LUCRETIUS AND DIOGENES OF OENOANDA *

A useful article entitled Diogene di Enoanda e Lucrezio, by Nilo Casini, was published in 1949 (1). My paper differs from his not only in being in English rather than in Italian and in being entitled 'Lucretius and Diogenes of Oenoanda' rather than 'Diogenes of Oenoanda and Lucretius', but also in more significant ways: whereas Casini draws attention to all the main comparisons and contrasts which he finds between the two Epicureans, I have been much more selective, and my main aim has been to focus attention on some areas where I believe that Diogenes can assist our understanding of Lucretius, another difference between my paper and his is that I have been able to take account of the 124 fragments of Diogenes' inscription discovered between 1969 and 1983 (2) as well as of the 88 fragments found in the last two decades of the nineteenth century.

Let us begin by stating some obvious *differences* between our two Epicureans: whereas Lucretius was probably a Roman (certainly he was familiar with life at Rome), Diogenes was a provincial — a citizen of a small hill-top city in northern Lycia in Asia Minor. Lucretius lived in the first half of the first century B.C.; Diogenes produced his work about two centuries later, in or soon after the reign of Hadrian (3). Lucretius, if we can trust Jerome, died in his forty-fourth year; Diogenes published his message in old age. Lucretius wrote Latin verse, Diogenes Greek prose. A probable similarity may also be noted at this stage: both

(*) This article is a revised and somewhat extended version of a paper read to a "Boreas" seminar on Lucretius at the University of Durham on 21st November, 1986.

(1) "RSF" 4, 1949, 279-290.

(2) For NF (New Fragments) 122-124, see M. F. Smith, "AS" 34, 1984, 43-57; for NF 1-121, see the list of publications ibid. 56.

(3) On the dating of Diogenes' inscription, see M. F. Smith in "Actes du colloque sur la Lycie antique", Bibliothèque de l'Institut français d'études anatoliennes d'Istanbul 27, 1980, 78-80.

are likely to have belonged to aristocratic and probably well-to-do families. That Diogenes at any rate was both influential and wealthy is indicated by his ability to set up his vast inscription in a public place and to pay for it.

Did Diogenes know of Lucretius? And, if so, could he have been influenced by him? Diogenes fr. 51 [I use Chilton's (4) numbering of the fragments found in the nineteenth century, my own numbering of the new fragments] mentions "the wonderful Karos" (*τοῦ θαυμασίου Κάρου*), and the first editors of this text, Heberdey and Kalinka (5), thought that the reference must be to Titus Lucretius Carus and attributed the letter to an Epicurean who was a contemporary of Lucretius. It is certain, however, that Karos is a contemporary and friend of Diogenes (6). So there is no reference to Lucretius in the inscription. But is it possible that Diogenes knew De Rerum Natura? Casini (282) thinks not, on the ground that, if Diogenes had been acquainted with Lucretius' polemic against Empedocles, who is called *Acragantinus... Empedocles* ("Empedocles of Akragas") in 1.716, he would not have committed "the gross error" ("l'errore marchiano") of giving Akragas as the name of Empedocles' father. The relevant passage of Diogenes is fr. 5. II.2-3, but five other philosophers mentioned in the same fragment are given the names of their cities, while no philosopher mentioned anywhere in Diogenes' work is given the name of his father. Something has gone wrong with Diogenes' reference to Akragas, probably involving an error (7) which for lack of space it proved impossible to correct properly (8), but the worst that he has done is to give us an incorrect form of the name of the city. So Casini's argument collapses. I should be surprised if Diogenes, who had links with Epicureans in Rhodes,

(4) C. W. Chilton, Diogenis Oenoandensis fragmenta, Leipzig 1967.

(5) R. Heberdey and E. Kalinka, Die philosophische Inschrift von Oinoanda, "BCH" 21, 1897, 443.

(6) See A. Körte, "RhM" 53, 1898, 160-165; M. F. Smith, "AS" 28, 1978, 53-54 and n. 27.

(7) Since the line, as we have it, already has 19 letters and *Ἀκραγαντεῖνος* (see next note) would have made it improbably long (25 letters), it is likely that the stonemason reproduced an error in the manuscript from which he was working – a copy which may or may not have been in Diogenes' own hand.

(8) Cousin reads ΑΚΡΑΓΑC, HK give ΑΚΡΑΓΟΥ. HK are right about the penultimate letter, but the final letter seems to have been corrected, either from C to Y or from Y to C, and the following two or three letters, which are not easy to read, may have been carved after an erasure. What Diogenes intended no doubt was *Ἀκραγαντεῖνος*: cf. fr. 5.I.11, 13; I.14-II.1; II.5, 9-10.

Chalcis, Thebes, and Athens (9), and who, as we shall see, had a cosmopolitan outlook, had not heard of Lucretius, but we have no evidence that he could read Latin, and there is no evidence that he was influenced by Lucretius. All parallels between Lucretius and Diogenes – and there are many – can be accounted for by their loyal adherence to Epicurus' doctrines and by their use of common sources, above all the master's own writings.

It is in their complete faith in Epicurus and in the healing and saving power of his philosophy, and in their determination to pass on the message of truth and salvation to others as faithfully and effectively as they can, that the most important similarities between Lucretius and Diogenes consist.

Lucretius, in the second of his four eulogies of Epicurus, at the beginning of Book 3, makes clear that he is not an original philosopher, and that his aim is to follow in Epicurus' footsteps (10) out of love for him; and we have abundant evidence that Lucretius does indeed faithfully follow Epicurus' doctrines, though his presentation of his master's philosophy is highly original. As for Diogenes, he reveals his loyalty to Epicurus not only by closely following him in his own writings, but also by including in his inscription quotations of maxims and other writings of the master (11).

As by Lucretius, so by Diogenes, fear of the gods and fear of death are seen as the two greatest obstacles to *ἀταραξία*, and Diogenes in fr. 14, evidently addressing Epicurus, says: "I have accepted what you say about death, and you have persuaded me to laugh at it. I have no fears on account of the Tityoses and Tantaluses whom some picture in Hades, nor do I shudder with dread at the decomposition of the body when I consider [that the destruction of the body involves no pain once the soul is destroyed]" (12). This passage is to be compared with lines in the third proem, in which Lucretius describes how his master's revela-

(9) Fr. 15; NF 107; fr. 16; fr. 51.

(10) 3.3-6. Cf. 5.55-56.

(11) At least thirteen *Κύριαι δόξαι* were included in the continuous line of ethical maxims which ran beneath the columns of the ethical treatise. A quotation from Sent. 16 is included in NF 8 (II.9-13). Among other passages probably or certainly quoted from, or closely based on, writings of Epicurus are a letter apparently from the youthful philosopher to his mother (fr. 52-53), a letter to Dositheus (NF 110), and an account of Epicurus' experience of being shipwrecked as he was sailing to Lampsacus (NF 7, on which see especially D. Clay in "GRBS" 14, 1973, 49-59).

(12) The words in square brackets give the probable sense of I.11-14, though, as I point out in "BCH" 101, 1977, 377, the exact text is in doubt.

tion of the nature of things enables him to dispel fear of punishment after death, as well as fear of the gods (3.14-30); it is to be compared also with other passages of the same book, notably 978-1023, in which Lucretius argues that Tantalus, Tityos, Sisyphus and company do not exist in hell, but only in the lives of fools who create for themselves a hell on earth, and 870-893 which deals with fears about what may happen to one's body after death.

All readers of Diogenes' inscription – not only of the passage just quoted, but also (for example) of the introductory passage in which he states that, now that old age has brought him to the sunset of his life and to the verge of release from it, he wishes to compose a hymn of thanksgiving for the perfect happiness he has enjoyed (fr. 2.II.7-III.3) – all readers of the inscription, I am sure, would agree that Diogenes gives us the impression that he has overcome fear of death and gained the coveted goal of *ἀταραξία*. But what about Lucretius? Some critics, influenced no doubt by the story of his madness and suicide, have seen his vehement attack on fear of death (death which Epicurus, it is to be noted, called the most terrifying of evils) (13) as a mark of mental unbalance and/or of pessimism and perhaps even as an indication that he himself was afraid of death; they have viewed his attacks on *religio* in much the same way, as a sign that he himself actually had a hankering for the practices which he condemns – a strange sort of argument, I must say. It is (or should be) impossible to read Lucretius' scornful attacks on *religio* without coming to the conclusion that he was completely opposed to it. That he had no fear of death, since I am not Lucretius or his psychiatrist, I cannot be absolutely sure, though, in view of what he says in the third proem, it seems unlikely. That he did fear death, critics, for the same reasons, have no right to assume. What we can say is that the poet's attacks on both fear of death and fear of the gods are carried out in accordance with orthodox Epicurean doctrine which laid down that these two fears are the main obstacles to a tranquil life, and the vehemence of the attacks is explained and justified by the very untranquil nature of contemporary Roman society, which was afflicted by all manner of public and private ills – ills which, according to the Epicurean analysis, had their roots in fear of the unknown. It may be added that the picture presented by Lucretius in 3.59-86 well harmonises, as many commentators have acknowledged, with Sallust's picture in the Bellum Catilinae (e.g. 10.3-5). And yet Lucretius' critics accuse him here and elsewhere of personal pessimism, when his por-

(13) Ep. ad Men. 125.

trayal of contemporary conditions is realistic and his analysis is, in Epicurean terms, orthodox.

Diogenes lived in an age that was far less troubled, though, needless to say, not one in which public and private vices were unknown. In fact, as he puts it, "the majority of men suffer, as in a plague, from false opinions about things; and their number is increasing, for they copy one another and so catch the contagion from one another like sheep" (fr. 2.IV.3-13). Now, if Lucretius had written those words, some critics, I suspect, would have pounced on him and said that here was another example of the poet's pessimism. But they do not say this of Diogenes. Why is this? Presumably because there is no tradition that Diogenes went mad and took his own life. But is it not true that Diogenes elsewhere says very cheerful and hopeful things about man's ability to achieve happiness, and does he not make it his business to bring healing help to the spiritually or morally sick? Yes, this is true. In fact the words just quoted occur in an introductory passage in which, having referred to his own happiness, he says that he wishes to help men of good will, and not only his contemporaries, but also generations to come ("for they too are ours, though they are still unborn"), and not only citizens of Oenoanda, but also, prompted by φιλανθρωπία, foreigners (fr. 2.II.7-V.8); and in NF 21 he looks forward to what one might call a new Golden Age situation in which, as he puts it, "the life of the gods will truly pass to men", for "all things will be full of justice and mutual love, and there will come to be no need of fortifications or laws and all the things which we contrive on account of one another". He goes on to say that men will divide their time between co-operative farming and philosophy – Epicurean philosophy of course. Well, there is nothing in Lucretius or in any other Epicurean writer to parallel Diogenes' prediction that *all* men will attain a godlike state on earth, and Diogenes' thoroughgoing philanthropy and cosmopolitanism, which are manifested also in other passages of his work (14), were no doubt influenced by political and philosophical developments under the Roman Empire (15). However, Lucretius too has plenty of cheerful and hopeful things to say about the opportunities which, thanks to Epicurus, man has to achieve happiness, and, like Diogenes, he is concerned to bring enlightenment to his fellow men. The sort of passages I have in mind are to be found in every book of the poem.

In 1.62-79 he describes Epicurus' victory over *religio* – a victory

(14) Fr. 25.I.12-II.11; 49.2-3.

(15) Smith, "Actes du colloque" 82-83 (see n. 3 above).

which has raised us to heaven. In 1.140-145 he explains to Memmius that the inspiration of his poem is the hope of converting him to Epicureanism – a theme elaborated on in 1.921-950, where, comparing himself to a doctor, who, wishing to administer an unpleasant-tasting, but beneficial, dose of medicine to a child, coats the rim of the cup with honey, he explains that he is presenting Epicureanism in delightful poetry in the hope of holding the attention of Memmius and so enabling him to comprehend the nature of things. Naturally he hopes, through the medium of his address to Memmius, to bring enlightenment to others too, to all those who hitherto have found Epicureanism unpalatable (1.943-945), and his prayer to Venus that his work will achieve immortality (1.28) suggests that he, like Diogenes, wishes his message to be of benefit to posterity.

The opening to Book 2 (1-61) underlines the misery of unenlightened mankind (compare Diogenes' introduction), but also the happiness of those who have achieved *ἀταραξία*.

The third proem (3.1-30), as we have seen, sings the praises of Epicurus, whose revelation of the nature of things causes the poet to experience *quaedam divina voluptas atque horror*. Later in the same book Lucretius assures us that there is nothing to prevent us living a life worthy of the gods (3.322 *ut nil impediat dignam dis degere vitam*), though, if we are foolish, we make a hell of our lives (3.1023 *hic Acherusia fit stultorum denique vita*).

The fourth proem (4.1-25) repeats, almost word for word, the famous mission passage in Book 1 (926-950).

At the beginnings of Books 5 (1-54) and 6 (1-42) we have more praise of Epicurus as the man with godlike qualities who has shown us how to lead a peaceful, pure, and completely happy life. The opening passage of Book 6 is to be kept in mind when we read the closing passage of the book, which is also of course the closing passage of the poem, the account of the Athenian plague (6.1138-1286). The placing of the grim account of the plague in the final position has often been regarded as proof of Lucretius' morbid pessimism and even as corroboration of the story that he committed suicide. However, this final section of Book 6 is closely linked to the sixth proem which begins with reference to Athens and sick or suffering mankind (*mortalibus aegris*) and contains other significant anticipations of the account of the plague (16). It is clear that Lucretius saw the plague as a notable example of a physical

(16) See J. P. Elder, Lucretius 1.1-49, "TAPA" 85, 1954, 92-93; H. S. Commager Jr., Lucretius' Interpretation of the Plague, "HSCP" 62, 1957, 105-118.

disaster which, because men did not yet have the benefit of Epicurus' philosophy, became a moral disaster as well; it is clear, too, as Commager (17) above all has shown, that Lucretius sees the plague as symbolic of the moral condition of unenlightened mankind. This idea, that the unenlightened are diseased, is found, as we have seen, in Diogenes; it occurs also in Cicero, De Finibus 1.18.59, and it is implicit in several passages of Epicurus (18). The important point, with regard to Book 6, is that Lucretius makes clear in the proem that, thanks to Epicurus, the diseases of the mind can be completely cured.

So our two Epicureans, Lucretius and Diogenes, are very much at one in their devotion to Epicurus, in their faithful adherence to his doctrines, and in their profound and ardent sense of mission, and it would be wrong to see Lucretius as pessimistic compared with Diogenes.

Next I shall give a few examples, drawn from the new fragments, of cases where Diogenes can assist our understanding of some passages of Lucretius.

Although Diogenes' Greek prose is no literary match for Lucretius' Latin verse, his use of the same language as Epicurus sometimes enables us to recover, without the need for translation, terms used by the master himself. I give one example. Three times in De Rerum Natura 4 (31, 51, 95) *membranae* is used in reference to *simulacra* or εἴδωλα – atomic films or images. Diogenes in NF 1.III.3 uses ὑμένες in reference to the εἴδωλα and, although the word does not occur in Epicurus' extant writings, there can be little doubt that Diogenes is giving us a term used by the master – a term which Lucretius has translated.

And Diogenes can give more substantial help than this. We have five new fragments dealing with the Epicurean theory of vision, thought, and dreams (NF 1, 5, 6, 13-12), (19). Diogenes' account has many close and interesting parallels with Lucretius' exposition in Book 4. In general, Lucretius provides more detail, but on the question of precisely how εἴδωλα are received by the mind he is less informative (4.722 ff. and 973 ff.) than Diogenes, who explains (fr. 5.III.6-14) that "after the impingements of the first images, our nature has its pores opened in such a way that, even when the things which it first saw are no longer

(17) Op. cit. (see n. 16 above).

(18) Cf. Usener 221; Epic., Ep. ad Men. 122 *οὔτε γὰρ ἄωρος οὐδείς ἐστιν οὔτε πάρωρος πρὸς τὸ κατὰ ψυχὴν ὑγιαῖνον*. Also Sent. Vat. 64, which emphasises that we should concern ourselves *περὶ τὴν ἡμῶν ἰατρείαν*.

(19) NF 1 is a continuation of fr. 7. See A. Barigazzi, Sui nuovi frammenti di Diogene d'Enoanda, "Prometheus" 3, 1977, 11-13.

present, things similar to those first things are received by the mind".

Let us look at one further example taken from the same group of fragments. Diogenes (NF 1, 13-12) criticises Democritus for attributing too much power to sleep-images – for believing that they possess sensation and talk. This criticism, which harmonises with and supplements a passage in Plutarch (Mor. 734F = Diels A77, Usener 326), assists, as Barigazzi has shown (20), our understanding of several passages of Lucretius, including 4.127-128 – lines which follow a lacuna which is probably of considerable length (it is likely that at least two pages of the archetype have been lost) (21). The lines, which are the closing lines of a section and have no relationship to the immediately preceding lines in the text as we have it, recommend the view that *simulacra* or εἴδωλα wander about without any intrinsic quality (the probable meaning of *nulla vi*, as Barigazzi argues) and devoid of sensation (*cassaque sensu*). The words *cassa... sensu* have been taken by many modern scholars, in violation of the natural meaning of the Latin, to mean "without the power of creating sensation" or "without being perceived by sense". However, they are almost certainly equivalent, as J. B. Pius pointed out in his edition of 1511, to "*vacua et privata sensu*", "devoid of sensation", and, thanks to the parallel passages of Diogenes, we may confidently assume that Lucretius is concluding an argument, presumably aimed above all at Democritus, against the view that *simulacra* possess sensation.

Both Lucretius and Diogenes address individuals in their works, in accordance with common Epicurean practice – a practice which no doubt reflects the idea that the Epicurean philosopher is a healer, and, like the physician, must give individual attention to those whom he is trying to help.

Both, again in accordance with regular Epicurean practice (22), are polemical. Lucretius' refutation of the views of Heraclitus, Empedocles, and Anaxagoras in Book 1 (635-920) has its parallel in Diogenes' work. In fr. 5 Diogenes declares his intention of disposing of the views of

(20) A. Barigazzi, Nuova luce su Democrito e Lucrezio da Diogene d'Enoanda, "Emerita" 49, 1981, 1-15.

(21) If G.P. Goold, A Lost Manuscript of Lucretius, "Acta Classica" 1, 1958, 27, is right in thinking that 4.126 ended the front page of a leaf, one may assume that the scribe made the error of turning over two pages instead of one. Goold's own assumption that the lacuna consists of no more than six lines (the scribe having "lost the place" after turning over the leaf) is improbable.

(22) See K. Kleve, The Philosophical Polemics in Lucretius, in Entretiens sur l'antiquité classique 24: Lucrèce, Genève 1978, 39-75.

other philosophers, including the three whom Lucretius refutes, before expounding Epicurus' theory of matter, and, like Lucretius, he begins with Heraclitus. Elsewhere both writers frequently introduce polemical arguments, but Diogenes is much more ready to name his opponents than Lucretius is: in fact, whereas Lucretius identifies only four rival philosophers by name (23), Diogenes mentions sixteen rival philosophers or schools (24). A main reason why Lucretius names fewer philosophical opponents than Diogenes may be simply that he is writing poetry rather than prose, and it may be noted that the Stoics, against whom Lucretius (pace D.J.Furley)(25) undoubtedly directs arguments, but whom he never names, are not easily introduced into hexameter verse (26). Diogenes, on the other hand, names them nine times (27) in the surviving fragments. Diogenes also mentions more contemporaries than Lucretius, who in fact mentions only one (28), whilst the poet mentions more deities and more mythical or legendary persons and creatures.

It is especially, though not exclusively, in their polemical arguments that another common feature emerges – a sense of humour. Take, for example, their arguments (Lucr. 5.195-234, Diogenes NF 39-40) that the faultiness of the world proves that it was not divinely created for the sake of man. Lucretius concludes his catalogue of the world's faults by describing humorously (in the course of making a serious point) the helplessness of a baby compared with the young of other creatures – creatures which need no rattles or broken baby-talk to keep them happy, no changes of clothing according to changes in the season, and no weapons or walls for the defence of their property (5.222-234). Like Lucretius (5.203), Diogenes (NF 40) draws attention to the vast area occupied by the sea: he says that it makes the inhabited world a mere

(23) Heraclitus, Empedocles, Anaxagoras, Democritus.

(24) Anaxagoras, Anaximenes, Antiphon, Aristippus, Aristotle, Democritus, Diagoras, Diogenes of Apollonia, Empedocles, Heraclitus, Plato, Protagoras, Pythagoras, Socrates, the Stoics, Thales.

(25) Lucretius and the Stoics, "BICS" 13, 1966, 13-33.

(26) Other possible reasons for Lucretius not naming the Stoics are: that he did not think it necessary, because their views were so well known; that he did not think it tactful, because he knew that some of his readers (including Memmius himself?) would have Stoic sympathies; and that often – in the case of anti-theological arguments, for example – the views against which he was arguing were not held by the Stoics alone.

(27) Fr. 5.II.7-8; 7.I.8; 35.I.13 (almost certainly); NF 1.III.8, 9-10; NF 13.1; NF 40.IV.11-12 (almost certainly); NF 54.4 (almost certainly); NF 61.7.

(28) Memmius.

peninsula and, as well as having other disadvantages, "to cap all, has water which is not even drinkable, but briny and bitter – as if it had been purposely made like this by the god, to prevent men from drinking". One more example – this time from Lucretius' and Diogenes' interesting accounts of the origin of language (Lucr. 5.1028-1090; Diogenes fr. 10.II.11-V). Lucretius refutes the view that one individual invented speech, by drawing attention to the difficulty, indeed impossibility, of the task of persuading others to accept the new inventions: "It would have been impossible for one man to impose his will on many, and make them agree to learn all the names of things; and it is by no means easy to tell and teach the deaf what needs to be done: the truth is they would not tolerate, or under any circumstances endure for long to have their ears dinned to no purpose by unintelligible vocal sounds" (5.1050-1055). Diogenes, though not usually as powerful a writer as Lucretius, scores over him on this occasion in his amusing and lively treatment of the same matter: "It is ludicrous, indeed the most ludicrous thing in the word, and also utterly impossible, that one individual should have assembled such vast multitudes of people and, having assembled them, should have taken hold of a rod and proceeded to teach them like an elementary schoolmaster, declaring ‹this shall be named 'stone', this shall be named 'wood', this shall be named 'man', this shall be named 'dog', this shall be named 'sheep'›".

Although Lucretius' and Diogenes' sense of humour emerges most often when they are dealing with rival views, this is, as I have indicated, not invariably so, and it is pleasing to note that they can make gentle fun of their own missionary fervour. Thus Lucretius in Book 1 (410-417) promises Memmius that, if he is slack, he will produce so many proofs that he fears old age may overtake the pair of them (29) before he has finished. One detects a touch of humour too in his confession that, just as lawyers dream of their legal cases, generals of battles and sailors of the sea, so he himself dreams of studying Epicureanism and expounding it in Latin (4.966-970). As for Diogenes, at the end of NF 81, a fragment whose text is poorly preserved, he acknowledges that his missionary zeal caused him to convert so many letters into stone (*τὰ τοσαῦτα ὑμεῖν ἐλιθοποιήσαμεν γράμματα*), the verb *λιθοποιέω* being used elsewhere only by Lucian (Dial. Mar. 14.3) in reference to Perseus turning a sea-monster to stone by showing it the head of Medusa. It may be added that Diogenes almost certainly thought it a good joke to set up his Epicurean inscription in a stoa (fr. 2.V.12).

(29) I take *nobis* in 1.415 to be a true plural.

As for the arrangement of Lucretius' and Diogenes' material, we know of some similarities: for example, we have seen that both began their refutation of rival theories of matter by dealing with Heraclitus. However, for the most part we cannot compare and contrast their arrangement, for, in the case of physics, where the similarities of subject-matter are most frequent, our knowledge of the order of Diogenes' fragments is very defective, and in the case of ethics, where we are much better informed about the arrangement of the fragments of Diogenes (30), Lucretius provides no systematic treatment.

The question of why Lucretius concentrates his attention on physics and does not deal systematically with Epicurus' ethical theory has provoked a good deal of argument among Lucretian scholars, not least in recent years. Some, like Kenney (31), think that the reason is chiefly poetical: the didactic tradition did not provide a model for exposition of ethics, and a metrical exposition of Epicurean ethics is hardly imaginable. Kleve (32) on the other hand believes that, since Lucretius was writing for beginners, and since Epicurus considered the abolition of fear of the gods and fear of death (the subjects of the first two Κύριαι δόξαι and the first two elements of the τετραφάρμακος) as essential if the moral end was to be achieved, Lucretius' concentration on eliminating these fears is dictated not by his own choice, but by the curriculum of the Epicurean school. Diogenes certainly cannot provide a complete solution to this particular problem, but it is worth noting two points: one is that his inscription, which is certainly aimed more at beginners than at advanced students, contains an ethical treatise as well as a physics treatise, and problems of physics and ethics receive balanced treatment not only in these treatises but also elsewhere in the inscription; secondly, there is evidence that he intended the physics treatise to be read before the ethics (33). I take – and have taken elsewhere (34) – a course somewhere between Kenney and Kleve. Although there are passages in De Rerum Natura which show that Lucretius was capable of converting Epicurean ethics into fine poetry (2.1-61, for example), he was conscious of following in the steps of earlier didactic poets, especially Empedocles, and Epicurean physics certainly afforded ample

(30) Above all because of the fifteenth line of ethical maxims. See M. F. Smith, "AS" 28, 1978, 44.

(31) E. J. Kenney, Lucretius, De Rerum Natura Book III, Cambridge 1971, 10.

(32) K. Kleve, What kind of Work did Lucretius write?, "SO" 54, 1979, 81-85.

(33) M.F. Smith, Thirteen New Fragments of Diogenes of Oenoanda, Wien 1974, 11, 13, 47.

(34) Lucretius, De Rerum Natura, Cambridge Mass.-London 1975, li-lii.

scope for his powers of observation, imagination, and description (35). At the same time, as an Epicurean who was concerned to improve the moral health of Memmius and others, he would naturally have felt that a good dose of physics was precisely the medicine needed. It was fortunate indeed that his concentration on the part of Epicurus' system which probably offered most scope for his poetic talents could be justified also in terms of his mission as an Epicurean teacher and preacher.

Bangor MARTIN FERGUSON SMITH
University College of North Wales

APPENDIX

Principal parallelisms in Lucretius and Diogenes of Oenoanda.

For the convenience of readers, two lists are given – the first for those primarily interested in Lucretius, the second for those concerned with Diogenes.

Parallels between passages of Lucretius and Κύριαι δόξαι quoted by Diogenes below the columns of his ethical treatise have not been included.

As elsewhere in this article, fr. = fragment according to the numbering of C. W. Chilton, Diogenis Oenoandensis fragmenta (Leipzig 1967), and NF = M. F. Smith, New Fragment (see n. 2 above).

I.

LUCRETIUS	DIOGENES
1.132-135	fr. 52.I-II
1.151-154	fr. 29.II.10-14
1.483-502	NF 53
1.540-550	NF 53
1.635-920	fr. 5
1. 699-700	NF 6.I.12-II.1
1.951-1051	fr. 19
2.20-21	fr. 1.I.8-10
2.37-54	fr. 24.II; NF 34
2.181	NF 54.5-6
2.216-293	fr. 32.III.1-8
2.547-568	fr. 19
2.865-867	NF 1.II.10-14; NF 13.12-NF 12.1 (36)
2.1023-1089	fr. 16
2.1091	NF 54.2-3
3.14-16, 25	fr. 14.I.1-3
3.95	fr. 37.III.8-10
3.119-120	fr. 37.III.4-10

(35) Ibid. xlv.

(36) For NF 13-12, see M. F. Smith, Thirteen New Fragments of Diogenes of Oenoanda, Wien 1974, 45-47.

LUCRETIUS	DIOGENES
3.136-146	fr. 37.I.5-12
3.138-139	fr. 37.III.8-10
3.322	fr. 52.III.9-IV; NF 21.I.4-6
3.323-326	fr. 37.I.7-12
3.323-349	NF 61
3.370-395	fr. 37.I.2-5
3.396-397	fr. 37.III.8-10
3.396-416	fr. 37.I.13-IV
3.548-579	NF 61
3.870-893	fr. 14.I.8-14
3.894-911	NF 110.I.10-II.3
3.900-904	fr. 58.II.7-10
3.931-977	NF 14.I.10-II.2
3.956-960	NF 16 (?)
3.978-1023	fr. 14.I.3-8
4.26-44	fr. 52.I-II
4.26-822	NF 5-6 + fr. 7 + NF 1
4.98-109	NF 5.I-II
4.127-128	NF 1; NF 13.12-NF 12
4.150-167	NF 5.I-II
4.269-323	NF 5.I-II
4.353-363	NF 9
4.480-499	fr. 4.III
4.627-629	NF 20.II.12-14
4.722-776	fr. 52.I-II
4.728-731	NF 5.III.6-14
4.757-767	NF 5.IV-NF 6.II.1
4.858-876	NF 97
4.973-977	NF 5.III.6-14
5.7-12	fr. 52.III.9-IV
5.87-88 (= 6.63-64)	NF 54.2-3
5.156-234	NF 39-40
5.195-234	NF 54.5-6
5.200-203	NF 40.I.13-II.2
5.526-533	fr. 8.III
5.592-613	fr. 8.IV
5.805-820	fr. 9
5.925-987	fr. 10.I.1-10
5.1011	fr. 10.I.1-10
5.1028-1090	fr. 10.II.11-V
5.1050-1055	fr. 10.IV.3-V
5.1120-1122	NF 15.1-4
5.1120-1135	NF 34

LUCRETIUS	DIOGENES
5.1169-1182	fr. 12.III (37)
5.1198-1203	NF 81
5.1350-1360	fr. 10.I.10-II.3
5.1430-1433	fr. 28.VII.4-7
5.1448-1457	fr. 10.II.4-11
6.24-34	fr. 28.VI-VII
6.27-32	NF 8
6.54-55	NF 54.2-3
6.63-64 (= 5.87-88)	NF 54.2-3
6.68-78	NF 115.II
6.156-159	NF 82.8-10
6.246-284	NF 45.1-7
6.529	NF 41; NF 82
6.535-607	NF 45.8-11

II	DIOGENES	LUCRETIUS
	fr. 1.I.8-10	2.20-21
	fr. 4.III	4.480-499
	fr. 5	1.635-920
	fr. 7	See under NF 5-6
	fr. 8.III	5.526-533
	fr. 8.IV	5.592-613
	fr. 9	5.805-820
	fr. 10.I.1-10	5.925-987, 1011
	fr. 10.I.10-II.3	5.1350-1360
	fr. 10.II.4-11	5.1448-1457
	fr. 10.II.11-V	5.1028-1090
	fr. 10.IV.3-V	5.1050-1055
	fr. 12.III (38)	5.1169-1182
	fr. 14.I.1-3	3.14-16, 25
	fr. 14.I.3-8	3.978-1023
	fr. 16	2.1023-1089
	fr. 19	1.951-1051; 2.547-568
	fr. 24.II	2.37-54
	fr. 28.VI-VII	6.24-34
	fr. 28.VII.4-7	5.1430-1433
	fr. 29.II.10-14	1.151-154
	fr. 32.III.1-9	2.216-293
	fr. 37.I.2-5	3.370-395
	fr. 37.I.5-12	3.136-146

(37) For fr. 12, see M. F. Smith, "CQ" n.s. 22, 1972, 160-161.
(38) See n. 37 above.

DIOGENES	LUCRETIUS
fr. 37.I.7-12	3.323-326
fr. 37.I.13-IV	3.396-416
fr. 37.III.4-10	3.119-120
fr. 37.III.8-10	3.95, 138-139, 396-397
fr. 52.I-II	1.132-135; 4.26-44, 722-776
fr. 52.III.9-IV	3.322; 5.7-12
fr. 58.II.7-10	3.900-904
NF 1	4.127-128. See also under NF 5-6
NF 1.II.10-14	2.865-867
NF 5-6 + fr. 7 + NF 1	4.26-822
NF 5.I-II	4.98-109, 150-167, 269-323
NF 5.III.6-14	4.728-731, 973-977
NF 5.IV-NF 6.II.1	4.757-767
NF 6.I.12-II.1	1.699-700
NF 8	6.27-32
NF 9	4.353-363
NF 13.12-NF 12 (39)	2.865-867; 4.127-128
NF 14.I.10-II.2	3.931-977
NF 15.1-4	5.1120-1122
NF 16	3.956-960 (?)
NF 20.II.12-14	4.627-629
NF 21.I.4-6	3.322
NF 34	2.37-54; 5.1120-1135
NF 39-40	5.156-234
NF 40.I.13-II.2	5.200-203
NF 41	6.529
NF 45.1-7	6.246-284
NF 45.8-11	6.535-607
NF 53	1.483-502, 540-550
NF 54.2-3	2.1091; 5.87-88 (= 6.63-64); 6.54-55
NF 54.5-6	2.181; 5.195-234
NF 61	3.323-349, 548-579
NF 81	5.1198-1203
NF 82	6.529
NF 82.8-10	6.156-159
NF 97	4.858-876
NF 110.I.10-II.3	3.894-911
NF 115.II	6.68-78

M. F. S.

(39) See n. 36 above.