain is attributed in the philosophically fundamental account are one and the same"[2]. And numerous contemporary views that reject Descartes' dualism have elements that are noticeably Cartesian: Consider, for example, Chisholm's theory of knowledge based on what is directly evident to the mind, or Fodor's view of the mind as having "narrow" content that is wholly independent of the "external world", or Galen Strawson's materialist version of inner selves. These views all share the Cartesian idea of a solitary self that is completely self-enclosed and independent of everything else.

In this talk, I challenge two Cartesian assumptions. The first assumption to be challenged is that there

* A previous version of this paper was presented at the conference on "The Cartesian 'Myth of the Ego' and the Analytic/Continental Divide", Radboud University, Nijmegen, 3-4 September, 2010.

[1] A neuroscientist, Antonio Damasio, infers from what he takes to be two kinds of consciousness, for which he claims empirical support, that there are two kinds of self: core self and autobiographical self, which he takes to be our traditional notion of the self and to be linked to our idea of personal identity (Damasio 1999, pp. 16-17). I see no reason to make any inference about selves from hypotheses about consciousness. In any case, neither of these kinds of self would be what I am discussing here.

[2] Foster J., The Immaterial Self: A Defense of the Cartesian Conception of the Mind, Routledge, London 1991, p. 238.

is an independent solitary self (material or immaterial) that is a part of a person (i.e., a human being). I challenge this assumption by setting out a materialistic alternative to Descartes – one that, on the one hand, abandons solitariness, yet on the other hand, retains the significance of the first-person perspective so prominent in Descartes' account. On my view, persons have first-person perspectives essentially, and first-person perspectives provide persistence conditions for persons. However, persons are not, and do not have, inner selves or inner agents; they have no parts that are selves at all.

The second assumption that I challenge is one that equates what is real with what is, in some strict sense, mind-independent. The assumption, widespread today in analytic philosophy, is that what has ontological status can exist in a world without mentality. On this assumption, nothing mental or intentional belongs in the basic ontology of the world. I'll try to show that this assumption is traceable to Descartes' view of minds and bodies, and that it is wrong.

1. No solitary selves

By "No Solitary Selves", I mean a conjunction of two theses: (1) There are no selves that are mental, nonmaterial parts of persons; and (2) Persons – the bearers of mentality – are not solitary; it is impossible for a world to contain a single person and nothing else. So, no selves, and no solitary persons.

First, I'll argue that there are no selves or minds as parts of persons. My strategy is to show that there is no need to postulate selves as parts of persons: the mental aspects of persons do not need special subpersonal or immaterial bearers.

On my view, all persons have first-person perspectives essentially. Newborn human babies, like chimpanzees and other higher mammals, have rudimentary first-person perspectives; then as an infant grows and learns a language, she develops a robust first-person perspective. All normal mature human persons have robust first-person perspectives. A robust first-person perspective is a conceptual ability, an ability to conceive of oneself as oneself, from the first-person without recourse to a name, description or other third-person referring device.

Here's a true story that illustrates a toddler who has developed a robust first-person perspective: when one of my nieces was two years old, she had a birthday party to which her many cousins were invited. One of her cousins (his name was Donald) went into her bedroom and began systematically taking toys out of my niece's toybox. When my niece saw what was happening, she was outraged. She cried out, "Dammit, Donald, mine!" Her parents were appalled: Where, they wondered with embarrassment, had she learned the profanity "dammit"? What interested me, however, was not her saying "dammit", but her competent use of the word "mine". She had a robust first-person perspective of herself: she knew that she – she herself – was the rightful owner of the toys, and that her permission was required for anyone else to play with her toys. This little story illustrates, I think, what is unique about human persons. Of all the beings in the world, we alone have robust first-personal perspectives. We alone can conceive of ourselves from "within," so to speak; we can think of ourselves without the need to identify ourselves by means of any description, name, or other third-person referring device.

My niece's shouting – "Dammit, Donald, mine!" – is a clear manifestation of a robust first-person perspective. A robust first-person perspective is typically manifested in English by first-person clauses embedded in first-person sentences with psychological or linguistic main verbs – e.g., "I believe that I am in Holland" or "I'm glad that I am here". The second occurrence of "I" (which I mark with an asterisk, as "I*") is the expression of a robust first-person perspective. Contrast "I wonder whether I* have enough money to retire" with "I wonder whether Lynne Baker has enough money to retire". A robust first-person perspective is the ability to distinguish between thinking about oneself *as* oneself and thinking about someone who just happens to be oneself.

A robust first-person perspective, as I am using the term[3], brings with it an awareness of one's own thoughts as one's own and makes possible an interior life, but as the above examples show, a robust first-person perspective is not just subjective. It also brings with it an awareness of one's own material possessions as one's own. I won't try to survey all the ways that we manifest our robust first-person perspectives. Suffice it to say that a first-person perspective, as the defining element of persons, attaches to whole entities, not just to parts of them.

Human persons, the bearers of robust first-person perspectives, are necessarily embodied. If you grieve for your friend who died, I may see the grief on your face or in your step. The sadness in your eyes is not just caused by your grief; it's part of your grief. No part of you – brain or mind – is the subject of your grief; you are. We whole persons are constituted by whole bodies. Brains have a special role in providing the mechanisms that make possible our mental lives. But it is not my brain itself that would like to go on a river cruise; it is not my brain that regrets having offended you. I did it; I regret it. And I am not identical to a brain. Neither brains nor minds are subjects of experience or are rational or moral agents; we persons are.

Although we are essentially embodied, we do not essentially have the bodies that we now have. Our bodies can be made of anything – organic material, silicon, whatever – as long as they provide the mechanisms that support our person-level activities and states. The relation between us and our bodies is constitution – the same relation that a statue has to the piece of bronze that constitutes it. We are constituted by our bodies, and the bodies that constitute us now are organisms. With enough neural implants, brain-machine interfaces, and prosthetic limbs, we may come to be constituted by nonorganic bodies. What is required for our continued existence is the continued exemplification of our first-person perspectives, along with some kind of body that has mechanisms capable or doing our our brains do.

In short, although human persons are essentially embodied, what makes us unique are our robust first-person perspectives. Descartes was exactly right about the importance of the first-person point of view. But he was mistaken, I think, in two ways that are often linked to a first-person point of view. First, Descartes thought that he himself could exist in isolation – that even if he were alone in the world with an Evil Genius, he could entertain the thought that he was sitting in his dressing gown in front of the fire. I'll discuss this point in the next section. Second, the other way that Descartes was mistaken was in supposing that his thinking required that he have a substantial mind or self. However, first-person perspectives do not require a substantial mind or a self. First-person perspectives are properties that may well have evolved by natural selection. We know from Darwin that the animal kingdom is a seamless whole, and it is not a stretch to imagine that first-person perspectives emerged from non-human organisms. (After all, non-human animals have rudimentary first-person perspectives.) When brains evolved to the point of being able to support robust first-person perspectives, a new kind of being came into existence, persons: perhaps not biologically new, but ontologically new – beings with new kinds of causal powers (e.g., causal powers to learn complicated syntax and to form complex organizations to govern the transfer of property). There is simply no need, or even a place, for a self or mind as distinct from a person. To be a person, on my view, *is* already to have a first-person perspective. Any further self or mind would be gratuitous.

(2) Having argued against selves or minds as parts of persons, I now want to argue against the other half of "No Solitary Selves". I want to show that persons, who are subjects of experience and agents

[3] My usage differs from Dan Zahavi's. Zahavi says "one can be aware of a mental happening from the first-person perspective and fail to realize that the happening occurs to oneself" (Zahavi 2005, p. 126).

responsible for what they do, cannot exist in total isolation. Even if Descartes could have had the thought that he was the only thing that existed in the world, that thought could not have been true. The ability to think of oneself as oneself – a robust first-person perspective – has relational presuppositions that require the existence of other things besides the thinker.

There is empirical support for the social character of beings like us. The psychologist Michael Tomasello gave cognitive tests to 2-year old human beings, and to adult orangutans and chimpanzees, and found that the *only* places in which the human beings outscored the non-human primates were on tests that measured social skills: social learning, communicating and reading the intentions of others.

Human beings – Tomasello said – have evolved to coordinate complex activities, to gossip and to playact together. It is because they are adapted for such cultural activities – and not because of their cleverness as individuals – that human beings are able to do so many exceptionally complex and impressive things[4].

Moreover, a robust first-person perspective is developmentally subsequent to a great deal of social and linguistic interaction. It emerges from a rudimentary first-person perspective along with awareness of others (e.g., caregivers) as conscious beings. It seems to develop from the phenomenon of "shared attention", in which the infant aligns his/her gaze with his/her mother's. When infants notice a divergence between their own attention and the mother's, they become aware of their mother as a conscious being. The activities of shared attention are necessary precursors of learning a language[5]. And it is only in a public language that a robust first-person perspective is manifest to others.
Now I want to ratchet up the argument from a mere *de facto* argument about social and linguistic interaction to a modal argument. But first, some preliminaries: I'll use the notion of *concepts* to individuate thoughts. If you don't like that notion, individuate thoughts in some other way, but you'll have to individuate thoughts in a way that distinguishes the thought that snow is white from the thought that snow is the colour of a cockatoo. I'll use the word "concept" to apply to propositional contents of thoughts, canonically expressed by "that"-clauses. For example, the thought that grass is green contains the concepts *grass* and *green*. I do not intend the term "concept" to carry theoretical weight. I am simply using the term in order to identify constituents of thoughts, the items that make up the contents of thoughts and determine the identity of thoughts. Canonical attributions of thoughts contain concepts that the thinker actually has.

Now apply this way of individuating thoughts to the notion of a first-person perspective. In order to have a robust first-person perspective, you must be able consciously to conceive of yourself as yourself, to be aware that it is yourself qua yourself that you are conceiving of. Call the self-concept in thoughts that manifest your robust first-person perspective, an "I*-concept". Your thought that you would express by saying, "I wish that I were a movie star" contains the concepts *wish*, *movie star* and your I*-concept.

To show that you cannot have a robust first-person perspective in isolation, I need to show that you cannot have an I*-concept in isolation. Here is the argument:

No Robust FPP in Isolation

1. Necessarily, if x has a robust fpp, then x has an I*-concept of herself.
2. Necessarily, if x has an I*-concept of herself, then x has a public language.

[4] "How are Humans Unique?" http://www.nytimes.com/ 2008/05/25/magazine/25wwln-essay-t.html?8br Accessed July 28, 2010.
[5] According to Michael Tomasello , The Cultural Origins of Human Cognition (Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA 1999), ch. 4.

3. Necessarily, if x has a public language, then x has social and linguistic relations.
4. Necessarily, if x has a robust fpp, then x has social and linguistic relations.

Since the argument is obviously valid, we need only check to see whether the premises are true.

Premise 1 is a conceptual truth that follows from the characterization of a first-person perspective and the method of individuating thoughts that I proposed. An I*-concept is a "formal" (not a qualitative) concept: its role is to refer to its user from a first-person point of view – in such a way that the user of an I*-concept cannot be mistaken about who she is referring to.

Premise 2: An I*-concept does not stand alone; it cannot be the only concept in one's conceptual repertoire. One cannot have an I*-concept unless one has a store of ordinary empirical, qualitative concepts that one can differentially apply to oneself and others. Canonically, the person attributes to herself some psychological or linguistic state (believing, wanting, intending, hoping, saying and so on) that has qualitative content (e.g., "I hope that I* won the election"). And qualitative content is conveyed by ordinary empirical concepts – like *winning*, *milk*, *sleep*, *sitting*, *hurt*, *apple*. Unlike an I*-concept, such qualitative concepts can be correctly applied to various things, and they also can be misapplied. The difference between correct and incorrect application of an ordinary empirical concept is grounded in public language. As Wittgenstein said, without a public language, there would be no application conditions to ground a difference between using a concept correctly and using it incorrectly.

One cannot make up one's own application conditions for a concept. Suppose that a nonlinguistic Robinson Crusoe finds himself stranded alone on an island and it occurs to him to call the sea creatures he sees, "sharks". How could Crusoe's use of the sound "shark" express one concept rather than another? In the absence of a language, what would make it the case that any of Crusoe's mental events or vocalizations expressed any concept – *shark* or *fish* or anything else[6]? Crusoe's putative concept does not have an extension that would make his use of what sounds like "shark" on a given occasion right or wrong[7]. Whatever seems right to him is right: "And – as Wittgenstein said – that only means that here we can't talk about *right*"[8]. So, what sounds like "shark" does not express a qualitative concept.

What's true of the concept expressed by the English word "shark" is also true of more mundane empirical concepts that are needed for thoughts that contain an I*-concept. For example, for my niece to wish that she* had more toys, she would have to have an I*-concept and the qualitative concept *toy*. Acquisition of the concept toy requires a public language. ("That's not a toy; put it down and be careful with it", her mother would tell my niece if she picked up a fragile vase.)

In short: In order to have an I*-concept, one must have a store of empirical concepts whose acquisition depends on a public language – at least for beings like us.

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[6] There are 350 species of sharks that are radically dissimilar in appearance from one another. Some sharks have anal fins; others don't. Some sharks have flat raylike bodies; others don't; and so on. Sharks range in size from a few centimeters to (perhaps) 18 meters long. Some sharks with raylike bodies have elongated, sawlike snouts; others with raylike bodies have short, un-sawlike snouts. Some sharks have 6 or 7 gill slits and one dorsal fin; others have 5 gill slits and 2 dorsal fins. Some sharks have dorsal fin spines; others have no fin spines. Of the sharks without fin spines, some have mouths behind their eyes, and others have mouths well in front of their eyes. The whale shark (Rhiniodon typus) is the world's largest fish. Sharks, John D. Stevens, editor (Facts on File, Inc., New York 1987), pp. 18-35.

[7] I have been influenced by Kripke here. In virtue of what would a person, considered in isolation, mean addition rather than "quaddition" by "+"? See Saul A. Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Natural Language (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1982).

[8] Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, par. 258.

Premise 3: As just suggested, in order to acquire the empirical concepts expressed by a public language, the learner has to stand to be corrected; and to stand to be corrected is to have social and linguistic relations. So, anyone who has a public language must have social and linguistic relations to others.

Given its validity and the support for its three premises, I think that we can take the argument for "no-robust-first-person-perspective-in-isolation" to be sound and the conclusion to be true.

If my argument is correct, then it is impossible for any entity that was truly alone in the world to have a robust first-person perspective. And nothing that lacked a robust first-person perspective could have thoughts about herself as herself. So, Descartes' resolution *to regard himself* as having "no hands, no eyes, no flesh, no blood, no senses" is not a thought that Descartes could have had if it had been true: the very fact that he had that thought (if he could have had it) would guarantee that it was false. Solipsism is a philosopher's fantasy. Individual human beings – persons – are social entities through and through. In the absence of communities, there would be no persons: human organisms, perhaps, but no persons, no individuals who could reflect on themselves as themselves.

So, a first-person perspective – not a substantial self or ego – is what is crucial for the existence of persons and their self-reflection. There would be no phenomenology without a robust first-person perspective. There would be no inner life at all. Nevertheless, the notion of a robust first-person perspective that I have discussed is clearly non-Cartesian. Entities cannot have robust first-person perspectives unless they have numerous linguistic and social relations by which to acquire a store of ordinary empirical concepts to apply to themselves and to others. Consequently, I suggest that we dissociate the idea of the first-person perspective from the Cartesian ideas of transparency, infallibility and logical privacy.

In sum, on my account of persons, solitary selves are gratuitous. Persons are neither solitary, nor do they have parts that are substantial selves or minds. The person herself – embodied and embedded in an environment – essentially has a first-person perspective and is the subject of experience and the agent who is responsible for her deeds. Both these Cartesian errors (as I think of them) – the possibility of solitary thinkers and the need for a self or mind – are closely related to what Descartes was right about, namely, the ineliminable importance of a first-person perspective.

2. The assumption that reality is mind-independent

The assumption that reality is mind-independent is what is known as "metaphysical realism". The *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* defines "metaphysical realism" as "the world is as it is independently of how humans take it to be"[9].

How do we get from Descartes to such a view? Well, one of the achievements of *The Meditations* was to establish corporeal nature as completely distinct from the mind, and as completely distinct from, but dependent on, God. "By starting from those ideas of the corporeal world which are genuinely clear and distinct, Descartes arrives at a mechanistic picture of how the world is to be described at a most fundamental level" (Gaukroger 1997, p. 352). The physical world is a "self-sufficient mechanistic system" (Carriero 2009, p. 18). Descartes' the metaphysical legitimation of mechanism, together with the divorce of the mind from the corporeal world, lays the groundwork for the assumption that corporeal reality is wholly mind-independent. And with the later turn to materialism, minds themselves – now thought

[9] Semantic Challenges to Realism, Drew Khlentzos. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/realism-sem-challenge) Accessed January 29, 2010.

of as brains – are likewise mind-independent. So, reality *tout court* is thought of as mind-independent. However, I believe that metaphysical realism is entirely wrong-headed. We live in a world full of objects whose existence depends ontologically (not just causally) on intentions and conventions – from legal documents, to economic instruments like credit cards, to manufactured tools, to artworks. Such objects could not exist in a world lacking entities (like us) who have intentions and create conventions. I call such objects "intention-dependent" or "ID" objects.

To see that the dependence of ID objects on beings with intentions is ontological and not merely causal, consider making a solid gold sphere that weighed 100 kg. The gold sphere would be causally dependent on beings with intentions, but not ontologically dependent on them. In another possible world, there could be naturally occurring gold spheres weighing 100 kg. Contrast this with building a boat. Nothing is a boat unless its intended function is to travel across water. If by quantum accident, matter coalesced in outer space that was indistinguishable from the boat that won the 2010 America's Cup, the matter in outer space would not be a boat. Unlike the 100 kg gold sphere, which is causally dependent on the existence of beings with intentions, a boat, like any other artifact, is not just causally, but ontologically dependent on the existence of beings with intentions. Hence, unlike the gold sphere, the boat is an ID object.

Since intentions are included in what we call "minds", ID objects are mind-dependent. (I think of minds as the mental aspects of persons.) Some philosophers want to draw a mind-independent/mind-dependent line between subjective phenomena like dreams and afterimages and everything else. But it could not be right to call objects that are ontologically dependent on the existence of beings with intentions mind-independent. Doing so just conflates a mind-independent/mind-dependent distinction with an objective/subjective distinction. To see that these are different distinctions, consider: it is an objective fact that some boats are propelled by motors; if you deny that some boats are propelled by motors, you are making as much a mistake as if you thought that the earth was flat. And the objectivity of this fact is not threatened by the likewise objective fact that there could be no boats in a world without minds. There are objective facts about ID objects, whose existence depends on intentions (i.e., on mental phenomena). Hence, objectivity and mind-independence are not equivalent. If we are going to include artifacts and artworks in reality (as artefacts and artworks), then we cannot take reality to be confined to what is mind-independent.

This discussion suggests another consequence of Descartes' framework that should be rejected: the consequence that takes minds to be were purely subjective and the material world to be purely objective. We have now seen from both sides the infelicity of the equation of mind with pure subjectivity and of the material world with pure objectivity. On the mind-side, the contents of our thoughts are not ontologically independent of the material world (our water-thoughts are not independent of the existence of H2O). And on the material-world side, the material world contains much that is not ontologically independent of our thoughts (artefacts and artworks). Mind and world are thoroughly implicated in each other, and can be disentangled only conceptually.
We persons are part of the natural world as much as electrons are. And there is no reason that we cannot contribute to basic reality by our intentional activity. I am told that this idea cannot be part of "serious metaphysics" or "fundamental ontology". But the only basis that I see for this objection is a prior commitment to a "ready-made world" (in Ted Sider's phrase)[10]. Since I believe that there is ontological novelty in the world, I do not share this commitment[11].

[10] I have discussed the difference between ontology at a time and ontology simpliciter in *The Metaphysics of Everyday Life*, and I cannot take it up here.
[11] For a discussion of ontological novelty, see *The Metaphysics of Everyday Life*, pp. 234-239.

3. Conclusion

With the rejection of the idea of a solitary self, I have replaced two Cartesian convictions: there is no pure self contingently connected to the so-called "external world" by the senses, and hence no pure self can form the self-evident starting point of a philosophical system. With the rejection of the idea of reality as mind-independent, I have rejected a contemporary idea that reality can be understood as what Descartes would have thought of as the "external" world. Whether this puts me any closer to the continental philosophers, I leave for you to decide.

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A PHENOMENOLOGICALLY ORIENTED ACCOUNT OF THE PHENOMENON OF ASPECTUALITY IN PROPOSITIONAL ATTITUDES

abstract

My main concern in this paper is to provide an account of the aspectuality of propositional attitudes. After having made the negative point that aspectuality cannot be accounted for in purely semantic terms, I shall maintain that what accounts for aspectuality are phenomenal modes of presentation. The fundamental difference between my modes of presentation and those employed in the several variants of the standard account of aspectuality is that while the latter are properties (taken to be true) of the objects which are involved in the content, my modes of presentation are properties of the subject's experience of the objects and in this sense qualify as "subjective". My thesis is that only phenomenal modes of presentation are suited to account for aspectuality because they incorporate that peculiar way of appearing of the object to the subject which explains whether or not he takes different attitudes towards contents which concern the same object. That modes of presentation have to play this role is an unquestioned point in the debate. That in order to do it they need to have a phenomenal nature is what I shall try to argue for here.

keywords

Aspectuality, propositional attitudes, opacity, modes of presentation, phenomenal characters, consciousness, intentionality

A PHENOMENOLOGICALLY ORIENTED ACCOUNT OF THE PHENOMENON OF ASPECTUALITY IN PROPOSITIONAL ATTITUDES*

1. The standard account of the phenomenon of aspectuality

My main concern in this paper is the phenomenon of aspectuality. Aspectuality and directionality (or aboutness) are the two distinguishing features of intentionality: intentional mental states are always directed towards something and the way in which they are so directed is always perspectival in the sense that what a given mental state is about is always given in a certain way ("under a given aspect"), where this way is crucial to account for the motivational role which the mental states the subject enjoys exert in her (verbal and non verbal) behavior. Even though the phenomenon of aspectuality manifests itself in every kind of mental state, here I shall deal with it only in connection with the attitudes, that is states such as *believing/desiring/fearing*, both in their propositional form (S desires that p) and in their objectual form (S desires x)[11]. The question I shall address is how aspectuality has to be accounted for as far as attitudes are concerned.

A widespread tendency in the philosophical literature has been to equate the *aspectuality* of the mental states with the *opacity* of the sentences used in the attitude attributions and to account for the former in terms of what accounts for the latter. This strategy, which was inaugurated by Frege's account of propositional attitudes in the last part of *Über Sinn und Bedeutung* and which was very congenial to the (explanatory) priority thesis of the linguistic content over the mental content which characterized the "linguistic turn" in analytic philosophy, has been subsequently endorsed even by people who have rejected Frege's analysis in terms of senses and even by people who have rejected the priority thesis characteristic of the linguistic turn. We can distinguish different varieties of this general strategy of accounting for aspectuality in terms of modes of presentation: (i) the Fregean variety which treats modes of presentation as constituents of the proposition expressed; (ii) the hidden-indexical variety which treats them as unarticulated constituents of the proposition expressed; (iii) the overt-indexical variety according to which modes of presentations are constituents of quasi-singular propositions; (iv) the neo-Russellian strategy in which modes of presentation do not enter into the semantic content of a belief report but in what is pragmatically conveyed by an utterance of it. Notwithstanding the differences,

* I have presented versions of this paper at the 2010 ESPP in Bochum and Essen, at the International Conference "The Nature of Belief – The Ontology of Doxastic Attitudes" in 2010 at the University of Southern Denmark in Odense, and at the 2010 SIFA Meeting in Padua. I would like to thank audiences on all of these occasions for their observations and comments. Special thanks to Alberto Voltolini who has commented on several drafts of this paper and with whom I have discussed many aspects of my proposal.

[1] Since my main concern here is in the propositional form I shall make use of the label "propositional attitudes" which is standard within the literature.

what all these strategies share is the assumption that the aspectuality of propositional attitudes has to be accounted for in semantic or in semantic plus pragmatic terms.
This assumption has of course a strong intuitive appeal: as a matter of fact both propositional attitudes and their linguistic reports manifest the phenomenon of "perspectivalness" (just to use a general label to cover both the mental and the linguistic case). If one can account for perspectivalness at the linguistic level in a given way (i.e. in semantic or semantic plus pragmatic terms), why not claiming that the same kind of explanation can be provided for the mental level?
The idea that it is not possible to account for perspectivalness at the mental level in purely semantic terms because the phenomenon of aspectuality does not coincide with the phenomenon of opacity of attitude reports has been defended by many people in the more or less recent literature in the philosophy of mind[2]. Here I shall side with those people and in the first part of my paper I shall provide some arguments in support of the thesis that any attempt to explain aspectuality in terms of opacity is doomed to fail.
This point about aspectuality matches a parallel point about directionality or aboutness. Many people nowadays maintain that it is not possible to explain "mental aboutness" in terms of "linguistic aboutness" because the former is original and non derivative. I accept this point even though I will not argue for it here. What I shall try to defend in the first part of this paper is the parallel point about aspectuality. I think that even though the two points can go together[3], they can be argued for on independent grounds.
In the second part of the paper, after having made the negative point that aspectuality cannot be accounted for in purely semantic terms, I shall address the question as to what positively accounts for it. The gist of my proposal is that what accounts for aspectuality are *phenomenal modes of presentation.*
To anticipate, let me explain why I think that we need them. My reason is the following: to account for aspectuality one needs to account for the way in which the object is given *to* the subject. The question is how modes of presentation have to be conceived in order to account for what we shall call the "to-aspect". My idea is that only phenomenal modes of presentation are suited in so far as they incorporate that peculiar way of appearing of the object to the subject which explains whether or not he takes different attitudes towards contents which concern the same object. That modes of presentation have to play this role is an unquestioned point in the debate. That in order to do it they need to have a phenomenal nature is what I shall try to argue for here.
The fundamental difference between my modes of presentation and those employed in the several variants of the standard account of aspectuality is that while the latter are properties (taken to be true) of the objects which are involved in the content, my modes of presentation are properties of the subject's experience of the objects and in this sense qualify as "subjective". By contrast, "traditional" modes of presentation qualify as "objective" in the sense that they are not properties of the subject's experience. The notion of mode of presentation is indeed ambiguous between these two readings. In order to avoid confusion I shall use the label "manners of presentation" for the subjective reading and "modes of presentation" for the objective reading[4].
I shall conclude my paper by addressing some objections to my positive account of aspectuality.
Before arguing for the first thesis that aspectuality cannot be accounted for in purely semantic terms let me say a word about the repercussions of my present suggestion on one central debate in the philosophy of mind which deals with the question of the relation between consciousness and intentionality. That my

[2] See e.g. Crane 2001.
[3] An example of the conjoined strategy is provided by Searle who accounts for the original aboutness of conscious mental states in terms of their intrinsic aspectuality. I shall come back to Searle's position at the very end of this paper.
[4] The distinction between manners and modes of presentation has been acknowledged for example by Chalmers, See e.g. Chalmers 2004.

suggestion has repercussions on that debate is obvious in so far as it claims that aspectuality, that is one of the two distinguishing features of intentionality, has to be explained in terms of phenomenal modes of presentation. To defend this stance is to reject the idea that intentionality can be wholly accounted for independently of consciousness and so to reject "intentionalism" in the debate concerning the relationship between intentionality and consciousness[5]. Many people nowadays defend the thesis that there is an explanatory priority of intentionality on consciousness. The general strategy those people have adopted, in the attempt to provide a naturalistic account of the mind, has been that of *divide et impera* which enjoins to separate intentionality from consciousness, to provide a naturalistic account of intentionality and then to naturalize consciousness itself by analyzing it in terms of intentionality without remainder. We can distinguish two main ways of pursuing the goal of grounding consciousness in intentionality. One way is provided by so called "Higher-Order Theories of consciousness" which analyze conscious states in terms of higher-order states that represent them: to be conscious for a state, according to this picture, is for the state to be represented in a special way by a higher order representation[6]. The other way, which is more popular, tries to analyze phenomenal conscious states as certain sorts of first-order intentional states, advocating in this way "representationalism" that is: the thesis that the phenomenal properties of a mental state are identical, or equivalent (and therefore reducible) to certain representational properties of the state[7]. Intentionalism has been challenged in recent times by people who have argued that consciousness itself plays a crucial role in the constitution of intentionality. Some have defended the strong claim that all intentionality is grounded on consciousness, others the more modest claim that not all intentionality is independent of consciousness and that there is a crucial sort of intentional content which is grounded in and derive from the phenomenal character of mental states[8].

Having drawn the main theoretical articulations of this debate let me clarify which position my proposal occupies within it. In so far as I want to defend the claim that one of the two distinguishing features of intentionality (namely the aspectuality of the mental states) has to be accounted for in terms of phenomenal characters I reject the intentionalist strategy. Rejecting intentionalism places me in the anti-intentionalist side of the debate but here I need to make some qualifications. In general those who enter this debate do not take care of distinguishing between directionality and aspectuality and, as a consequence, they do not raise the question as to whether it is directionality or aspectuality or both or neither to depend on consciousness. I think it is important to introduce this further question because in my view the range of available options is wider than the participants in the debate tend to assume. Not only can one be an intentionalist or an anti-intentionalist *tout court* (either of the strong or of the weak variety); one can be an intentionalist/an anti-intentionalist as regards directionality (in so far as he claims/he denies that no appeal to consciousness is needed to account for directionality) and at the same time he can either endorse or reject the parallel point about aspectuality. In this paper I shall not raise the question as to whether aboutness or directionality depends on consciousness, but the parallel question about aspectuality. In answering this question I shall defend a qualified form of anti-intentionalism claiming that a feature of intentionality, namely, aspectuality, cannot be accounted for independently of consciousness. From this nothing follows as far as directionality is concerned. As things stand, directionality could be explained wholly independently of consciousness[9].

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[5] I shall here use "intentionalism" as a label for the general strategy of grounding consciousness in intentionality.
[6] Among the proponents of Higher-Order Theories of consciousness there are Carruthers 2000, Lycan 2004, Rosenthal 2002.
[7] The representationalist position is very well exemplified by Dretske 1995 and Tye 2002. For this characterization of "representationalism" see Chalmers 2004, p. 4.
[8] A representative of the strong position is Searle 1992. Among the representatives of the weaker position there are Horgan and Tienson 2002, McGinn 1988, Siewert 1998.
[9] In Sacchi and Voltolini, submitted, aboutness has been treated as a relation of constituency holding between an intentional state, a thought, and the object it is about, the intentional object. In the account we provided consciousness does not play any role. Our position therefore is not compatible with the anti-intentionalist idea that mental aboutness is grounded in consciousness.

2. Why aspectuality cannot be accounted for in purely semantic terms

My aim in this part is to make the negative point that aspectuality is not the same as opacity and, consequently, that it cannot be accounted for in terms of what accounts for the latter. I shall start by a minor consideration. The way in which the phenomenon of opacity is defined does not seem to be sufficiently general to cover all mental states. Let me explain. Opacity is defined in terms of failure of substitution *salva veritate*, but this feature does not seem to be applicable to mental states having a non propositional content for example, because the notion of truth-preservation has no application there in so far as objective contents are neither true nor false[10]. It goes without saying that this consideration does not prove that opacity is not the same as aspectuality. At most it shows that the characterization provided of the linguistic phenomenon is not sufficiently general to capture the mental phenomenon.
The more substantial point we have to consider is whether it is possible to account for aspectuality in terms of what accounts for opacity. The general tendency within the literature has been to account for opacity in semantic (or in semantic plus pragmatic) terms, that is, in terms of modes of presentation taken as articulated or unarticulated constituents of the proposition expressed or communicated. Modes of presentation have been conceived in very different ways: as senses, intensions, guises, characters.
My claim is that modes of presentation do not account for aspectuality because they do not capture the way in which the object is given to the subject who is entertaining a given mental state. Many people have criticized the so called standard account of the attitudes on the ground that it does not succeed in individuating in a sufficiently fine-grained way the modes of thinking of the objects which are required to account for aspectuality. I side with those people in criticizing the standard account. Yet I do not claim that we need more fine-grained modes of presentation. That they would not help is a point which has been stressed, among other people, by Kent Bach in discussing Kripke's Paderewski puzzle[11]. Given that our interest here is in the failure of substitution salva veritate I shall formulate Kripke's puzzle along the lines of Frege's cases.
Here is how the case goes. A subject, Peter, has had interactions with a politician he knows under the name 'Paderewski' and interactions with a pianist he knows under the same name. Unbeknownst to Peter, Paderewski the politician is the same person as Paderewski the pianist. Peter, who does not know this, believes that they are two different guys who happen to have the same name. As regards Paderewski the pianist Peter believes that he has musical talent (he has attended several concerts of Paderewski and in those occasions he has very much appreciated his skill); as regards Paderewski the politician Peter is agnostic about his having musical talent. So we have a situation in which

1. Peter believes that Paderewski has musical talent (as regards the pianist he knows under the name 'Paderewski') is true, and nonetheless
2. Peter believes that Paderewski has musical talent (as regards the politician he knows under the name 'Paderewski') is false.

The problem which this case raises is how to account for Peter's situation.
A standard reply to this puzzle is to claim that the that-clauses used in the attributions do not completely specify the content of Peter's two beliefs and that, in order to provide a more accurate formulation of his beliefs, one just needs to insert additional material (more verbiage) by adding for example "Paderewski, the politician" and "Paderewski, the musician".
According to Bach the idea that it is possible to account for this puzzle by introducing more concepts in the subject's modes of presentation of the object, so that in one case Peter would believe that Paderewski under the

[10] One could claim that every objectual content is equivalent to a propositional content and therefore that truth-preservation applies there as well. For example, one could claim that Petrarca's desire for Laura is a desire to meet and kiss Laura and so a state with a propositional content. Nonetheless the idea that states with objectual content can be reduced to states with propositional content has been strongly criticized within the literature. As far as perceptual states are concerned, for example, those who, like Dretske, 1995, defend the plausibility of a "non-epistemic seeing", reject the idea that any objectual seeing is reducible to a propositional seeing (I can see an object without categorizing it and so without seeing that the object is so and so). For a defense of the irreducibility claim as far as emotions are concerned see Crane 2001.
[11] See Bach 1997.

concept PIANIST has musical talent and in the other he would neither believe nor disbelieve that Paderewski under the concept POLITICIAN has musical talent, does not make the problem go away. In order to show how the problem would present itself one step further, Bach proposes the following variation of the original puzzle. Suppose that Peter hears a recording of Paderewski playing Rachmaninov in Carnegie Hall and that he likes what he hears. Then he hears a recording of Paderewski playing with a jazz combo at the Apollo Theatre and this time he hates what he hears. He does not realize he has heard the same pianist twice. But here, Bach claims, it won't do any good to say that Peter disbelieves that Paderewski, the pianist, has musical talent, because we could also have truly said that he believes that Paderewski, the pianist, has musical talent. We could make the that-clauses more precise by adding "Paderewski, the classical pianist" and "Paderewski, the jazz pianist" but this ploy, he claims, won't ultimately work either in so far as one could imagine a situation in which the enriched that-clauses could be used to generate further versions of the puzzle.

Bach's point is that it is not possible to individuate belief contents in terms of purely conceptual specifications. The train of thought behind his argument seems to be the following: if conceptual specifications were sufficient to individuate the mental states a subject enjoys in a given context, then it shouldn't be possible, by sticking to those specifications, to generate a new version of the puzzle at a subsequent level. But this is possible. Therefore purely conceptual specifications are not sufficient for the individuation.

According to Bach, the lesson to draw is that "that-clauses" are not content clauses in the sense that they do not specify what the subject believes and therefore there is no reason to suppose that there is a unique thing that he both believes and disbelieves. I think that his argument legitimates a weaker conclusion, namely that belief reports do not specify beliefs fully. What is left out or in any case not fully determinate is precisely the peculiar way in which the object is given to the subject in the two cases. Whether this implies that belief reports do not specify belief contents very much depends on which ontology of the propositional attitudes one adopts. If one thinks that the attitudes are two-places relations, then differences in modes of presentation determine differences in content, but if one conceives of them as three-places relations (between a subject, a content and a mode of presentation/ way of thinking), then differences in modes of presentation do not determine differences in content. In what follows I shall stick to the more general moral, which I deem less theoretically laden.

The claim that the that-clauses used in the attribution may not fully specify the content of the mental states of the subject (or, more generally, the subject's mental states) is not new in the literature. As far as thought's contents are concerned a case in point is provided by Brian Loar. In *Phenomenal Intentionality as the Basis of Mental Content*, for example, Loar claims in a vein very similar to that of Bach's: "Mental content is individuated more fine-grainedly than the interpersonally shared 'oblique' content of certain that-clauses... That-clauses as they are standardly used apparently capture too little information, even on oblique interpretations, and that information is not of the right sort... They are not especially psychologically informative" (Loar 2003, pp. 229-230)[12].

If Bach and Loar defend the claim that the that-clauses used in the attribution may not fully specify the contents of the mental states of the subject by considering the case of propositional attitudes, most of those who have endorsed that claim have taken into account the case of perceptual experience. That the content of a perceptual experience cannot be fully specified in purely linguistic terms is a point widely acknowledged. People who endorse this claim ground it on the idea that the way in which the object is perceptually given is different and irreducible to a conceptual mode of presentation. The idea that manner of perception are irreducible to (Fregean-like) modes of presentation is explicit in Peacocke's work. In *Perceptual Content*, for example, Peacocke claims that "these manners of perception constitute a genuine level of content in their own right" and goes on distinguishing that level from both the level of the objects

[12] In Loar's view what matters for the individuation of the mental (or as he says "psychological") content of a subject's thought is not "what her thoughts represent as it were impersonally, but also how they represent things to her" (Loar 2003, p. 229).

in the world which are perceived and the level of modes of presentation which can enter thought-contents. This irreducibility has to do with the irreducibility of what we can call "the level of experience" to the conceptual level. As far as perceptual demonstrative thoughts are concerned, Peacocke acknowledges that they are partly individuated by elements at the level of experience; for he claims that what individuates a demonstrative mode of presentation such as *that* distance is not only the perceptual mode of presentation of the line and the concept DISTANCE but also the manner in which the distance is perceived. But even though he acknowledges this point he deems phenomenology to be out of place as far as the individuation of propositional attitudes are concerned: "The distinctness of the content of perception at the level of manners from the contents of the attitudes seems ultimately to derive from the different demands made by the two very different notions which individuate the two kinds of content. *Individuation of the content of perception is answerable to matters of phenomenology in the first instance, while the content of attitudes is answerable to matters of epistemic possibility – and these two notions can come apart"* (Peacocke 1989, p. 314. Emphasis mine). Peacocke exemplifies the standard stance in philosophy of mind according to which matters of phenomenology are relevant for the individuation of so called qualitative states such as sensations and feelings but not for the individuation of propositional attitudes.

3. The positive point: grounding aspectuality on the phenomenal character of the act

According to my proposal, phenomenal characters play a fundament role in accounting for the aspectuality of the mental (not just as regards qualitative states but as regards every kind of mental state) for they are precisely the phenomenal characters that are responsible for the subject's taking or not taking the same attitude towards contents which concern the same object and which ascribe the same properties to it. My thesis is that what we need to account for aspectuality are *manners of presentation*, i.e. modes of presentation which are individuated in terms of phenomenal characters. So, to come back to Kripke's Paderewski puzzle, what in my view accounts for the difference in Peter's two beliefs is a difference in the phenomenal characters of his two beliefs. When Peter thinks of Paderewski (*qua* pianist) in entertaining the belief that Paderewski has musical talent he is phenomenally affected by Paderewski in a way which is different from the way in which Paderewski affects him when he thinks about him (*qua* politician). In order to highlight the difference between the nature of my modes of presentation (*manners of presentation*) and that of those that have traditionally been employed in the philosophical literature on propositional attitudes we must use the contrast subjective/objective. Manners of presentation are subjective: they are constituted by properties of the subject's "experience" of the objects and properties thought about. Modes of presentations are objective: they are constituted by properties the thinking subject takes what he is thinking about to possess.
In this sense my proposal differs radically from that of those who reject the idea that it is always possible to individuate modes of presentation in purely conceptual terms and that introduce non-conceptual modes of presentation within the picture to cope with the above mentioned problems[13]. Both conceptual and non conceptual modes of presentation are objective in the sense that they are not properties of the subject's experience. What is new in my picture is precisely the idea that we need subjective modes of presentation to account for aspectuality because objective modes of presentation, even if implemented with a non-conceptual level, are not fine-grained enough to account for aspectuality. A subject could not recognize that it is one and the same object that is given to him in two different occasions even though both the conceptual and the non-conceptual specifications of the object in the two cases were identical. This would be a case in which the subject's experience of the object has different properties even though there is no difference at the objective level of what is represented[14].

[13] An advocate of this position is, for example, Récanati. See e.g. Récanati 1993.
[14] Of course a representationalist could claim that even the subjective properties of experience are part of the content of the mental states. But even the representationalist would need to distinguish them from the other properties of the content reintroducing in this way that distinction between subjective and objective presentations which I claim has to be acknowledged in order to account for aspectuality.

My proposal commits therefore to the claim that not just in perceiving an object but also in thinking about it there is something it is like to be presented with the object, whatever the attitudinal mode of the act turns out to be. That there is something it is like to perceive an object (to see a ripe tomato, to hear a melody, to taste a cherry) is a point that everyone is willing to concede. In my view the same holds for thinking. That that is so is something which everyone can ascertain on the ground of her own experience (provided her theoretical biases do not prevent her to make this acknowledgement). And this turns out to be true not only of a very peculiar subclass of thoughts (such as, for example, perceptual demonstrative ones) but of every thought. To acknowledge this point is of course not enough to ground the claim that phenomenal characters play a fundamental role in accounting for aspectuality. What does ground this claim then?

My answer is that they are the phenomenal characters what ultimately account for the subject's taking or not taking different attitudes towards contents which ascribe the same properties to the same object. Let me explain. Whether a given subject takes the same or a different attitude is not explained by the fact that in the two cases he entertains the same or a different set of conceptual specifications of the object. The concepts of the object which get mobilized in the two cases could be the same and nonetheless the subject could take different attitudes. What explains the subject's taking the same or a different attitude is the fact that he takes/does not take that it is one and the same object that is *presented to him* in the two cases. The fact that he uses the same or a different set of conceptual specifications of the object does not explain this fact. One could put this point by saying that sameness or difference in conceptual specifications do not explain the subject's taking the thing he is thinking about to be the same as itself or not. Objective modes of presentation seem therefore to be inadequate to play the role they have been introduced to play. This is a point which an author such as Ruth Millikan, for example, has stressed in a series of works[15]. In *Perceptual Content and the Fregean Myth*, for example, she attacks Frege by saying that he has done something like "confusing sameness in the vehicle of representation with a representation of sameness" (Millikan 1991, p. 439), generating in this way the illusion that sameness in meaning immediately translates into sameness in intermediaries and then into sameness in cognitive mechanics and conversely. Against Frege, she claims that the iteration of a thought via the same mode of presentation cannot, simply as such, necessitate an act of grasping the sameness of the contents involved. I deem Millikan's criticism to the point. Yet, against her, I do not think that sameness or difference have to be "represented" in order for the rational mind to respond to them. Sameness or difference, or better presumed sameness or difference, are, so to say, to be "felt". When a person on two different occasions is thinking of what he takes to be the same object (whatever conceptual specifications he uses in the two cases) his two episodes of thinking have the same phenomenal character. By contrast, when two episodes of thinking have different phenomenal characters this shows that the subject does not take them to be about the same object.

Let me now clarify how phenomenal characters have to be conceived. The phenomenological account which I promote commits itself to the claim that every (occurrent[16]) mental state has a phenomenal aspect: so not only sensations and feelings but also propositional attitudes have a phenomenology[17]. What is worth stressing here is that even granting that propositional attitudes have a phenomenology as far as their attitudinal mode is concerned (i.e. even granting that there is something it is like to

[15] See e.g. Millikan 1991, 1993.

[16] The rational for this qualification will become clear at the end where I shall address some objections to my proposal. To anticipate the point, let me say that if the aspectuality of the mental is explained in terms of phenomenal characters then, given that only conscious states can have phenomenal characters and that only occurrent states can be conscious, it follows that what I am accounting for is the aspectuality of occurrent mental states. How the case of dispositional mental states can be dealt with is a point which I shall address at the end.

[17] I shall not provide any argument for this claim here even though at the end I shall briefly present some lines of arguments which could be put forward in its defense.

desire that *p* and that it is different from what it is like to fear that *p* for example), it cannot be that dimension what accounts for aspectuality. The reason is simple. Let us consider Kripke's Paderewski puzzle (or Frege's Hesperus/Phosphorus puzzle). In both cases we are dealing with attitudes having the same attitudinal mode. Given that the attitudinal mode is the same it cannot be differences in the phenomenological mode which explain the difference in the way the object is "*presented to S*" in the two cases. The difference has to be explained in terms of the way in which the objects and properties S is thinking about are given to her. We therefore have to say that they are the contents themselves which are responsible for the differences in the phenomenal characters of the subject's experience in the two cases. So the phenomenologically based account of the attitudes commits itself to the claim that *contents themselves contribute to the phenomenology* in the sense that they figure in our phenomenological domain when we consciously entertain them in a given attitudinal mode[18].

Does this mean that contents have associated with them distinct *qualia* or raw feels? Well, many people simply identify phenomenal characters with raw feels. If one makes this identification he can hardly see how something devoid of sensible properties (as contents as opposed to sentences seem to be) could be associated with a phenomenal character[19]. But it is a mistake to make that identification: the phenomenal characters associated with sense experience are but a variety of phenomenal characters. Many people in the recent literature have acknowledged this point and have introduced the distinction between sensuous phenomenology and non-sensuous phenomenology[20]. The idea is that both a sense experience and a propositional attitude may be associated with a distinctive phenomenal character which is of the sensuous variety in the first case and of the non-sensuous variety in the other case. Once the idea of a non-sensuous phenomenology has been introduced, a further distinction has to be drawn between the non-sensuous qualities associated with the attitudinal mode of the act (non- sensuous act phenomenology) and those associated with the subject's experience of the content of the acts (non-sensuous content phenomenology). They are the latter which are needed in order to characterize the aspectuality of propositional attitudes, because aspectuality has to do with the way in which the content is (experientially) given to the subject and the content is something devoid of sensible properties. The non-sensuous phenomenal character of S's belief that *p* is the way in which that *p* affects S when S entertains the belief.

But what relation is there between the (non-sensuous) phenomenal character and the content? As far as this issue is concerned one can take one of two stances: one can claim that (i) the phenomenal character is a constituent (and therefore a determiner) of content; or that (ii) the phenomenal character does not determine content but the way in which it affects the subject's act of entertaining it. Position (i) is very well exemplified by McGinn in his 1988 paper *Consciousness and Content* where he talks about the Janus-faced character of conscious content having both an outward looking face (a face which points to the external world) and an inner looking face (a face which points to the subject). In his view, these faces or aspects (the *of-aspect* and the *to-aspect*) are a function of each other. I don't want to follow the first stance which McGinn exemplifies. My reasons for not adhering to (i) is that in my view it ends up subjectivizing contents in a way which makes it impossible for two subjects to entertain one and the same content.

Let me explain. If the to-aspect (the phenomenal character) is a determinant (however partial) of the content a given subject entertains, then given that the to-aspect involves reference to the subject who is entertaining the content, it follows that no two different subjects could entertain one and the same content.

[18] For a defense of this point see McCulloch 2003; Strawson 1994, 2004.

[19] It goes without saying that if one's model of phenomenal character is based on sensory experience one would hardly attribute phenomenal characters to one's acts of entertaining contents. For in the latter case there aren't any of those sensuous aspects which are present in sense experience. Undoubtedly, what it is like to taste a ripe tomato, or to kiss one's lover, or to smell a scented flower is incomparably different and richer. And yet this should not prevent one to recognize that there are other kinds of qualitative features of a non-sensuous kind.

[20] The distinction between sensory and non-sensory qualia is acknowledged by several authors: Crane 2001, for example, draws it (he uses "qualia" or "qualitative features" for sensory properties and "phenomenal character" in the broader sense of what it is like to be in a mental state); Kriegel 2008 also draws it and distinguishes between phenomenal character as a kind of sensuous quality and phenomenal character as whatever property the explanatorily gap concerns.

This seems to me a very undesirable consequence. I think it is possible to account for subjectivity without making contents themselves subjective. That's why I think that option (ii) is preferable. According to it, to be Janus-faced are not the contents but the subject's conscious acts of entertaining them. To adhere to (ii) is to locate subjectivity on the act-hand side of the divide; a mental act has both representational features and phenomenal features: the representational features of the act account for the of-aspect (the directionality of the mental act); the phenomenal features account for the to-aspect (the aspectuality of the mental act). In my view, the tendency to locate the subjective aspects of our mental states in the content of the state, i.e. on the "objective side" of the so called subjective/objective divide, is a mistake made by all forms of "representationalism". According to representationalism phenomenal properties are a special kind of representational properties. The strong variety of this doctrine defends the idea of the reducibility of phenomenal properties to representational proprieties by claiming that the former are identical or equivalent to the latter. But even those varieties which rejects reducibility[21], and McGinn's position is one of those, make in my view the same mistake of thinking that the phenomenal properties contribute to what is represented.
Let us now consider how the relation between the phenomenal character and the phenomenal mode of the act has to be conceived. We can here distinguish two possible ways of treating phenomenal characters: either as independent from the phenomenal mode of the act (so that, for example, a given content, that *p* say, may affect the subject in a given way no matter whether that *p* is perceived or thought about for example), or as dependent from the phenomenal mode of the act (so that the way in which that *p* affects the subjects depends on the attitudinal mode under which that *p* is entertained). The alternative which I deem more congenial to my proposal is the former. Let me explain why I think so. If I am right in claiming that they are the phenomenal characters of the subject's mental states that account for whether the subject takes what he is thinking about to be the same or different in different mental episodes, then since it is patently possible for a subject to make an assumption of identity/difference towards the "intentional object" of mental states of different attitudinal modes (i.e. he can deem that it is one and the same object that is both perceived and thought about or desired or feared or whatever), it ought to be possible for states in different attitudinal modes to have the same phenomenal character. But this requires that phenomenal characters are independent from the attitudinal modes of the act. This follows from the explanatory role which manners of presentation are claimed to play in my picture. Of course if one questions my assumption my line of argument collapses, but in order to do it one has to show that other candidates are better suited to play that explanatory role. Even though there are many arguments against the suitability of objective modes of presentation to play the mode of presentation role, I know of no argument to the same effect which is directed against manners of presentation. Given that it is in "the very nature" of manners of presentation to account for the way in which the object is (experientially) given to the subject and given that this is precisely what one needs in order to account for aspectuality, I do not see which arguments the objector could device against them. What he could do is to question their existence. But pending that demonstration, and the *onus probandi* is on the part of the objector, we can go on undisturbed.
But if phenomenal characters can be common in mental acts with different intentional modes and if phenomenal characters are properties of the act, the question immediately arises as to which act they are properties of. A plausible answer is to claim that any mental act, whatever its intentional mode may be, is actually "grounded" in a more basic act which can be conceived as a presentation of the object to the subject[22].

[21] For a discussion of the various forms of representationalism, reductive and non reductive, strong and weak, pure and impure, see Chalmers 2004.
[22] This kind of answer seems to be in line with some of Brentano's thesis about the role of Vorstellungen. Brentano (in Brentano 1874) distinguishes three classes of mental phenomena or acts: representations (*Vorstellungen*) – including ideas, images, thoughts and sensations –, judgments and emotions. After having made this distinction he presents in ch. 7 appendix IX a theory of judgment according to which all judgments are based on presentations.

An issue on which I prefer to stay neutral here is the way in which the claim according to which the phenomenal characters do not determine contents but the way in which they affect the subject's act of entertaining them is to be articulated. I just signal two ways in which one could develop that claim which could be called the adverbialist and the non-adverbialist way as regards manners of presentation[23].

According to the "adverbialist way"

S's believing that p (that Hesperus is F) is for S to believe-Hesperus-wise that p
and
S's believing that q (that Phosphorus is F) is for S to believe-Phosphorus-wise that p.

According to the "non-adverbialist" way

S's believing that p (that Hesperus is F) is for S to believe in a Hesperescent way that p
and
S's believing that q (that Hesperus is F) is for S to believe in a Phosphorescent way that p.

Even though these two ways seem to be notational variants, the kind of metaphysics of the attitudes on which they are based is different. The adverbialist way conceives of propositional attitudes as two-places relations (between an individual and a proposition); the non-adverbialist way conceives of propositional attitudes as three-places relations (between an individual, a way of appearing – sort of non-sensuous looking – and a content).

I shall conclude this paper by considering some objections to my suggested phenomenologically oriented account of aspectuality. The first objection goes like this: "Your suggested account of the aspectuality of propositional attitudes cannot be right because propositional attitudes do not have any phenomenology, only sensations have phenomenal or qualitative aspects"[24].

As I said, one of the principal resistances to the idea that propositional attitudes have phenomenal characters comes from the identification of phenomenal characters with sensuous *qualia*. To reject that identification is a fundamental step in accepting the idea that phenomenology extends far further than the domain of the sensible. So which arguments could be provided in support of the idea that propositional attitudes have a phenomenology (of a non-sensuous kind)? I shall here present two arguments. The former, which is a revision of what is called in the literature "the argument from subjective identification", goes like this[25]. First step: we have an immediate access to some aspects of the state we are in (we can know immediately not just the intentional mode of a propositional attitude – whether it is a desire or a belief or a fear for example – but also how it presents things to us); second step: we can have immediate access only to aspects which are endowed with a phenomenal dimension; conclusion: both the intentional mode of a propositional attitude and the aspect under which the content is given to us must have a phenomenal dimension[26].

Let us now consider the second argument which is grounded on the intuition that mental states of different

[23] This qualification is important not even the former qualifies as adverbialist as regards the analysis of the attitudes in so far as it provides a relational account of them.

[24] An author such as Dretske for example could make this objection. See e.g. Dretske 1995.

[25] Among the proponents of the original version see Boghossian 1989 and BonJour 1998. The name of the argument has to do with the proponents' rejection of the functionalist account of our subjective identification of the mental states we are in. Arguments against functionalist accounts of our self-ascription of mental states can be found in Goldman 1993.

[26] In its original version the argument maintains that we have an immediate access to (and therefore that we know immediately) not only the attitudinal aspect of the state we are in but also its content. This version of the argument has been challenged on the ground that, in so far as it is possible to provide a non phenomenological account of our immediate self-knowledge of content, the second step of the argument has to be rejected and so the conclusion does not go through. Even though some authors (see e.g. Pitt 2004) have tried to defend the second step against the objection that it is possible to provide a functionalist account of our immediate self-knowledge of content, I do not want to follow that line. Given that in my picture the phenomenal character is not an aspect of the content of the act I do not need to defend the idea that the best account of our immediate self-knowledge of content is a phenomenological one.

attitudinal modes may exhibit a high degree of phenomenological continuity. The basic idea behind this argument is that when we move from a state of non-conceptual perception (or pre-perceptual awareness of properties: a sensation of cat-shapedness, a sensation of carpet-shapedness) to one of non-conceptual perception (I see a cat on the carpet), and from there to propositional perception (I see that there is a cat on the carpet) and thinking (I think that there is a cat on the carpet) we keep our focus on the object and do not experience any qualitative "break" or "jump". To deny that propositional attitudes have a phenomenology would amount to claiming that when the subject moves to the level of thought he ceases to be phenomenally conscious. But this is contrary to the "phenomenological continuity intuitions"[27].
Even though these arguments may not support the strong claim that propositional attitudes are *essentially* phenomenal they seems to support the weaker claim that phenomenology does not disappear at that level. That's enough for my present purpose. To defend my phenomenologically based account of the aspectuality of the attitudes I do not need essentialism but the more modest claim according to which propositional attitudes present a general dependency on states with phenomenal characters. Let us now consider another objection. Here what the objector rises is a point about the range of application of my proposal: "Since only occurrent mental states can have phenomenal characters, how to account for the aspectuality of dispositional mental states?". I think that there are at least two ways in which one could accommodate the case of dispositional mental states. The most radical way is to deny that there is any aspectuality at that level or, less radically, to claim that there is only "as-if aspectuality". The other way is to resort to the distinction between original vs. non original and to provide an explanation of the aspectuality of dispositional mental states along the lines in which Searle, for example, accounts for the non original intentionality of non-conscious mental states[28]. One could therefore say that what makes a non-occurrent belief of S the belief that Hesperus is beautiful and not the belief that Phosphorus is beautiful is this: if the belief were conscious then it would have a Hesperescent phenomenal character and not a Phosphorescent phenomenal character.

4. Addressing some objections

I shall conclude by making a comment on Searle's thesis that only conscious intentionality has genuine aspectuality. In *The Rediscovery of the Mind* Searle tries to defend the thesis that intentionality depends upon consciousness and makes use of aspectuality to make this point. The general outline of his argument is the following: no genuine intentionality without intrinsic aspectuality; no intrinsic aspectuality without consciousness; therefore no genuine intentionality without consciousness. We can distinguish two dependence claims in Searle's argument: the dependence of intentionality on aspectuality; the dependence of aspectuality on consciousness. The two claims are independent and can be held separately. I agree with Searle's second claim and in my paper I have tried to give some substance to it. In commenting Searle's proposal in the context of the discussion as to whether intentionality is dependent on consciousness Kriegel says: "According to Searle, when x becomes aware of her belief... her belief is endowed, in and of itself, with an aspectual shape... But what is it about the *conscious* thought that endows it with this intrinsic aspectual shape? Searle has nothing to say about that" (Kriegel 2003, p. 280). Well, I think that this criticism is to the point. What I have tried to do in my paper is precisely to show how an answer to that question could be provided.

[27] For a presentation and discussion of this argument see Klausen 2008.
[28] See Searle, 1992.

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COLLECTIVE INTENTIONALITY VS. INTERSUBJECTIVE AND SOCIAL INTENTIONALITY. AN ACCOUNT OF COLLECTIVE INTENTIONALITY AS SHARED INTENTIONALITY

abstract

I will shed light on the phenomenon of collective intentionality, which, in the philosophical, cognitive sciences and neurosciences debate, is often confused with similar yet diverse phenomena, i.e. with intersubjective intentionality, also called social cognition, and with social intentionality. In order to elucidate the phenomenon of collective intentionality, I shall present a taxonomy of collective, intersubjective and social intentionality, and consider a thesis about shared intentionality. The taxonomy intends to show that although collective, intersubjective and social intentionality are very close phenomena, nonetheless they are different types of intentionality, and that, like individual intentionality, collective and intersubjective intentionality involve different kinds of intentionality – practical, affective and cognitive – which have to be distinguished. The sharing thesis, I will argue for, maintains that collective intentionality is a shared intentionality in a very strong sense of the term "sharing", a sense that implies some essential conditions, which are not required in the cases of intersubjective and social intentionality. Finally I shall point out that intersubjective intentionality is the basis and the necessary condition for collective and social intentionality.

keywords

Collective intentionality; intersubjective intentionality; social intentionality; social cognition; cognitive, practical and affective intentionality; shared intentionality

COLLECTIVE INTENTIONALITY VS. INTERSUBJECTIVE AND SOCIAL INTENTIONALITY. AN ACCOUNT OF COLLECTIVE INTENTIONALITY AS SHARED INTENTIONALITY

Introduction

In order to shed light on the nature and on the structure of collective intentionality, I will present a *taxonomy*, which distinguishes *collective intentionality* from *social* and *intersubjective intentionality*. The aim of this taxonomy is to clarify the philosophical debate about collective intentionality and social cognition with regard to some basic confusions concerning the different phenomena and the correlated meanings of "collective intentionality", "social intentionality" and "intersubjective intentionality".

I maintain that although intersubjective, social and collective intentionality are very close phenomena, nonetheless, they represent different types of intentionality. I will also state that, like individual intentionality, collective and intersubjective intentionality involve different kinds of intentionality: practical, affective and cognitive.

The taxonomy I present here is based on early phenomenological contributions on collective, intersubjective and social intentionality and on social ontology[1]. The taxonomy also refers to some of the recent accounts of collective intentionality and social cognition[2].

I am going to develop my taxonomy discussing eight conceptual distinctions:

(i) Collective intentionality *vs.* Intersubjective intentionality;
(ii) Collective intentionality *vs.* Social intentionality;
(iii) Intersubjective intentionality *vs.* Social intentionality;
(iv)Cognitive *vs.* Practical *vs.* Affective collective intentionality;
(v) Cognitive *vs.* Affective *vs.* Practical Intersubjective intentionality;
(vi)Affective collective intentionality *vs.* Affective intersubjective intentionality;
(vii) Practical collective intentionality *vs.* Practical intersubjective intentionality;
(viii) Social entities created by social intentionality *vs.* social entities created by collective intentionality *vs.* social entities created by intersubjective intentionality.

Secondly, I am going to argue for a thesis on shared intentionality: I will maintain that, differently from social and intersubjective intentionality, *collective intentionality is a shared intentionality* in a very

[1] See: Husserl (1905-1920, 1912-1928), Reinach (1911, 1913), Stein (1917, 1922, 1925), Scheler (1926[3]) Hildebrand (1930), Walther (1923); about the early phenomenological accounts, see Mulligan (1987), Smith (1990), De Vecchi (2008, 2009, 2010).
[2] See: Searle (1990, 1995, 2010), Bratman (1992), Tuomela-Miller (1988), Gilbert (1989, 2002), Ferraris (2009), Gallagher-Zavahi (2008), Gallese (2005), Goldman (2005).

strong sense of the term "sharing", a sense that implies some essential conditions, which are not required in the cases of intersubjective and social intentionality.

1. A taxonomy of collective, intersubjective and social intentionality

First of all, I will focus on three basic levels of phenomenological distinctions. I maintain that intersubjective, social and collective intentionality are different types of intentionality:

(i) Collective intentionality *vs.* Intersubjective intentionality;
For instance: *we* intend to go to the movies together *vs. I* see that *you* intend to go to the movies.
(ii) Collective intentionality *vs.* Social intentionality;
For instance: *we* intend to go to the movies together *vs. I* promise *you* to go to the movies with *you*.
(iii) Intersubjective intentionality *vs.* Social intentionality.
For instance: *I* see that *you* intend to go to the movies *vs. I* promise *you* to go to the movies with *you*.

These first distinctions are grounded in some basic notions and phenomenological data concerning collective, intersubjective and social intentionality. I will now deal with these basic notions and phenomenological data, and introduce further distinctions.

1.1. Collective intentionality

Collective intentionality is constituted by *mental states* or *acts* shared by two or more persons. The mental states or acts may be *practical*, *cognitive* or *affective*: hence, *intentions* (or *volitions* or *desires*), *beliefs* (or *perceptions*) or *feelings* (including all the variety of feelings: moods, emotions, passions etc.) respectively. Thus, I will also focus on a fourth level of distinctions:

(iv) Cognitive *vs.* Practical *vs.* Affective collective intentionality[3].
For instance: We believe that *Hereafter* by Clint Eastwood is a beautiful movie *vs.* we intend to go to see *Hereafter vs.* we both are moved by *Hereafter* and we share the same enthusiasm for this movie.

We may already see that, among these different kinds of collective intentionality, the more problematic phenomenon to grasp and to define is affective collective intentionality: what exactly does it mean that we *share* the same feeling, that we feel it together or collectively[4]? In which specific sense are "we both moved by *Hereafter*"? Which are the necessary and sufficient conditions for collective affective intentionality? In this paper, I will deal with these questions and attempt to provide an answer to them.

Moreover, I will focus on a very relevant phenomenological issue. I have said that collective intentionality is constituted by mental states or acts. Considering the above mentioned examples of cognitive, practical and affective collective intentionality, it is maybe already manifest why I spoke of both mental states and acts. In fact, our *collective belief* that *Hereafter* is a beautiful movie is a collective mental *state;* instead, our *collective intention* to go to see *Hereafter* together is a collective *act*. Thus, what is an act and why is it different from a state? In philosophy, and also in common language, the meaning of "act" is ambiguous. Analytic philosophers tend to call mental acts mental states and tend to identify acts with actions. Phenomenologists, on the contrary, distinguish among states, acts and actions, and hold this distinction to be very important. I agree with this distinction, and in this paper I will always adopt it and I will refer to states, acts and actions as very different intentional phenomena. Hence, what are acts and what are actions? Differently from mental states, *acts* are characterised by *positionality*: acts involve or presuppose taking a position (yes-no) relative to an object or to a state-of-affairs. *Actions* are goal-directed intentional movements: they are intended bodily

[3] The distinction between practical collective intentionality and cognitive collective intentionality is now quite accepted (Gilbert 1989, Gilbert 2002, Bratman 1999, Searle 2010, Zaibert 2003, Tollefsen 2005, Schmid 2009). The individuation of affective collective intentionality as a third kind of intentionality, internal to the type of collective intentionality, on the other hand, is much more recent (see Schmid 2009), and not widely adopted. Michael Tomasello seems still to give a priority to cognitive states: he talks about «cognitive representations» for both collective intentions and collective beliefs, without paying particular attention to affective states (Tomasello 2009).
[4] Hans-Bernhard Schmid has dealt with this problem in depth (see Schmid 2009).

movements which aim to satisfy the content of the intention. Let us consider just the case of *intention*: different from beliefs or from perceptions, which are mental states, intentions are acts in that they involve taking a position. A bodily movement which satisfies an intention is an action.
It is worth noting that among analytical philosophers, John Searle's account of intention presents a very interesting intermediary position between phenomenology and analytical philosophy: although Searle does not speak of "mental acts" but only of "mental states" and "actions" (and also of "speech acts"), he distinguishes between "prior intention" and "intention-in-action": "prior intentions begin prior to the onset of an action and intentions-in-action are the intentional components of actions" (Searle 2010, p. 51). Thus, the prior intentions Searle speaks about are exactly what in phenomenology are referred to as intentions, i.e. acts. In my paper I will speak much more about collective intentions, i.e. collective practical acts, and less about collective actions[5].

1.2. Intersubjective intentionality

Intersubjective intentionality is constituted by mental states or acts of one or more persons directed to the understanding of experiences of others.
Intersubjective intentionality may be *affective* or *cognitive*. Affective and cognitive intersubjective intentionality are respectively directed to the *understanding of affective and cognitive experiences of other persons*. For instance: I see that you are thinking about your next lecture; I see that you are feeling joy. Moreover, we may also identify a third kind of intersubjective intentionality: *practical intersubjective intentionality*. This may be, for example, the case in which I see your intention to do something.
The distinction among affective intersubjective intentionality, cognitive intersubjective intentionality and practical intersubjective intentionality has not yet been really adopted in philosophy: philosophers, but also and especially psychologists, cognitive scientists and neuroscientists tend to speak generically of *social cognition* which may indistinctly concern the understanding of cognitive, affective and practical experiences of other subjects. In other terms, "social cognition" means intersubjectivity, without distinguishing among cognitive, practical and affective intersubjectivity. Consistent with the phenomenological tradition, I distinguish, rather, among cognitive, affective and practical intersubjective intentionality: they are three different phenomena indeed.
Thus, I will focus on a fifth level of distinctions:

(v) Cognitive *vs.* Affective *vs.* Practical Intersubjective intentionality.

For instance: I see that you are thinking about *Hereafter vs.* I see that you are still moved by and enthusiastic about *Hereafter vs.* I see that you intend to go to see *Hereafter* again.

1.2.1. Intersubjective intentionality vs. collective intentionality

One of the aims of my taxonomy is to show that *affective intersubjective intentionality* is not to be confused with *affective collective intentionality*, and that *practical intersubjective intentionality* is not to be confused with *practical collective intentionality*. The possibility of this confusion is directly connected with the *criteria of characterisation* of intersubjective intentionality.
Firstly, we may characterise the kind of intersubjective intentionality through the *content* of mental states or acts: I see your intention, I see your belief, I see your feeling. Now, according to this characterisation, if I see your intention, this is a case of practical intersubjective intentionality; if I see your belief, this is a case of cognitive intersubjective intentionality; if I see your feeling, this is a case of affective intersubjective intentionality.
Secondly, we may also characterise the kind of intersubjective intentionality in a stronger way, not only through the content but also through the *quality* of the mental states or acts: I intend

[5]About the phenomenological theory of acts, see Reinach (1911a) and De Monticelli (2007, 2007a and 2009).

your intention, I feel your feeling, I believe your belief[6]. According to this second criterion of characterisation, I may see your intention, your belief, your feeling only if I personally have the same experience you have: only if I intend your intention, I believe your belief, I feel your feeling[7]. These different criteria of characterisation depend on which account of intersubjective intentionality (social cognition) we adopt[8]. In any case, it is clear that if we adopt the second and stronger criterion of characterisation of intersubjective intentionality, then it is more difficult to distinguish between intersubjective affective intentionality on the one hand, and collective affective intentionality on the other, and between intersubjective practical intentionality on the one hand, and collective practical intentionality on the other.

Nonetheless, I think that, even if we adopt the stronger criterion of characterisation, we can distinguish among these different types and kinds of intentionality.

Just consider these examples: if I feel your joy (I share your joy), it does not mean that you share my joy, too. In the same way, if I intend your intention, and so share your intention, it does not imply that you share my intention, too. My point is the following: these are not cases of collective intentionality because we do not intend together and we do not feel together. The content of the intentions and feelings are certainly the same in both of the subjects involved, you and me: you intend x, I intend x; you feel joy, I feel joy. But the *direction of the intentionality* in the case of intersubjective intentionality is always and only an *I-you direction*, i.e. a direction from I to you: by seeing your intention or feeling, I intend the same intention you intend, I feel the same joy you feel. Instead, in the case of collective intentionality, the direction of the intentionality is always a *we-shared object direction*: a direction from *we* (I and you) to a common, shared object (see *infra* § 2.1., 2.2.).

Moreover – and strictly connected with the direction of intentionality issue – the *role of the subjects* involved is different. The subjects of collective intentionality are always agent-partners: we all intend or feel together. Instead, the subjects involved in intersubjective intentionality are not agent-partners: I am the only agent; you are not another agent. Only I intend, only I feel – your intention, your feeling.

I would also mention another possible borderline case between intersubjective affective intentionality and collective affective intentionality. I refer here to the case of *emotional contagion* in which I am affected by your emotion: I feel joy because I am swayed by your joy, I have absorbed it without being aware of it; in other terms, I do not feel joy at a personal level, I do not have a first personal perspective towards the joy I feel (see *infra* § 2.3). Also in this case, it is manifest that we (I and you) *de facto* feel the same feeling, but also in this case the direction of intentionality remains an intersubjective direction from *I* to *you* and the role of the subjects involved is not an agent-partners' role.

Thus, with respect to the question I have posed – what exactly does it mean to say that we share the same feeling, that we feel it together or collectively? – I can firstly state that it means that in the case of collective or shared intentionality: (i) the intentionality direction of the subjects involved is

[6] The distinction between content and quality of intentional experiences is a classic phenomenological distinction: we find it already in the early Husserl (1901). This is also a classic analytical distinction: in Searle we find the intentional content versus intentional mode distinction (Searle 1983).

[7] Particularly in the case of intersubjective affective intentionality it makes sense to adopt the stronger criterion: it really could be difficult to see that you are feeling joy or pain without feeling it. This is also the position of phenomenologists like Scheler and Stein: according to them, empathy (called *Nachfühlung* by Scheler and, more traditionally, *Einfühlung* by Stein), the act by which I see the feeling of the other, is characterised by the affective *nuance* of knowing. Scheler speaks properly of a «*verstehen fühlend*» (see Scheler 1926[3] and Stein 1917).

[8] There are different accounts which try to describe or explain the phenomenon of intersubjective intentionality or social cognition. The crucial problem is: how do I understand the experiences of others? Do I understand them by *inferences* (the inference which I can make from the expressions or bodily appearance of the other and from my own experience)? Do I understand them by *simulating* them? Do I understand them by feeling them, if they are feeling, by intending them, if they are intentions *etc.*? Can I understand the experiences of the others without engaging myself in such experiences? Neurosciences maintain that mirror neurons are the heroes of social cognition. But the neurobiological data are interpreted in many ways according to the different accounts (Simulation theory, Theory of Mind, called also Theory-theory etc.). About this debate, see Gallese (2005, 2011), Goldman (2005), Rizzolati-Sinigaglia (2007), Gallagher-Zahavi (2008).

towards a common object (and not, as in the case of intersubjective intentionality, directed from one subject to the other subject); (ii) all of the subjects involved perform an agent-partner role.
Moreover, we will see that collective intentionality, and particularly collective affective intentionality, must satisfy further conditions in order to exist (see *infra* § 2.2.).
The conclusion of this argument is that I can focus on a sixth and seventh level of distinctions:

(vi) Affective collective intentionality *vs.* Affective intersubjective intentionality.
For instance: we are both moved by *Hereafter* and we share the same enthusiasm for this movie *vs.* I see (I feel) your emotion and enthusiasm for *Hereafter* .

(vii) Practical collective intentionality *vs.* Practical intersubjective intentionality.
For instance: we intend to go to see *Hereafter* together *vs.* I see (I intend) your intention to go to see *Hereafter*.

1.3. Social intentionality

Social intentionality is constituted by *social acts* performed by one or more persons in the very act of speaking, addressed to one or more persons and grasped by them. Social acts are promising, commanding, informing, demanding, promulgating etc[9]. As acts, they are experiences which involve and presuppose taking a position, thus they are characterised by *authorship* or *agency*[10].
Differently from collective and intersubjective mental states and acts, social acts need to be communicated to their addressees and grasped by them. Social acts are *speech acts* – most of them are *declarations*, as Searle affirms[11]. Hence, the nature of social intentionality is essentially *communicative* and *linguistic*: social intentionality can be performed only if it is linguistically addressed to the addressees and grasped by them.
I will here make some remarks on a point concerning Searle's conception of social intentionality, social acts and speech acts. According to Searle, social intentionality, social acts and speech acts can be subsumed under collective intentionality (Searle 1995, 2010 pp. 48-50). Thus, Searle would not probably agree with the distinction between collective and social intentionality I make. Why? What does Searle mean? And why – on the contrary – do I think that his perspective is not completely adequate for elucidating the phenomenon of social acts?
According to Searle, the intentionality of language, and thus the intentionality of social and speech acts, derives from the intentionality of the mind. Now, in order to perform a social act, i.e. linguistically address another individual (the addressee) who grasps the act, the individual, agent of the act, must have a preceding representation of the act itself, representation which is already collective. In fact, according to Searle, the content of the representation involves the other individual; thus it is collective before the agent of the act communicates it to the addressee and before the addressee exists and grasps the act. In this sense, the social and linguistic moment of the act ontologically depends on the collective moment – the capability to refer to other subjects – belonging to the intentionality of every individual[12].

[9] Social acts were discovered and defined by Adolf Reinach, a phenomenologist and philosopher of law who was a student of Edmund Husserl at the beginning of XX century (Reinach 1911, 1913). Before Reinach, Thomas Reid had already spoken of «social operations» (Reid 1788). Reinach's social acts anticipate by some fifty years the discovery of Austin's speech acts (Austin, 1969). About a history of social and speech acts, see Smith (1990), Mulligan (1987), Shuhmann-Smith (1990), De Vecchi (2010).
[10] More precisely, social acts are «spontaneous» and free acts, and have a second order positionality: their taking a position presupposes a previous taking of a position. Consider these examples: promising presupposes a will, informing presupposes a conviction, asking a question presupposes an uncertainty etc. In all these cases, social acts are manifestly second order position-takings because they presuppose first order position-takings such as, accordingly with the examples mentioned, the will, conviction and uncertainty. In other terms, in social acts, we take a position with respect to positions which we have already taken, and we turn these previous position-takings into the ground of an act. For instance, you told me a story, and I did not understand exactly how it ended; now, I can take a position about it: I can endorse or ignore my state of uncertainty and curiosity about it. If I endorse it, this state of uncertainty may be the basis for another position-taking, a higher order position; I may turn this state of uncertainty into the ground of asking you about the end of the story (see Reinach 1911a, 1913: § 3; Stein 1922; Husserl 1912-1928: § 61; De Monticelli 2007a).
[11] See Searle (1969, 1995, 2010), Mulligan (1987), Smith (1990), De Vecchi (2010).
[12] See Searle (2010: 48-50): "There is a ground-floor form of collective intentionality, one that exists prior to the excercise of language and which makes the use of language possibile at all (50)".

This is a very significant point characterising Searle's individualism and internalism: it implies that, in order to perform a social act, a collective moment must already be present in the individual mind, and that the individual's capacity for collective intentionality grounds the sociality of social acts. This perspective keeps Searle apart from other philosophers like Anthonie Meijers and Hans-Bernhard Schmid, who state that a concrete and real relational moment is ontologically necessary in order for a collective intentionality to exist (Meijers 1994, Schmid 2009)[13].

Now, why do I think that Searle's perspective does not adequately account for the phenomenon of social acts? Because it does not show that social acts and collective acts have different existential conditions and different essential structure. Phenomenologically, the essential character of social acts is their need do be communicated to and grasped by their addressees; on the contrary it is not an essential character of collective intentionality and of intersubjective intentionality. Thus, on the basis of this essential difference, I state that social acts are not reducible to collective states or acts.

A very specific characteristic of *social intentionality* is that it creates *social ontology*, and precisely *normative* and *institutional entities* belonging to social ontology. For instance, if I promise you to do something, my promise produces an *obligation* and a *claim*.

Social ontology is also produced by collective intentionality and in some cases also by intersubjective intentionality. The taxonomy also focuses on the different roles and contributions of social, intersubjective and collective intentionality in the construction of social reality.

Thus, I will lastly focus on an eighth level of distinctions:

> (viii) Social entities created by social intentionality *vs.* social entities created by collective intentionality *vs.* social entities created by intersubjective intentionality.
> For instance: promising creates obligations and claims *vs.* collective beliefs create philosophical societies, political parties etc. *vs.* intersubjective feelings create groups of friends, families, communities etc.

2. The sharing thesis: collective intentionality is a shared intentionality

I state that, differently from social and intersubjective intentionality, *collective intentionality is a shared intentionality* in a very strong sense of the term «sharing», a sense that implies three essential conditions in the case of practical and cognitive collective intentionality and four essential conditions in the case of affective collective intentionality. Singularly, these conditions are necessary conditions, and jointly they are also sufficient conditions.

This thesis would also try to give an answer to the previously mentioned question regarding collective affective intentionality: what exactly does it mean that we share the same feeling, that we feel it together or collectively? (see *supra* § 1.1)?

This thesis develops what I have stated previously concerning the distinction between affective intersubjective intentionality on the one hand, and affective collective intentionality on the other, and about the distinction between practical collective intentionality on the one hand, and practical intersubjective intentionality on the other (see *supra* § 1.2). This thesis also develops the previously mentioned point regarding the role of the subjects in collective intentionality (see *supra* § 1.2).

2.1. Collective intentions and collective beliefs are shared intentions and beliefs

Collective intentions and collective beliefs are a shared intentionality which requires three conditions:

> (i) *Intentional quality and intentional content condition;*
> (ii) *Mutual belief condition;*
> (iii) *Agent-partners role condition.*

These conditions are jointly *essential conditions for collective intentions* and also collective beliefs *as*

[13] For a very clear presentation of the salient issues of the internalism versus externalism collective intentionality debate and also a defence of Searle's internalism, see Gallotti (2010, Third Chapter).

shared intentionality. In other terms, these conditions specify the sense – a very strong one – in which collective intentions (volitions or desires) and collective beliefs are indeed *shared* intentions and *shared* beliefs.

Consider the following *collective intentions* (i.e. a case of practical collective intentionality) *state-of-affairs* (the case of collective beliefs may be built symmetrically):

(i) We intend to go to the movies together[14].

Firstly, state-of-affairs (i) implies trivially an *intentional quality and intentional content condition*. It implies that:

(ii) We have an intentional act of the *same quality*: an intention;

(iii) My intention and your intention have the *same content:* to go to the movies together.

It is important to stress this condition, because we could have intentional acts of the same type (practical intentionality) and with the same content (to go to the movies together) but of different quality: I could have the *intention* to go to the movies together and you could have only the *desire* to go to the movies together. Thus, in this case, there would of course not be collective intentions[15].

Secondly, state-of-affairs (i) also presupposes a *mutual belief condition*. It presupposes that:

(iv) I believe that you intend for us to go to the movies together;

(v) You believe that I intend for us to go to the movies together[16].

Hence,

(vi) We believe that we intend the same goal[17].

Finally, state-of-affairs (i) entails an *agent-partner role condition:*

(vii) We (you and I) are both agents of the intention to go to the movies together.

The *agent-partner role condition* concerns the role of agent-partners that all of the subjects involved necessarily have with respect to the common goal to go to the movies together: we are all agents of this collective intention. This condition, of course, does not require that the content of our shared intention necessarily be the same with respect to the part I have to perform in order to carry out our intended goal: in order to do x together, I may have to do x1 (my part) and you may have to do x2 (your part)[18].

I claim that these three conditions jointly characterise collective intentions and collective beliefs as such, i.e. as shared intentionality (I have not created a specific example for collective beliefs, but the reader can proceed to the substitution of the intentions and their intentional contents with beliefs: for instance, "we believe that we will go to the movies together").

To summarize, we intend together and we believe together, only under the conditions that each of us:

(i) has the same intentional act (intention) or state (belief) and the same intentional content;

(ii) is reciprocally aware that we share the same intended goal, the same belief;

(iii) jointly has the agent-partner's role with respect to the common intended goal and the common belief.

I also state that these conditions are not essential conditions either for social intentionality or for intersubjective intentionality, and also maintain that neither social intentionality nor intersubjective intentionality are shared intentionality.

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[14] I assume here Searle's account of collective intentions which does not reduce collective intentions to individual intentions plus mutual beliefs (1990, 1995, 2010).

[15] Moreover, I have to remember that intentions and desires have different conditions of satisfaction (see Searle 2010, Zaibert 2003, Zaibert-Smith 2006).

[16] According to Searle, the belief about the intention of the other (i.e. about the fact that the other – like me – intends x, too), and viceversa, cannot be a content of the intention, because intentions are self-referential mental states, and hence cannot concern the intention of other persons than myself. This mutual belief about the intention of others is present aside from the intention and is presupposed by the intention (see Searle 2010, chapter III). On this point, I agree with Searle.

[17] The mutual belief condition (expressed in (i), (iv)-(vi), in case of «intention-in-action» does not require that each of us exactly know what the other does (see Searle 2010). This condition requires only that I believe that you intend and cooperate towards the same goal and that you believe that I intend and cooperate towards the same goal. In the case of collective intentionality of high complexity (for example, the collective intentionality of a corporation, of a state's government, or more simply of a theater company), it is rare that each member knows the part-intention (and the part-action) of every other member.

[18] See Searle (1990, 1995, 2010).

2.2. Collective feeling is a shared feeling

Collective feeling is a shared intentionality, which requires four conditions:

(i) *Intentional quality, intensity and content condition;*
(ii) *Mutual belief condition;*
(iii) *Agent-partner role condition;*
(iv) *Subjects' relation towards the object condition.*

These conditions are jointly essential *conditions for collective affective intentionality as shared intentionality*. Consider the following *collective feeling state-of-affairs:*

(i) We both feel enthusiasm for *Hereafter*.

Firstly, state-of-affairs (i) trivially implies an *intentional quality and intentional content condition*. It implies that:

(ii) We have the *same quality* of intentional act: a feeling, and precisely, a feeling of enthusiasm;
(iii) My feeling and your feeling have the *same content*: enthusiasm with respect to *Hereafter*.

As we have previously remarked for collective intentions, it is important to focus our attention on this condition because we could have intentional acts of the same type (affective intentionality) and with the same content (*Hereafter*) but of different quality: I could feel enthusiasm for *Hereafter*, and you could simply feel joy for *Hereafter*. Thus, in this case, there would of course not be collective feelings.

Moreover, besides the same intentional quality and content, state-of-affairs (i) also implies that the *intensity of the feeling* is the same. Feelings have degrees, and in order to share the same feeling we have to share a feeling of the same *degree*, and not only of the same quality and content. Thus, state-of-affairs (i) implies that:

(iv) We both feel the same degree of enthusiasm.

The degree of feeling also depends on the character of the person (there are persons who feel an emotion much more intensely *vs.* persons who feel an emotion less intensely) and on the life energy we have in the moment we experience a certain feeling[19].

Secondly, state-of-affairs (i) also implicitly presupposes a *mutual belief condition*. It presupposes that:

(v) I believe that you feel enthusiasm for *Hereafter*;
(vi) You believe that I feel enthusiasm for *Hereafter*.

Hence,

(vii) We believe that we feel enthusiasm for *Hereafter*.

Thirdly, state-of-affairs (i) also entails an *agent-partner role condition:*

(viii) We (you and I) are both agents of the feeling (enthusiasm for *Hereafter*).

Finally, state-of-affairs (i) implies another condition concerning the *subjects' relation towards the object*. All of the subjects involved must have the same relation towards the object which they feel a certain emotion for:

(ix) We (you and I) have the same relation towards *Hereafter*: we are both spectators of the movie.

If you were Clint Eastwood, the director of the movie, and I were simply a spectator of the movie, then we could not share the same feeling of enthusiasm.

In this regard, I would like now to mention Scheler's famous case of *feeling-together* (*Mit-einanderfühlen*): a father and mother feel the same pain standing by the dead body of their beloved child. In this case, we properly have an example of "emotional sharing"[20], which satisfies all the essential conditions for collective feeling that we have individuated. Moreover, Scheler's example is very clear with respect to the subjects' relation condition. As Scheler remarks, the friend of the

[19] See on this point the remarks of Edith Stein (Stein 1922).
[20] See Scheler (1926[3]), and in this regard see: Schmid (2009, § 15 "Phenomenological Fusion"), Krebs (2010), Zahavi (2008).

family, who also feels pain for the dead child, does not share the same pain as that shared by the parents. He may only experience compassion or a fellow-feeling (*Mit-gefühl*) with respect to the parents' pain. Why? Because he does not have the same relation that the parents have with the dead child.
It is manifest that this condition does not make sense with respect to collective intentions or collective beliefs: we could share the same intention or the same belief, even if my relation with the object towards which I have the intention or belief were different from yours.

2.3. Intersubjective intentionality is not a shared intentionality

Consider the following *cognitive intersubjective intentionality state-of-affairs:*

(i) I intend to go to the movies;
(ii) You understand that I intend to go to the movies;
(i) and (ii) are essential moments of the intersubjective state-of-affairs.

There is a subject (I) that intends to go to the movies, and there is another subject (You) who understands the mental act of the first subject (I).
In this situation, can we properly speak of a *shared* intentionality implying the three above mentioned conditions: (i) Intentional quality and intentional content condition; (ii) Mutual belief condition; (iii) Agent-partners' role condition?
No, we cannot. There is here only a *one-sided knowledge condition*. Certainly, it may happen that:

(iii) You intend to go to the movies, too;
(iv) You and I (We) intend to go to the movies.

But, even in this case, where we share the same intentional quality and the same intentional content, and thus satisfy one of the three conditions, we cannot describe (iii) saying that *you share my intention* in the same strong sense of sharing implied by collective intentionality. Because, in case (iii), we only have a one-sided sharing and not a mutual sharing: *you share my intention, but I do not share your intention*. In other terms, this is a case of *practical intersubjective intentionality and not a case of practical collective intentionality*.
To sum up, in this situation (i)-(iv) we do not have a proper shared or collective intentionality, but only an intersubjective intentionality: first, you know (understand) that I intend to go to the movies (cognitive intersubjective intentionality); second, you intend to go to the movies (the same intention I have), too (practical intersubjective intentionality). Apparently, we both intend to go to the movies, but we do not intend to go to the movies together. The I-intention and you-intention do not produce here a "we-intention".
What about the *agent-partners' role condition* in this case? Neither does this condition hold: you and I are both agents, but *we are not agent-partners relative to the same-shared goal*. My intention and your intention may have the same content (I intend to go to the movies and you intend to go to the movies) but we are not jointly the agents of the same intention: you have just the same intention I have, and you know that I have this intention.

2.3.1. Affective intersubjective intentionality vs. affective collective intentionality

It is important to return now to the distinction between affective intersubjective intentionality on the one hand, and affective collective intentionality on the other, and to stress a very significant difference with regard to it. Affective intersubjective intentionality satisfies only the *intentional quality and intentional content condition*, and may also satisfy the claim about *intensity*, but it does not satisfy either the mutual belief condition or the agent-partners' role conditions. On the contrary, as we have seen, affective collective intentionality entails all these conditions.
Consider the following *affective intersubjective intentionality states-of-affairs:*

(i) I feel joy
(ii) You understand that I feel joy;

And maybe,

(iii) You feel joy, too
(iv) You and I feel joy.

In this case, differently from the affective collective intentionality case, we do not properly share the same feeling. You understand my feeling and, possibly, understanding it, you feel it, but a common feeling does not really exist. Each of us feels her/his feeling: my feeling and yours have the same quality and the same content and they could also have the same intensity, but we do not feel it together. This is the case of empathy (*Einfühlung*) and sympathy (*Mitfühung*) (or of forms of "social cognition" which are affectively marked)[21]. But this is not the case of collective affective intentionality: collective affective intentionality is realized only if the subjects share the feeling, only if their feeling is a "feeling-together".

2.3.2. Intersubjective intentionality grounds both collective and social intentionality

I maintain that intersubjective intentionality is in many cases the basis of collective and social intentionality. For instance, in the case of *collective intentions and collective actions*, in order to cooperate towards a common goal, a relation among the subjects, which is the basis of the agreement and the commitment towards the shared goal, is needed. This relation is created through intersubjective intentionality, particularly intersubjective affective intentionality, at the personal level (empathy and sympathy). This type of intentionality allows us to understand the others with whom we share intentions, beliefs etc. and with whom we perform social acts (promising, informing, asking, commanding etc.).
Phenomenologists like Husserl claim that the intersubjective relation is a necessary condition for social acts, for collective experiences and for the constitution of the social world. In intersubjective intentionality, and precisely in a mutual intersubjective intentionality where the role of agent is played by both the subjects (I see what you intend, believe or feel, and you see what I intend, believe or feel), even if probably in different temporal moments, Husserl identifies the situation which normally characterises interpersonal relations: we know each other and mostly we understand what the other intends, believes and feels. Thus, on the basis of this mutual understanding, which is proper of interpersonal relations, we may also perform social acts, have collective intentions, beliefs, feelings and generally have forms of collective experiences[22].
Hence, also in this case, phenomenology sees all the richness of the reality, and "save the phenomena". In fact, I perform the social act to invite you to the movies with me, since there is an affective interpersonal relation between us (love, trust, esteem, respect etc.). Likewise, we have the collective intention to walk on the hills together, since we have feelings of trust, mutual sympathy and pleasure: I feel and believe that you are trustworthy and tomorrow you will come to the trip, and we like each other's company.
I agree with Husserl, and I maintain that affective intersubjective intentionality, conceived as a basic inter-personal relation, is a necessary condition – even if obviously not a sufficient condition – for collective intentionality and for the constitution of social entities like associations, groups, communities (rock bands, basket teams, orchestras, philosophical societies, families, marriages etc.).
On the contrary, philosophers like Searle say that collective intentions could also be intentions of an extremely solitary brain in a vat. Most philosophers and cognitive scientists – with rare exceptions – pay very little attention to the inter-personal relation, and in particolar the affective one, and do not claim that it is a necessary condition of each collective experience[23].

[21] See Lipps (1913), Stein (1917), Scheler (1926[3]), Gallese (2005).
[22] See Husserl (1910), "Die für Sozialität konstitutiven Akte, die *kommunikativen*" and "Soziale Ontologie und deskriptive Soziologie", in Husserl (1905-1920, p. 98, Beilage XVIII, p. 102-104, Beilage XVIII), and see Husserl (1912-1928, § 51 *Die Personen in der Kollektivität der Personen*).
[23] See Searle (1990), Against Searlian individualism in collective intentionality and *pro* a collective intentionality based on relational intentionality, see Meijers (1994, p. 7), Bratman (1999), Schmid (2009, p. 37).

2.4. Social intentionality is not a shared intentionality

Now, let us consider the following *social intentionality state-of-affairs:*

(i) I promise you to do x.

In order to be performed, a promise, as do all social acts, requires that the addressee grasps the act. So, (i) requires that:

(ii) You (the addressee) grasp my act of promising.

(i) and (ii) imply a mutual knowledge condition:

(iii) You know that I promise you to do x.

(iv) I know that you have grasped my promise.

Hence, in the case of social intentionality, a *knowledge condition is necessary*: the promisee knows that the promisor promised something to her/him; and the promisor knows that the promisee grasped her/his promise. Thus, the content of the knowledge of the agent (the promisor) is different from the content of the knowledge of the addressee (the promisee).

Moreover, in social intentionality *the agent-partner role condition fails.*

For my act of promising to be performed, it is necessary that you be aware of my promise. But your being aware does not at all imply that you share my act of promising, i.e. that you also are promising me the same thing. It only implies that you are aware of my act: you are the addressee of the act, while I am the agent of the act.

Thus, this situation clearly does not entail the agent-partner role condition. The two subjects play a different role: one subject is properly the agent who is the source of the act; the other is the addressee. The two subjects are complementary: they constitute a partnership, but the addressee is the *counter partner* of the agent, while in the case of collective intentionality all the subjects are agent-partners in the same way.

In conclusion, social intentionality does not coincide with collective intentionality for at least two reasons: because it entails a knowledge condition, and because of the lack of the agent-partner role in all the subjects involved.

3. Conclusions

In order to elucidate the phenomenon of collective intentionality and to show its family resemblances and diversities with the phenomena of intersubjective and social intentionality, I have developed a taxonomy of collective, intersubjective and social intentionality, and I have argued a thesis on collective intentionality as shared intentionality.

My taxonomy has presented eight distinctions:

The (i)-(iii) distinctions stated that collective, intersubjective and social intentionality are different types of intentionality.

The (iv)-(v) distinctions claimed that, as in individual intentionality, there are different kinds of intentionality also in collective and intersubjective intentionality: practical, affective and cognitive.

The (vi)-(vii) distinctions focused on two kinds of collective and intersubjective intentionality which are often confused: practical collective intentionality *vs.* practical intersubjective intentionality; affective collective intentionality *vs.* affective intersubjective intentionality.

The (viii) distinction has remarked on the fact that all these types of intentionality – collective, intersubjective and social intentionality – create social entities, but that each produces social entities of different kinds belonging to different levels of social ontology.

Secondly, I have argued a thesis on collective intentionality as shared intentionality: only collective intentionality – and not intersubjective and social intentionality – is a shared intentionality *stricto sensu*. This thesis aims to answer to the question: what exactly does it mean that we share the same feeling, the same intention, the same belief? The thesis identifies essential conditions for collective intentionality, precisely three essential conditions for collective intentions and collective beliefs, and

four essential conditions for collective feelings.
We *intend together* and *we believe together*, only on the *conditions* that each of us:

(i) has the same intentional quality (the same act, i.e. intention, or the same state, i.e. belief) and the same intentional content;
(ii) is reciprocally aware that we share the same intended goal, the same belief;
(iii) jointly has the agent-partner's role with respect to the common intended goal and the common belief.

We feel together only on the *conditions* that each of us:

(i) has the same intentional quality (the same feeling), the same intensity of feeling and the same content of feeling;
(ii) is mutually aware that we share the same feeling;
(iii) jointly has the agent-partner role condition with respect to the common feeling;
(iv) has the same subjects' relation towards the object which we feel a certain emotion for.

I state that these conditions are not essential conditions either for intersubjective intentionality or for social intentionality.
Finally, I have also identified a foundation relation among collective, intersubjective and social intentionality: intersubjective intentionality is the basis and the necessary condition for collective and social intentionality.

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SESSION

SESSION 2

ACTION AND AGENCY

Luca Casartelli (Université de Genève)
Agent, action and agent's awareness. A conceptual clarification of our experience

Donnchadh O' Conaill (Durham University)
Actions and attitudes

Beril Sözmen (Istanbul Technical University)
Keeping a sense of self. Pathologies and preferences of self and agency

Philip Tonner (The University of Glasgow)
Toward a phenomenological cognitive archaeology

Lodovica Maria Zanet (Università Cattolica Sacro Cuore, Milano)
See clearly to act well. Possible levels of intentionality

Silvano Zipoli Caiani (Università degli Studi di Milano)
The ecological meaning of embodiment

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AGENT, ACTION AND AGENT'S AWARENESS. A CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATION OF OUR EXPERIENCE

abstract

In this paper I propose two genuine philosophical approaches to action and I compare the different positions about this topic. I attempt to show that Heidegger's elaboration about the "worldlessness of world", about "poverty in world of animal" and about the "world-formation of Dasein" can bring to mind Gallagher&Zahavi's distinction about "oriented-towards-something movements", "action", and "action with sense of agency". In this sense I try to reflect about act, action, agent and about the agent's awareness to be an agent towards a phenomenology of action, towards a phenomenological clarification of our experience. In the first part I propose some philosophical elements about phenomenology of action showing how it is difficult to identify two or more experiences "as the same experiences". In the second part I recall very briefly the main line of Gallagher&Zahavi perspective that we can find principally in "The Phenomenological Mind" where they try to explain the different aspects of movement and action proposing some reflections about agency. In the third part I expose Heidegger's position that we can find in the "The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics". In the fourth part, I present the synergetic attempt of comparison between Heidegger thought and Gallagher&Zahavi perspective.

keywords

Phenomenology of action; agency; Heidegger; Gallagher; Zahavi

AGENT, ACTION AND AGENT'S AWARENESS. A CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATION OF OUR EXPERIENCE

Introduction: philosophical elements about the role of action

In this paper I compare Gallagher&Zahavi perspective and Heidegger position in order to present a genuinely philosophical *phenomenology of action*. Introducing my speech I want to underline some phenomenological elements that can point out my considerations. Quoting *The Phenomenological Mind:*

> *To put it differently, our primary way of encountering worldly entities is by using them rather than by theorizing about them or perceiving them in a detached manner.*

In this way, as Whitehead did, I can affirm that we are *where we are able to produce effects*. A "simple thing" is not *simply* a "thing among the others things": it is *handling*, it is *ready-to-hand* because we *take care of things*. What can we say about the role of experience? How can we distinguish phenomenologically the experience that is usually the natural attitude of cognitives science consider superimposable? How can we phenomenologically argue about it? The natural attitude asserts that there is a neutral view capable of showing the "real things", without the mutable outcomes of the first-person perspective. On the contrary Gallagher&Zahavi say:

> *Some people mistake phenomenology for a subjective account of experience; but a subjective account of experience should be distinguished from an account of subjective experience. In a similar way, some people confuse an objective account of experience with the idea that we can understand subjective experience by turning it into an object that can be examined using third-person methods.*

So, there is not any pure third-personal perspective as there is not a "view from nowhere". Phenomenologically it is very hard to identify two or more experiences as *the same experiences*. It is very doubtful to argue that "a, b, c" are *the same actions* observed from different positions. Quoting Gallagher:

> *Despite the similarity and perhaps the identity of the actions at the motor level, however, these are two different actions at the level of intentions. (Gallagher, in press)*

A phenomenology of actions has to explain *how* we can observe the same common elements at the motor level

(or neurological level) but at the same time we understand a *difference of meaning*. So, *how* can we explain that the *same* action is not *equivalent*? The answer has to be found in the phenomenological perspective of action and in the intentional givenness of consciousness: the different intentional givens (remembered, regretted, judged) can take root in the common physical elements (the body movement, the airplane landing): in this way a non-phenomenological view mistakes the experience and unifies the givens. On the contrary, a phenomenology of action tries to underline the common physical elements, (that is "mechanical" or "motor" elements), of different intentional givens. Only with a phenomenological analysis of action we can argue meaningly about our experiences and go beyond the ingenuous prejudice of natural attitude.

1. The Gallagher&Zahavi phenomenological perspective

I want to recall very briefly the main line of Gallagher&Zahavi perspective that we can find in *The Phenomenological Mind* and in particular way in the chapter titled "*Action and agency*".
The philosophers try to explain the different aspects of *move* and *act* proposing the distinction between *movements* and *actions*. A phenomenological attitude asks to attend to the world strictly as it appears; a phenomenological perspective about action problem involves a reflective approach about first-order and high-order experience. I quote *The Phenomenological Mind:*

> *For a movement to be an action it has to be goal-directed and intentional. A movement that is a reflex, or passive, or subintentional, or preintentional is not an action, although it might be interpreted as an action from the outside, that is, by some other person.*

Quoting again *The Phenomenological Mind*:

> *What makes a movement intentional? What makes it an action? What does it mean to have an intention to act? We said: all intentional movements – all actions – are goal directed. So to have an intention to act means that we have some kind of goal in mind.*

In this book we can find some interesting examples that could clarify the subject: the example of the handgun, the friend's visit that obliges me to stand up in order to open the door, the example of the dress. These examples show how we can distinguish the different kinds of movements that can be discerned in the range between *reflex movement* and *intentional action*. In other words: there is a distinction between *movement* and *action,* but it is not always simple to consider the broad range between *reflex movement* and *intentional action*.
Another very important element in the research about phenomenology of act is the concept of *agency* and the connected notion of *sense of agency*[1]. In a general way, I can say that the sense of agency is the experience that *I am the one who is causing or generating the action.* Nonetheless several theories and brain-imaging experiments show that there is not consensus about how to define the sense of agency.
Quoting Gallagher:

> *In some cases the sense of agency is construed in terms of bodily movement or motor control, in others it is linked to the intentional aspect of action. For some theorists it is the product of higher-order cognitive processes, for others it is a feature of first-order phenomenal experience.*

However, beyond the doubts and the multiple perspectives that the philosophers can engage, I want to return to *The Phenomenological Mind* analysis; in this way I quote:

> *In its proper sense, we understand agency to depend on the agent's consciousness of agency. That is, if someone intentionally causes something to happen, that person is not an agent (even if they are a cause) if*

[1] It is possible to discern agency from sense of agency considering some neuropathological disorder. Cfr. Pacherie *et al.* 2005.

> *they do not know that they have intentionally caused it to happen.*

In other words, if someone or some animals causes something to happen, that person or animal is not the agent if they do not know in some way that they have caused it to happen. So, if an action is something goal-directed and with an intentional reference then someone has *agency* when he knows to be the agent of the action. The main point of the argumentation is this one: we can phenomenologically describe an *action without sense of agency*, namely an action without the agent's awareness to be an agent. In the Gallagher&Zahavi perspective an action can be realized by an actor that has not awareness to be the actor, even if this actor has carried out the action following an aim and involving an intentional reference.
In summary, in Gallagher&Zahavi perspective about phenomenology of act I can emphasize three levels of experience:

- the oriented-towards-something character (for example, a hurricane);
- the action (differently from movement, an action is intentional and goal-directed but the agent can be not-aware to be the agent of the action);
- the action with sense of agency (the agent is aware to be the agent of the action).

2. Heidegger's considerations towards a phenomenology of action

We can extrapolate some very interesting analysis about *phenomenology of action* in the Heidegger reflexion (Heidegger 1983). In fact we can find three theses about the relationship with the world: the first one affirms that the *stone is worldless*; the second one that the *animal is poor in world* and the last one that the *man is world-forming*. I argue that these theses involve three levels of experience concerning a *phenomenology of action*, and I compare them with Gallagher&Zahavi results.
Quoting Heidegger it is possible to make some considerations about worldlessness of stone:

> *The stone is without world. The stone is lying on the path, for example. We can say that the stone is exerting a certain pressure upon the surface of the earth. It is 'touching' the earth. But what we call 'touching' here is not a form of touching at all in the stronger sense of the word. It is not at all like that relationship which the lizard has to the stone on which it lies basking in the sun. And touching implied in both these cases is above all not the same as that touch which we experience when we rest our hand upon the head of another human being. The lying upon..., the touching involved in our three examples is fundamental different in each case.*

Indeed we can say that the stone *lies upon* the earth, but does not *touch* it. If we throw the stone into the river, then it will lie wherever it falls. The stone follows the circumstances, crops up here or there, amongst and amidst a host of other things; nevertheless everything around the stone remains essentially *inaccessible* to the stone itself. The stone is worldless: it signifies that the worldlessness can be characterized as not having access to beings. The stone lies on the path, it rests on the path without being aware of lying on the path and without intending to lie on the path.
Concerning the *poorness of animal* Heidegger says:

> *The lizard basking in the sun on its warm stone does not merely crop up in the world. It has sought out this stone and is accustomed to doing so. If we now remove the lizard from its stone, it does not simply lie wherever we have put it but starts looking for its stone again, irrespective of whether or not it actually finds it. The lizard basks in the sun. At least this is how we describe what it is doing, although it is doubtful whether it really comports itself in the same way as we do when we lie out in the sun, i.e, whether the sun is accessible to it as sun, whether the lizard is capable of experiencing the rock as rock. Yet the lizard's relation to the sun and to warmth is different from that of the warm stone simply lying present at hand in the sun.*

It is true – and Heidegger exposes it very clearly – that the lizard cannot propose a "mineralogical analysis" about rocks; then, the sun where the rock is warming is not given for the lizard as sun;

at the same time we cannot say that the lizard is *amongst* other material things (the rock, the bush etc.). Heidegger suggests that what we identify as the rock and the sun are just *lizard-things for the lizard*. When we expose the example about the lizard lying on the rock, we ought to cross out the word "rock" in order to indicate that whatever the lizard is lying on is certainly given *in some way* for the lizard, nevertheless the lizard does not know *the rock as rock*. The *dealing with* the world of the lizard is not simply a *lying* on the rock: the lizard is not put on the rock in the same way the stone is put on the path, because if someone moves it far from the rock the lizard will try to reach the warm rock again. In this way the lizard is not simply subsisting nearby the rock and amongst the other things but it has a special relation with the rock, with the sun and with all the material things. The presentation of the third thesis has to be connected with the clarification of the notion of "world". I can underline four principal steps in this Heidegger's argumentation about this concept: firstly, he naively considers the world as the totality of beings; then as "accessibility of beings", successively as the "accessibility of beings as such" and finally he speaks about the world as "the manifestness of beings as such as a whole". The thesis about the man world-formation allows to open the perspective towards the last section of Heidegger phenomenology of action and explains the "manifestness of beings as such as a whole". I propose a consideration about this topic: the accessibility of beings as such is the specific structure of the "metaphysic practice". Indeed the peculiarity of metaphysic action is the possibility to be in relation and to be positioned face to face with the beings as such. An example can clarify the topic; the cat could be interested in the mouse or desire to catch it and then eat it. The cat observes the mouse only inside a practical situation, only inside a situation of (its) life. Contrary the man could have another different experience: he can fear the mouse, he can be worried about its presence but he can also think about the mouse as such, independently and separately from every practical connection. The reifying practice of metaphysic human language brings us to see, to observe, to deal with *things as things*, *thing as such*. Contrarily the animal can only be inserted in a practical situation with (a lot of) things: properly we cannot say that the cat looks for "the mouse", but we have to show how the cat *is behaving with respect to* the mouse; the mouse for the cat is not "a mouse" but it is "cat-food", "cat-enemy-to-hunt". In fact, the last step in Heidegger's argumentation tries to explain that the world – for the *Dasein* – is not a manifestness of just any kind whatsoever, but rather *manifestness of beings as such as a whole*; therefore "as a whole" signifies "in the form of the whole". I can conclude quoting Heidegger again:

> *We shall now describe the site of the problem in a preliminary fashion by explaining in general what we mean by world-formation. According to our thesis, world belongs to world-formation. [...] For it is not the case that man first exists and then also one day decides amongst other things to form a world. Rather world-formation is something that occurs, and only on this ground can a human being exist in the first place. Man as man is world-forming.*

I have been obliged to limit my considerations in this paper. Heidegger analysis permits us to pose the guiding-problem of acting from a different perspective. Now it is the time to propose the comparison between Heidegger perspective and Gallagher&Zahavi position.

3. A synergetic attempt to propose a genuinely phenomenology of action: a comparison between Heidegger's thought and Gallagher&Zahavi' s perspective

Considering the analysis suggested in this paper, it appears lawful to propose a comparison between Heidegger perspective and Gallagher&Zahavi position that we can find in *The Phenomenological Mind.* This attempt conducts us to outline a genuine phenomenology of action that tries to distinguish three different degrees of experience involving three parallelisms: *the worldlessness* of the stone in Heidegger perspective could be connected with the *oriented-towards-something character of experience* which Gallagher&Zahavi speak of; the *animal's poverty in world (behaviour)* with the notion of *action*; lastly, *the man's world-formation (comportment)* with the action with sense of agency.



A) In Gallagher&Zahavi's perspective I can distinguish different kinds of "movements-displacements" that I cannot name "actions" even if they are directed to something and even if they produce some consequences. The philosophers speak about a hurricane: it surely causes some modifications on the earth; it operates on the trees and on the plants (*oriented-towards-something character*) but it does not *act* in respect to trees and plants.
Heidegger speaks about worldlessness of the stone: he explains how a stone, a tree or a leaf lies on the path. They are directed-towards-something (the path) but they cannot be aware of it and they cannot try to reach it: the stone cannot strive to lie in the river, it falls into the river. For this reason its "touching" the path is essentially different from the animal or human experience of "touching".

B) In *The Phenomenological Mind* the philosophers speak about a particular kind of action completed by an agent even if he is not aware to be the agent of that action. They call it an action without sense of agency for the agent. In this sense there is a real intentional reference inserted in a finalistic purpose, even if there is not explicit awareness of these elements. When I get up to open the door because my friend is arriving, I flex my legs and I grasp the arms of the chair (to get up) without awareness of this specific act (even if I am aware of the final goal: to go to the door and open it); so this is an action (because it is goal-directed and intentional) but I do not have awareness to be the agent of this action.
Heidegger positions seem more structured: the animal is the living being properly characterized by a *have* and *does not have world* (the animal is poor in world): an animal has the accessibility to the beings in an intentional manner (the dog making for the steak) and it is guided by aims (the dog wants to eat the steak), but at the same time it does not know the steak as such, it sees and it wants the steak as dog-nourishment. Briefly: while it is certain that all instinctual behaviour is a "relating to...", it is just as surely the case that in all its behaviors the animal is incapable of *ever properly attending to something as such*. The dog makes some actions but it is not aware of being the agent of these actions, so it does not have the sense of agency.

C) In Gallagher&Zahavi perspective, the high-order phenomenal experience appears limited to human activity: differently from the first-order experience that can involve non-conscious and sub-personal processes, the human high-order experience presents to us an intentional horizon structure in the sense that it "aims at" or "intends" something beyond itself; furthermore it is goal-directed and the awareness about these elements is called agency. *Stricto sensu*, we can speak about *action* only for the human experience that is an intentional and goal-directed experience acted by an agent aware of being the agent of this action.
In Heidegger perspective – coherently with a typical metaphysic theoretical prejudice – only the *Dasein* is world-forming, and he is separated from the other beings from *an absolute oppositional limit.* Man is the only being that can have the access to a *thing as thing,* to a *thing as such*. This typical and exclusive human *openness* permits to the Dasein to *see* the things as such: the man is the only animal that can see, use and deal with *things as things*.

4. Some conclusive considerations:

I think that the comparison between these three levels of experience in Heidegger perspective and in Gallagher&Zahavi position is definitely convincing. We have to clarify how some apparently equivalent movements (at the level of sensory-motor processes and body schematic processes) are phenomenologically different. Proposing an attitudinal change we have to diverge from a reductive materialism and we have to return *to the things themselves* in order to attend to the world strictly as it appears. If we want to clarify our experiences we have to reflectively dwell and refrain from naturalistic approaches; following this way, I want to propose some conclusive considerations.
In the analysis suggested, it clearly appears the attempt to explain and to discern the difficulties connected to the role of action and the agent's awareness to be an agent. So in this perspective I have tried to present an attempt of phenomenological reflection about acting forward an outline of a phenomenology of action. What I have sought to do, it is not a rereading of *The Phenomenological Mind* by means of the Heidegger perspective or vice versa. Rather, I have researched for a phenomenology of action as the attempt to return retrospectively to the phenomena of our experiences as they appear, showing the genesis of our beliefs and biases. Nevertheless, there are, obviously, some aspects that would be more attentively researched. I can briefly remember some open-ended considerations :

- Developing Heidegger perspective, it seems that also man sometimes acts in the same way as an animal: sometimes man acts without sense of agency, that is he acts without considering the typically human openness to *beings as beings*. This explication allows us to give light to some controversial human experiences and it gives a plausible explanation to the question about the action without sense of agency, which Gallagher&Zahavi write about.
- In opposition to Heidegger, Derrida tries to show how animals – like men – *can suffer*; this element would cancel the supposed structural difference between humans and *what-the-humans-call-animals*. It is very clear in Heidegger perspective the purpose to manifest the human superiority, coherently with his metaphysic commitment: we can say that the "animalist care" does not worry Heidegger simply because it was not an element of his discussion. Nevertheless, the Derrida position is more complex but – I think – not resolutive.
- At last – properly – Heidegger does not speak about "action" and he does not use the expression "phenomenology of action". Nevertheless, I am convinced that Heidegger ontical analysis about "world" can be connected with the Gallagher&Zahavi perspective about action. Obviously, it would be necessary to ask *why* Heidegger does not approach directly a *phenomenology of action*. We can hypothesize to find the answer in the ontological field.

Concluding my paper, I would like to stress that further research would obviously be needed. My purpose was very simple: proposing two genuine phenomenological approaches to action and compare the different positions about this topic, trying to connect the elements and suggesting some conclusions. I think that Heidegger elaboration about the *worldlessness of world*, about *poverty in world of animal* and about the *world-formation of Dasein* can bring to mind Gallagher&Zahavi distinction about *oriented-towards-something movements*, *action*, and *action with sense of agency*. In this sense I have tried to reflect about act, action, agent and about the agent's awareness to be an agent towards a phenomenology of action, towards a phenomenological clarification of our experience.

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ACTIONS AND ATTITUDES

abstract

Any phenomenologically sensitive account of action must be able to deal with at least two features which characterise many examples of acting. First, actions can be rational; that is, an agent can act for or in light of reasons. However, the phenomenology of action stresses that action is primarily a practical mode of engagement with the world, and so need not be guided by reasoning or abstract principles.
I shall offer a phenomenologically-informed account of how action might be able to meet both of these descriptions. To do this, I shall develop Husserl's notion of an attitude. On my interpretation, an attitude is the intentional structure of the agent's ability to perform a particular kind of action. Since an attitude is an intentional framework, it is not something which must be attended to before the action can be performed. Agents can justify their actions by appealing to what they were aiming to do and to the demands and opportunities of their situation. An attitude is precisely the agent's awareness of their situation as allowing for courses of action structured by goals and possible means. The agent can justify their action by appealing, not the attitude itself, but to the way their situation appeared in that attitude.

keywords

Action; phenomenology; reasons; engaged coping; McDowell; Husserl

1 Any phenomenologically sensitive account of action must be able to deal with at least two features which characterise many examples of acting. First, actions can be rational; that is, an agent can act for or in light of reasons. This requires not just that there are reasons for the action, but that agents respond to reasons as such when they act (McDowell 2007b, p. 366). In this paper, I shall not take a particular stance on what kind of thing can count as a reason for action. Therefore, it will not matter whether one takes a reason for action to necessarily be a mental state of the agent, or a non-mental item such as a state of affairs.

The second feature is stressed by the phenomenology of action; acting is primarily a practical mode of engagement or coping with the world. In acting, agents usually deal with the objects around them and the situation they are in without having to follow a preconceived plan or consider the reasons for what they are doing. Phenomenology thus regards much acting as what I will term engaged coping, where this means any behaviour which is not guided by cognition in a narrow sense, "theoretical detached observation" (Zahavi and Gallagher 2008, p. 154).

These two features of actions were both discussed in the recent exchange between Hubert Dreyfus and John McDowell (Dreyfus 2006, 2007; McDowell 2007a, 2007b). Dreyfus, starting from the phenomenology of action, argued that the two features were incompatible; McDowell denied this. I agree with McDowell that these features are compatible. Indeed, I think there are many actions which are both rational and examples of engaged coping. However, I wish to address a different issue in what follows. Given *that* it is possible for an action to be both rational and an example of engaged coping, I wish to ask *how* this is possible. To this end, I shall develop an idea McDowell highlighted in the exchange, the suggestion that rationality does not need to guide an action in the manner of a maxim, but rather can be present in the action itself (2007a, p. 351 n. 13). That is, an action can be rational even if the agent has not made a conscious judgement as to what it is intended to achieve; nor need the agent execute the action by consciously following a rule or rules. Rather, the agent can act rationally simply by responding to the situation in the appropriate fashion, as including reasons for acting in that way. Put another way; an action can be for a reason even if the agent does not engage in a process of reasoning prior to or concurrent with the action (McDowell 2007a, p. 341).

I assume in what follows that McDowell's suggestion is correct. What I wish to do is to offer an account of how this suggestion is possible; an account which would be compatible with what the

phenomenology of action tells us about engaged coping. To do this, I shall first introduce the notion of an attitude, and outline what this notion can and cannot explain (section II). In section III, I shall argue that the notion of an attitude can help explain how it is possible for much human activity to be rational engaged coping.

2.

Following the phenomenology of action, I shall take as my examples of action such modes of practical engagement as the use of tools and instruments. Using a tool requires understanding it as a particular object in one's environment which one can use to perform different tasks, for example by directing towards oneself or to another object in one's environment (as when one shaves, or sews a button). In using tools the agent will usually not follow an explicit plan which has been worked out prior to the action; nor need the agent have made a judgement about the aim of the action, or the reasons for performing it.

Each action, I suggest, occurs in a particular attitude[1]. An attitude is the intentional structure of an agent's ability to perform actions of a particular kind; for example, actions using a particular type of tool or instrument, or which, at least from the point of view of the agent, have the same goal. The attitude is not a state or process which is separate from this ability, but is rather the meaningful aspect of this ability. When an agent is in a particular attitude, a particular field of objects is available to him or her to be perceived or acted upon. Every object in this field is presented as having certain features, some of which are directly available to the agent, others of which are indirectly given. The classic example is when I see a physical object such as a cup; only a certain side is directly given to me, but I perceive it as a three-dimensional object, with other sides and indeed with other features (such as weight and texture). Furthermore, each object is given as in a field of other objects, to which the agent can turn. Thus, in revealing these objects, each attitude also opens up what Husserl terms a horizon of possible experiences (1960, p. 47); an array of possible perceptions of these objects, possible activities which one can undertake towards them, and so on.

Attitudes are characteristically first-personal; they reveal a situation as offering possibilities for what I or we can perceive or do. They are thus closely related to what Wallace terms the agent's "deliberative perspective", the perspective from which one decides what one ought to do (2002, p. 432)[2]. Both Wallace's notion of a deliberative perspective and the notion of an attitude I am using are first-personal, and both, as I shall outline, involve the agent's being sensitive to reasons as such. The main difference between them is that Wallace defines the perspective he discusses in terms of the agent's deliberation, weighing up considerations for and against various courses of action. Being in an attitude does not require one to deliberate before acting. As we shall see, this allows the notion of an attitude to help explain how rational engaged coping (rational acting which does not require reasoning prior to acting) to be possible.

As an example of an attitude, consider a musician's ability to play jazz. One can exercise this ability in different actions, involving the manipulation of particular instruments or parts of instruments (for example, the keys of a piano). But this ability does not simply consist in a disposition to react in a particular way to particular stimuli. Nor can it be captured by describing all the actions one has undertaken or one will undertake which would count as one's playing jazz. One's ability to play jazz is better described as involving a frame of mind which reveals one's situation as including various objects with particular properties (as being musical instruments, fellow musicians etc), and as offering various

[1] By "attitude" I do not mean the propositional attitudes discussed in the philosophy of mind. In particular, my use of this term is not to be confused with the notion of a "pro-attitude" (Davidson 2001, p. 4). My discussion of attitudes systematises and adds detail to Husserl's treatment of them (in particular, his discussion of the natural and the arithmetical attitudes in his 1982, pp. 51-57), while trying to remain consistent with what he says.

[2] Indeed, Wallace even speaks of the agent's "deliberative horizon" (2002, p. 432).

possibilities for acting (performing standards, improvising etc). This attitude structures bodily and social abilities, such as one's ability to manipulate certain instruments, or to engage in specific modes of social interaction. These abilities are bound together as forming one's ability to play jazz by the attitude in which they can together be exercised.

The notion of an attitude does two kinds of explanatory work. It explains the generality of one's abilities to act, and it provides us with a way of understanding the structure of the agent's openness to his or her environment. By "generality", I mean that an agent's ability to perform an action of a particular kind is never exhausted either by any particular action or by any particular situation within which the agent acts. For example, an agent is capable of using tool T1 on object O1 only if they are capable of using T1 on a different object (O2), or a different tool (T2) on O1[3]. I mentioned above that each attitude reveals its objects as suggesting different possibilities for perception and action, and as belonging to a wider field of objects. Therefore, the agent can perform different actions on the object or objects, or the agent can direct his or her activity towards other objects in the same field. In the example of jazz, one can play the same instrument in different ways, or different instruments of the same type; one can play in different combinations with different musicians; and so on. Attitudes are inherently general, and can thus explain how one's abilities to act can meet the generality constraint. In speaking of generality, I am not saying that attitudes or the rationality of the action they allow for are general in the sense of being detached or situation-independent. An attitude does not need to involve the application to a specific situation of principles which are themselves situation-independent. However, in any attitude the agent must be aware of the situation as having conditions and potentials which it shares with other situations. An ability to play the piano need not involve the application of situation-independent principles, but it must be more than an ability to play just one specific piano, or to play only one piece of music on a piano[4].

The second feature of action which attitudes can explain is the structure of the agent's openness to the situation. When agents are aware of or engage with objects, they are never simply open to these objects in an unstructured way. Rather, they are always open to them in a specific mode, which involves exercising particular capacities (for perception, for practical coping, for abstract theorising etc). The notion of an attitude thus provides an important complement to the phenomenology of action. The latter stresses the openness of agents to their environment, and rightly warns against a view of agents as detached from their surroundings (that is, as acting only when consciously following rules) (e.g., Dreyfus 2007, pp. 354-355). However, when agents act, they are never *simply* open to their surroundings. Rather, they are always presented with their surroundings in a particular manner, which helps to determine the modes of engagement which are possible (and appropriate). I have stressed how attitudes serve to open up fields of objects and horizons of possible experiences, but correlatively each attitude closes off certain possible experiences. That is, in order for the agent to undergo one of these experiences, he or she must adopt a different attitude. In this way, each attitude frames the agent's possible experiences and actions, and thus structures the agent's openness.

In the phenomenology of action, much weight is placed on the notion of skilful embodied coping (e.g., Dreyfus 2006, pp. 46-48). I do not think that attitudes and skills are competing explanations of action. Attitudes are the intentional structures of abilities to act. For an agent to have a skill is for him or her to have honed a particular ability to such a degree that it can be deployed without following rules. Therefore, to exercise a particular skill requires being in a particular attitude; however, one can be in the right attitude and not have the kind of control characteristic of skilful coping. So attitudes and skills explain different facets of acting. Skills can explain a certain type of highly controlled acting

[3] This generality constraint is modelled on Gareth Evans' generality principle (1982, p. 104).
[4] McDowell makes a similar point when discussing the generality of phronēsis (2007a, p. 341).

which is characteristic of what I earlier termed "engaged coping". Attitudes are structures of the agent's abilities to perform any actions at all, no matter how skilfully or ineptly. I thus regard the two notions as complementing each other in an overall account of action.

3.

Let us now consider how the notion of an attitude applies to the two features of action I outlined in the first section; rationality, and engaged coping. My initial claim is that an action can be rational (that is, it can be done for a reason) without being the result of a process of reasoning or deliberation. That is, the rationality of the action is in the action itself, not standing behind it as a maxim which the agent must refer to in order to act for a reason. My suggestion is that the notion of an attitude can help explain what it is for the rationality of an action to be in the action in this way.

The attitude an agent is in is the agent's awareness of his or her situation as allowing for a variety of courses of action towards particular goals, and as offering possible means of achieving this goal and possible challenges to be overcome. Conversely, to be aware of a particular feature of one's situation as a challenge or as an opportunity, or to be aware of an item as suitable to be used in a certain way (as a needle or as a razor), requires that one be in the appropriate attitude. To be aware of an item, *x*, as affording one, an opportunity requires having some awareness of what it might let one do. Similarly, to be aware of *y* as a pen requires that one be aware of how to use it as a pen and be aware of what the purpose of such behaviour might be. So to be able to perform an action of a certain kind requires that one be aware, not just of a particular object or objects, but of various goals and means of achieving them. These are revealed to the agent as allowing for or requiring certain courses of action. For example, a pianist sitting at a piano with other musicians nearby will be aware of the situation as allowing for the creation of musical pieces, as requiring that he or she solo or play backing chords and so on.

The action the agent performs will be an exercise of the ability structured by this attitude. As such, the action will be a response to the situation presented by the attitude (as allowing for or demanding various actions etc). It is because the action is a response to these features of the situation that it can be rational, a response to reasons as such. This account does not explain what the agent ought to do in any particular situation. Nor does the attitude the agent is in ensure that the agent's action, even if responding to a reason, will always be the correct thing to do. There may be a number of different courses of action available in a given situation, and the course the agent chooses may not be the best one. But for the agent to act for a reason at all, he or she must be in a particular attitude and respond to the situation as revealed to him or her in that attitude. The attitude forms the agent's sensitivity to reasons as such; insofar as the action is a response to these, it counts as rational.

This responsiveness to reasons as such allows us to explain an agent's behaviour based on the agent's reasons for acting. A typical explanation of this sort might run as follows: "I was trying to get a drink of water from the tap, but it was stuck, which is why I was trying to free it with a wrench". This type of explanation can be applied to the behaviour of other agents, or to oneself, when it is typically used to justify what one has done. In justifying one's own behaviour, one typically does not appeal directly to one's attitude, but rather to how things appeared to be from within that attitude[5]. Correlatively, one can understand the reasons for which another agent acted only if one can share his or her attitude to some degree.

Other kinds of explanation, such as a mechanical account of bodily behaviour, do not require this sensitivity to the agent's attitude. The contrast I am drawing here (between explaining behaviour by appealing to the agent's attitude and explaining it by giving a causal, non-rational account) is very similar to McDowell's distinction between the space of reasons and the realm of law. These two "spaces" are not separate realms

[5] This doesn't commit me to the view that reasons are how things seemed to be, as opposed to what states of affairs actually obtained. All I am saying here is that in attempting to justify their behaviour, agents can appeal either to actual states of affairs, or to how states of affairs appeared to them to be.

containing different objects (e.g., reasons in one, law-governed natural phenomena in the other), but are rather different ways of making things or events intelligible. To place an event in the realm of law is to explain why it occurs by appealing to a law under which it falls; to place it in the space of reasons is to explain it by appealing to the reasons some agent had for performing it (McDowell 1996, pp. 70-71). Bringing our behaviour into the space of reasons is the characteristic way in which we understand ourselves and others as agents, as individuals who can act rationally. To explain an action by appealing to the agent's attitude is one way of placing that action in the space of reasons (it may be the only way of doing so, but this is a stronger claim than I need to make in this paper).

Having described the relation between an action and the attitude it is performed in, we can now explain how rational engaged coping is possible. An instance of rational engaged coping is a rational action where the agent does not engage in any process of reasoning prior to acting, or follow any rules while acting. The rationale of such an action must be present in the action itself. This action involves the exercise of an ability the agent has, an ability which is structured by an attitude. Insofar as the action is a response to the demands and opportunities of the situation as revealed in that attitude, then it is a response to reasons as such. Since the attitude is the intentional structure of the ability which is being exercised, it does not stand between agents and their actions as something which must be attended to before the action can be performed. The agent can, in certain circumstances, formulate an explicit plan of action, but this is a different matter to one's simply being in a particular attitude.

The notion of an attitude can therefore help to develop McDowell's point that the rationality of much of our acting is present in the actions themselves. This allows us to formulate an account of rational acting which is compatible with the phenomenological insight that much of our acting consists of engaged coping with our surroundings.

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KEEPING A SENSE OF SELF. PATHOLOGIES AND PREFERENCES OF SELF AND AGENCY

abstract

This paper deals with the question concerning the effects of the sense of self on agency, particularly the implications that a disharmonious sense of self can have for agency. Consciousness, as intimately connected with a sense of self has a unique status in being accessible both from a first-person and a third-person perspective. A study of self therefore requires phenomenological approaches as well as neurological, psychological or sociological ones. A promising approach to understanding how the sense of self affects agency is studying pathologies. Such studies support the view that both the sense and the conception of self as unified and as an initiator of agency are valued, while a sense of conflict or dissonance is avoided. The frequency with which confabulations occur in pathologies of self can be taken as an indicator that distortions of perception, memory and narration are considered a fair price to pay to counteract a sense of diffused self. The picture or narrative of the self that is thereby produced necessarily involves a sense of what the individual regards as good. However a strong urge to maintain an idealised, unified and stable picture of self and agency may involve the danger that mechanisms used against a diffusion of the self misrepresent both self and the other.

keywords

Agency; self-representation; pathologies of the self

Two points tend to stand out in the debate around the question concerning the self. One deals with the metaphysical respectability of the self; is it real or an illusion? The other is concerned with its nature and number; is the self a unified, singular entity or is there a multitude of selves in a given moment or during a lifetime? Another set of questions lags a little behind in popularity but is in fact just as central to an exhaustive picture of the self: what are the conditions of agency, should the self be understood as an agent and what is the relationship agency includes the role that the conception of self plays in an individual's understanding and realisation of agency.

Certain assumptions surrounding such questions should be clarified. Some assume that there is such a thing as self or that there are certain qualities that it has. This can be contrasted with another assumption, i.e. that individuals have conceptions of what a self is. These two aspects should not be confused; one concerns the nature of self, if it exists; the other what individuals take their selves to be. Using the term "individual" here aims to suspend judgement on whether an individual is identical with her self or if she had better be understood as the owner of her self. These two notions should further be distinguished from a "sense of self", which denotes a primary, pre-reflective, experiential feeling of what it's like to be a certain individual in a given moment. A further assumption is that the self should be understood as an initiator of action as opposed to an epiphenomenon.

Self and agency are thus thought to be closely related when it comes to considering which characteristics of individuals are necessary for agency. A number of these characteristics seem to call for an agent who is unified both diachronically and synchronically. Synchronic unity is thought to be necessary for the capability to choose and implement action; diachronic unity is thought to be necessary for accountability, responsibility and the capability of judging, choosing and following up long-term actions. The notion of agency seems to need a unified self as the initiator and carrier of action, while conversely the fact that a single individual can only act out a single course of action at a given time is used as an argument to strengthen the picture of a unified agent (Korsgaard 2003).

A further step is that of conceptual clarification and an evaluation of the appropriate uses of the term "self". Not only is there no consensus on what the "self" is supposed to be but the debate is additionally

made more difficult by the fact that related questions are discussed under a number of terms. Among the terms popularly used are "Person", "I", "Ego", "Subject", "Identity" or even "Soul" and though different discourses prefer different terms and disregard others, their connotations can be unclear. Thus, some argue that the whole concept of self should be disregarded since the confusion about what it is supposed to denote might be taken as an indicator that it does not exist (Olson 1998).

Nevertheless it seems safe to assume that there is enough of a "self" to be used as a tool and to be problematised both as concept and as phenomenon. It also seems relatively safe to assume that apart from certain pathologies most people tend to experience some sort of a self. Even in cultures where the self is (dis)regarded as an illusion, it is thought of as something that needs to be overcome by training and reflection. A sense of self, it seems, has a strong pre-reflective presence but it has a precarious status in hard sciences since there is a uniquely first person access to it which the traditional reliance on objectivism in natural sciences tends to eye with suspicion. The first-person perspective makes the self categorically different than any other thing that can be studied because it cannot be grasped without taking that perspective into account.

Studying pathologies is a way to combine both aspects by comparing first person reports of senses of self and agency with neurological or psychological anomalies. These can provide indications for the relationship between the structure of the central nervous system and the function of parts of it as concerns a sense of self. There is an abundance of "pathologies of the self", which indicate that the seemingly given sense of self is nourished by a complex interaction of neurological, psychological, social and possibly self-constitutional sources. By studying such pathologies one might hope to abstract certain factors and thereby gradually develop a broader theory on the various contributors to the sense of self.

Some such pathologies of the self are directly related to the question of embodiment. The self is sometimes regarded as disembodied. We tend to have no difficulties imagining ourselves as living in another time, as another person, of another gender, age or with other physical characteristics than those that we have[1]. It is quite another thing, however, to imagine ourselves as *being* another being. A famous account of the irreducibility of the first person account of what it feels like to be a certain being is the impossibility of imagining what it feels like to be a bat (Nagel 1979). In fact, one needn't go further than the next best person to see that the particular feel of a self cannot be captured by anything else but by the self itself. Descartes argued that the fact of our ability to imagine ourselves without a body at all demonstrates that the ego is of another substance than our material bodies. We are not our bodies, our bodies are not even part of us, rather we own our bodies, just as one owns a toolbox[2]. In fact, the conviction that one's body is not one's own or that parts of it don't belong to it carries with it a strong feeling of estrangement and discomfort. Patients who suffer from asomatognosia do not recognise parts of their bodies and reject them as alien (Feinberg 2001, p. 8) and in some cases this is coupled with impaired proprioception, the sense of the position of the body in space (Feinberg 2001, p. 11). Fantastic confabulations can occur when patients are asked to identify one of their limbs, attributing the limb to a spouse or a family member or even attributing a self of their own to the wayward limb, giving them names and speaking of them in the third person (Feinberg 2001, p. 15). It is noteworthy that such patients, suffering from a strong sense of estrangement of parts of their bodies tend to try and integrate the phenomenon into a unified picture of themselves and their surroundings that makes sense and maintains a feeling of familiarity. This is one of the many indications that the sense of a unified self with clear margins is a valued feeling while that of detachment

[1] A literary example of this is Virgina Woolf's Orlando.
[2] This sense of one's self as a mental entity that owns the body is very common, "It connects with a feeling that nearly everyone has had intensely at some time – the feeling that one's body is just a vehicle or vessel for the mental thing that is what one really or most essentially is", (Strawson 1999, p. 3).

and disintegration is experienced as decidedly unpleasant or even painful[3].

Another prominent example of the failure of the brain to produce a "normal" sense of self is the Capgras syndrome (Ramachandran 2003). A patient suffering from the Capgras syndrome misidentifies a usually very close person as an impostor. The Capgras syndrome is significant because it indicates that the capability of cognitively recognising an individual is not sufficient to identify her as that individual if a certain feeling of relatedness lacks. While we tend to think that it's the cognitive familiarity with a person that is the cause of a sense of emotional familiarity, the Capgras syndrome indicates that there are two independent pathways involved, at the failure any of which the recognition fails to take place. Patients complain that the person in question is in every respect identical to their spouse, their mother or their friend but that they don't feel like them, therefore they reason, they can't be them. The dissonance that exists between their recognition of the person and the lacking emotional response creates an urge for a resolution and results in a Capgras delusion. The failure of various brain regions involved in the creation of recognition and the ensuing hardly credible explanations by the patients indicate not only that the inter-relational creation of the self-other complex is a function of different centers converging on one narrative but also that the production of such a narrative seems to be of utmost importance to the individual[4].

Another example for a change in the margins of the self is the Frégoli syndrome, quasi the opposite of the Capgras syndrome. Here the patient experiences a relatedness, which is not grounded in prior experience and strangers or casual acquaintances are attributed a position of much closer relationship with the patient. These examples of mistaken relatedness occur also with places or with objects, familiar from patients who mistake the hospital for their house (Feinberg 2001, p. 49). Dissociative fugue, on the other hand, is a mental disorder, the sufferer of which travels away from home or from the accustomed places of their lives without remembering part or all of their past. Part of this disorder is a complete or partial confusion of identity, occasionally with the assumption of a new one (American Psychiatric Association 2000, pp. 300-313).

Autoscopia is a hallucination in which the patient projects herself into the outside world (Feinberg 2001, p. 80). The *Doppelgänger* appears often but not necessarily always ghost-like and mimics the patient. It is remarkable that these hallucinations are visual; the hallucinating subject creates itself as an object, i.e. it brings the distinction the subjective, first person view and the objective, third person view into visual explicitness. Despite this, autoscopia is generally not accompanied with a sensation of being split; on the contrary, the patient experiences herself and her *Doppelgänger* as unified (*ibid.*). This pathology seems to indicate that it is possible to have a sense of a unified self with a sense of multiplied embodiment.

In some cases of autoscopia, the experience is nearer to an out-of-body experience; the subjective, perceiving "I" seems to move out of the "Me" and to see it from the third person perspective. These experiences often occur with patients suffering from autoscopia but they are not confined to them (Feinberg 2001, p. 82); the phenomenon of "depersonalisation", of a vivid sense of estrangement from oneself and ones surroundings at certain moments of stress or discomfort, often accompanied with a feeling of looking at oneself from above or from outside is common. A suggested explanation for this phenomenon is self-protection by reducing the activity of the pre-frontal cortex, i.e. by tuning down the intensity of emotional response (Fine 2005, p. 47); the self puts some distance between itself and itself, so to speak, when the perceived situation is difficult to cope with. This finding is remarkable because it indicates the

[3] There is a suggestion that the feeling that we are continuingly present persons as opposed to construction out of temporal entities might have a biological basis (Kim, J. & Sosa, E. 1999, p. 329).

[4] In most cases the confusion is regarded as deeply disturbing but it can have advantages: in a case reported in the thirties a woman experienced her lover as two different people, one of whom she described as a failure while the other was virile, rich and satisfying (Feinberg 2001, p. 35).

importance of intact emotional functions for the sense of self. In a pathological extent, this loss of self due to a loss of emotional responsiveness is the Cotard delusion; patients suffering from it are so detached from their phenomenological life, from their bodies and from the world that they have difficulties believing that they are alive (Fine 2005, p. 49); indicating that it isn't so much the cogito that makes one exist as a self but rather the *sentio*[5].

A similar common example of the fragmentation of self is the invention of imaginary friends or companions, usually by children. Here the imagined entity can be understood as an alter-ego of the inventor although at times they are personifications of others close to her. With adults the opaqueness of the invented entity tends to fade and turns into a vague sense of "a presence" (Feinberg 2001, p. 87). Again, these phenomena are comparable in that they involve discomfort or stress – the sense of disintegration of the self is, in itself, uncomfortable and tends to produce a variety of coping mechanisms to be overcome. In the case of imaginary friends however, they are actively used by the patient to overcome a sense of unity, which is experienced as too painful to bear.
The tendency to confabulate is central to most, if not all these pathologies. Confabulations are false statements about the personal state or life of a patient, they are especially common in cases of amnesia and are often related to damages in the frontal lobes (Feinberg 2001, p. 69). Among other functions, the frontal lobes or more specifically the prefrontal cortex regulates emotional responses. The prefrontal cortex takes over twenty years to develop (Fine 2005, p. 30). In contrast to the "maturing" prefrontal cortex, the limbic system, which is the phylogenetically older part of the brain that colours experiences with emotions, does not mature at all (Taylor 2008, p. 18), which means that it is up to the prefrontal cortex to control and direct emotion.

There are two main types of confabulations at work to create a sense of a unified self. "Momentary" or "provoked" confabulations are brief and occur in response to a situation in which a statement about the patient is expected (Feinberg 2001, p. 55). Other confabulations are "fantastic" or "spontaneous" and are more akin to delusions (Feinberg 2001, p. 57). Most confabulators share the need to "fill in the blanks" in their autobiographical memories but there are others whose urge to confabulate doesn't seem to stem from a forgotten episodes in their biographical narrative. Yet in both cases, whether with the aim to unconsciously gloss over blank parts or to indulge in fantasies, the product is a unified self with a linear storyline. Such confabulations are "therapeutic"; they "help to restore a sense of identity and create a sense of belonging in the world that might otherwise be incomprehensible" (Feinberg 2001, p. 68).

The phenomenon of confabulation also supports the conception of self as a narrative construction. What is worthy of being narrated, what had better be disregarded or suppressed is a question of the values the individual has come to support and thus the "constructive" work on the self involves a sense of the Good (Taylor 1989).
A narrative in this context should be understood much more widely than the biographical narrative of an individual agent; it involves the story told by the agent to herself and others about the metaphysical structure of the world, of action and of morality and it is distinctly normative (Flanagan 2009). The narration in question involves something we might call "worldview", which is not independent of culturally reigning narratives about morally relevant aspects of life. Owen Flanagan speaks of "master-narratives" (Flanagan 2009, p. 54) which are commonly accepted in a given culture and which influence individual narratives.

[5] Emotions tend to be neglected in some schools of moral thought. The resurgence of virtue ethics (Anscombe, G.E.M., 1958) and its fairly swift return among the main moral theories might partly be explained by the fact that a moral theory devoid of a proper explanation of the function of emotions is psychologically too crude to be satisfying. Bernard Williams explains the neglect of emotions in the British philosophy of the 20th century with the Anglo-Saxon emphasis on language, specifically "the preoccupation with the distinction between fact and value", (Williams 1973, p. 208) and with the influence of a Kantian theory of morality (Williams 1973, p. 207). The disrepute of emotivism, as the theory in analytical moral philosophy, that puts weight on the role of emotions to the point of reducing moral judgement to emotions, also played its part in the rejection of emotions in morality (*ibid.*, p. 208).

If we understand this sort of a narrative, "autobiographical" self, not as something that should be thought of as replacing the idea of a basic, pre-reflexive, phenomenal self but rather as an additional aspect of personhood which is both influenced by the stream of experiences and which helps shape the structure of experience, then our view of agency in general and of moral action in particular could profit from the distinction. Traditionally, the transcendental pure ego is seen as necessary for moral judgement, agency and responsibility to be conceivable. If it is correct to take the phenomenon of confabulation in cases of a sense of diffusion of the self as an indicator that a sense of meaningful and intact being-in-the-world is generally cherished, then it might be possible to argue that mechanisms like those used against cognitive dissonance support a conception of agency that misrepresents both self and other. If we understand the most basic self and the sense thereof as necessarily being in the world and relational (Buber 1999) instead, then this might not only not undermine the notion of agency, it might on the contrary support particularist notions of moral agency, which emphasise the specific inter-subjectivity in a given moment. Additionally, pathological cases like the Capgras syndrome or the Cotard delusion indicate that a loss of emotional responses hinder both a sense of self and a sense of agency, so that the disembodied thinking ego of the cogito had better be complemented with a *sentio*, which needs yet to be fleshed out and which takes into account the phenomenology of the relational self.

Broadly, what a study of pathologies of the self seems to indicate is that individuals are not neutral about their conceptions of self but prefer a singular, unified and coherent self. A sense of ownership seems to be insufficient for such a preferred sense of self. The autobiographical self that adds to the feeling of what it's like to be me and answers to a broader question of *who* or *what* I am demands a fairly linear, fairly unified storyline[6]. Individuals seem to cherish this so much that they are ready to confabulate in most fantastic ways to keep up a picture of themselves as a singular self and agent. A phenomenological approach that differentiates between the various elements of self, agency and their interaction helps to bring out the distinctions between levels of self-awareness or self-fictionalisation that affect attributions of consciousness, sentience, personhood, character, agency and accountability to self and other in morally relevant ways. A further investigation concerning the question of the relation between a sense of self and agency on the one side and patterns of (moral) judgement and behaviour on the other would need to be informed by empirical studies of subjects, both with conventional senses of self and those diagnosed with pathologies of the self and their respective views and habits concerning moral agency.

[6] This, at least, seems to be the case in "the West". An empirical study of how adherents of religions or worldviews advocating a No-Self approach react to a loss of a sense of self due to pathologies could possibly provide conflicting indicators.

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TOWARD A PHENOMENOLOGICAL COGNITIVE ARCHAEOLOGY

abstract

Archaeologists, neuroscientists and philosophers all aim to shed light on the holistic and co-constitutive role played by bodies and brains, objects and culture over the course of hominin cognitive evolution. Recent advances in neuroscience and brain imaging have enabled exploration of the foundation for tool using capacity in modern human brains. In tandem with this has been the development of cognitive archaeology, a perspective that seeks to uncover and engage with past ways of thought, as these can be inferred from surviving material remains. What I will suggest in this paper is that the phenomenological perspective can contribute to the methodological drive in cognitive archaeology. Phenomenology provides just the kind of access to consciousness and the mind required for an understanding of "ways of thought and action", including past ways of thought and action, to emerge. I will argue that pragmatic meaning-bestowing agency is operative throughout the Palaeolithic and I will suggest how empirical evidence can be understood in the terms suggested by phenomenological philosophers.

keywords

Phenomenology; cognitive; archaeology; tools; manufacture; agency

1.

Archaeologists, neuroscientists and philosophers all aim to shed light on the holistic and co-constitutive role played by bodies, brains, objects and worlds throughout hominin cognitive evolution. Hominins include modern humans (*Homo sapiens sapiens*) and all of our fossil ancestors: hominins are hominids, as are the great apes (Coward and Gamble 2009, p. 64). Archaeology can, with an increasing precision, tell us where and when modern humans emerged: Africa between 100.000 and 200.000 years ago. The archaeological record itself began 2.5 million years ago with the appearance of the first intentionally modified stone tools.

The earliest archaeological sites are composed of assemblages of stone artefacts and fragments of animal bone that constitute the earliest (non-anatomical) evidence for human behaviour (Klein 2009, pp. 725-727). This is the Oldowan Industrial Complex. Oldowan tools display a complexity such that the ability to produce them is (probably) beyond that acquirable by living chimpanzees (Klein 2009, p. 733).

Human brains and the technology produced by them have been co-evolving since at least this period in the Early Stone Age (ESA) (Stout *et al.* 2009). Thus, it is not unreasonable to suggest that understanding human cognitive evolution will involve coming to terms with, amongst other things, tool use by our hominin ancestors.

A perspective that seeks to uncover and engage with past ways of thought as these can be inferred from surviving material remains and that is concerned with the development of the human mind has been evolving in archaeology since the early 1980s under the title *cognitive archaeology* (e.g. Mithen 1996; Renfrew 1983, 1993, 1994, 2007, 2009; Scarre 2005; Marshack 1972a, 1972b; Wynn 1979, 1981). Most recently cognitive archaeology has begun to engage with methodological questions in order to ascertain how it is possible to "learn how the minds of ancient communities worked" together with the "manner in which that working shaped their actions" (Renfrew 2007, p. 108). What I want to suggest in this paper is that the phenomenological perspective can contribute to this methodological drive in cognitive archaeology: phenomenology provides just the kind of access to consciousness and the mind required for an understanding of *ways of thought and action*, including past ways of thought and action. The promise of phenomenology for cognitive (and experimental) archaeology is that phenomenological analysis can disclose the *workings of the mind*; the structures of action and agency, of temporality and consciousness, that can then be used to extrapolate how such structures shaped the actions of members of past communities.

2.

Advances in cognitive neuroscience and brain imaging have enabled researchers to explore the foundations for tool-using capacity in both modern human and modern primate brains. Stout *et al.* (2009) have suggested on the basis of a recent (FDG-PET) study a thesis for the co-evolution of language and tool manufacture: they note that the neural "circuits supporting ESA toolmaking partially overlap with language circuits" and that this suggests that:

> *these behaviours (tool manufacture and linguistic behaviour) share a foundation in more general human capacities for complex, goal-directed action and are likely to have evolved in a mutually reinforcing way (Stout et2009, pp. 15-16. Brackets: my addition).*

Phenomenological thinkers attempt to elucidate our capacities for goal-directed activity within environments of pragmatic concern. Tool manufacture, for example, is guided by both pragmatic and social concerns and the action involved in producing these tools admits normative constraints. The use of equipment (e.g. a hammerstone) in the production of tools is structured intersubjectively: there are standards employed in getting this activity right (Gallagher and Zahavi 2008, p. 154)[1].

Third-person experimental results relating to tool manufacture (or to any form of practical engagement) must be "correlated to [a] subjects first-person experience" (Gallagher and Zahavi 2008, p. 16) if they are to be informative for studies of consciousness. From a holistic perspective the attempt to comprehensively engage with and understand the human mind must at some point "confront consciousness and subjectivity" (Thompson 2007, p. 16).

A dynamic shift between such perspectives when considering tool manufacture is prompted by at least two factors: i) the tools used in stone tool manufacture are highly personal (Stout *et al*). Test subjects were allowed to use their own hammerstones; ii) it is possible to discern traces of the styles of particular flint knappers in the archaeological record of ancient cites (Stringer 2006, p. 83). Did these ancient knappers also have personal equipment? The first person perspective and its traces is announcing itself as a field of study. Our only access to the physical world, whether in field work or in experimental settings, is made possible by consciousness (Gallagher 2007; Gallagher and Zahavi 2008). Consciousness is the *sine qua non* "access we have to studying the physical world" (Gallagher 2007).

Phenomenological thinkers have suggested that it is possible to approach consciousness scientifically. Phenomenological approaches to consciousness will enable archaeologists to overcome the spectre of Cartesianism that has been affecting accounts of human cognitive evolution. Coward and Gamble suggest that human evolutionary studies remains "committed to a Cartesian model of cognition and consciousness" wherein cognition is "abstracted from its real-world context" (Coward and Gamble 2009, p. 52). Since the advent of existential-phenomenology such abstraction of consciousness and cognition from real world contexts has been anathema. Central to the work of phenomenological thinkers is their desire to reconnect agents with the world as they experience it. Phenomenology attempts to grasp and unfold the original meanings of agents' direct experience of the world (Chaplin 2001, p. 159). Phenomenologists are motivated by the desire to look at the world afresh from a first-person perspective (Merleau-Ponty 1962) so as to try to articulate our pre-reflective lived experience of that world without becoming embroiled in Cartesian epistemological problems.

Phenomenologists argue that *subjectivity* and *objectivity* are abstract notions that arise out of and are

[1] Gallagher and Zahavi note that one difference between a piece of manufactured equipment and a naturally occurring object is that there are *right and wrong ways* to use manufactured equipment. In prehistoric contexts this division has to be augmented since naturally occurring objects (hammerstones, for example) were used as equipment without modifying them. Because of their deployment as equipment it follows that there were/are right and wrong ways to use such naturally occurring objects.w

derivative from a far more basic, dynamic and complex unity named being-in-the-world (*In-der-Welt-sein*). What is essential to the structure of any experience is its intentionality: the experience's being about some object or other in the world. Phenomenological description will eventually lead from basic descriptions of objects to description of the basic dimensions of intentionality. Eventually, description will lead to an analysis of the conditions of possibility of our experiences. These conditions set-up our experiences into the forms that we experience them: phenomenology leads into an enquiry into the conditions of the possibility of intentionality, our bodily dealings with the world, our habits, our social and cultural practices, including our natural languages.

Phenomenological thinkers maintain objectivity in their descriptions by implementing methodological innovations generating results available to intersubjective corroboration (Gallagher and Zahavi 2008, pp. 19-28). Many subscribe to a naturalized phenomenology recognising that the phenomena under study are part of the natural world and are also available to empirical and experimental investigation. Phenomenology ought to be informed by the most up-to-date science and science must be informed by phenomenological analysis: the result will be the best available account of subjective experience and its enabling conditions (Gallagher and Zahavi 2008, p. 30). Phenomenology can contribute to cognitive archaeology by enabling the best account of past ways of thought and action to emerge.

How is a piece of stone constituted as a cutting tool by an agent? Introducing the notion of *appropriative agency* can help answer this. Appropriative agency involves appropriation of aspects of the (material) world to discrete tasks. For Heideggerian phenomenologists the world is revealed as a holistic totality of significance relations wherein the being of any thing is determined by its use or readiness-to-hand in relation to an agent. *Being* is the meaningful relatedness that things can have for an agent.

Heidegger's account of practical engagement (Dasein) shows how an agent's purposeful appropriation of an item to the task of cutting, for example, constitutes that item as a piece of equipment. I suggest that such constituting behaviour (pragmatic meaning-bestowing appropriative agency) has been operative since the Palaeolithic: this is the phenomenological insight I want to bring to bear on problems in cognitive archaeology.

Example: a hammerstone is an item of equipment used by an agent in their daily work of making tools. Enquiry into the being of a hammerstone will ask about the structures by virtue of which it is available to an agent as ready-to-hand. The structures in question include the hammerstones' belonging to a context of equipment and to its referring to/pointing at other items to be appropriated, such as raw materials, into the agents' project. For Heidegger, the category of equipment is a paradigm case of the available and "all equipment is what it is and the way it is only within a particular context" (Heidegger 1995, p. 215).

Ready-to-hand items can become present-at-hand when they become objects of (quasi) scientific enquiry: the hammerstone shatters and the agents' normal fluid practical engagement with their useful tool is interrupted. They encounter a difficulty and an unanticipated situation. The transition from ready-to-hand to present-at-hand transpires when the occurrentness of the object obtrudes and it presents itself as a discrete property bearing entity needing fixed.
A piece of equipment is available when it is "defined in terms of its place in a context of equipment, typical activities in which it is used, and typical purposes or goals for which it is used" and when it "lends itself to such use readily and easily, without need for reflection" (Dreyfus and Wrathall 2005, p. 4). The world and our acquaintance with it is the basis upon which the entities met in experience can be involved with one another and with us. Understanding (*Verstehen*) is the central dimension of agents' being-in-the-world. Meaning is use: what a thing is, is what it is understood to be by an agent within a particular

context/community. Might hominin engagement with the world be characterised by *linguisticality*? Could hominin linguistic behaviour (gesture and speech) and tool manufacture be grounded in basic yet complex intentional activity within pragmatic environments?

In any case action-in-the-world reveals agents' general understanding of how things relate to each other and to their possibilities. Action reveals to agents' the general know-how inhabiting their understanding. This a matter of practical agency since understanding in Heidegger's sense is manifest in agents' projecting into possibilities for action that are afforded to agents' by how things in general are related to each other as a meaningful whole (Dreyfus and Wrathall 2005, p. 6).

3.

Recently Gosden has emphasised the plasticity of brains and objects: "brains help make new objects, which in turn help create new brains" (Gosden 2009, 109). Plasticity is the ability of the brain to change as a result of experience (Ward 2006, 177). From an archaeological/object-centerd perspective Gosden considers how novel materials appearing in the archaeological record at different times (stone, bronze, iron) placed new demands on the brains and bodies of agents who engaged with them. The realisation that there is a holistic and co-constitutive role played by bodies, brains, objects and worlds over the course of hominin cognitive evolution can now be taken as a starting point when considering the complex relationship between brains, bodies and worlds (Gosden 2009, p. 108).

Embodied knowledge and bodily intelligence is the key to skilled productive activity and material objects can change and extend the body schemas of agents utilizing them. Gosden argues that our peripersonal space can be extended through objects: the creation of an object – his example is a sword – impacts on this sense of space and to the relationships between agents that is mediated materially by the object[2].
The *world of metals* aided the creation of different sets of social ontologies – networks of connections between agents and materials – than those created in the earlier *world of stone* (Gosden 2009, p. 116).
In different periods peripersonal space and social interaction are constructed differently and such construction is fundamentally related to manufacturing objects (Gosden 2009, p. 116). The origination of such networks and relationships is available to phenomenological description by virtue of the disclosure integral to the creation of an artefact and phenomenology can aid the reconstruction of such disclosive events in the past.

Phenomenological analysis opens up such creative moments and so can contribute to cognitive archaeology. While it is not possible to recreate the minds of past agents something of a *fusion of horizons* is possible. The phenomenologico-hermeneutic recreation of networks of meaning in the past is possible and the phenomenological contribution to method in cognitive archaeology amounts to disclosing relations of *in order to* and *for the sake of which* that inhabited past agents' understanding *vis-à-vis* their cultural *know-how*. Such *know-how* is the enabling power of the social ontology that agents creatively inhabit.

The cognitive *archaeophenomenologist* is able to investigate the experience of tool manufacture on its own terms in order to give an account of the subjective experience of tool manufacture. Causal factors remain the province of cognitive science. Naturalised phenomenology will operate in terms of and will inform cognitive archaeology.
The phenomenological perspective can contribute to cognitive archaeology because it reconnects researchers with the world as it is experienced by a practically engaged agent, whosoever that agent is or was. Looking at the world afresh from a first-person perspective in order to articulate pre-reflective lived

[2] Multiple agents might have been involved in the production of the sword in Gosden's example. The understanding how to work the different materials involved in producing the sword was probably beyond the ken of a single individual (Gosden 2009, 115).

experience is the basic starting point for coming to terms with human cognitive evolution. Cognitive archaeophenomenology does not proceed by asking about *minds* and *brains* as separable entities but by inquiring into the structures enabling the production of both agents and meaningful worlds.

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SEE CLEARLY TO ACT WELL. POSSIBLE LEVELS OF INTENTIONALITY

abstract

Is it possible to speak of levels of intentionality? What does this mean? Further: it is possible to stratify this very sense of intentionality with other properties directly related to it, as, for instance, the fact that some acts are objectivant and that some others are "egological"?
Starting with these main topics, within a discussion directly related to The Phenomenological Mind and some of the main phenomenological works, it is my aim to establish whether a possible solution to the problem of the possible levels of intentionality can be found out. I also want to understand if and why some acts can be grounded on other acts, and what kinds of acts come prior to others.
A way in which to understand the very relationship between cognitive and axiological acts, and to re-write some aspects of the phenomenological concept of experience.

keywords

Intentionality (levels of); experience; gemütsbewegungen; foundation; objectivant (and non objectivant) acts

1. A realistic approach

What is reality? We can provide many answers to this apparently simple question, even if, in one way or another, we are forced to admit that reality is whatever comes before us and asks us to be taken into account.

If one then subscribes to philosophical realism, one is moreover led to believe (and to demonstrate) both that reality actually exists, and that it involves a specific ontological structure which is not dependant on those who know it and are interacting with it at a given moment.

Arising at the very beginning of the past Century as an answer for all those wishing to make Philosophy a "rigorous science (*sternge Wissenschaft*)", the Phenomenological Movement firmly subscribes to a realistic point of view.

According to Edmund Husserl and Adolf Reinach, it does not make sense to argue that things hide an intrinsically secret level which should constitute them and which would lack in the way they appear: no distinctions between phenomena and noumena, but a direct relationship between what things are and what they reveal to one's consciousness.

Thus interpreted, Phenomenology has become a matter of vision – it is, a method conceived to make things appear clearly and to enable people to see them in a coherent and complete way.

According to Adolf Reinach's *Über Phaenomenologie*, it is often the case that we persons fail to really perceive the reality around us as well as our inner lived experiences. If it is difficult for us to really understand what objects, state of affairs and people surrounding us are, it becomes even more difficult to turn to all «*Akte und Erlebnisse*» directly involved with whatever we aim to do with ourselves. As persons, we seem to be as short-sighted as we are long-sighted. It is extremely difficult for us to experience reality in an objective way. We are not directly expected to make a coherent, personal and unique experience of our being-within-the-world (Reinach 1951). This experience is something we have to *gain*.

2. The very concept of experience

To describe and define what (our) experience is constitutes not a secondary aspect of what Husserl, Reinach and many others phenomenologists tell us. It is the very aim of the Phenomenologist – a major contribution Phenomenology can give to contemporary philosophical theories.

As Shaun Ghallagher and Dan Zahavi stress in *The Phenomenological Mind*, phenomenologists are persuaded that many things can be revealed by experience. Besides, it is untrue that Phenomenology seeks to tell something about experience interpreted as *yours or mine*: Phenomenology is on the contrary supposed to encompass all unchanging structures of whatever a personal experience should be. It argues how it is possible for every human being to experience this unique world, common to all people sharing it from a different historical and existential perspective (Ghallagher & Zahavi 2008).

It is not because instant by instant we breath air, that analysing this air ceases to be interesting for us – as well as it is not because we fail to pay attention to the fact we breathe air that it is possible to declare that we do not do it.

For the phenomenological thought, exactly the same occurs: it becomes of the greatest importance to pay attention to whatever makes us persons, starting from those aspects of our lives that we normally do not refer to.

It is exactly at this point that a second question arises. If it is true – as Reinach tells us – that to be deeply plunged in reality does not necessarily coincide with the skill to make an effective experience of it, it then becomes of the greatest importance to "see clearly". Moreover: to "see clearly to act well".

3. Main kinds of acts

To know and to act are mutually related. A proper acquaintance with the world makes us capable to interact with it, just as living and acting in the world permits us to know this world better and better. From its very beginning, Phenomenology demonstrates a specific way to start by a logical/epistemological/theoretical approach, and to reach an anthropological/ethical/moral side.

As Husserl starts as a logician and reaches an impressive ethical-moral theory in the latest period of his life, so the entire Phenomenology created by him affirms the will to relate both to the necessity of seeing clearly and to the effort of acting well. Phenomenology argues that the very property of we persons to be intentional (it is, to live in a strong world-oriented way) must be enriched by a second statement:

"Intentionality is not just a property of we persons and of our acts (*Akte*). Intentionality has a certain number of levels – being in fact capable to relate into the deepest unity the different aspects and forms of our unitary and unique experience."
Just to tell it in a third way:
"Intentionality is not a mere predicate. It is a dynamic property. There are levels of intentionality as well as specific ways these levels interact."

But what about these levels, which seem to involve different ways of "clearly seeing to act well"?

Starting from Brentano on, "Phenomenology" in its broader sense has intercepted a certain number of intentionally lived experiences and a certain range of properties related to them.

(Re)presentations allow us to see: we are then aware of something that is external to ourselves; we perceive it; we work out an abstract representation of it.

Judgments allow us to take a position: something is true or false, nice or ugly, pleasant or unpleasant, useful or harmful, and so on. To judge is both a way to assert how things really are, and to declare how we perceive them.

Hearth dispositions allow us to feel and want. It is on this level that emotions, feelings, volitions take place, and that human beings "experience" what makes them really human.

We know reality; we take a position before it; we are also moved by it. These are three complementary ways to certify that kind of rationality being capable of distinguishing us as "rational beings who are socially oriented to one another", as the majority of philosophers beginning with Aristotle have asserted.

Being in the world as feeling-willing-thinking-acting beings, we all deal with a certain number of intentionally lived experiences; we enhance certain experiences and we do not enhance other experiences according both to the circumstances we are plunged into and our own cognitive strategies.

In Brentano, for instance, a logical entailment between representation, judgement and hearth dispositions seems to exist.
It is clear that we cannot judge a situation without knowing it. Of course we can hurriedly or mistakenly judge; and we can judge with regard only to what is important *for us*. But all these bad ways of judging are nevertheless possible because they just say something about things which exist and that are known by us. So (re)presentation seems to precede judgement and makes it possible. Similarly, having experienced something as true/false or as good/bad for me involves a certain kind of reacting hearth disposition ("*Gemütsbewegungen*").
But is this last statement really true?

4. How do acts (*Akte*) interact with their author?

In order to answer this question, Phenomenology starts integrating a definition of what "acts" (*Akte*) are, with a description of those properties they do or do not share: intentionality, objectivity and egologicity.

First of all, acts are supposed to be intentional, if and only if they help establish a relationship between me and the world.

Acts are supposed to be objective, if and only if (technical definition) they are capable of giving themselves their proper object – it is as if they are epistemologically independent of other kinds of lived experiences.

Finally, acts are supposed to be egological if and only if they train our Self-constitution and if, by accomplishing them, we do not only make something happen in the external world, but we allow ourselves to make things change within (Zanet 2009).

First of all, it is possible to assert that intentionality is a property of all acts: representations, judgements and hearth dispositions are intentionally lived experiences: they are ways in which to experience the world, starting with a specific way to relate to it.

If one takes egologicity into account, he has to admit that every human act is capable of changing whoever accomplishes it. This very act is signed by myself/yourself, and has the power to modify me/you. Every act exercises a constitutional impact upon me.

Perceptions and representations help us act in the world.

Through judgment, we both assert how things are "*an sich*" and declare what they are in relationship to us. And the hearth dispositions? These acts seem to be both "constitutive" and "egological" in the very sense of the term. In feeling and in wanting, it is I who am the real (even if indirect) object. In a much higher degree than in (re)presentations and judgments, what I experience through my own hearth dispositions runs through and goes past me. Warts and all, it has a crucial impact on me. If I fall in a perceptual illusion, I take cognizance of it and I reform. If someone tells me that, through judgment, I've made a mistake, I become aware of that and change my point of view. Should we make a mistake in perception, we will change in very little time. Should we go the wrong way in judging, a change, even if perhaps difficult, is always possible. Should we make a mistake in our feeling and wishing, in our wanting and deciding: to adjust the state of affairs means to correct ourselves. Feeling and wanting are not only acts we accomplish, but rather are what we are and what constitutes our own life (Zanet 2010).

Last but not least: the property of (some? all?) acts to be objectivant. Edmund Husserl looks upon two different perspectives, and (subscribes) them respectively in the *Logische Untersuchungen* and from *Ideen* on. Every act (and every kind of act) is either objectivant or grounded on an objectivant act. All which cannot provide itself a content (non objectivant act), has to derive it from an objectivant act.

5. A "time without time"

Thus interpreted, the property of all acts either to be objectivant (or to ground themselves on other objectivant acts) is quite different from intentionality. It is – dare I say it – intentionality seen from another perspective and understood in a different way. It is intentionality as interpreted by the side of acts, and not by the side of their author; it is intentionality re-interpreted in relationship to the kind of power some acts exercise on other acts. If intentionality seems to live in something like an "eternal present" (I open my eyes and see, but things are already in front of me and it isn't necessary to start looking for them and seeking them), "objectivity" introduces a sort of row and sequence. It adds a "time without time"; a "becoming" out of history similar to logical entailment; an arrow capable of reminding us that in order to accomplish some kinds of acts and actions it is firstly necessary to have accomplished some other things, acts and actions. According to two different perspectives.

6. Two different perspectives

In his *Logical investigations*, the so-called "first Husserl" declares that only strictly speaking cognitive acts are objectivant: thinking, perceiving etc. From *Ideas* onwards, the so-called "second Husserl" (it is the one directly involved with ethical and not just logical writings and investigations) recognizes that all kinds of acts may potentially possess the property to be objectivant.

Feeling and wanting, emotions, free wills, and so on, can give themselves a proper content, out of the essential, constitutive mediation of the strictly speaking cognitive acts. What could previously be experienced overstepping a complex, stratified hierarchy, can up to now be considered a real objectivant act: as an act capable of giving itself a proper object, not deriving it from other acts leaning against. Thus, it becomes a primal, essential way of directly experiencing the world and its values, people and their relevance, things and their usefulness for us. Consequently, it becomes a primal way to make experience, without being always related to cognitive acts which come "first".

Experience acquires this property through its very unity: it is, the fact of being *one*, actually constituted by inclusion and entanglement of a set of different acts, all pertaining to the same, unique person.

If not every act is objectivant, a representation leads to a judgment leading to a feeling/wanting structure.

If all acts, hearth dispositions included, are objectivant, the feeling and/or the will play a role into personal experience, without cognitive acts and judgements being necessarily presupposed by them. But what does this change involve with regard to our personal experience and the "phenomenological mind"?

People rendering feeling and willing acts as non-objectivant, will hold as evident that something has to be "theoretically" known to be felt and/or wanted. If a massive cognitive structure isn't involved, it is hard for them to detect axiological aspects of reality. On the contrary, people rendering all kinds of intentional *Gemütsbewegungen* objectivant will try to raise a different argument by suggesting that every "cognitive" perception is related to an axiological perception, and that it is already in perceiving that things appear good or bad, pleasant or unpleasant and beautiful or ugly.

The two main solutions phenomenology has suggested might even look contradictory. They cannot stay the one with the other.

If literarily considered, they both seem to assume something not involved with the richness and complexity of a human being that *knows in acting, and acts in knowing*. However, if seen as frames through which some authors have tried to portray a dynamic process, they can tell us many things.

Intentionality is a property of each kind of act: a main feature which is present or absent, and which we cannot modulate. A way for us all to be "thinking and knowing" people; a way Phenomenology has to distinguish psychical from physical phenomena.

Objectivity can be present or absent: it follows an all/nothing, open/close, in/out logic. We can recognize or disown it, affirm or refuse it.

Egologicity is a noun for our being-unique-persons. Every act can do this, but not everyone can do it in the same way and at a common rank. Perception, intuition, representation "are" "egological"; but in quite different ways from both judgements and *Gemütsbewegungen*.

It is perhaps not by chance that, as Husserl starts working on ethics, he also starts recognizing that the third group of acts possess the property to be objectivant as well as egological. In fact, it is not possible to maintain and to assume that some acts "make us persons", if we are not allowed to say that they are able to disclose us sets of experience – and to do it in a quite "independent" way, being primary ways of our lived experiences. What constitutes us must enjoy of a certain kind of independence. It must be capable of offering us experience in a new, rich and coherent way.

If perception is seen not only as an "act of perception" (or as a perception *stricto sensu*), but as an image of all theoretical and cognitive acts (or as a perception *lato sensu*), it is then deeply involved with feeling and wanting. As Husserl's Prolegomena often remembers, the normative dimension is always grounded on a descriptive one. And as the *Lectures on ethics* (1908-1914) recognizes, this foundation

entails a complex plot: every will presupposes both a representation of what is wanted and a frame of background representations that the belief is added to (Husserl 1988).

Reality has to be present, for a position (*Stellungnahme*) can be taken in its regards. We cannot enjoy of a neutral knowing, even if a certain kind of epoché is of the greatest importance. Cognitive acts arise at the same time as axiological acts. To start to see clearly and to begin exercising a correct theoretical attitude has a lot to do with the way in which a state of affairs is judged. To feel well and to train our feelings are already ways to influence and shape our behaviour. And to judge correctly, is to adopt such attitudes and bearings directly involved with a thoughtful, effective decision.

7. See clearly to act well

"See clearly to act well" is then something more than a saying. It refers to the very structure of our conscious and experienced life. It is directly concerned with the way our complex experience is and evolves in time. And it is capable of remembering the tight links which bind our ordinary lives and their eidetic view.As Husserl remembers in a private note dated 1906, "to develop a theory of reason" (or a theory of what we do and what we think) is absolutely essential for he who wishes to be called a "philosopher". Husserl often stresses the idea that human beings are "rational" in any instant of their lives, because to each one of them pertains a distinction of what is right and what is not.

If it is clearly impossible to separate "*Vorstellung*", "*Urteil*" and "*Gemütsbewegungen*", it is also impossible to separate intentionality, objectivity and egology of our acts. It must be recognized that our feelings on the one side, and our wanting, feeling, and deciding on the other, constitute us and make us persons. But it must also be recognized that the way we have to see the world, to contemplate it and to describe it, is directly related to the way we behave with it.

The *Fundierung-logik* running through Phenomenology from its very beginning onwards, leads us to a coherent portrait of what we individuals are as subjects of an every-day enriching experience. It helps us to understand the links and boundaries of what we have do think and do. It definitely allows us to avoid making the mistake of separating what can only be distinguished. Furthermore it helps us appreciate the importance of seeing clearly and judging wisely to act well.

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THE ECOLOGICAL MEANING OF EMBODIMENT

abstract

Today embodiment is a critical theme in several branches of the contemporary philosophical debate. The term embodiment refers to the role of an agent's own body in his situated life, suggesting the existence of a bodily root for several experiential and cognitive abilities. A metaphor, that of the root, which aims at establishing a constitutive participation of the body in what we usually consider the domain of the mind. As other philosophical concepts, the notion of embodiment, as well as the idea of embodied mind, lacks of an explicit and shared definition, therefore, is possible to find many different uses of it. Works concerning "embodiment" cover many fields of research such as those concerning the nature of abstract thought (Lakoff & Núñez 2000), artificial intelligence (Clark 1998) and social cognition (Sinigaglia 2009). The aim of this paper is to define a path linking considerations from the phenomenological tradition with recent theoretical developments and experimental evidence. This will make it possible to show that the identification of the bodily roots of experience has the consequence to involve a series of theoretical and experimental consequences leading towards an enactive and ecological approach to perception.

keywords

Ecological theory of perception; affordance; agency; embodiment

1. Phenomenological roots

For the *phenomenological* debate, the notion of embodiment coincides with the rebuttal of what is usually considered the *Cartesian dualism*. In spite of the fact that Descartes' ontological distinction is traditionally considered to be the origin of the dualistic stance in philosophy of mind, it should be noted that the French philosopher also considered the problem posed by the interaction of what he called *res extensa* and *res cogitans*. In a famous passage of his Sixth Meditation, Descartes rejects the idea that our bodily dimension and our mental dimension can be described as two independent things:

"Nature also teaches me, by these sensations of pain, hunger, thirst and so on, that I'm not merely present in my body as a sailor in a ship, but I'm very closely joined and, as it were, intermingled with it, so that I and the body form a unity." (Descartes 1986, p. 56)

However, the fact that perceptions and sensations reveal that our subjective experiences and body form a unity is, exactly, what a dualistic stance is not capable to explain.
After Descartes, the way to understand the relationship between body and consciousness finds a new style in the nineteenth century with the establishment of the framework of phenomenology. The role of the body in shaping human experience emerges as a critical background assumption within several parts of Husserl's thought. The constitutive function of the body turns out to be relevant for Husserl starting from the early lectures of 1907 (Husserl 1997). In this work, particularly in section 3, Husserl's analysis of perception is concerned with the perspectival appearance of every perceived object due to the spatial location of the perceiver, so that the *noematic* constitution of the perceptive referents can only be defined moving from the assumption of an *embodied subject* (for a more detailed analysis, see also Zahavi 1994). Certainly, the most critical Husserl's work concerning embodiment is the second volume of the *Ideas*. Exploiting the possibilities allowed by the analytical character of the German language, Husserl suggests that intrinsic qualities characterizing our bodily experience could be expressed using two different conceptual frameworks: as a *physical object* (*der Körper*) and as a *lived phenomenon* (*der Lieb*). According to this view, embodiment is not a concept pertaining to the experience of an autonomous physical thing (*der Körper*); rather it pertains to the *first person* experiential domain, as well as it concerns also to the way a direct interaction with the world is personally lived by the subject through his bodily-related phenomenological modalities (*der Lieb*).

Accordingly, through the introduction of *kinesthetic constraints*, relating the sense of bodily position, weight, movement of the muscles and joints with the appearance and the variation of conscious phenomena, the body becomes the medium of all possible *object-directed* perception (Husserl 1989, p. 61). As the *bearer of the zero point* of orientation, each thing that appears, or is supposed to be able to appear, has *eo ipso* an orienting relation to the body and its kinesthetic functions (Giorello & Sinigaglia 2007). According to Husserl (1970), if the *self is originally embodied*, the relationships and the interaction with the surrounding environment assume the role of critical condition for the possibility of any subjective *lived* experience. The role of the body lies in the assumption that an *un-thematic* "being-in a life-world" functions as the condition of possibility for all phenomena; so that the presence of a system constituted by corporeal features and kinesthetic dynamics emerges as the *transcendental condition* of all possible objective experiences. This leads Husserl to state that, in order to be intelligible, even God, considered as a necessary limiting concept, must "see the things precisely through sensuous appearance" (Husserl 1989, p. 90), that is, through the kinesthetic regularities allowed by the possession of a body endowed with a specific shape and sense organs analogous to those of a human being. In this manner Husserl attributes a critical importance to human embodiment, making *corporeality* a critical constraint of a purely intellectual understanding of what he calls the *life-world*.

Within the phenomenological tradition, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, more than Husserl, focused his attention on the role of the body in the construction of subjective experience. Capturing the idea of phenomenal body with the concept of *corps propre* (i.e., one's own body), Merleau-Ponty has emphasized the role of the agentive character that accompany the human embodied nature. In his early work *The structure of behavior*, Merleau-Ponty states that the world experienced by a subject emerges from the interaction between states of consciousness and the environmental conditions, so the subject can primarily be conceived as living "in a direct commerce with beings, things and his proper body" (Merleau-Ponty 1983, p. 189). According to this view, *le corps propre* appears not only as a material thing, that is, a potential object of study for experimental sciences, but can also be considered a *constitutive* element of the perceptual world, that is, the *permanent envelop* shaping any experiential (motor) activity.

For Merleau-Ponty the body is the origin of the subjective experience of space and represents its necessary condition of existence so that "there would be no space at all" for an ideal disembodied subject (Merleau-Ponty 2002, p. 117). Accordingly, to conceive a space it is necessary that "we have been thrust into it by our body" (p. 164), that is, that we have provided us with a first model of spatial features through a direct experience of movement in the environment. As such, he claims the body is a crucial experiential element, the source of several independent *phenomenological constraints* that affect our experience of external surroundings (Merleau-Ponty 2002, p. 87, 511).

According to Merleau-Ponty, conscious perception is a way through which one is able to interact with the environment; that is an aspect of the process by means of which a subject reaches his goals. The body, as a condition for every perceptive experience, can be compared to a sort of *selective* device; a spatial form in front of which the world shows up only through "important figures against indifferent backgrounds" in virtue of its being polarized by the tasks and the aims that characterize motor intentions and action execution in an ordinary existence. This leads Merleau-Ponty to argue that originally a conscious life is not a mere matter of an abstract and disembodied "I think", but it is grounded in the ensemble of motor possibilities of one's own body, that is in the "I can" that always goes with the execution of actions. Accordingly, the sense of *agency* is not the byproduct of a pure ideal conscious life, something that, as it were, *governs* the movements of one's own body in function of a goal reaching. Instead, in order to perceive an object, or intentionally act toward it, is necessary that the target of one's actions exists for his body, namely, that it belongs to the range of *possibilities of action* that pertain to the body itself. The motor experience of our own body cannot be considered as a mere case of knowledge, instead

motor experience gives us a primary access to the world, representing both the condition and the limiting constraint of the human conscious life.
Husserl's and Merleau-Ponty's works shows that phenomenology, from its early stage, has conceived the body as a critical locus for the constitution of an objective experience. As noted by Gallagher & Zahavi (2008), for the phenomenological tradition the body, since it is implicated in the constitution of an objective phenomenal world, turns out to be a *transcendental principle* whose analysis appears of critical importance to the understanding of human cognitive abilities. A phenomenological analysis necessarily reveals that no objective experience can be conceived without tacitly assuming that a lived body always accompanies all possible variations through which phenomena inhabit our consciousness. As a result, the body emerges as a functional constraint that imposes its structure over different domains of human experience. Although Husserl's analysis deals only with the recognition of a kinesthetic function of human embodiment, it should be noted that Merleau-Ponty has the merit to have build up this conception, conceiving the body not only as a mere apparatus for movements through the space, but also as the bearer of human intentions and actions. An intuition, that of Merleau-Ponty, that makes it possible the introduction of what has been called the *ecological theory of perception.*

2. Perceiving the environment

Focusing the attention on the major theoretical frameworks in cognitive science, it is interesting to note that a consideration concerning the influence of bodily features within the processes of perception has been developed mainly as a reaction to the computational conception in cognitive science (Dreyfus 1972). After years in which the *functionalist paradigm* has been the only game in town, the idea of an embodied dynamicism is today emerging with the support from substantial empirical evidence. As perceptual experience is shaped by action execution, it seems necessary to assume a more general theoretical framework within which the interconnection between the *perceiving subject* and the *environment* is adequately emphasized. This seems to be the case with some critical aspects of the *ecological approach* to perception as introduced by James Gibson (1979). It can be considered a gestalt theory of cognition based on numerous experimental outcomes (for a review, see Chemero 2009), which shows how certain aspectual values are *directly* perceived via a process of pattern recognition. Instead of adopting the idea that visual representations result from the hierarchical processing of sensory stimuli, Gibson argued that perception is already structured in ways that specify the layout of the environment through the perception of *salient* features so that the perceived world is always awareness of a system rich in meaning. Accordingly, a perceptive experience is not the final stage of a synthetic activity involving the unification of basic qualitative elements, but is an internally structured process based on the notion of *affordances* instead of that of *elementary qualities*.
An affordance is an invariant combination of objective features based on the subject's possibilities of action and interaction with the environment in accordance with his physical constitution and intentions. Gibson's critical idea was that the human perceptive ability becomes tuned to such possibilities of action and that there is no need to invoke something like an internal *neutral representation* as an additional entity mediating between perception and action. On the contrary, in this view, perception emerges as an *action-oriented* process based on those features characterizing the body of an agent in its interaction with the environment within which an organism lives and evolves. Basically, this approach holds that the perception of events and things subserves not only internal representational functions (e.g., imagery, memory, reasoning) but action-related functions as well (e.g., action planning). In other words, Gibson ecological conception states that the interaction between action and perception is based on the very intuitive principle according to which *we must perceive in order to move*, as well as *we must move in order to perceive*.
According to the affordance hypothesis, the perception of some objective properties is related to the subject's motor possibilities, so that the perception of specific features should be correlated and anticipated by specific behavioral reactions. As a result, in a study performed by Klatzky *et al.* (1995),

authors showed how cognitive processes that eventually produce arm movements to interact with an object actually initiate before the contact with target. The authors refer to a process of advance action specification as a form of planning that involves reaction to *direct* perceptive stimuli in preparation for movement on the basis of *parameterized components* (such as force, precision etc.) with the aim of tuning action with objective characteristics. In a study performed by Craighero *et al.* (1999), subjects were asked to grasp a bar, oriented in different ways in conjunction with the presentation of visual stimuli that were congruent (or incongruent) with selected properties of the object to be grasped, such as its spatial orientation. Results of this series of experiments converge to show that grasping reaction times to congruent visual stimuli are usually faster that reaction times to incongruent stimuli. Data indicate that the preparation to act on an object facilitates the processing of perceptive stimuli that are congruent with the object toward which the action is direct and that the same occurs also when participants are suddenly instructed to inhibit a prepared movement and to respond with a different motor effector.

Within the field of cognitive studies, many other experimental results show that a relationship exists between the dynamic properties of the body and the environment. Among them there are the experiments performed by Mike Tucker and Rob Ellis (Tucker & Ellis 1998; 2001; 2004; Ellis & Tucker 2000) whose results are consistent with the view that a seen object *potentiates* different sensory-motor *parameterized components* related to the action afforded by the same object. In addition, results support the view that intentions to act operate on the basis of the recognition of *potential actions* elicited by a visual scene. For example, in a study by Tucker and Ellis (1998) participants were invited to judge whether pictures of affordable objects were presented in a normal *vertical* orientation, or were inverted, by pressing either a right or left key. Even though the *horizontal* orientation of the object was irrelevant in the assigned task, when associated with the object's proper *affordances*, this variable influenced participants' motor acts involved in the execution of responses by pressing keys. In particular, if the hand of response was the same normally required for reaching or grasping the represented object, participants were faster in executing the task than in the incongruent case. According to these data Tipper *et al.* (2006) have demonstrated that affordance recognition is not completely automatic, but is determined by the action-related nature of the stimulus properties that are attended to. Thus, when a person focuses his attention to the shape of an object, action affordance effects are observed (*action compatibility effect*); but when a person is engaged in discriminating an object's property unrelated with any action possibility, such as color for example, no affordance effects are observed. This shows that the shape is associated with action, such as grasping; but that color is irrelevant to action and doesn't afford any significant measurable motor activity.

Along this line of research many theoretical frameworks in cognitive science have recently been developed with the aim of introducing a new paradigm about the common underpinning of action and perception. Among them it must be cited *The Theory of Event Coding* (TEC) (Hommel, Müsseler, Aschersleben and Prinz, 2001) holding that the cognitive representations of events and objects subserve not only functions such as perception, imagery, memory and reasoning, but also action-related functions. TEC claims that the cognitive codes that represent perceptual objects are *identical* to those representing action plans in that both refer to external entities. According to TEC, it makes sense to assume that the representations underlying perception and those underlying action planning are coded together, so that it's possible to assume the existence of a *common representational domain* for perceived events and intended actions. The limit of an integrated view on information processing such as TEC is that, even though this conception makes intelligible the relation between bodily interaction with the environment and perceptual sensitivity, it doesn't give any genetic explanation about the existence of such a commonality between representations that makes it possible to link action and perception.

In order to overcome difficulties such as these, it is possible to avoid the postulation of theoretical

entities such as mental representations and computational processes, limiting the analysis to a description concerning the interaction between the subject and the environment. Perception and action can be understood as a *factual* coupling of action and environmental features so that in this view the perceived world emerges as a meaning-leaden system based on the presence of *affordances*, that is, on perceptive aspects meaningful to animals because based on the recognition of practical action possibilities that are spread all over the environment. Within this approach, agents and environment are modelled as coupled dynamical systems forming a non-decomposable evolutionary unity whose behaviour cannot be modelled as a set of separate parts. This can be viewed as a co-determination of the organism and the world where it lives in, according to which the body and the ecological niche where it is situated enact each other through their structural coupling. Given this view, it follows that the concept of biological evolution, instead of being a process whereby organisms modify themselves to solve problems posed by an autonomous environment, can actually be assumed as a process through which living beings and their habitat preserve their coupling [11].

3. Conclusion

Assuming that our mind has an embodied character requires us to abandon the Cartesian view according to which the mental is a distinct dimension from that of the body. According to this, the phenomenological tradition and the ecological approaches to cognition converge on the proposition that subjective experiential consciousness has to be explicated in relation to the human embodied nature, showing a full sense of the term "embodiment" that encompasses *static* as well as *dynamic* corporeal features in relation with the environment.

It should be noted that although Husserl has recognized the role of the bodily possibility of movement as a pre-condition for perceptive experience, his view lacks of emphasizing the role of practical skills in shaping perception. Differently, Merleau-Ponty has focused the attention on the role of the agentive character that accompany human embodiment, introducing the constitutive role of practical skills for experience.

The phenomenological analysis of human embodiment cannot be divorced from the assumption of an ecological approach that makes it possible to emphasize adequately how the interaction between the body and the environment shapes the subject's perceptual experience. The human body is always a situated thing whose functioning is strictly influenced by the character of its habitat. Movements, actions and goals ascribable to an embodied being are always the result of a body-environment coupling; accordingly it seems reasonable to expect that every perceptive experience of the environment will be shaped by the recognition of those salient features defined by goals and motor possibilities in the surrounding environment. Just this combination of *flesh*, *actions* and *environment* is the distinctive character of our being in the world.

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[1] (see also Chemero, 2009)

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SESSION

SESSION 3

SOCIAL COGNITION AND CONSCIOUSNESS

Anna Bortolan (Durham University)
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Higher-order persons: an ontological challenge?

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Gloria Galloni (Università degli Studi di Roma "Tor Vergata")
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Nicola Zippel (Università degli Studi di Roma "La Sapienza")
Consciousness, ego, alterity: crossing of neuroscience and phenomenology?

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A PHENOMENOLOGICAL DISCUSSION OF ANTONIO DAMASIO'S THEORY OF EMOTIONS

abstract

Antonio Damasio's Theory of Emotions has deeply contributed to the understanding of the cognitive significance of affective states and of the relation between embodiment and cognition. Nevertheless, in this paper I argue that his account is inadequate from a phenomenological point of view. In the first place, I suggest that Damasio doesn't provide a plausible analysis of the intentionality of emotions, ignoring both the intentional structure of feelings and the variety of objects they can be directed at. Secondly, I claim that by adopting a physiological approach to the study of emotions he can hardly account for their responsiveness to education and thus for the idea that it is possible to speak of responsibility also with regard to affective life. Besides, I suggest that Damasio doesn't provide a plausible description of the way we become aware of other people's affects, because he argues in favour of a separation between external behaviour and inner mental states.

keywords

Damasio; emotions; feelings; intersubjectivity; intentionality; phenomenology

In this paper I will discuss the main intuitions of Antonio Damasio's Theory of Emotions from a phenomenological perspective suggesting that, even though his approach has deeply contributed to the acknowledgement of the cognitive value of affects, the account he proposes is inadequate under various respects. In particular, I will argue that his theory misconceives the intentionality of emotions, their responsiveness to education and the intersubjective aspect of affective experience.

1. Damasio's Theory

1. 1. Emotions and homeostatic regulation

According to Damasio, emotions are particular states of the organism generally dependent upon the relation with the environment. They are regarded as homeostatic reactions, namely as regulatory processes which contribute to the survival and the biological wellbeing. Therefore, along with metabolism, the immune system, impulses and motivations (Damasio 2004), also emotions and feelings would help to reduce the negative effects of dangerous situations and to take advantage of favourable circumstances. Considered as the outcome of either pre-organized or learned response mechanisms, complex sets of neural and chemical reactions which give rise to various organic modifications, they have a fundamental role also in decision-making processes (Damasio 1995)[1].

1.2. Primary, secondary, background emotions and feelings

Damasio maintains that affective states do not constitute an homogeneous category. In his opinion, anger, fear, disgust, happiness, sadness and surprise are "primary emotions" (1995), articulate neurobiological responses which, because of their being innate mechanisms, respond to stimuli and give rise to behaviours that are very uniform. However, he believes that also voluntary and non pre-determined cognitive processes could play a role in the development of emotions and argues that it is possible to identify emotional states to the emergence of which both evaluative judgments and personal experience are fundamental. Conditioning processes, in his view, would have a remarkable role also in the extension of affective sensitivity: on this basis, several aspects of personal and interpersonal experience would acquire affective significance, thus becoming the source of the so-called "secondary" or "social' emotions" (1995). Within this frame of reference, the number of

[1] Indeed, in the author's words: "Well-targeted and well-deployed emotion seems to be a support system without which the edifice of reason cannot operate properly. These results and their interpretation called into question the idea of dismissing emotion as a luxury or a nuisance or a mere evolutionary vestige. They also made it possible to view emotion as an embodiment of the logic of survival" (Damasio 2000, p. 42).

potential inducers is indeed considered to be "infinite" (2000, p. 58)[2].
Apart from the primary and the social ones, Damasio identifies a third fundamental category of affective states, namely "background emotions" (2000, pp. 52-53). He maintains that background emotions are responses provoked by internal conditions generated by diverse physiological processes, by the interaction of the organism with the environment or by both factors. The inducers of these emotions, then, would be mainly "internal" in character and they would result from a plurality of regulatory mechanisms operating simultaneously.
Finally, it is important to note that, according to Damasio, emotional reactions are not necessarily felt by the subject. Emotions are consciously experienced only when a specific set of neural processes takes place and feelings of emotions[3] consist in the perception of the bodily modifications which constitute emotional reactions[4-5].

2. Critical evaluation of Damasio's intuitions

In Damasio's account, emotions are of a fundamental importance to both short- and long- term decisions. The information they convey concern the biological value of particular stimuli and, as shown by the "somatic-marker hypothesis" (1995), they positively influence our choices and can give rise to actions which are beneficial under the physiological point of view. Damasio's research, therefore, largely contributes to the rejection of the idea that there exists a radical opposition between emotion and cognition and between bodily processes and cognition.

2.1. Emotion, cognition and embodiment

First, since emotions are regulatory devices and the information they provide has a cardinal role in decision-making processes, they are attributed cognitive significance, thus making it impossible to keep on thinking that reason and affects are totally opposite phenomena. Secondly, by drawing attention to the role of both the body and the brain in the realization of emotional states, Damasio brings further evidence to the idea that mental functions are essentially modulated by the organism, namely that they are essentially embodied (Clark 1997; Gallagher, Zahavi 2008; Merleau Ponty 1945; Varela *et al.* 1992)[6].

[2] Damasio argues that secondary emotions usually stem from cognitive evaluations, conscious mental representations directed at specific objects (1995). However, in his opinion, although these reactions differ from the basic ones, it is possible to claim that there exists a structural connection between primary and secondary emotions dependent on the fact that certain elements of primary emotions become constitutive parts of secondary emotions by undergoing only partial modifications. With reference to this point, for example, he maintains that contempt, which is deemed to be a typical secondary emotion, shares many features, and in particular facial expressions, with disgust, a primary emotion that, from the evolutionary point of view is connected with the avoidance of potentially dangerous food (Damasio 2004, p. 62).
[3] Damasio uses the term "feeling" in order to designate every conscious perception of bodily states, emotional responses or other regulatory mechanisms.
[4] Feelings, thus, are considered as the conscious perception of bodily changes and are regarded as dependent on the existence of the so-called "proto-self" (2000, p. 154), that is the articulate and constant representation of bodily states at the neural level. Indeed, in Damasio's opinion, consciousness, even in the basic form of "core consciousness", is grounded on the neurobiological capacity to collect and connect information regarding two specific elements: an external or internal object and the body itself. In this context, consciousness is viewed as the outcome of the capacity to have a neural representation of how a particular object has modified the bodily conditions and Damasio refers to the "sense of self" as a fundamental aspect of his conception (Damasio 2000, p. 7). From this point of view, by departing from the theories which consider consciousness and self-consciousness to be separate phenomena, he seems to suggest that the two should be identified, thus emphasizing the fact that experiences are always lived by the subject as his own experiences. "If 'self-consciousness' is taken to mean 'consciousness with a sense of self', then all human consciousness is necessarily covered by the term – there is just no other kind of consciousness as far as I can see" (2000, p. 19).
[5] It is worth noting that, although in Damasio's work the notion of feeling is usually employed to designate the conscious experience of an emotion, the author maintains that there is a difference also between "feeling" and " knowing that we have a feeling" (2000, p. 36), thus suggesting that the presence of the neural and mental representations which constitute feelings does not necessarily entail that we are conscious of these events. Indeed he claims: "[...] I separate three stages of processing along a continuum: *a state of emotion*, which can be triggered and executed nonconsciously; *a state of feeling*, which can be represented nonconsciously; and *a state of feeling made conscious*, i.e. known to the organism having both emotion and feeling" (2000, p. 37). However, in his work "feeling" is often used to indicate the emotions we are conscious of and, for the sake of simplicity, this is the definition I refer to in this paper.
[6] Furthermore, as observed by Gallagher and Zahavi (2008), the hypothesis introduced with regard to the structure and constitution of the "sense of self" shares some important features with a phenomenological account of the topic. In the first place, it is important to observe that in Damasio's account there seems to be no difference between consciousness and self-consciousness and this idea is typical also of phenomenological approaches. Indeed: "In contrast to higher-order theories, phenomenologists explicitly deny that the self-consciousness that is present the moment I consciously experience something is to be understood in terms of some kind of reflection, or introspection, or higher-order monitoring. It does not involve an additional mental state, but is rather to be understood as an *intrinsic* feature of the primary experience" (Gallagher, Zahavi 2008, pp. 52-53). As outlined before, in order for core consciousness to emerge, at the neural level there should be a representation not only of the object we are conscious of, but also of the organism that by the interaction with that object is modified. The most basic form of consciousness, therefore, depends on the representation of the relation which exists between the proto-self and a particular object. Damasio, then,

2.2. Intentionality and feeling

Despite these important intuitions, it seems that Damasio's Theory either ignores or misunderstands some essential characteristics of affective experience as an experience undergone from a first-person perspective.

In the first place, his approach doesn't adequately account for the intentionality of emotions. Emotions seem to be directed at specific objects which define their character (De Sousa 1987; Scheler 1916) but, according to Damasio, feeling an emotion is equal to perceiving how the organism has been modified by the interaction with a particular environmental condition or by an internal event. Therefore, these phenomena would consist in the perception of the modifications which have taken place in the body in response to a specific stimulus[7]. However, it is possible to wonder if this is a faithful account of emotional experience: is feeling an emotion identical with perceiving a particular bodily condition, possibly accompanied by the mental representation of the stimulus by which it has been elicited[8]?

Our ordinary experience deeply contradicts this idea. When feeling admiration or contempt for someone, for example, we experience not only a particular bodily state, but one or more qualities of the person we are interacting with. In particular, emotions seem to be about the different value properties which can define people, events or states of affairs (De Monticelli 2003; Mulligan 2010 Scheler 1916). Goldie has drawn attention to the intentional aspect of affective states by claiming that, apart from bodily feelings, it is possible to speak of "feeling towards" (2000, p. 58), that is feelings directed at a variety of different objects[9]. Therefore, bodily feelings, rather than exhausting our emotional experience, would constitute only a particular form of it.

Furthermore, it is important to observe that in everyday emotional experience phenomenal properties do not seem to be separate from the intentional aspect of affective states. On the contrary, it is possible to claim that when we emotionally react to particular features of an object (for example, we experience fear in front of a ferocious dog), the "what it is like" (Nagel 1974) of our experience seems to be exactly the means by which the characteristics of the objects we are dealing with are appraised. As suggested by Goldie, emotions cannot be considered as neutral perceptions of particular properties accompanied by distinct bodily feelings (2002, p. 40). On the contrary, feelings themselves rather than merely coexisting with intentional states would have a peculiar intentional character, thus allowing for the rejection of an absolute distinction between phenomenal and intentional mental states (De Monticelli, Conni 2008).

Moreover, we experience a wide variety of feelings and not all of them can be equated with the bodily sensations previously described. Social emotions such as pride, shame, embarassment or admiration, for example, do feel in specific and distinct ways, but these feelings, although they can be combined with particular bodily sensations, seem to be different, and, to a certain extent, autonomous states.

In addition, as far as bodily feelings are concerned, it is possible to question the idea that they

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rejects the idea according to which the emergence of self-consciousness is dependent upon the mastery of particular uses of language (e.g. Baker 2000) and concepts and argues on the contrary that these capacities arise from a pre-verbal experience of the self. In accordance with investigations carried out in both Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind (Bermúdez 1998; Gallagher 2005), he believes that there is a form of self-awareness which is pre-linguistic in character and a further point of contact with the phenomenological perspective consists in the fact that both attribute to embodiment a central role in the constitution of this kind of consciousness.

[7] Damasio argues that emotions can take place also in absence of real bodily changes when an "as if body loop" process is realized at the neural level (2000, p. 281). This element, however, does not change the main claim of his theory, namely the idea that emotions are felt when there is a perception of bodily modifications, no matter whether these are real or not.

[8] Furthermore, the distinction between "emotions" as mere bodily modifications and "feelings" as the conscious perception of those bodily modifications is in itself highly counterintuitive. Indeed, when speaking of "emotions" we usually refer to conscious, rather than unconscious, affective experiences and we do not usually consider "feeling" and "emotion" as two distinct phenomena.

[9] As far as bodily feelings are concerned, however, Goldie argues that they are always directed at the body and that they can be about the world only by "borrowing" the intentionality of the "feelings towards" (Goldie 2000, p. 57). With reference to this point, I agree with Ratcliffe (2008, p. 35) in maintaining that the idea that bodily feelings cannot be world-directed is implausible from a phenomenological point of view, but I think that Goldie is right in claiming that not all intentional feelings are bodily feelings. By means of these experiences, indeed, we do not perceive only the conditions of the organism in a particular circumstance: rather, emotions and other affective reactions consist in the perception of different kinds of qualities which define various aspects of reality.

consist in the perception of the body as an object (Ratcliffe 2008). Indeed, from a phenomenological point of view, we can observe that, while in some cases we have an objectifying consciousness of our bodies, in most circumstances we are aware of them in a "pre-reflective" way (Gallagher, Zahavi 2008) and the background feelings described by Damasio usually convey an implicit awareness of the body as an experiencing subject rather than as an observed object.
In Damasio's perspective, despite the fact that affective intentionality is misunderstood, emotions are correctly seen as the basis of a rapid and implicit acknowledgement of the vital significance of a variety of situations. However, although this idea constitutes a fundamental step towards the recognition of the cognitive value of emotions, if not integrated with the consideration of the different kinds of significance emotions make us aware of, it still generates an incomplete account of first-personal affective phenomena. Thanks to emotions such as awe and contempt, pride and shame, we experience a series of qualities which seem not to be reducible to the biological value of the objects at issue. Things are worthy of admiration or blame, anger or disappointment because of a set of features which are independent of the fact that the circumstance is beneficial or detrimental to the organic equilibrium. Through the variety of affective states we have thus the possibility to experience qualities, such as the moral and aesthetic ones, that cannot be identified with the biological impact of the situation. Although he differentiates between primary and secondary emotions, Damasio seems to ignore this distinction. In his opinion, secondary emotions distinguish themselves from primary emotions by virtue of the nature – learned and not genetically pre-determined – of their inducers and the role played by conscious thought in their formation. It seems to me, however, that this distinction regards only the different processes which give rise to emotions and not their qualitative/intentional difference[10].
Since the stimuli of secondary emotions acquire their function of inducers because of their being associated with the stimuli of primary emotions, there is no substantial difference between the two phenomena. Indeed, like primary emotional states, secondary emotions are determined by the vital value of particular circumstances, and the fact that they can be accompanied by a conscious cognitive evaluation doesn't change the evaluative dimension they refer to.
In my opinion, on the contrary, not only primary and secondary emotions differ from one another by virtue of their characteristic feeling (the "what it is like" of an emotion concerning the social world is not identical with the "what it is like" of non-social emotional reactions), but they are also directed at essentially different intentional objects[11].
Furthermore, as far as secondary emotions are concerned, Damasio conceives of evaluation and emotion as two distinct processes: evaluative beliefs and judgements can have emotional effects but they are different from the bodily modifications which constitute emotions. However, from a phenomenological perspective it is possible to claim that affective states are evaluative processes and emotion themselves should be seen as evaluations by means of which a direct perception of axiological properties takes place (De Monticelli 2003; Scheler 1916).

2.3. Passivity, responsibility and intersubjectivity

In Damasio's account, affects are considered as completely passive phenomena: being regarded as neurobiological processes, emotions and the relative feelings can only be viewed as involuntary, automatic phenomena which, once elicited, can hardly be controlled. However, also this idea can be

[10] Since, from a phenomenological point of view, it is not possible to consider qualitative aspects of emotions as separate from their intentional character, I am using the expression "qualitative/intentional" with reference to feelings which are directed at specific aspects of self, others and the world.
[11] Moreover, there is no substantial phenomenological evidence in support of the idea that secondary emotions can be considered as particular combinations of elements characteristic of primary emotions (such as peculiar facial expressions) and other distinct components. On the contrary, emotions manifest themselves as unitary phenomena which differ in virtue of their intentional objects and qualitative character and therefore, even though they could share some features with one another, emotions such as contempt and disgust, should be seen as essentially different phenomena.

questioned from a phenomenological point of view. Feelings do not seem to be absolutely passive: although they are not completely under voluntary control, it would be wrong to maintain that we do not have any role in their constitution. On the contrary, we can exert a great influence on the development of our emotional life, for example by concentrating our attention on some qualities rather than others or by establishing priority relations among our emotional concerns.
If affective states are not passively undergone and we can exert an active role in their constitution, then it is plausible that, at least to a certain extent, feelings could be educated, thus allowing us to respond to particular things, people and states of affairs with increasingly appropriate emotional reactions. In everyday life we can say for example that "we try to overcome fear" or that "we have learnt to get indignant" at something and sometimes, as time passes by, we become able to react in a more moderate way to the events which used to be the origin of negative emotions. It is by virtue of the role we feel we play in our affective education that we tend to deem people as at least partially responsible for the feelings they have or haven't developed and from a phenomenological point of view, it is thus possible to maintain that affective sensitivity can be "extended" or "narrowed" (De Monticelli 2003). As observed by Goldie:

> *emotions can be educated; in bringing up a child we use the child's capability for emotional experience, and our own emotional responses, to educate him or her to recognize certain things as meriting a certain sort of emotional response. And, through this process of education, the child's responses can come to be both appropriate and proportionate (Goldie 2000, p. 48).*

Indeed, although some emotional reactions are completely involuntary, it is possible to take a position, even an affective one, towards our emotional responses, attributing or denying them a specific motivational role (Stein 1922). For example, when experiencing an emotion that we do not consider to be adequate, such as envy of a friend's success, we can prevent this state from provoking other negative emotions, trying to leave the affective "landscape" open to other positive emotions, such as joy or admiration for the friend's abilities. If emotional states were totally passive, there wouldn't be the possibility to go through this affective modulation and evolution.
However, it is possible to claim that, in the cases described by Damasio, an affective development concerning secondary emotions can take place. Nevertheless, it is important to note that in his account, at the level under consideration, it is a particular cognitive process that determines a set of physiological reactions, while, along with De Monticelli (2003) I suggest that, from a phenomenological point of view, a specific affective, rather than cognitive, maturation takes place. Beside judgements, also emotions can become more appropriate, thus resulting in our being able to respond to aspects of reality which were previously neutral from the affective point of view or to experience more adequate emotional reactions.
Finally, I would like to examine an aspect of Damasio's theory which I consider of a primary importance for the intersubjective status of emotions. By defining emotions as complex sets of bodily reactions to specific environmental or internal conditions, he argues that these states can be the object of experimental observation, that is they can be publicly examined and measured from a third-person perspective. Feelings, on the other hand, would consist in the subject's conscious perception of the emotion, namely a first-person experience which, in Damasio's opinion, is private and can be acknowledged only by the subject himself. Therefore, he maintains that only the bodily modifications that constitute the emotion are directly observable while the presence of feelings should be deduced from verbal reports and by means of analogies with the observer's own experience. In his opinion, then, there would be a radical separation between what is public and accessible from a third-person perspective and what is private and accessible only from a first-person perspective.

The capacity to understand the experience of others, that is the capacity to attribute mental states, is a primary philosophical issue and the approach adopted by Damasio with reference to this point is still characterized by some "cartesian" elements. In his view (2000), indeed, we directly experience only the body of other people, namely the external manifestations and the bodily changes that can be scientifically investigated. The subjective component, the feeling itself, is completely hidden and its existence is to be inferred on the basis of some relevant circumstances. Therefore, although central to Damasio's position is the acknowledgment of the relation which exists between mental and bodily phenomena, as far as their manifestation is concerned, these phenomena are considered as radically separate[12].

I believe, however, that the author's account is once again implausible in light of the structure of our first-person experience. In interpersonal relations, indeed, we do not have an exclusively indirect access to the emotional states of other people: on the contrary, we are able to perceive them directly. As suggested by Scheler, we do not perceive the blushing of a face as a mere cutaneous reaction that only subsequently, thanks to the subject's reports and the comprehension of the circumstances, can be associated with a particular emotion. Rather, in the blushing we immediately perceive shame as in a particular grimace we can perceive anger. The felt emotion and its expression should thus be considered as a unitary phenomenon rather than two distinct elements (Buck 1993; Scheler 1923). Cheerfulness and sadness, anger and tenderness are manifested by characteristic gestures and expressions and these phenomena, rather than being mere signs or symptoms, are an integral part of the affective state itself[13]. Thanks to these gestures and expressions, we directly perceive others' emotional reactions, namely we have an immediate access to their lived experience. The radical separation between emotion and feeling, which mirrors the separation between behaviour and consciousness, seems then inappropriate to account for the structure of our interpersonal relations and gives rise to unconvincing explanations of how we become conscious of the mental states of others.

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[12] "It is through feelings, which are inwardly directed and private, that emotions, which are outwardly directed and public, begin their impact on the mind [...]" (Damasio 2000, p. 36).

[13] This idea is not at odds with the acknowledgement of the importance of feelings in affective experience. As observed by Goldie: "One can easily allow the importance of feelings in emotion and emotional experience whilst at the same time responding to and defusing an unnecessary misunderstanding about the epistemology of others' emotions – a misunderstanding which, to summarize, goes something like this: an emotion *is* what one feels (false); only he can experience what he is feeling (true); so I cannot know what emotion he is feeling (false); all I can grasp are the expressions of the emotion he is feeling and these are only symptoms of the thing itself (false)" (Goldie 2000, pp. 184-185).

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HIGHER ORDER PERSONS: AN ONTOLOGICAL CHALLENGE?

abstract

The concepts of superindividual mind and superindividual person represent a double ontological challenge: in formal ontology, as higher order objects; in regional ontology, as minds and persons. I will discuss Stein's (1922) phenomenological description of common intentionality and her accounts of individual and superindividual personality and personhood in Social Ontology. Her argumentation is first to be proved within other phenomenological accounts, particulary in comparison with Husserl's concept of higher order person (Personalität höherer Ordnung), Scheler's total person (Gesamtperson) and Gallagher and Zahavi's philosophy of mind (2008). Finally I will try to compare it with Petitt's concept of group mind, stressing Stein's distinction between stream of consciosness and stream of experience and the way the latter is founded on the former.

keywords

Person; group mind; collective intentionality; social ontology; formal ontology; early phenomenology

In English we sometimes say that a group that acts as a whole does something *as one mind*: is this a way of speaking that is only *analogical* or is it also *ontological* justified? Can we speak phenomenologically about group minds, i.e. about groups *with their* own minds? Do groups have their own phenomenological mind, i.e. can we find, as members of a group, invariant structures of experience that are not reducible to the collection of our individual experiences? Can we further speak about superindividual persons as ontological persons, too?

Pettit argues that we can speak about group minds as "entities that are psychologically autonomous and that consitute institutional persons" in a way that "is consistent with a denial that our minds are subsumed in a higher form of *Geist* or in any variety of collective consciousness" (Pettit 2003). If we don't accept any higher form of *Geist*, if we fear that any form *of Phänomenologie des Geistes* necessarily denies individual values, we risk to overlook an interesting issue of phenomenology of the '20s. Therefore I will try to compare Stein's account with Pettit's one.

1. Stein's phenomenological description of common intentionality

Stein defines Geist as a structure of intentional acts: *Geist* relates in its broader sense to every intentional subject and to every intentional object. Acts are connected through nexes of motivation that can be implicit or explicit. These connections can be rational or irrational: one can be rationally or irrationally motivated to do, to think or to evaluate something. The concrete structures of these intentional connections are *ex parte subjecti* minds and *ex parte objecti* intentional objects. Stein describes the intentional structure of communal lived experience within Husserl's transcendental concept of intentionality, which is marked by four moments:

Constituted intentional unity of experience:

1. lived content (Noema)
2. lived experience (Noesis)

Constituting consciousness:

3. stream of consciousness (temporalizing)
4. reflection

We do live in everyday common experience with other people, we do have experiences with other persons: we do something with friends, we make decisions together, we have parties, we play something together and so on. Do these experiences have a particular intentional structure that simply overlaps

with individual ones or do they have new properties which don't coincide either with simple individual experiences nor with their sum? Stein argues that common intentionality is marked only by two moments: *Constituted* intentional unity of experience:

1. lived content of group experience (Noema)
2. lived experience of the group (Noesis),

whereas *constituting* consciousness is essentially individual: we can say that a community has grades of consciousness, but doing so we are speaking about properties of her members, not of the community as such (Stein 1922, p. 126). As we see, Stein agrees with Pettit who denies that group intentionality presupposes any variety of collective consciousness.

Stein points out the peculiar way that common intentionality is expressed in the formula *my intentionality as member of this group*. To be a member of a group and to act as a member of it doesn't need to feel like being a member of an *us*. I can act in an institution, I can follow its rules as a member of it without referring to any kind of *us*. To be bound to an *us* requires an emotional identification with the group that is not the key to understand every form of social group, only a very few of them. But what does it mean to live *as a member of* a group?

Stein defines the relation between communally lived experience and an individually lived one as a relation of *constitution*, not of *summation*. Individual contributions to community life are locked together in a unity of meaning and motivation that represents an experience structure of a higher order: no sum, but a new founded structure (Stein 1922, p. 130). We have to distinguish between the original *constituting* stream of consciousness and the *constituted* stream of experience. The former is essentially individual. Within individual mental life the stream of consciousness and the stream of experience are inseparable. Only through difficult trascendental reflection can one distinguish in one's mental life constituiting and constituted streams of consciousness. This distinction is of primary importance when we reach the level of community experience: here we see how a new stream of experience arises out of individual streams of consciousness. This new stream is marked by the fact that it is constituted by a plurality of individual subjects: it is constituted by individual lived experiences both in its contents and in its way of being experienced. What "the individual as member of the community experiences, constitutes the material upon which community experiences are built up. They belong to a higher constitution level than the individual ones" (Stein 1922, pp. 126-127).

The same experience can be lived in its meaning both as an individual and as a communal one: I can experience a political event as member of a party or as me as such, a familiar one as member of my family or as me as such, and so on. On the other hand, every community experience in its being lived experience is at the same time an individual one: it is me *as member* of this or that community, my experience *as member* of a community. Of course as one can be member of a plurality of communities one can live the same experience in very different perspectives: as an individual, as a friend, as a husband, as a member of a family, of a sport club and so on. Everyone can see what is meant, since everyday life is full of such partly discordant experiences: often our pratical decisions depend on the importance that we give to these different levels of experience.

To live *as member* of a group means of course that every lived experience of the group is an individual perspective of the whole stream of experience: this perspectival quality can't be given up. One cannot have a total community experience, one can have only a fulfilled individual perspective as member of a community. Scheler calls this essential character of social unities their nature of *not concludable totality* (Scheler 1966, p. 510).

Summarizing, Stein describes the way in which individual community experiences do fill in a superindividual stream of experience as follows: "To this stream belong all experiences that are constituted through individual ones, whose correlate are superindividual objects, matter of facts or matter of values, empirical or ideal objects, further all community statement on its world of objects and all pure inner experiences (i.e. not related to an extern object), that are common to a plurality of subjects" (Stein 1922, p. 149).

2. Stein's ontological description. Higher order personhood or higher order personality?

To be a member of a community involves experiences and decisions that are lived within a community point of view: we can say that a community has a *proper rational point of view*. Has a community as such a mind too? If we intend mind as both costituting and constituted consciousness we are not allowed to speak about group minds. If we accept the idea of mind distinguished from its stream of consciousness we could maybe speak about mind as Pettit does. But in order to make such a distinction we have to accept the idea that the field of embodied mind doesn't exhaust the whole personal life. Personal mind and life trascends the shape of bodily boundaries. The person has a new power upon her body, she can be the author of her life, she can mind it personally and can take responsibility. Gallagher and Zahavi distinguish between *sense of* ownership and *sense of* agency (Gallagher, Zahavi 2008, p. 161). I would like to distinguish a third sense of the self, the sense of authorship (De Monticelli 2008, p. 307): the experience or sense that I am the author of my actions and of my life.

Can we speak about a sense of authorship for communities? And what about responsibility? Stein is very clear: "The community as such is not a 'free' subject and it is therefore not 'responsible' in the way individuals are. Individuals have to take the last responsibility for the actions that they do in the name of the community" (Stein 1922, p. 174). The members of a community of free persons are co-responsible for each other, without exonerating each other from their individual responsibility: co-responsibility presupposes responsibility. Being a person means to be free: we can have a community of free persons, but not a free superperson. As constituting stream of consciousness, as individual reflection, freedom is essentially individual (i.e. personal), too: we can say that *spontaneity* as such belong essentially to the individual person.

It seems as if we should abdicate the aim of this paper: there seems to be no reason to speak about persons of higher order, since there are no subjects of higher order that are free: as Stein and De Monticelli point out personhood requires capability for freedom. But in phenomenology we find descriptions of superindividual subjects, personal communities and conceptualisations about kinds of superindividual persons: we can find, for example, Scheler's term *Gesamtperson*, Stein's *überindividuelle Persönlichkeit*, and Husserl's *Personalität höher Ordnung*.

Scheler's concept of *Gesamtperson* is presented as being opposed to the one of *Einzelperson*: both have *individuality*, both total and individual persons have *personality*. In Scheler's ontology, individual and total persons are put as persons *on the same ontological level*: they are both constituted centers of acts who are constituted by a "psychophysically indifferent" person. Individual and total persons are both intentional individualities as such. On the other hand, not every social unity is a total person: Scheler distinguishes four types of social unity: mass, life-community, society and total person. A mass has not an intentional structure: formally it is a connex (its connection can have both a causal nature – such as the ormons who lead social insects lives – and a collective intentional nature – such as masses of minded beings who are joined in attention to something that is capable of influencing every individual behaviour in the same way). A society has an intentional structure which is constituted through conscious social acts that are able to institute social entities (such as promise, law etc). Every society subscribes to an abstract rational point of view, which its members should obey. Both mass and society are formally not independent social unity, because they are founded on independent beings. Life-community and total persons are on the contrary independent social unities because they both have an autonomous intentional center of essential different acts (Scheler 1966, p. 516). On the other hand, total personhood means to be a "*unity of independent, rational individual persons 'in' an independent, rational total person*" (Scheler 1966, p. 533): Total persons are the highest form of social unities.

These are the outlines of Scheler's social ontology upon which Stein works out her community ontology. She profits from three distinctions that Husserl sketches in his formal ontology: the concept of objects of higher order, the conceptualisation of whole and part as pregnance and emergence, and the distinction between independent and non-independent objects (Husserl 1984). First of all, she makes a distinction between typical properties of the members of a community and their typical properties as members of

that community as such: it is a very simple distinction that can be clarified with an example. We usually refer in our serious or trivial speeches to typical national characters, such as the typical French one, the typical Italian and so on. These types of national member characters differ from what the same national members do as members of a nation as such: we could, for example, notice that typical members of a group do not usually act *as members* of it, but according to other reasons. It is only what the members of a community do *as members* of it that founds an intentional subject of higher order, i.e. an object of the same genus of the founding one that is founded in it and that cannot be imagined whitout this foundational relation. Such an object is an emergent object. Emergent objects do individuate their parts in a very peculiar way: these parts are called *pregnant proper parts*, because they are related and concretely connected to each other and individuated from the emergent whole. A member of a community has therefore some typical properties that members of that community usually have – proper part – and some founded and founding properties as members of that community as such – *pregnant proper part* (Conni 2005).

Within this formal ontological frame, Stein prepares a typology of communities that differs a little from Scheler's one. She notices that in everyday German language one usually speaks about the *Geist einer Gemeinschaft*: what does this words refers to? She claims that ascribing a *Geist* to a community "means more than leading an intentional life, i.e. to be open to an object-world, to face it in meaninngful acts. Moreover it means that this life shows a qualitative unity, it is formed out from a center into a cohesive one. To ascribe a [*Geist*] to a community means something anologous to ascribe personal character to an individual" (Stein 1922, p. 248). To ascribe a *Geist* to an individual or to a community means to recognize in their life a qualitative unity that informs their acts: I tend to call this kind of qualitative unity *personality*. Stein claims further that there are *independent* and *non-independent* personalities. To be an indipendent object means formally that we can imagine it in its peculiar properties without helping us with other external objects that provide it with properties it wouldn't have without them. Stein claims that there are personalities that are indipendent, i.e. that we couldn't face without finding other persons who are authors of their life. She claims that to have a personality one doesn't necessarily need to have sense of authorship: to be independent means to own a proper center of gravity, i.e. to live within one's own point of view. Stein also calls this center of gravity the *core* of the person. She claims that "it is principially possible that an individual lives completely within the rational point of view of a community or that a community lives within the rational point of view of another one. Yet we do have a cohesive whole with a unified quality, though it doesn't bear its own center of gravity, but is rather held up by something else" (Stein 1922, p. 248).

It is therefore possible to find personalities without core selves. How is it possible? Personhood means to be independent and capable of freedom and since personality is founded on it every person has personality (De Monticelli 2008, p. 308). Stein claims that this founding relation is unilateral and not bilateral. That means that we can find personalities that are necessarily founded in personhoods but that can be founded outside themselves since they have to be founded in personhood. We are now able to follow better these distinctions: every intentional unity that hasn't its own core needs to be founded on an independent one. We can have objective and subjective intentional unities. An example of an objective one is that of a landscape, which can be ascribed a kind of non-independent personality. On this objective non-independent personality (the landscape) can
be founded subjective non-independent personalities, such as mythological spirits who relate to particular landscapes. Examples of non-independent personality can be found in every good novel character: these personalities are not authors of themselves but are conceived in the imaginations of their authors.

We do have superindividual personalities that we ascribe to communities. Do they also have personhood? Stein claims that communities can lay claim to be *recognized* if they are founded in the core-self of individual persons. But although these superindividual personalities show a unified form they have no simple formation-root (*Bildungswurzel*) because their personal existence is grounded on the core of their

members. We can only speak of personhood of *higher* order as a superindividual person who is founded by personal acts of its members as members of it.

3. Conclusion

The concept of *higher order person* represents a double ontological challenge: in formal ontology, as higher order object; in regional ontology, as person. We can now try to answer to the original questions posed in this paper: we can speak ontologically about group minds if we face independent communities with own lived center of acts. We can call this lived center of acts *mind* if we accept that this mind has no stream of consciosness itself but only a stream of experience. It can exist as *plural mind* because as group mind it is founded on a plurality of embodied minds. Groups have their own phenomenological *plural mind* if they are independent entities.

We can speak ontologically about superindividual persons if we refer to personalities and if we accept the concept of personhood of higher order. This kind of personhood lives through the free persons who live as members of it. The persons who are essential for the superindividual personhood (and therefore for its personality) form its essential pregnant part that coincide with the totality of its members only in the supremum limit of the *idea* of community. These persons who are the essential pregnant part of the community are at the same time

bearers of its personality and the persons who are more responsible for it.

Through them as particular representative members of the community the community is itself responsible.

Finally we can say that group minds are "entities that are psychologically autonomous" only because of the fact that a superindividual psychological reality is only possible if its founding individuals are minded beings (Stein 1922, p. 267).

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WHAT DOES THE FALSE BELIEF TEST TEST?

abstract

The age at which children acquire the concept of belief is a subject of debate. Many scholars claim that children master beliefs when they are able to pass the false belief test, around their fourth year of life. However, recent experiments show that children implicitly attribute beliefs even earlier. The dispute does not only concern the empirical issue of discovering children's early cognitive abilities. It also depends on the kind of capacities that we associate to the very concept. I claim that concept possession must be understood in terms of the gradual development of the abilities that underlie the concept in question. I also claim that the last step to possess the concept of belief requires children to understand how beliefs and desires are used in everyday explanations of people's actions. Thus, I suggest that understanding folk psychology as an explanatory theory is what children lack when they fail the false belief test.

keywords

Belief; false belief test; theory of mind; social cognition; folk psychology

1. Introduction: implicit and explicit attribution of beliefs in infancy

The age at which children acquire the concept of belief is a subject of debate. Until recently, psychologists have relied for evidence on a standard procedure, the *false belief test* (FBT). In the classical version of FBT, the *location change* task (Wimmer & Perner 1983; Baron-Cohen, Leslie & Frith 1985), a child is presented with a scene in which a puppet puts an object in a box and leaves the room to play. While the puppet is away, another character moves the object from the box to another place. When the puppet returns, the child is asked: "Where will the puppet look for the [object]?". If the child points to the box, this demonstrates the ability to consider the puppet's belief about the object's old position as opposed to relying on his or her own knowledge of its real position.

Extended research showed that children younger than four perform very poorly on several versions of the test[1]. Not only do they often fail but their scores are rarely above chance (Wellman, Cross & Watson 2001; Wellman & Liu 2004; Milligan, Astington & Dack 2007). We know that this result does not depend on the complexity of the test's linguistic presentation[2]. Thus, empirical research highlights younger children's inability to consider others' point of view. Many have hence argued that children lack the concept of belief before they are able to pass FBT.

Nevertheless, recent data collected through violation of expectancy, gaze-monitoring and other methods challenge this conclusion. Surian, Caldi & Sperber (2007), for instance, found that 13-month infants formed different expectations about a puppet's future behaviour depending on whether the puppet had previously seen a desired object being put beyond a screen. Therefore, those infants apparently understand the puppet's knowledge or ignorance about the object's location. Other studies (Onishi & Baillargeon 2005; Southgate, Senju & Csibra 2007) show that children's looking time anticipates the right answer in FBT already around the second year of life[3]. Thus, it is argued, children have an *implicit* understanding of belief attribution much earlier than age four. Finally, the same phenomenon has been found using experimental tasks requiring more active choices (Buttelmann,

[1] Besides the location change task, different version of FBT are the u*nexpected content* task (Hogrefe, Wimmer & Perner 1986; Perner, Leekam & Wimmer 1987; Gopnik & Astington 1988), the *hide and retrieve* task (Fodor 1992; Bloom & German 2000), and the *unexpected-identity* task (Gopnik & Astington 1988).

[2] Children's performance does not improve if they are asked about where the puppet will look for the object, or where it will say, or think, or know that the object is (Wellman *et al.* 2001). Several studies also show that methods to elicit non-linguistic answers from children do not improve the test's outcome (e.g., de Villiers & Pyers 2002; de Villiers & de Villiers 2000; Wellman, Hollander & Schult 1996).

[3] Clements & Perner (1994) already found that, but the exposition of their methodology was unclear and biased further research (see de Villiers & de Villiers 2003).

Carpenter & Tomasello 2009). A growing body of empirical evidence hence strongly suggests that children younger than four are already sensitive to others' beliefs although this ability is not manifested in all the contexts in which one would expect it. It appears that, before being able to pass FBT, children have at least an *implicit* understanding of others' beliefs.
In this article, I resolve this apparent inconsistency in the empirical data by contending that the question about the age when children acquire the concept of belief concerns a theoretical, not only an empirical, question: which minimal capacities are necessary to possess a concept? I will claim that children do not generally acquire concepts at once, but that they gradually master them as they acquire various abilities connected to the concepts themselves. Thus, the empirical results that indicate the implicit understanding of others' beliefs may demonstrate only a preliminary, partial possession of the concept of belief, a concept that must be present in a more mature form in order to pass explicit false belief tests. I will argue that the final step in the acquisition of this concept requires children to understand how beliefs and desires are used in everyday explanations of people's actions. Thus, I will suggest, it is the lack of competence in folk psychological explanation that prevents children from passing FBT. I will provide empirical evidence supporting this view.

2. Possessing the concept of belief: empirical and theoretical issues

The debate hinges on whether children's implicit belief attribution ability is a case of genuine belief attribution. This is at the same time both an empirical and a theoretical matter. Although the studies just reviewed show that children younger than four already have an implicit understanding of others' beliefs, they do not clarify whether infants already possess the *concept* of belief. Some claim that this is indeed the case. These theorists argue that children's failure on FBT reflects only a performance limitation, which makes it difficult to manifest their competence in reasoning about beliefs in more complex situations (Fodor 1992; Bloom & German 2000). As I will argue below, these theorists are committed to a *minimalist* conception of belief attribution.
Others claim that children only possess the concept of belief when they pass FBT. According to them, children's sensitivity to others' beliefs does not demonstrate the possession of the concept of belief, because the relevant competence is so restricted. We are entitled to credit children with the concept of belief only when they show the general ability to make explicit predictions about others' behaviour. Call this a *maximalist* conception of belief attribution.
Note that, despite the empirical opposition between the minimalist and the maximalist conception of belief attribution, they share a common theoretical presupposition, viz., that a concept is defined by a set of properties. Accordingly, concept possession is thought about in terms of all-or-nothing conditions: someone possesses a concept if and only if she is endowed with a particular set of abilities. The debate then concerns whether we are entitled to attribute the concept in question to beings manifesting just a subset of these abilities.
However, the view that concept identity is subject to necessary and sufficient conditions has been widely opposed in both the philosophical (Wittgenstein 1953; Putnam 1975) and the psychological (Rosch 1975) literature. Since the work of Wittgenstein and Quine, philosophers are inclined to think that there are no analytical truths that define a concept[4]. It follows that we neither must expect there is a predefined set of abilities the manifestation of which ensures that one has any particular concept. Instead, the abilities manifesting the possession of a concept are progressively expanded in their domain of possible applications. We may say that each of these improvements reflects a better possession of a concept, but that none of these steps alone marks the acquisition of the ability. Concept possession is a matter of degree.
This conclusion helps to solve the debate about the age when children acquire the concept of belief. The question as it was posed at the beginning of this article is seen to be ill-formed: there is no precise

[4] For a discussion of the problems connected with the traditional theory of concepts see, for example, Fodor (1998, cc. 3-4), and Laurence & Margolis (1999).

age at which children acquire any concept; *a fortiori*, there is no age when children acquire the concept of belief. However, the question acquires a new meaning once that concept possession is seen along the lines of ability development. Indeed, if concept possession is a matter of degree, it becomes important clarifying (i) which are the relevant abilities for manifesting the possession of the concept of belief, and (ii) how and when they are learned, so that the concept itself is gradually mastered. Providing a full list of relevant abilities is beyond the scope of this article. Roughly, the list should include, among the others, infants' early abilities to intentionally interpret others' behaviour (Gergely, Nádasdy, Csibra & Bíró 1995), infants' early abilities to participate in joint attention exchanges (Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne & Moll 2005), as well as the early capacities usually associated with implicit false belief attribution. Herein, I want just to claim that the last ability manifesting the acquisition of the concept of belief will be that of mastering belief attribution not only to predict people's behaviour, but also to explain it. This is a linguistic capacity, and it requires children to master what is usually called common sense, or folk psychology, that is, the theory, which is implicit in common talk about mental concepts, relating reasoning about different mental states.

Now, several abilities are required to master folk psychology as an explanatory practice. On the one hand, children need to understand the syntactic structure of mental verbs, i.e., the fact that mental verbs take sentences (i.e., that-clauses) as their complement[5]. On the other hand, children need to evolve their understanding of the complex network of relations between different mental verbs. Such a task is complicated by the fact that children do not encounter folk psychology all at once, but that they must reconstruct it from their participation in folk psychological narratives (Bruner 1990; Hutto 2008). Limited narrative ability means that children cannot learn to distinguish the functional meaning of different kinds of mental verbs (e.g., thinking as opposed to desiring verbs) in their third year (Rakoczy & Tomasello 2009). If passing FBT were connected to possessing the ability not just to predict, but also to explain others' beliefs, then it would stand to a reason that children cannot pass FBT before they were able to perceive subtle differences between mental state verbs with respect to their role in the explanation of behaviour. In the next section, I will claim that this is indeed the case.

3. What does the false belief test test?

In the previous section, I have claimed that possessing the concept of belief is a gradual achievement. The final ability in the relevant suite of abilities constitutive of the possession of this concept, I have claimed, is the ability to use belief attribution in folk psychological explanation. I want now to argue that it is specifically children's lack of a proper explanation of the puppet's behaviour that prevents them from passing FBT before age four. Indeed, in FBT children are explicitly required by verbal interrogation to deliberate about the puppet's behaviour. In many versions of the test, children are asked to justify their prediction, unmotivated results being scored as random answers. But even when no explicit justification is required, deliberating requires one to be able to support her conclusions. Therefore, children try to produce a prediction they can justify in conversational exchange.

Here is the impasse, for until age four, children do not master folk psychology as an explanatory theory. Of course, they are able to provide explanations based on the status of the world. Such explanations may be sufficient to explain successful behaviours. However, in FBT, children need to know how beliefs justify behaviour even when behaviour is unsuccessful. Until they lack a general theory about rational agents' behaviour, they are not able to do that. Thus, in the absence of contrasting reasons, what better justification than reality[6]? The only justification they may accept for the puppet's behaviour brings them to a wrong prediction. On the other hand, once they master folk

[5] This ability has been demonstrated to be related to children's performance on FBT (de Villiers & Pyers 2002; de Villiers 2005).
[6] This effect has been somewhere called the "curse of knowledge" (Birch & Bloom 2007). Herein, I am not suggesting that children lack the ability to detach from reality in their predictions. Indeed, they have pretty good predictive capacities, as experiments on implicit belief attribution show. What they lack is an explanation for their own predictive capacities.

psychology as an explanatory theory, alternative explanations are available; consequently, children even attempt alternative predictions.
My proposal is consistent with those accounts according to which children's failure in FBT must be imputed to their lack of linguistic competence (Astington & Baird 2005; Miller 2006; Milligan *et al.* 2007). However, it advances the deeper explanatory hypothesis that it is a lack of explanatory power, rather than some more direct linguistic inability, that explains children's failures on the test. If this is correct, we should find that children's performance in psychological explanations is predictive of their ability to pass the test. In particular, it should not be the case that children can provide reliable psychological explanation without being able to pass it. This is an empirical claim that can be easily tested.
An analysis of empirical research in explanatory versions of FBT leads to some *prima facie* conflicting, but nonetheless in the end consistent results. First, let us examine what is apparently contrary evidence. Bartsch & Wellman (1989) found that children' explanatory competence is antecedent to the time when children can pass FBT. Nonetheless, their methodology is questionable with many respects. First, they prompted mental explanations by appropriate questioning when subjects' initial answers did not provide them. Only 39 out of the 79 collected explanations based on false belief attribution were not prompted. However, it is dubious that prompting had no effect on the ratio of mental explanations. Second, they were excessively well-disposed towards children in assessing good responses. Responses like "Because she wants to" including no reference to the object of the desire were scored as correct explanations in terms of belief-desire reasoning. Finally, children's mental explanations were unbalanced towards desires (30% of the unprompted answers) as opposed to beliefs (18% of the unprompted answers)[7].
Batsch and Wellman's result is also odd when compared with much literature finding exactly the opposite. For instance, Moses and Flawell (1990) presented three-year-old children with location change scenario. They report that only 3% of children's explanations invoked the character's false belief as the cause of her action; instead, children usually made reference either to the character's desire, or to the outcome of the situation. Similarly, Wellman *et al.* (1996) analysed children's performance in explanatory versions of FBT with the help of thought bubbles. They found that four- but not three-year-olds were able to provide explanations to their answers. Also Wimmer and Mayringer (1998) contrasted children's performance on predictive and explanatory false belief tasks and found that the latter was as just as difficult as the former. They concluded that children do not understand the causal link between misleading informational conditions, epistemic states, and resulting actions. Finally, Atance & O'Neill (2004) reported that only rarely three-and-half-year-olds referred to false beliefs in an explanatory version of an unexpected content task.
Therefore, it seems that children are unable to provide explanations of people's actions until they pass FBT. This supports my claim that FBT does not tap children's general ability to attribute beliefs, but only their more specific capacity to support belief attribution with reliable psychological explanations. Of course, the results provided are not by themselves sufficient to demonstrate such a claim. However, that no negative evidence has been provided already constitutes a positive hint to drive future investigation.

4. Conclusions

In this paper, I have argued that explaining children's acquisition of the concept of belief requires clarifying our hidden assumptions about concept possession. Now, in the same way as we usually lack definitions to characterise concepts in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions, we also lack criteria to sharply define concept possession, which is better understood in terms of the gradual development of those abilities that possessing a particular concept provides.
If concept acquisition is interpreted as gradual, empirical evidence coming from studies on infants in their second year of life shows that they already possess a minimal concept of belief. However, I have

[7] A similar analysis is also compatible with Bartsch, Campbell & Troseth (2007), although their method to prompt answers was more ecologically valid.

pointed out that the final step to possess the concept of belief requires children to understand how beliefs and desires are used in everyday explanations of people's actions. And I have suggested that it is the lack of this last capacity which prevents children from passing FBT before age four: when children are explicitly asked to predict the puppet's future behaviour, they feel engaged in a conversational practice, and they respond according to the reasons they may provide to support their prediction. But understanding the right reasons for unsuccessful behaviour is a complex task, which is mastered only in the fourth year. Acquiring it expands children's predictive abilities beyond the limit of contextual interpretation of people's actions. A review of the empirical literature about children's ability to pass explanatory versions of FBT supported this interpretation[8].

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ACTION, EMOTION AND EMBODIMENT IN EMPATHIC RESPONSES

abstract

In the perspective of a study of emotions and mind in adaptive and naturalized terms, the analysis of empathic phenomena assumes a peculiar significance. Putting together neuroscience and philosophy, nowadays it is possible to analyze the neurobiological substrate of empathy and to conceptually redefine empathy. We will talk about some philosophical reflections on empathy and then we will stress that, as in some philosophical theories, recent brain imaging studies reveal the existence of multiple areas (and so, multiple levels) involved in empathic responses: limbic areas for the emotional resonance; motor areas and sensory areas for sensorimotor resonance; prefrontal areas to assess the social status of others, and parietal areas to adopt the others intentional point of view and for the self/other distinction. A detailed analysis of empirical data has led us to show how the same 'mirroring' metaphor is used for two different phenomena. However, it is possible to throw a bridge between the different types of empathic responses (motor or emotional ones). Then, we will focus on some theoretical points to provide a contribution about empathy, a topic that often is still considered an enigma for sciences of mind and behavior.

keywords

Empathy; intersubjectivity; motor theory; embodiment

Introduction

The analysis of empathic phenomena assumes a great significance for the study of emotions and mind in adaptive and thus naturalized terms. This subject has been the center of a long philosophical debate. Recently empathy studies crossed the borders of philosophical research to become a subject of experimental investigation. In particular empirical evidence from psychology and neuroscience was achieved in the theory of motor resonance and in the perception-action model. We are convinced that it is of great heuristic value to approach this subject both by neuroscience research and philosophical theories, because in this way it becomes possible to analyze and interpret the neurobiological substrate of the empathic phenomenon and to conceptually redefine empathy.
Therefore, we will focus on the possible interaction between a phenomenological perspective and the progresses of neuroscience as also Gallagher and Zahavi proposed in their *The Phenomenological Mind* (2008). Within this framework we will both try to interpret some neuroscientific evidence in the light of the phenomenological theories and to modify the theories about empathic mechanisms using the results achieved by cognitive neuroscience.

1. Philosophical considerations about empathic mechanisms

Theodor Lipps (1903) claims that empathy is a fundamental concept in the theory of aesthetics, and he defines it as a process through which we relive ourselves within the observed object. Moreover, Lipps affirms that when we put ourselves in the other's shoes, for example when we observe a tightrope walker moving on the wire, we are able to understand his/her intentions and emotions. This understanding is relieved through our bodies and our feelings.
Max Scheler (1923) describes the differences between the various ways of "feel with others" (*Mitgefühl*). He distinguishes both "sympathy", namely the sharing of feelings, the emotional contagion, and "unipathy" (*Einsfühlung*) namely the identification with the other, from "empathy" (*Einfühlung*), which is defined as feeling the other's feelings. According to Scheler the self/other distinction seems to be one of the basic characteristics that distinguishes empathy from other forms of "feel with the other".
Edmund Husserl (1931, 1952) suggests that, by nature, we are intersubjectively open to others. According to him, the intersubjective experience should be conceived as an empathic experience in which we consciously ascribe to the other intentional acts and feelings, putting in its clothes. The opening of subjectivity is made possible because of physical, sensorial and perceptual similarities with the other seen as *Leib* (Husserl distinguishes between *Körper* , the physical structure, and *Leib*, the

component that is experientially based in our living body). The first step to take the point of view of others is a passive one and it is followed by the voluntary (intentional) act of imaginative thinking. For an accurate analysis, see Petit (2004 and also 1999).
The disciple of Husserl, Edith Stein (1917), focuses on the act of "fusion" of different points of view needed in empathy, but pointed out that, to really understand the other, it is crucial to maintain a self/other distinction: empathy presupposes *alterity*. Stein describes empathy as a way to access the other in its wholeness; it represents the condition of possibility of all the feelings and the many forms of understanding others. It is also interesting to note that the alterity becomes, according to Stein and Scheler, a constitutive element of the empathic feeling. [On this topic, see Gallagher and Zahavi (2009, p. 284) when they say that it is not an imperfection: the difference between the access in the first person to the own experience and the access to the experience of the other is constitutive].

2. A brief review of the most recent neuroscientific data about resonance phenomena

Leaving aside for a moment the theoretical argument concerning the theory of mind and theory of simulation as different explanations of empathy (see, also in this case, Gallagher and Zahavi 2009), we want to summarize some of the principal recent studies of brain imaging on empathy. It is important to underline that those studies reveal the existence of multiple areas involved in the empathic response:

- limbic areas (the anterior cingulate cortex and the anterior insula, Singer *et al.* 2004; de Vignemont and Singer 2006, Carr *et al.* 2003) for the emotional resonance;
- motor areas (premotor cortex and, in general, the mirror neurons' circuit, Di Pellegrino *et al.* 1992; Rizzolatti and colleagues in the last twenty years, Wicker *et al.* 2003) and sensory areas (somatosensory cortex; Bufalari *et al.* 2007; Avenanti *et al.* 2005) for sensorimotor resonance (e.g. especially the supporters of the perception-action model, Preston and de Waal 2002, and the motor theory of empathy, Leslie *et al.* 2004, Carr *et al.* 2003, Meltzoff and Decety 2003).
- prefrontal areas (ventromedial prefrontal cortex, Damasio 2003) involved in assessing the social status of others, and parietal areas, active in adopting the intentional point of view of others (Decety 2004) and for the self/other distinction (Bachoud-Levi and Degos 2004).

A detailed analysis of empirical data provided to date by neuroimaging has led to show how the same metaphor that of mirroring is used for two different phenomena that involve the activation of different neural networks: the one a motor network, the other an emotional network (Galloni 2009). However, the results of Avenanti and colleagues (2005, Bufalari *et al.* 2007) indicate that in the mechanism for empathic pain there is the activation of motor components but also fine-grained somatic responses. Avenanti and colleagues, both using transcranial magnetic stimulation (Avenanti *et al.* 2005) and somatosensory-evoked potentials (Bufalari *et al.* 2007), found that motor components and also fine-grained somatic responses (also in the primary somatosensory cortex) are involved in the empathic mechanism for pain. They suggest the existence "of a pain resonance system that extracts basic sensory aspects of the model's painful experience [...] and maps them onto the observer's motor system according to topographic rules" (Avenanti *et al.* 2005, p. 958). Therefore, it seems that both the affective and the sensorimotor areas of the so-called "pain matrix" (a neural network crucially involved in pain experience, Melzack 1999) are activated in an automatic and unconscious way in empathic response. This mechanism, which they named "sensorimotor" or "somatomotor contagion", seems to throw a bridge between the two types of empathy – motor and emotional – mentioned above.

3. A multi-levels account

Therefore we tried to attempt a contribution towards the explanation of the empathic feeling, with a neurophilosophical formulation of the different levels of empathic-like and empathic-based mechanisms, starting from low-levels (see Galloni 2009). We can now briefly analyse this stratified approach.
At the lower level, following the formulations of Preston and de Waal, we talk about the emotional contagion, which consists of a total and immediate identification with the feelings of the other and that is an unconscious and automatic phenomenon, and it provides an identity of emotional state between

perceiving and perceived subject, without any inhibition in the repetition of emotional matching (think about the crying of babies in a nursery). The sensorimotor-emotional resonance, similar to Scheler's unipathy, differs from the emotional contagion because the state is not duplicated but only simulated; it is a phenomenon that is based on mirror mechanisms and a network that implies limbic areas, premotor but also sensory areas that communicate using both anatomical pathways, such as the field of dysgranular insula (e.g. Carr *et al.* 2003, p. 5497), and functional ones, such as the hypothesis of gamma-band frequencies (Lutz *et al.* 2004). Then there is the genuine empathy, which requires, in addition to what listed in previous levels, the intentional self/other distinction, made possible by the involvement of proprioceptive information (Decety 2004, see also Gallagher and Zahavi, when they speak in relation to the sense of agency, p. 252) and parietal areas (Bachoud-Levi and Degos 2004).
At a further step, we place what is called social empathy, or the pragmatic application of empathy, our inclination to relieve the suffering of others. It is probably made possible by the contribution of the ventromedial prefrontal areas mentioned by Damasio (2003); it requires the self/other distinction but state matching is not necessary. We are not saying that it is an explanation for the ethical domain, but it may be a precondition of it (e.g. de Waal and Thompson 2005, p. 49). Finally, there is cognitive empathy, or perspective-taking, which is a representation of the mental and emotional states of others in which the perceiver is not identified, he doesn't "resonate" with the other. Classically it can be considered as the main level on which the supporters of the theory of mind operate.
Therefore, empathy is only a level among all the resonance phenomena, and it is a conscious bodily experience of other's feelings.

4. Commenting The Phenomenological Mind

Now, going on to observe the way in which Gallagher and Zahavi addressed this issue in their text *The Phenomenological Mind*, we cannot but agree with the fact that phenomenology has much to say about the explanation of social cognition, intersubjectivity. We have seen that adopting some phenomenological theories we have been able to interpret more deeply the latest neuroscientific results, especially to articulate the mirroring phenomenon in different levels.
The reading makes clear, however, some thoughts and clarifications to do, that we would like to briefly set out. First, we have to notice that often, when we talk about the neurobiological basis of the resonance, mirror neurons are mentioned (Gallagher and Zahavi 2009, p. 269). This is not entirely correct because, as we saw in the previous discussion, in the case of empathy there is not properly an activation of mirror neurons. It is not therefore the neural premotor area but the functional mechanism (a direct "resonance" mechanism) discovered through mirror neurons that is really interesting for an explanation of empathy.
Furthermore, trying to understand what constitutes the phenomenon of the simulation, Gallagher and Zahavi discuss quite correctly that it is part of an intersubjective perception (p. 272), but a little later they state that we are not active during the social experience of other's feeling or intentions, the other is doing something to us (p. 274). So while it is correct that this is a perceptual event, we are not in agreement with the fact that the interpretation of the authors seems to assume the idea that the perceiving subject is a passive one in relation to that event. Both from a theoretical and experimental point of view, the idea of a passive perception now seems meaningless, and in other points of the discussion the authors show to be totally convinced of that, stating, for example, that we perceive in a pragmatic way (p. 152). Another point we would like to raise is in relation to the existence of various levels of intersubjective understanding. As we have seen, it is our belief that empathy is indeed one of the possible ways in which we understand what the other feels, an intermediate level among the different constructs we have listed. Gallagher and Zahavi say that this account is problematic if you intend to take a phenomenological point of view, since it is likely to distinguish a perceptual stage and a cognitive one. So we would clarify that when we speak about a "level" what we mean is a slightly different phenomenon in which there is something (as a specific neural activity) that is not added later

than usual on the lower level, but there is something that is added or subtracted *during* that specific phenomenon (for example, think about empathy, that – in addition to the mechanisms involved in the previous levels – requires the self/other intentional distinction). The act of understanding is a joint act, because our cognitive system is integrated, and because – as previously stated – the very act of seeing the expressive movement of others leads us to understand its meaning, without any inference.

5. Conclusion

In conclusion, we hope that such an approach, that aims to connect more and more the philosophy of mind in general and phenomenology in particular to the cognitive sciences, will be increasingly followed and that the communication between these disciplines will be highly fertile. Still today in experimental sciences it is difficult for researchers to understand what might be the true and proper role of the phenomenological point of view, and the text of Gallagher and Zahavi is certainly useful in this direction. On the other hand, philosophers often are unfamiliar with the experimental literature, and often they use the same data just in a descriptive way, not arriving to a true interpretation of a class of experimental data and neurological disorders. We are trying to cross this bridge. We firmly believe it is indeed the only way to get a deeper understanding of cognitive functions.

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LANGUAGE AS EMBODIMENT

abstract

The paper traces the particular quality of human existence as linguistic embodied existence. In asking whether language is like body, it spells out what linguistic experience entails and what kind of picture results from this analysis as grounding the "person" (following Gallagher & Zahavi's definition) in space/time/body and language. Understanding linguistic existence as embodied existence also facilitates an argument against a representationalist view of language. Nietzsche's concern is taken up and analyzed: Does the self-reflexivity resulting from linguistic experience threaten individuality? Against his pessimistic conclusion, the article suggests to see language as enabling the individual agent-self.

keywords

Embodiment; language; Nietszche; social ontology; Descartes

In the following paper I would like to contribute to the discussion of contemporary phenomenology by presenting some thoughts on linguistic existence as experienced existence. In particular, I want to address the question whether existence in language is embodied existence. As creatures of language, we are constituted, surrounded and limited in our existence by language. Is language then like body?
I will propose and discuss the thesis that both our embodied and linguistic nature enables a specific form of experienced self. First, I give in brief the premises and definitions of the terms I am using. I review what the embodiment argument argues, critically examine it and spell out what experience of and experience in language entails. Next, I pursue some phenomenological and logical implications of my thesis, some differences and some similarities of language and body. Then I briefly address Nietzsche's worry that the ability of self-reflection is merely an effect of the herd and that it threatens the strong, autonomous individual. Finally, I close with some remarks on methodological individualism[1].

1. General terms and conditions

What Self are we talking about?
For the purposes of making sense of the self, there are different levels of self to be distinguished and these are referred to differently in different analyses. There is one sense of the social self which can be found quite independently of a linguistic structure, for example in hierarchical social structures of ape-groups (DeWaal 1982). There is another sense of the social self by which the self is constituted through intentional agency (Korsgaard 2009). In contrast to these notions, what I have in mind and what I would like to investigate is a sense of self that intentional agency *presupposes*.
I am here concerned with the negotiation between the pre-intentional experience of self and the experience of the narration of self (as they are relevant for individual intentional agency). Gallagher and Zahavi suggest calling this aspect of the self "person" (Gallagher & Zahavi 2008). The perceptions of self-experience and self-narration align with the distinction between the first-person perspective of experience and the mediation of this experience in language according to which the linguistic realm is

[1] This article was first presented as an introduction to a discussion at the Milano Winter School of 2010 that was very fruitful and I thank all the participants for their comments. The material is part of an ongoing research project entitled "The Leap into Language - The Constitution of the Social Self between pre-intentional Background and self-reflexive Cogito" and will function as position paper for this project. I thought it best to retain the broad strokes of the argument to give an overview over some of the basic positions and main theses I am pursuing with this project. This article has been completed with the support of the DAAD in cooperation with the Maison de Sciences de l'Homme. I thank both institutions for a research stipend in Paris that made my work possible.

the realm of third person accessible descriptions, the publicly shared realm of language[2].

Language/Body as Medium

There is an understanding of language, body and self whereby language and body are *media* giving the self access to the world. According to this view, the world is always mediated through sense-perceptions and the sensible ordering of propositional or quasi-linguistic categories that allow us to understand our perceptions as apperceptions[3]. I believe this view falls prey to a homunculus fallacy. It is easy to see this fallacy first with regard to the body:

It is clearly wrong to think that there is a kind of "tiny person" inside the body, steering this body and being responsible for organizing the perceptions of the body, rendering them meaningful. The body is not the medium of the tiny self, for her expressions or conations. What we describe while describing a "self" is according to Hume not an extra-entity (Hume 2007). Yet, even though Hume is right in that there is no discrete experience of the self as entity, the self is present in all other experiences. Most minimally it describes a unified field of consciousness. One could say that being a rational agent is like having a distinct perspective. Several perspectives are available to describe different levels of self. The capacity to reason and a net of recognition cast over past experiences and future aspirations are added to the "perspectival self" to enable agency in the full sense of the word. Most animals and humans share at least the perspective of self as embodied unity capable of consciousness and intentional actions. Humans are capable of the additional perspective of rational agency that ties their experiences and enables their specific forms of action. So, body, like language, is not analogous to a medium for an agent-self, but rather constitutes a perspective available to the agent.

Rejecting the "body/language as medium"-analogy on grounds of the homunculus fallacy forms the blueprint for an argument against a representationalist view of language and an argument for a pragmatic semantics. A pragmatic semantics allows us to see language not as an image or a representation of the world inside the head of the speaker. There is no tiny person "in the head" receiving perceptions of the world as linguistic representations and constructing an image of the world from these instructions. A pragmatic semantics sees language as a way of acting in the world (Grice 1989; Meggle 1997; Kobow 2009). It is a way of acting in the world of meaning that we share and constitute with others.

Embodied linguistic experience is not like having a map of noun-phrase type affordances (bees)[4], it creates not just a social space of relations and group hierarchies (primates), but delivers us into a world constructed and shaped by deontic relations.

2. The embodiment argument revisited & what language entails

Where is Descartes? (or rather: where he is not)

I take the embodiment argument to have originated as a critique of Cartesian Dualism. It is true that Descartes is looking from nowhere when he states that the structure of thinking/doubting is the least and last certainty, failing to see that there can be no thoughts from nowhere, but instead that the thought always brings with it coordinates of time and place, of body and of language. I leave aside the question whether thought can only be linguistically structured. Let me stress that most categories of perception, agency and understanding depend upon the existence in a world of deontic relations, created collectively with others, which is constituted linguistically. It is not that thought has to be linguistic in its form, but rather that the structure of contingency (whether linguistic or corporal) gives actual shape (content) to the empty capacity for thought as background-given.

The embodiment-debate considers different kinds of intentionality. Dreyfus claims that there is motor versus brain intentionality. He cites the example of playing tennis or piano, and he emphasizes the

[2] My position sets itself apart from Sartre's distinction of en-soi and pour-soi that describes different modes of the first person perspective from the third person point of view; see Sartre.

[3] For a critique of this view see also Burge 2010.

[4] Tyler Burge detailed this position (based on his 2010 publication) in the Jean-Nicod Lectures 2010 in Paris.

importance of corporeal skills and memories as constitutive of a special kind of intentionality, one that is not in one's brain, but instead in one's body. I take it to be an idle question though to ask what "organ" stimulated which response. Ultimately, the real problem is not where intentionality originated, but how we can conceptually overcome Cartesian Dualism. That is: how can we theoretically bridge the gap between body and mind? There is a related dualism manifest in the schism between first person experiences and mediation of these experiences in language. If the dualism body/mind is confined to the individual, the dualism experience/language broadens the view for an analysis of the connection between the individual and the world of others.

What does "linguistic" experience and existence entail?
Sometimes language is considered to be the default, or the most basic, or the most primordial means for translating experiences into the realm of the shared, the narrated, the described. Two questions arise:

Are experiences describable?
This question points towards the general question of translatability. A tentative "yes" could be the answer if one considers that "translation" or "paraphrase" never encompasses the notion sameness, but rather difference. "Losing" or "gaining" in translation means just that. Beholding a translation then describes a process that is different from the experience of the original or the original experience, but is in itself to be experienced (as translation, and as new original experience). Translations can be understood analogously to communicative attempts. Understanding signs as non-naturally meaningful, as communicatively meaningfully ordered, is the foundation for cultural cognition, the basis of pooling knowledge in a community and transmitting it from individual to individual (Tomasello 1999).

What is the experience of language?
Language is to be experienced in itself; it is part of our cultural background: that is, the pre-intentional realm where our biological capacities, inclinations, abilities are spelled out culturally; for example, the ability to learn a language is occupied by a mother tongue. The occurrence of cultural specification is arbitrary. Yet, it is experienced as naturalized. The experience of language is naturalized in this way. Thus, we are embodied in a body and in a language necessarily, but at the same time contingently. Our language is not a biological given (though our capacity to learn a language is), but culturally shaped. That is, in being linguistically embodied, we are necessarily linked to the cultural world surrounding us. We are also bound to accept the phenomenological and logical entailments of this linguistic existence:

3. Some phenomeno-logical implications

Body - Contingency - Language
The phenomenological implications of my thesis that our embodied and linguistic nature enables a sense of self facilitate a re-structuring of the different components of the self in relation to world and others. Here is the new picture: the body delineates the individual, it enables an experience of ownership and agency via the experience of bodily movement in a space perceived as external; contingency carries the coordinates of place and time where place and body are not the same; body affords experiencing the core-self, place grounds this experience as taking place in an external reality; time is largely a category shaped through collectively structured facts – we have an understanding of time because we are agents and we are always acting in the world as culturally constituted world (rarely with brute force in brute reality); language is the component that grants us access to this largest part of reality that we shape with others, that makes up our world.
Let me lastly remark on the fact that the term "self" in a language-philosophical analysis always shows up as a term indicating a relation. That something can be described as "self" is due to the fact that there are "others"; this relates not only to the bodily self in a space that is perceived as external, it relates also to "self" as opposed to other consciousness with which reality has to be negotiated and shared.

Indexicality - Generality - Strong Altruism

Another logical entailment of linguistic structure is the understanding of indexicality, generality and strong (non-moral) altruism. I follow Searle in his analysis of the consequence of the indexicality of statements concerning my-self (Searle 2001). It is much like Nietzsche predicts: the need to self-ascribe and self-describe comes from my need to communicate and leads to recognition of "the herd" (Nietzsche 1990). This, in turn, leads to the abstraction and grasping of the concept of linguistic generality (what goes for me also goes for you), and lastly results in a logical requirement of strong altruism. It is not only a thing of preference or fairness to see that I and you alike should be bound by the truth-requirement of statements, but it is instead a logical and thereby theoretical syllogism that binds me to this truth-requirement; and this is due to the fact that I as an agent-self am constituted via participation in collectively constituted facts (Searle 2009).

Thus, the phenomenological and logical implications of language-shaped existence come to mind when one considers the role of self-reflection. Recognizing these implications is, in a way, of no consequence since it does not change our ontological make-up. In this way, I think Pascal's dictum of customs being our nature does not, as frequently assumed, indicate that we have no nature (and are therefore free to chose), but instead that we are essentially, ontologically linked to the historical givens of our existence. It remains to be seen whether and how self-reflexivity plays a real role in our actions.

What does it mean to be able to understand the indexicality of "me" as abstraction with the consequence that "me" can be the same for you, pointing to the ownership and agency of bodily experiences, leading to a structural understanding of self and of linguistic generality that entails the logical necessity of strong altruism? This is Nietzsche's worry:

4. Nietzsche's worry about becoming self-conscious

What is Nietzsche worried about?

Nietzsche is worried about becoming self-conscious because he sees it as a direct consequence of our biological nature as gregarious animals (Nietzsche 1990). Interestingly, he analyses self-consciousness as resulting from our need to communicate. This in turn results from our weakness as individual beings who need the help and assistance of the herd to survive. Nietzsche would have much preferred the individual to be the solitary beast of prey. He sees human autonomy and intellectual freedom threatened by the communicative, the non-individual, the conventional sign.

(Logical) Problems inherent in the analysis

There is, of course, as Nietzsche himself is aware, a logical problem with his position. He argues against the foundations of his own writing. He himself is only and necessarily the result of the hated herd, his own writing is incessantly self-referential and self-analytical. The language that he uses like the great soloist his instrument is only the result of the need for communication and so refined because of the necessity and utility of "truth" and "introspection" for the herd. Nietzsche maintains that the translation into the third person perspective of language threatens the ipseity and singular genius of individual experience.

Taking his analysis seriously (Getting rid of self consciousness)

Generally, I agree with Nietzsche's analysis. Yet, I think that his conclusion is flawed because he insists on an evaluation of the analysis of language and self-consciousness as threatening the individual. Where Nietzsche begins paragraph 354 on a hopeful note, stating that we are now in a position to shed self-consciousness as we understand its origin, he lets go of this threat and by the end of the text anticipates the downfall of mankind due to its inability to see beyond the "herd" and its biological utilitarianism. That we should need the others is the biggest insult for Nietzsche.

Vs. Nietzsche: Existence in Language as Enabling

Nietzsche evidently regards the translation of experience into language as a second order phenomenon, one that is necessitated and effected by our need for others and for communication. And he laments this generalization as making something unique flat, general and dull. But of course one can also understand the making describable of experiences as an enabling process. Nietzsche would have to agree that we cannot be who we are without introspection, recognition of our ontological make-up and without language, without others, without communication and without self-consciousness.

The solitary beast of prey never developed a language and a system of collectively constituted meanings, nor did most gregarious animals. That we are who we are is biologically motivated, it is due to our creature-nature and it is also necessarily determined by our existence in a contingent circumstance. All of these facts are given. I suggest seeing them as enabling rather than disabling for their interpretation is, like the interpretation of all facts, entirely up to us.

5. Concluding remarks: a disclaimer for methodological individualism & evaluation of results

Worth the trouble? Keeping Methodological Individualism as Premise

In my research, I am analyzing texts that have the premise of Methodological Individualism as a common denominator and a starting point. I think that the Cartesian tradition delivers us to this premise. But why bother?

Methodological Individualism can be understood as the position that all agency, including collective endeavors and group actions, bottoms out in individual mental states; that there is nothing but individual mental states that constitute and motivate individuals, groups and their actions[5].

I suggest abiding by Methodological Individualism because it is necessary for obtaining "meaningful" coherence with the analysis of data (for example, data from the neurosciences): it is only at this level of explanation that "meaning" can enter the picture. Meaning links the individual's perceived values and motivating desire-independent reasons to the world of deontic relations that it constitutes with others, a world that enables most (if not all) agency in the full sense for the individual. Methodological Individualism is theoretically necessary to explain the constitutive power of linguistic structure for the individual. In this respect my insistence both on Methodological Individualism and on the analysis of linguistic structure is *formally* much like the justification of doing phenomenology for the philosophy of mind. Both times a level of explanation is added that is deemed irreplaceable for a coherent understanding of the phenomenon. If language is as body constitutive of the experienced self, Methodological individualism indicates how an experience of self is important for any notion of agency.

Evaluation of Results

I hope to have demonstrated that an analysis of language analogous to body not only

- leads to a clearer differentiation of the make-up of the self as logically implying the self's interest in the world of the others as necessity, and
- leads to an understanding of the self as being individuated through a body, manifested at a time-place, and constituted through language.

I hope to have also outlined how understanding linguistic existence as embodied enables us

- to see the homunculus fallacy in the representationalist view of language,
- to question the primacy of experience (as opposed to narration of self) not only on the level of epistemic facts, but rather on a theoretical level where it concerns the self as agent-self, and
- to reread Nietzsche's pessimistic conclusion in a positive way where language (and consciousness through language) is an enabling structure for the agent-self.

[5] Some problems arise with explaining unintended fall-out consequences, non-agentive functions of collectively constituted facts (such as, for example, systemic discrimination, inflation or man-made natural disasters). Another problem is the analysis of group-think, that is, group-wants that are contrary to each of the group members' individual preferences, where agents behave and argue differently (giving explanations of their behavior and arriving at decisions to act) because they "think on behalf" of their group. I think both of these problems can be overcome.

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PERCEIVING SUBJECT AND SOCIAL COGNITION. REMARKS FROM ADOLF REINACH, SHAUN GALLAGHER AND DAN ZAHAVI

abstract

This paper deals with what Shaun Gallagher and Dan Zahavi call "the social cognition" from the chapter How we know others in their book The Phenomenological Mind *(Gallagher, Zahavi 2008), and what Adolf Reinach calls the "extraneous perception" in his university course* Einleitung in die Philosophie *(Reinach 1913) – that is, the possibility of intersubjectivity, according to these authors. My objective is to show how Gallagher and Zahavi's analyses could profit from that of Reinach. I find that Reinach's study could provide a particular heuristic value to Gallagher and Zahavi's work, by furnishing it with a useful tool to clear up some issues which, in my opinion, remain rather vague. The first part of this article is devoted to outlining Gallagher and Zahavi's thesis about how we know others, clarifying which points of their analyses could be cleared up by Reinach's study; the second part presents Reinach's arguments concerning the perception of the other subject; and finally, I will explain how Reinach's analysis contributes to that of Gallagher and Zahavi's work and remark on what accessing to others' mental state from the second-person perspective by combining the two positions means.*

keywords

Phenomenology; philosophy of mind; intersubjectivity; perception

PERCEIVING SUBJECT AND SOCIAL COGNITION. REMARKS FROM ADOLF REINACH, SHAUN GALLAGHER AND DAN ZAHAVI

1. Deepen "How we know others"

Gallagher and Zahavi's *The Phenomenological Mind* is a very interesting effort to outline the most important topics concerning the philosophy of mind, cognitive science and phenomenology. According to the authors, cognitive science and philosophy of mind require comparing their interpretation of neural, sub-personal processes to their phenomenological and experiential face, as "we will not get very far in giving a scientific account of the relationship between consciousness and the brain unless we have a clear conception of what it is that we are trying to relate to" (Gallagher and Zahavi 2008, p. 9). On this point, they state that the phenomenological analysis allows for understanding the neurological data in agreement with the correspondent experiences. The authors then set a problem of "access" – the object (experience, psychological state) is the same, but the access to it is different, and only an access to the experience from the first-person perspective (direct) can guarantee the right interpretation of data which comes from an access to the experience from a third-person perspective. Therefore, the claim of Gallagher and Zahavi is to show that "these phenomenological-based theoretical accounts and descriptions can complement and inform ongoing work in the cognitive sciences" (*ibid.*, p. 10).

Each chapter of Gallagher and Zahavi's textbook is focused on a particular theme. In this article I will outline the 9th chapter of their book, *How we know others*, and I will attempt to link Reinach's analysis to the former's work. The chapter *How we know others* (*ibid.*, pp. 171-256) deals with the problem of access to the others' experiences from the second-person perspective. We could divide it into three parts: a first part, in which Gallagher and Zahavi provide an interpretation of social cognition using neurological data; then, a phenomenological part, devoted to reinforcing their interpretation on this aspect of one's experience; and finally, a part where they deal with intersubjectivity from a genetic, pragmatic and socio-cultural standpoint. I will focus on this third part here.

After having interpreted neurological data about social cognition as a particular kind of perception (*empathy*), refusing any theory-theory of mind and simulation theory of mind, Gallagher and Zahavi pose the question – "how can we explain the abilities that we have for our direct perception of the intentions and meanings of the others?" (*ibid.*, p. 187). Gallagher and Zahavi identify three intersubjective capabilities which appear at different moments in the development of the child: primary intersubjectivity (*corresponding to empathy*), which enables a person to grasp the lived body and expressions; secondary intersubjectivity, which is the ability to perceive other phenomena of expression in pragmatic contexts; and narrative competency, which allows to comprehend other's

"attitudes and responses as whole situated persons" (*ibid*, p. 194) and requires a cultural and social dimension.
Gallagher and Zahavi state that empathy is not enough to result in an inclusive theory of social cognition. Empathy constitutes the basis of access to others, but it cannot entirely justify social cognition.
Gallagher and Zahavi describe primary intersubjectivity as follows:

> *From early infancy, humans [...] have capabilities for an interaction with others that [...] are precisely the capacities [...] to directly perceive the intentions and meanings of others. [...] Infants [...] are able to see bodily movement as goal-directed intentional movement, and to perceive other persons as agents. [...] The infant follows the other person's [...] body movements as meaningful, goal-directed movements(ibid., p. 188).*

Gallagher and Zahavi, then, present the secondary intersubjectivity:

> *Our understanding of the actions of others is guided by the most relevant pragmatic (intentional, goal-oriented) level [...], we see actions as meaningful in the context of the physical and inter-subjective environment. If, in the vicinity of a loose board, I see you reach for a hammer and nail, I know what your intentions are as much from the hammer, nail, and loose board as from anything that I observe about your bodily expression or postulate in your mind. We interpret the actions of others in terms of their goals and intentions set in contextualized situations [...]. [...] Our perception of the other persons, as another agent, is [...] of an agent in a pragmatic context that throws light on the intentions (or possible intentions) of that agent (ibid., p. 190).*

Thus, empathy gains access to the other mind, and it is able to "see bodily movement as goal-directed intentional movement, and to perceive other persons as agents", however it is not enough to be able to throw "light on the intentions (or possible intentions) of that agent". Here, we must comprehend the pragmatic context.
The question I would ask concerns what does one grasp by empathy if one also needs a pragmatic context in order to "interpret the action of the others in terms of their goals and intentions".
Gallagher and Zahavi show "the asymmetry between the first-person and the second- (and third-) person access to psychological states" (*ibid*., p. 185), it being clear that "we never have direct access to another person's mind" (*ibid*., p. 182). They explain that indirect access doesn't imply more or less certainty in perceiving others' mental states, but only a constitutive difference to be respected and maintained. Nevertheless, I find their analysis vague in clarifying what one experiences when one accesses experiences from the second-person perspective. I will attempt to show how Reinach's analysis could be reactivated here in order to clarify this point.

2. Adolf Reinach's phenomenological analysis about how we "perceive" others

During his university course *Einleitung in die Philosophie* (Reinach 1913, pp. 369-512), held in the summer semester of 1913, Adolf Reinach discussed the fundamental phenomenological problems and then, dealt with how the subject grasps "extraneous psychical experiences" (*ibid*., p. 389) – how one accesses others' psychological states.
Concerning my article, this means that Reinach only deals with the first step of a theory of intersubjectivity and stops at the threshold of the second one. We should note that Reinach and Gallagher and Zahavi use different words to denote the same phenomenon – Reinach speaks of "I" (or "subject"), "extraneous psychical experience" and "perception", while Gallagher and Zahavi speak of "person", and "first and second person". I will mainly use Gallagher and Zahavi's lexicon.
Furthermore, I will only focus on a part of Reinach's highly detailed analysis – the answer to "the question about the structure of the act, namely, extraneous perception analysis" (*ibid*., p. 390).

According to Reinach, the analysis of the perception of extraneous psychical experience shows that:

a. "The extraneous experience has its self-appearance" (ibid., p. 391);

b. "It does not need feelings of sympathy to be present for my part" (ibid.);

c. "Extraneous experiences cannot be grasped as directly as one's own experiences" (ibid.).

To understand point a., one has to consider the pages devoted by Reinach to "the philosophical problematic of the external perception" (*ibid*., pp. 372-382) in his course. In these, we find a clear treatment of the differences between the intentionally represented object and the intentionally perceived object, which can be the same, however, the former cannot appear on its own, while the perceptual object can:

> *We follow the transition from representation to perception. The represented [das Vergegenwärtigte] is supposed to be real and offers itself to me on its own in perception. This self-appearance is essential. 1. Self-appearance has to be sharply separated from the features of the object concerned. 2. Self-appearance is also not to be confused with liveliness or difference of intensity. 3. Self-appearance must also be separated from the existence of the object in any sense [...]. 4. Self-appearance has no degrees. There is no more or less self-appearance. [...] Self-givenness is something that comes last, not to analyze further (ibid., pp. 374-375).*

The first difference between these two intentional experiences lies in the way of givenness of certain phenomena – perception gives phenomena which appear *by* themselves, whereas, representation gives phenomena through a further mental operation which set them before the subject. Representing phenomena, therefore, means grasping them mediately, while perceiving them means grasping them immediately. The self-appearance of a phenomena means: these phenomena appear *as* such, e.g., they cannot be discomposed into something else; on *their* own, e.g. without any representation; and as "something last", because one cannot further analyze them without altering them as *those* phenomena. Therefore, point a. of Reinach's analysis of extraneous perception implies one really perceives extraneous experiences and does not grasp a body in order to imagine a psychical life in it afterwards. If one person perceived sadness in someone, it would not represent it in a body, but it would perceive someone's actual sadness as such.

For b., it suffices to observe that extraneous experiences need not be transmitted to the subject in order to be perceived. At first, one person grasps sadness in someone else, but she doesn't feel its sadness consecutively.

In point c., the most important one, Reinach shows how one person accesses others' experiences. By observation "extraneous experiences cannot be grasped as directly as one's own experiences", Reinach means extraneous experiences are directly grasped, but in a different way from one's own experiences. In order to correctly understand what Reinach suggests here, it is opportune to quote the whole passage at issue:

> *The opposition between extraneousness and ownership of the experiences is here exchanged with the opposition between the mediateness [Mittelbarkeit] and immediateness [Unmittelbarkeit] of their grasp. I grasp the extraneous sadness through something (gestures and the like), but like a self-given. The extraneous experience appears in something other, through something other- indirect self-appearance, mediated through physical. But there is no inference here (ibid., p. 392).*

Most likely, "ownership" points to what "the I" belongs to, the "I-affiliation" (*ibid*., p. 382), then its own experiences; the extraneous ones are denoted by the "extraneousness"; "mediateness" and "immediateness" probably mean the way of grasping.

In order to understand whether the perceiving subject grasps extraneous experiences mediately or not, Reinach emphasizes an "exchange" between the first two terms and the second one. The perceiving subject grasps extraneous sadness *mediately*, but does not mediate extraneous sadness appearance, that

is, it does not represent the extraneous sadness. The other person's sadness is given through gestures (mediately), *but* also self-appears in them. Reinach's example shows that the extraneous sadness does not appear as if it were represented (mediately) by the subject to whom it appears, but rather self-appears in the extraneous body gestures (mediately). In fact, "there is no inference", no "mediateness [...] of their grasp" – no mental operation, which adds something to a simple perception.
Extraneous experience self-appears *as* such, *by* itself, but (one could say) *not* "in" itself, namely, indirectly, so that one perceives the extraneous body shining through the extraneous sadness.
Moreover, Reinach tries to further clarify the experience of the access to another person. He does this by recounting a gripping analogy:

> *The case of the indirect givenness of extraneous experiences can be [...] compared to the grasp of meaning by (and through) hearing words [...]. Perhaps with a foreign language, words and meaning are two different things, not in one's own language. Here, words also appear to us as grounds [Anhaltspunkte], but I do not comprehend them as such, rather, I am directly wrapped up in their meaning [gehe direkt in ihrer Bedeutung auf]. We have a 'symbol-appearance' in both cases: through the word the meaning is grasped. But through direct pointedness to meaning, there is no sense in distinguishing between self-appearance and alien-appearance [Fremderscheinung] (symbol-appearance), as also through extraneous experiences (ibid., p. 392).*

Reinach shows that extraneous experiences self-appear, as well as a meaning, and that the perceiving subject grasps them as meaningful in a meaningful body. The extraneous body, as well as a word, expresses extraneous experiences as well as a meaning.
One person accesses the extraneous experiences if, and only if, they perceive symbols, that is, something different from the "psychical" – the "physical". This kind of perception is then a peculiar one because of the indirect appearance of its object.
Reinach's analogy refers as much to two different kinds of objects, as to two completely different experiences – perception and understanding hearing (*Vernehmen*)[1]: The first directly aims at given objects, while the second aims at them by receptively taking in meanings, which are only given by expression. The first requires the self-appearance of the object and can be intuitively fulfilled, while the second requires no intuition-based presence of the object. Using this analogy, Reinach points to the way of the givenness of these intentional objects – both self-appear by alien-appearing. Phenomenologically, the extraneous gestures are symbols (grounds) which allow something else to appear. When one perceives someone's experience, one grasps his experience without representing what is taking place by his gestures. According to Reinach, then, the extraneous psychical experience appears as such and on its own, however "*in the flesh*" (reversing the actual meaning of the phrase), because one could only gain access to it through something physical.
Therefore, "being-wrapped-up-in" the extraneous experiences can only happen through its body. It implies no emotional involvement, but rather, it describes how a person intentionally grasps others' experiences. The "being-wrapped-up-in" clarifies that a person perceives, *at first*, its object as a subject, and *only then*, *can* she perceive the body as if it were lacking in psychical life. As well, one grasps the meaning in the word before grasping the phonetic complex.
In Reinach's phenomenological analysis, eventually, symbol (either words or gestures) appearance "disappears" "behind" what they give (either meanings or experiences), when one's intentionality is aimed at the last ones. Besides intentionality, what allows the extraneous psychical experience to appear is the extraneous body itself. Therefore, the extraneous body is not experienced as a normal body, but as a peculiar one, which, following Reinach's analogy, lets something meaningful (alien) appear: a psychical life.

[1] In order to better understand this kind of act Cfr., Adolf Reinach 1911, pp. 315-376, especially p. 373, n. 11.

In his analysis, Reinach doesn't further stress what the alien-appearance of other's experience implies. He concludes only stating that:

> *Even though we cannot see experiences (as well as a human being has never heard a meaning, but has grasped it through words), then extraneous experiences are directly grasped through physical expression-appearance (symbolic self-appearance of extraneous experiences). So, we actually comprehend [auffassen] extraneous states which we had no representation of before (ibid., p. 392).*

3. Experience and second-person perspective

I find that Reinach's phenomenological analysis and that of Gallagher and Zahavi's could, taken together, be much more meaningful regarding the passage from primary to secondary intersubjectivity. According to Reinach extraneous experiences self-appear by alien-appearing. Gallagher and Zahavi assume that one person grasps the other experience from the second-person perspective. By putting both of the descriptions together, one could say that extraneous experience self-appears from the second-person perspective by alien-appearing. This "confusion" shows the phenomenological difference in the structure of the appearance of the extraneous experience. Therefore, one might say that the appearance of the other persons' experience is "forbidden" because one cannot access it in the first-person perspective, however, it is also "exposed" because experiences shine through a body and one can perceive them.

I would like to go deeper into what this "forbidden exposition" allows access to and Reinach's example of sadness and his analogy between meaning and extraneous experiences will lead my concluding arguments.

In agreement with Reinach's definition of intentionality, as "the relation of the experience [...] to any object" (*ibid*., p. 383), and with that of experience as "experience the content" (*ibid*., p. 393), Reinach speaks about the "*über*" (*ibid*., p. 383) of the sadness, which points to what sadness is aiming at (its content). By feeling sadness, then, one aims at something (this feeling content) which is felt as sad. Reinach's theory of meaning presents the same structure (Reinach 1913, pp. 419-421). By saying "sadness", one aims at this feeling, by experiencing the meaning "sadness", as content of this experience; one only grasps its object and the correlative content by a given expression; the grasp happens without any intuition of the aimed object. By perceiving extraneous sadness, one grasps it intuitively, but one cannot grasp "further features" together with its sadness – what *its* sadness aims at is not given. In fact, either one already knows something about it or one has to ask to know about it. "The I" perceives an experience which self-appears without showing its content directly as well as, by saying "sadness", one is blind regarding what he's referring to – in both cases there is a lack of intuition. Consequently, even if "the I" perceived the other person's intentional object and actually grasped her experience, it would not grasp the experience "content" – that is, the other person's experiences self-appearance does not allow *their* intentional relation to an object to appear by symbols. An experience without experience, if experience means "experience of the content", or better, an experience which accesses the psychological states from the second-person perspective. This is the actual difference between the first-person and the second-person perspective. One can grasp symbols which have meanings, but these meanings have no intuitive relations to their objects, therefore, one needs to grasp the meaningful expressions of the extraneous experiences in a particular, pragmatic context.

The "forbidden exposition" describes the access to others' experience in terms of appearance of experience without the content experienced. Then, by saying extraneous experiences self-appear by alien-appearing one understands why one needs to develop pragmatic abilities in order to actually know others' expressions and actions.

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CONSCIOUSNESS, EGO, ALTERITY: CROSSING OF NEUROSCIENCE AND PHENOMENOLOGY?

abstract

The paper aims at comparing the recent findings of neurosciences with the phenomenological approach as regards the multifaceted relationship between self as consciousness and self as subjectivity. Phenomenology, thanks to the careful consideration of the issues concerning the constitution of mental life, offers a precious chance to set the scientific results in an authentically philosophical outlook.

keywords

Self-Identity; time consciousness; reflection; sociality

As Gallagher and Zahavi explain in Chapter 3 of their analytic study, consciousness always involves the moment of self-consciousness, which has "to be understood as an *intrinsic* feature of the primary experience" (Gallagher and Zahavi 2008, p. 53). This character of internality means that self-consciousness is given prior to the reflection upon it: for this reason, the authors rightly stress its *pre*-reflective mark. This givenness is worth investigating, considering that the fact that self-consciousness precedes any observation or inference one can address to it doesn't entail that one is not able to be aware of it, but rather that one can be *immediately* aware of it. According to Goldman quoted in the text, it is "a non-reflective self-awareness" (Gallagher and Zahavi, 2008, p. 51).

Thus "pre-reflective" signifies a peculiar givenness of this inner feature of the primary experience, because "prior to reflection" doesn't mean "prior to consciousness", albeit the consciousness' domain is implicitly referred to the reflective one, but it indicates an original possession of myself by myself, a possession that I *feel* before knowing it, just to reflect on it (Gallagher and Zahavi 2008, p. 49).

In one of his previous studies on these issues, Dan Zahavi has clearly stressed the relevance and the complexity of the relation between the pre-reflective level and the reflective one: since both share the dimension of consciousness as a location of their development, they improve a peculiar form of interdependency.

This in turn is not symmetric, because "the act of reflection is itself a prereflectively self-given act", and for this reason it "must also already be prereflectively self-aware, since it is this that permits it to recognize the reflected act as belonging to the same subjectivity as it*self*" (Zahavi 1999, p. 56). The question of the reference of the reflecting act to its pre-reflective root is of basic importance from a phenomenological standpoint, because it deals not only with the essence of the method, but also with the status of Ego as performer of such a method. If one identifies the egological level *only* with the reflective one, it becomes hard to affirm that the pre-reflective sphere is *self*-aware: how is it possible to talk about a self, which is in turn not an I? But on the other hand, if one attributes the egological trait both to the reflective and to the pre-reflective consciousness' grade, it is possible to question not only the legitimacy, but also the necessity of something like the phenomenological method: why should I carry on a reflection on myself, if I am self-aware already as *pre*-reflecting?

To exit from this antinomy, one has to come back to the fundamental distinction Gallagher and Zahavi make between *feeling* and *knowing*, where the latter only is linked to the authentically egological

level of self-aware (the one of the method), while the former describes the *immediate* experience of self: "When I am aware of a current pain, perception, or thought, the experience in question is given immediately, non-inferentially, and non-criterially as *mine*"; it means that "I am usually able to respond immediately, i.e. without inference or observation, if somebody asks me what I have been doing, or thinking, or seeing, or feeling immediately prior to the question" (Gallagher and Zahavi 2008, p. 54). The central mark of the pre-reflective self-awareness is thus its present occurring, which involves simultaneity of experiencing (perceiving, being in pain, thinking) and being aware of it.
If I cannot doubt a self as mine when I am *currently* experiencing something I am living *now*, because *I feel* prior to knowing that *I* am experiencing, what happens to past experiences? If to the question "are you in pain?", i.e. "are you as your-self in pain?", I am able to answer *immediately* "Yes, I am – as my-self", since I am simultaneously feeling in pain, can I show the same confidence to the answer "Are you – as your-self – the one *who was* in pain?"? In this case I am not feeling in pain, but I should remember to have been in pain, and so I should *know* that I as my-self I am the same who was before in pain and remembers it now, and that the pain was and is always *mine*. From where does this knowledge derive? Which is its legitimacy, considering that it lacks the grounding trait of immediacy? The question is linked to the last, which has elapsed between the experienced pain and the remembered one, and so such a question must find a solution related to its temporal mark.
The difficulty which remains, in any case, open is the following: where, i.e. in which point of self-consciousness, is there something like becoming Ego? In order to try to point out a possible answer to such an intricate matter, one can joint the phenomenological standpoint on this fundamental issue to some recent neuroscientist approaches, relying upon the fruitful interconnection between both accounts.
Antonio Damasio, among others, has stressed this constantly developing state of self, which roots in her temporal constitution: "What is happening to us *now* is, in fact, happening to a concept of self based on the past, including the past that was current only a moment ago. *At each moment* the state of self is constructed, from the ground up" (Damasio 2005, p. 240, second emphasis mine). This construction is not isolated from its experience context rather it is based upon precisely this context, which constitutes its living environment. According to Damasio, this environment consists of two different and reciprocal sets, the object and the organism which responds to the object, both producing specific images; the self as subject refers to these two sides of the same living experience, but it doesn't identify with nor reduce to that or the other, since "subjectivity emerges during the latter step when the brain is producing not just images of an object, not just images of organism responses to the object, but a third kind of image, that of an organism in the act of perceiving and responding to an object" (Damasio 2005, pp. 242-243). Thus subjectivity arises in the meeting point between object and experience of the object, and this point corresponding to the encounter of consciousness with something else means the authentic appearance of Ego; phenomenologically speaking, "we also focus on the *subjective* side of consciousness, thereby becoming aware of our subjective accomplishments and of the intentionality that is at play. If we want to understand how physical objects, mathematical models, chemical processes, social relations, or cultural artefacts can appear as they do, with the meaning they have, then we need to examine the experiencing subject to whom they appear" (Gallagher and Zahavi 2008, p. 25).
The temporal trait, which animates this subjective coming out, constitutes for Damasio a sort of autobiography, "a combination of memories of the past and of the planned future" (Damasio 2005, p. 239)[1], and links up with the *bodily* side of experience, which represents the "basic", i.e. "grounding"

[1] This autobiographical trait contributing to the formation of self-identity is emphasized, among others, by Daniel Schacter, who points out the fact that "Psychologists have come to recognize that the complex mixtures of personal knowledge that we retain about the past are woven together to form life stories and personal myths. These are the biographies of self that provide narrative continuity between past and future – a set of memories that form the core of personal identity. [...] [That fact] underlies our trust in autobiographical memory as a basis for self-understanding" (Schacter 1996, pp. 93 and 101). See also Gallagher and Zahavi (2008), in particular pp. 200-202.

reference of self. Upon this basis the self is able to recollect her history which is developed until that moment, and this recollection takes place mainly as a nonverbal though narrative way, which uses "the elementary representational tools of the sensory and motor systems in space and time" (Damasio 2005, p. 243). Despite his stated disagreement with Gerald Edelman's point of view due to the greater emphasis put on the primary consciousness, Damasio acknowledges, recalling the assertions by Edelman himself and Giulio Tononi[2], that the "language may not be the source of the self, but it certainly is the source of the 'I'" (Damasio 2005, p. 243. See also Chomsky 1980, pp. 185-216).

As a linguistic being, the Ego is ready to *communicate* her personal states, which means that the passage from the pre-reflection to self-consciousness as I-consciousness is characterized by the openness to an alterity and therefore by the becoming a social consciousness. Husserl himself has clearly expressed the gradual transition from a pure egological sphere to a complete intersubjective world, via body (see Husserl 1989, pp. 103-230; Husserl 1999, p. 108 ff.). This involves the impossibility to conceive an isolated subject, a subject without relation with other subjects, but it involves nevertheless the necessity to start from a *first*-person account of mental life, in order not to fall in a solipsistic circle, but rather to enable talking *also* about subjects *other* than me: "When Husserl realized this, he abandoned his nonegological theory. Every conscious experience, even an anonymous one, belongs to a subject, i.e., either to me or to somebody else. It cannot belong to nobody" (Zahavi 1999, p. 143). As he asserts this research perspective, reaffirmed in his recent work (see Gallagher and Zahavi 2008, pp. 40-41), Zahavi also recalls the same position expressed by Eduard Marbach in his analytical comment to the problem of I in Husserl (Marbach 1974)[3].

To consider the environment which determines the process of experience of an I-consciousness implies going forward to talk about the *social* context where this experience is always communicated, tested, discussed, objected or acknowledged. The public characteristic of the subjective cognition as inborn part of the growth of consciousness is not something that occurs from the outside, but is an *intrinsic* feature of the phenomenon of becoming Ego[4], i.e. of becoming a person. As such, this improvement starts from the beginning of one's mental life, namely from the birth of individual consciousness (see Merleau-Ponty 1962). For this reason, the discourse about self-consciousness both in its pre-reflective and reflective levels involves always a speech about the others, with regard to the *first* steps of subjective growth: "While we cannot say when the 'true subject' starts, we can be sure that, from the birth, the baby is constructing his or her own 'scenes' via primary consciousness and that these scenes rapidly begin to be accompanied by the refurbishment of concepts through gesture, speech, and language. From the earliest times, the thought that accompanies language and that flowers with its development is likely to be metaphorical and narrative. [...] According to this picture, internalism and externalism are too extreme – components of both play major roles in subjective development" (Edelman and Tononi 2000, p. 198). It is possible to find an analogous consideration of social connection of individual consciousness as well as in some recent phenomenological analyses, which following the Husserlian investigations (Husserl 1970, pp. 178-186; Husserl 1973; Husserl 2006, pp. 79-86) assert the relevance of the intersubjective aspect of I-experience, and they root this aspect in the egological mind with mention also of studies regarding the children's representational achievements (Kern and Marbach 2001) and their corporal way – emotional, sensorimotor, out or prior to any belief – to refer outwards (Gallagher 1996; Gallagher and Varela 2003, pp. 105-106; Gallagher and

[2] "With the emergence of a higher-order consciousness through language, there is a consciously explicit coupling of feelings and values, yielding emotions with cognitive components that are experienced by *a person - a self*" (Edelman and Tononi 2000, pp. 204 and 205, emphases mine).

[3] With regard to this egological trait of inquiry, Eduard Marbach develops a very valuable point of view, which is able to treasure the findings of neuroscience within a phenomenological perspective (Marbach 1993, 2006).

[4] "Self-alterity provides a fine tool to understand better that there is no exclusive alternative between ego and non-ego. The truth lies in a middle path, which can be called a self-altered ego. In that respect, 'alterology', being the science of such a self-altered subjectivity, constitutes an *inner* alternative to egology" (Depraz and Cosmelli 2003, p. 180, emphasis mine).

Zahavi 2008, pp. 187-191; Zahavi 1999, pp. 174-180).
The natural tendency of the individual level to transcend itself towards another already from the beginning of existence, like the reference to the infantile level of relationship to something else demonstrates, enables the progressive formation of the social dimension of life. This is primordially embedded in the *bodily* feature of the Ego, since "to exist embodied is to exist in such a way that one exists under the gaze of the other [...]. Bodily behaviour, expression, and action are essential to [...] some basic forms of consciousness" (Gallagher and Zahavi 2008, p. 148). This means that the recognition of him/herself both as a conscious and self-conscious individual I finds in the social, public side of this cognition not only its counterpart or confirmation[5], but rather the original location of self-manifestation as embodied subject, and so an experiential domain to describe and deal with in order to gain a more *complete* phenomenological account of the mind.
Phenomenology, thanks to the analytical consideration of the issues regarding the constitution of mental life, which it describes with a specific focus on the interconnection between Ego and consciousness, offers a precious chance to set the scientific findings in a truly philosophical outlook.

[5] Such a confirmation is depicted in a very compelling manner by the following James's statements: "No more fiendish punishment could be devised, were such a thing physically possible, than that one should be turned loose in society and remain absolutely unnoticed by all the members thereof. If no one turned round when we entered, answered when he spoke, or minded what he did, but if every person we met 'cut us dead', and acted as if we were non-existing things, a kind of rage and impotent despair would ere long well up in us, from which the cruellest bodily tortures would be a relief; for these would make us feel that, however bad might be our plight, we had not sunk to such a depth as to be unworthy of attention at all" (James 1950, pp. 293-294).

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