

## HOMER AND THE FABLE: ODYSSEY 21.293-306\*

In the *Natural History of Iceland* (translated from the Danish of Horrebrow) the chapter *Concerning Snakes* reads, in its entirety, "There are no snakes in Iceland". Likewise, "there are no animal fables in Homer"<sup>1</sup>, and whoever chose to extend that generalisation into the form 'there are no fables in Homer', would still be on safe ground, at least as regards the *Iliad*<sup>2</sup>. This is one of those negative features about Homer's epics that prove highly illuminating. Why do they generally eschew so primeval and widespread a form? The main answer must be the 'popular' and 'low' ethos of the fable<sup>3</sup>, unsuitable for dignified and heroic epic. Animals are brought

\* For a compendious bibliography on the whole issue of Fable see Pack Carnes (ed.), *Fable Scholarship: an annotated bibliography* (New York, London 1985). For general introductions, see the entries in *Enzyklopädie des Märchens* by F. Wagner s.v. 'Äsopika' (1.889ff.), and by R. Dithmar s.v. 'Fabel' (4.727ff.) and 'Fabelbücher' (4.745ff.). The article on 'Tiermärchen' will also be relevant. For the Ancient World more specifically, see G.-J. van Dijk, *AINOI, ΛΟΓΟΙ, ΜΥΘΟΙ. Fables in Archaic, Classical, and Hellenistic Greek Literature with a study of the theory and terminology of the genre*. ("Mnemos." Suppl. 166, 1997), hereafter van Dijk.

<sup>1</sup> M.L. West in *La fable* (Entretiens Hardt 30, 1984), p. 106 n. 1. This volume (containing eight contributions by as many different scholars) is a handy (though inevitably uneven) introduction to many of the issues raised by the fable in antiquity. See further Meuli (as cited below n. 7), and T. Karadagli, *Fabel und Ainos: Studien zur gr. Fabel* (Beitr. zur kl. Phil. 135, Königstein 1981). The Introduction to B.E. Perry's Loeb translation of Babrius and Phaedrus (1965) is also useful, and classical scholars will find much to interest them in Haim Schwarzbbaum, *The Mishle Shu'alim (Fox Fables) of Rabbi Berechiah Ha-Nakadan: A Study in Comparative Folklore and Fable Lore* (New York 1979), not least its opening definition of a fable (one of the very best known to me out of the numerous attempts) as "a fictitious tale told for the purpose of communicating a certain idea, or a truth of some kind, metaphorically... through the transparent analogy of actions of gods, heroes, men, animals".

<sup>2</sup> For the significance of αἴτιος (the most obvious Greek word for 'fable') in Homer see the article by Meuli referred to below (n. 7) p. 85f. = p. 751f. On the analogous (not identical) issue of whether Homer can be said to use 'parables' see my remarks in "CQ" 45, 1995, p. 2 and n. 5. (For a general analysis of the similarities and differences between Fable and Parable see R. Dithmar in *Enzyklopädie des Märchens* s.v. 'Fabel' [4.731f.]). Cf. H.T. Archibald, *The Fable as a Stylistic Test in Classical Greek Literature* (Diss. Baltimore, 1912), p. 5f.

<sup>3</sup> Compare the Homeric avoidance of story-telling formulae like 'once upon a time' (cf. "BICS" 36, 1989, p. 18 n. 4): see e.g. ἦν ὄτε (*Cypria* fr. 1.1). But fables (animal and other) do occur in that other quintessentially elevated genre of ancient Greek literature, Tragedy. See my note *Aeschylus and the Fable*, "Hermes" 109, 1981, 248ff. and below n. 37.

into the two poems, but generally by means of the simile<sup>4</sup>. When Homer wishes a character to encourage, exhort, or dissuade, instead of employing a fable<sup>5</sup>, he introduces a formal exemplary or paradigmatic myth. This allows him freedom to manipulate the details of the myth in order to produce an artificial but close set of correspondences with the context he illustrates<sup>6</sup>. No such freedom would have been available for him with the ready-made plots and values of the world of the animal fable. One may suggest another reason for absence: if Karl Meuli was right<sup>7</sup> to argue that the fable was originally formed as a tool of the weak, vulnerable and oppressed against the powerful, a means of conveying criticism in the relative safety offered by indirectness, the *Iliad*, at least, with its background of aristocratic and heroic values, would have offered a very unsuitable context for such a device. Small wonder, by contrast, that it should be Hesiod's *Works and Days* with its picture of peasants exploited by ruthless βασιλῆες, that contains the first explicit animal fable<sup>8</sup>.

But then there is the *Odyssey*. The ethos of this work is generally acknowledged to be on a lower and less heroic level than the *Iliad*'s<sup>9</sup> and its

<sup>4</sup> See F. Lasserre in *La fable* (above, n. 1) p. 67: "on n'en [de la fable] trouve pas la moindre réminiscence chez Homère, bien que l'*Iliade* et l'*Odyssee* recourent abondamment aux comparaisons animales". Cf. U. Dierauer, *Tier und Mensch im Denken der Antike* (Amsterdam 1977), pp. 6ff. on 'Tiervergleiche und Tiergleichnisse'.

<sup>5</sup> Fables "are told with the intention of influencing the conduct of a particular person or persons in a particular situation": West (cited above n. 1) p. 107. The same is true of Homer's mythological *exempla* (see next note), whose characteristic tripartite pattern (thesis, exemplification, restatement of thesis) may ultimately derive from the Fable.

<sup>6</sup> It would be inappropriate to go into minute bibliographical detail here concerning Homer's use of paradigmatic myth. A particularly intelligent statement of the central issues is Ø. Andersen, *Myth, Paradigm and Spatial Form in the Iliad*, in *Homer: Beyond Oral Poetry* (ed. J.M. Bremer *et al.*, Amsterdam 1987), pp. 1ff. (esp. p. 3 on how "mythological paradigms inserted into the *Iliad* effect the transformation of single events into variants of a timeless pattern").

<sup>7</sup> In his influential article *Herkunft und Wesen der Fabel*, "Schweiz. Archiv. für Volkskunde" 50, 1954, 65ff. = *Ges. Schr.* 2.731ff. For criticism see Perry, "Gnomon" 29, 1957, 427ff. and cf. now the remarks of West (cited in n.1) pp. 107ff., van Dijk pp. 4ff.

<sup>8</sup> *Op.* 202ff. (the hawk and the dove). For the main problem here (the apparent "discrepancy between fable and message") see West *ad loc.* and in *La fable* (cited above n. 1) p. 244f. and J. Dalfen, *Die ὄβρις der Nachtigall: zu der Fabel bei Hesiod... und zur gr. Fabel im allgemeinen*, "WS" 107, 1994, 157ff.; van Dijk pp. 127ff. On the social background of the poem see, e.g., M. Detienne, *Crise agraire et attitude religieuse chez Hésiode*, 'Coll. Latomus' 68 (Brussels 1963); E. Will, *Hésiode: crise agraire? Ou recueil de l'aristocratie?*, "R.E.G." 78, 1965, 542ff.; P. Millett, *Hesiod and his World*, "PCPS" 30, 1984, 84ff.

<sup>9</sup> See, for instance, J. Griffin, *Homer the Odyssey* (Cambridge 1987), pp. 50, 93ff. etc.

plot contains a larger number of oppressed and victimised individuals<sup>10</sup>. So it is appropriate that the same Karl Meuli should have detected<sup>11</sup> a fable of sorts at *Od.* 14.457ff., the passage where a still disguised Odysseus ‘tests’ the swineherd Eumaeus by getting him to part with his cloak on a wet and windy night. To do so he tells a story, set at Troy, of how, on a similarly cold night, Odysseus had helped him when he had come out on an expedition without a cloak. The ever-resourceful hero invents a reason for sending someone back to the ships with a message for Agamemnon; the volunteer who responds doffs his cloak prior to running off on the errand, leaving it for the speaker (the real Odysseus, ironically) to put on. Odysseus closes this anecdote with a species of Ring Composition (14.503 ~ 468):

ὡς νῦν ἠβώοιμι βίη τε μοι ἔμπεδος εἶη·  
 δοίη κέν τις χλαῖναν ἐνὶ σταθμοῖσι συφορβῶν,  
 ἀμφοτέρων, φιλόττητι καὶ αἰδοῖ φωτὸς ἔηος·  
 νῦν δέ μ’ ἀτιμάζουσι κακὰ χροῖ εἶματ’ ἔχοντα. (14.503-6)

Eumaeus’ response shows that the indirect approach has paid off:

ὦ γέρον, αἴνος μὲν τοι ἀμύμων, ὃν κατέλεξας,  
 οὐδέ τί πω παρά μοῖραν ἔπος νηκερδὲς ἔειπες·  
 τῶ οὔτ’ ἐσθῆτος δευήσεαι οὔτε του ἄλλου,  
 ὧν ἐπέοιχ’ ἰκέτην ταλαπεῖριον ἀντιάσαντα. (14.508-11)

As said above, then, here is a fable of sorts: the word αἴνος, after all, is used by later authors, of the Aesop’s fable as we know it<sup>12</sup>. But it is remarkable how successfully Homer has managed to infuse this αἴνος with a colouring and tone that matches the epic as a whole. Thus the story constitutes another of Odysseus’ lying tales<sup>13</sup>. The central emphasis on physical discomfort and the somewhat selfish or egotistical concern for personal

<sup>10</sup> The fact that suppliants, strangers, and beggars all loom larger in the *Odyssey* than in the *Iliad* (and are more protected by Zeus) has long been recognised. See, e.g., E.R. Dodds, *The Greeks and the Irrational*, p. 32, who observes that Zeus as “the Hesiodic avenger of the poor and oppressed begins to come in sight” in this epic.

<sup>11</sup> As cited above (n. 7), pp. 73ff. = pp. 739ff. As West says (above n. 1) p. 107, *Od.* 14.457ff. “is certainly relevant to the meaning of the word αἴνος. It confirms that the idea of a pointed lesson is essential to it”. Meuli’s study is nowhere mentioned in Hoekstra’s commentary on the Odyssean passage.

<sup>12</sup> Cf. E. Hoffmann, *Qua ratione ἔπος, μῦθος, αἴνος, λόγος... in antiquo Graecorum sermone adhibita sint* (Diss. Göttingen, 1922); Archibald (cited above n. 2) pp. 2ff.

<sup>13</sup> The others are *Od.* 13.256ff. (told to Athena), 14.192ff. (told to Eumaeus), 17.419ff. (told to Antinous), 19.165ff. (told to Penelope), and 24.265ff. (told to Laertes). There are similarities of content and ethos between the second of these passages (told to Eumaeus) and Eumaeus’ own biographical narrative at 15.390ff. For links between swineherd and beggar in disguise see below n. 36. For bibliography on the lying tales see G. W. Most, “J.H.S.” 109, 1989, p. 132 n. 92.

well-being suits the ethos of the *Odyssey*<sup>14</sup>. The every-day realism of the opening references to bad weather is also characteristic: as Hoekstra observes in his note on vv. 473-7<sup>15</sup>, this passage contrasts “with the *Iliad*, where hardships suffered by soldiers because of the weather are never mentioned”. The eager desire for a *χλαῖνα* becomes a symbol of Odyssean values<sup>16</sup> and the passage as a whole corresponds surprisingly well to the functioning of Homer’s mythological *paradeigmata* as outlined above: story meshes perfectly with context (both in the narrower sense – bad weather in past and present – and in the wider). One feels that Homer might have said of the whole passage something like what Dickens said of chapter 21 (Book the Second) of *Little Dorritt*: “in Miss Wade I had an idea, which I thought a new one, of making the introduced story so fit into surroundings impossible of separation from the main story, as to make the blood of the book circulate through both”<sup>17</sup>.

There is another relevant passage, the story of Eurytion the centaur as recounted by the suitor Antinous at *Od.* 21.288ff. Unlike the passage just examined, this is nowhere explicitly identified as an *αἶνος*, but there is a convenient piece of external evidence to show that it was so regarded in antiquity: Theocritus *Idyll* 14.43 *αἶνος* θην λέγεται τις ‘ἔβ̄α Κένταυρος ἄν’ ὕλαν’. Jasper Griffin<sup>18</sup> has shown that, contrary to the assumptions of earlier scholars, Κένταυρος is the *paradosis* here (καὶ ταῦρος of the *codd.*

<sup>14</sup> For Odysseus’ submission to “the imperious necessities of the belly” see Griffin (above n. 9), p. 93f. For Odysseus’ attachment to possessions see Griffin, p. 94f.

<sup>15</sup> The whole passage in a sense combines the two Odyssean motifs of (i) concern for bodily welfare; and (ii) high valuation of possessions, mentioned in the last note. The importance of a *χλαῖνα* to keep out the cold anticipates the world of Hipponax (fr. 32.4, 34.1, 85.3 W.; cf. fr. 104.17) who had a fine eye for epic parody (fr. 128.1 W.). The evocation of Hipponax is not inappropriate, since the fragments in question do share features with the songs of mendicant beggars: see R.L. Merkelbach, *Bettelgedichte*, “Rh. Mus.” 95, 1952, 315f. = *Hestia und Erigone* (Stuttgart 1996), p. 117f.

<sup>16</sup> Cf. n. 14 above. Near the very climax of the poem, when Penelope is seeking to persuade the suitors to let the disguised Odysseus try his hand at the bow, she lists the rewards she will give him if he succeeds in stringing it (*Od.* 21.339ff.). The first line of the passage runs ἔσσω μιν χλαῖνάν τε χιτῶνά τε, εἴματα καλά. On the *Odyssey*’s motif of clothes as a gift for strangers cf. G.P. Rose, *The Swineherd and the Beggar*, “Phoenix” 34, 1980, 292f.

<sup>17</sup> Charles Dickens in a letter of February 1857 to John Forster (*The Letters of Charles Dickens*, ed. G. Storey and K. Tillotson, 8.280). The same point can be made about Demodocus’ song of Ares and Aphrodite: cf. Burkert, “Rh. Mus.” 103, 1960, 142 = *Homer: German Scholarship in Translation* p. 260: “Demodocus’ song... turns out on a spiritual level to belong fully to the *Odyssey*”.

<sup>18</sup> In *Owls to Athens* (Dover Festschrift, 1990), p. 122f.



ὥς καὶ σοὶ μέγα πῆμα πιφάυσκομαι, αἴ κε τὸ τόξον 305  
ἐντανύσῃς. (Od. 21.293ff.)

Five features near its end convincingly confirm this passage's status as an αἴνιος:

(1) ἐξ οὗ (303). Commentators regularly seem to take this phrase as *causal*<sup>20</sup>; but this is not the meaning, or at least not the primary meaning. Rather it is *temporal*: "since which time", "since when". Cf. ἐξότε (similarly at the start of an hexameter), at the end of the αἴνιος<sup>21</sup> about how mankind came to incur old age, in Nicander's *Theriaca* 355f.:

ἐξότε γηραλέον μὲν αἰὶ φλόον ἐρπετὰ βάλλει  
ὀλκήρη, θνητοὺς δὲ κακὸν περὶ γῆρας ὀπάξει.

In each case we have to do with a story which explains aetiologically how a mythical or fabulous happy state of affairs was brought to an end by some failing, *since when*<sup>22</sup> the less happy state with which we are now familiar has prevailed. ("Since when, a state of strife has existed between Centaurs and humans")<sup>23</sup>. Compare the Russian folk-tale whose final sentence runs "Since when there have been no more heroes in Holy Russia"<sup>24</sup>.

<sup>20</sup> So, e.g. Ameis-Hentze ("deshalb"), Fernandez-Galiano ("because of all this": his alternative suggestion – "masc. (referring to θυμῶ)" [at the end of the previous verse] – is even less attractive).

<sup>21</sup> See my remarks in "Mus. Helv." 44, 1987, 69ff., and cf. van Dijk pp. 134ff. Compare also the close of the *aition* concerning the origins of sacrifice in Hes. *Th.* 556f. ἐκ τοῦ δ' ἀθανάτοισι ἐπὶ χθονὶ φῶλ' ἀνθρώπων / καίουσ' ὅστεα λευκὰ βοδὸς δολίῃ ἐπὶ τέχνῃ (see Appendix 2 below), and ἐκεῖθεν in the fable at Callim. *Iamb.* 2 (fr. 192.5 Pf.), glossed ἔκτοτε by Dieg. VI.27. Cf. Karadagli (above n. 1) p. 149.

<sup>22</sup> Of course, such phrases may contain a *secondary* causal implication: "since when (and as a result of)". Karadagli (as cited above n. 1) pp. 133ff. assembles analogous instances of some such formula as οὕτω (τε) συνέβη ("and so it came about that") at the end of aetiological fables. For a more general analysis of such formulae at the end of aetiological tales see Lutz Röhrich, *Märchen und Wirklichkeit* (Stuttgart 1979), pp. 33ff. = *Folktales and Reality* p. 33f. He thinks they are likely to be "blosser Spielform", later accretions, artistic elaborations. Cf. my remarks in "CQ" 45, 1995, p. 2 n. 5, p. 3 n. 10, and compare Perry (cited below n. 29), p. 404 on a different type of concluding formula in Greek fable as "relatively late and spurious".

<sup>23</sup> V. 303 does *not* mean "thence sprang a νεῖκος (feud) between Centaurs and men" (so H. Hayman in his three volume text of and commentary on the *Odyssey* (London 1882), note on 21.297 (3.442), my italic; cf. his p. 439: "thence a standing quarrel arose"). Either "from that time sprang the feud (*scil.* that still goes on)", or the rendering I give above.

<sup>24</sup> Compare the witty modern parody of this formula in Lloyd-Jones and Wilson, *Sophoclea* (Oxford 1990), p. 126: "Neville Chamberlain used [*Ant.* 523] to justify his self-abasement before Hitler, since when Greek has never been quoted in the House of Commons". The original formula may also have had no very serious intention: see n. 22 above.

Such original happy states are the very stuff of fable: think, for instance, of the class that presupposes a primeval state of affairs where mankind and beasts shared the same language (ὄτε τὰ ζῷα ὁμόφωνα ἦν...) <sup>25</sup> and lived in harmonious amity. In just such a way, Antinous' αἶνος posits (in a mode untypical of Homer: see Appendix 1 below) a time when mankind and centaurs <sup>26</sup> lived in happy amity... until Eurytion's drunken antics ruined everything <sup>27</sup>. Note also ἐκ τοῦ at Hes. *Th.* 556, discussed in Appendix 2 below.

(2) οἱ δ' αὐτῶ πρωτῶ... εὔρετο (304). These words conjure up that im-

<sup>25</sup> See Karadagli (as cited above n. 1) p. 99f. (She also quotes a German fable which begins: "Früher muss es doch ganz anders gewesen sein als jetzt. Dazumal konnten die Tiere noch reden..."). Cf. Perry (as cited in n. 1) p. 505f. and Röhrich (cited in n. 22) pp. 75ff. ≈ pp. 77ff. See further K. Horn's article in *Enzyklopädie des Märchens* s.v. 'Freundschaft und Feindschaft' (5.299ff.), esp. subsection (3) 'Freundschaft und Feindschaft zwischen Tier und Mensch' (5.299ff.). This latter entry analyses a number of aetiological explanations of supposed antagonism between men and animals (e.g. the snake [p. 300]: cf. *Genesis* 3.15 and Nicander *Ther.* 355f. with my remarks in "Mus. Helv." 44, 1987, 69ff.) for which sometimes man is to blame, sometimes animal. Cf. *Enzykl. d. Märchens* s.v. 'Feindschaft zwischen Tieren und Mensch' (4.982ff.): e.g. (985f.) "first Lion and Man were on friendly terms, but then...". As Dr. Y. Sano reminds me, the generalised phrasing at v. 303 (Κενταύροισι καὶ ἀνδράσι) confirms this comparison (Κενταύροισι Λαπίθησί τε would have been metrically possible).

<sup>26</sup> Centaurs constitute a convenient ambiguity between the human and the animal world (see, e.g., Kirk, *Myth: its meaning and functions in ancient and other cultures*, Cambridge 1971, pp. 154ff.). It has been stated that the rôle of animals is absolutely essential to the operation of the Fable in general. See T. Spoerri's *Nachwort* ("Der Aufstand der Fabel") to *La Fontaine: 100 Fabeln* (ed. H. Hinderberger, Zurich 1965), p. 251: "Das Animalische ist keine Verkleidung, sondern Substanz... Es gibt kein besseres Mittel, den Menschen aus seinem Grössenwahn herunterzuholen, als dadurch, dass man ihn an seine Animalität erinnert". H. Hayman argued (as cited above, n. 23, vol. 2 p. cxxi f.) that "Homer's Centaurs are no more quadruped than Shakespeare's Caliban", and that the poet conceived of them as (more or less) human, but that seems unlikely (not least in view of v. 303's antithesis Κενταύροισι καὶ ἀνδράσι). Rather, Homer exploits the Centaurs' ambiguous position to move, for his own purposes, further towards an *animal* fable, without quite reaching that end.

<sup>27</sup> The effects of wine do seem to have served as the subject-matter of actual fable. Demetrius of Phaleron, the fourth century B.C. author of the earliest collection of Aesopic fables known to us (cf. B.E. Perry, "TAPA" 93, 1962, 288ff. and Introduction to the Loeb Babrius and Phaedrus p. xiii f.), recounted a story of how Dionysus invented three different clusters of grapes (symbolizing the various stages of drunkenness) of which the third makes its victim the slave of Ὑβρις [cf. Schwarzbaum (as cited in n.1) p. iv f. (cf. p.xl: n. 20)]. This concept is reflected as early as Panyassis of Halicarnassus fr. 13.7ff.: ἀλλ' ὅτε τις μοίρης τριτάτης πρὸς μέτρον ἐλαύνοι / πίνων ἀβλεμέως, τότε δ' Ὑβριος αἴσα καὶ Ἄτης / γίγνεται ἀργαλέη, κακὰ δ' ἀνθρώποισιν ὀπάζει. On the relevance of *Hybris* to Antinous and the suitors more generally see below n. 44.

plausible but immensely widespread figure of aetiology and popular imagination: the first individual to: get married, ... sleep around, although a married woman, ... or, as here, get drunk<sup>28</sup>.

(3) ὡς καὶ σοί (305). There can be no doubt that these words reflect precisely the sort of closing formula (found here alone in Homer) that marks the end of many fables as they move from the actual story to the specific circumstance(s) the fable has been cited to illuminate: οὕτω δὲ καὶ σύ / ὑμεῖς, *vos quoque* and the like. Cf. Arist. *Rhet.* 2.20.5 = Stesichorus TA8: οὕτω δὲ καὶ ὑμεῖς ὁρᾶτε μὴ βουλόμενοι τοὺς πολεμίους τιμωρήσασθαι κτλ.<sup>29</sup>

(4) The fable-formula thus identified has, in the present instance, been complicated (and partly obscured) by its dependence upon the if-clause that follows it: ὡς καὶ σοί μέγα πῆμα πιφάσσκομαι, αἶ κε τὸ τόξον / ἐντανύσης. But this *conditional* too is idiomatic at the close of a fable. Eduard Fraenkel<sup>30</sup> cited Soph. *Aj.* 1155 εἰ γὰρ ποήσεις, ἴσθι πημανούμενος as an example of the sort of admonitory reference to possible future bad consequences for the addressee which is sometimes found at a fable's end. One could add several instances from Babrius, usually set in the mouth of one of the characters in the fable. Thus *fab.* 47.13f. (the dying father warning his

<sup>28</sup> Cf. Menander fr. 142 Körte ἐξώλης ἀπόλοιθ' ὅστις ποτέ / ὁ πρῶτος ἦν γήμας, ἔπειθ' ὁ δεῦτερος, / εἶθ' ὁ τρίτος κτλ., Eubulus fr. 115 KA (5.258) with Kassel and Austin *ad loc.* (cf. Hunter's commentary *ad loc.* [his fr. 116]), Eur. *Hipp.* 407ff. ὡς ὄλοιτο παγκάκως / ἦτις πρὸς ἄνδρα ἦρξαι' αἰσχύνειν λέχη / πρώτη θυραίους with Barrett's note *ad loc.* Such passages can be consulted in collections of the motif of the πρῶτος εὐρετής or *primus inventor* (see "BICS" 36, 1989, p. 20 n. 17). Homer notoriously suppresses this figure (see Appendix 1 below) but v. 304's use of the words πρῶτῳ and εὕρετο in such close proximity is very suggestive. The point of our passage is not usually taken by translators: e.g. the Loeb (A.T. Murray, revised by G.E. Dimock, 2.333): "but it was for himself first that he found evil, being heavy with wine". Rather we should render, e.g., "but it was with himself as the first victim that he acquired [for this rendering of εὕρετο see my notes on Soph. *Tr.* 284 and 1177f.] the evil that is drunkenness". Note that Antinous is the *first* victim of Odysseus' bow.

<sup>29</sup> See further Soph. *Aj.* 1147, Ar. *Vesp.* 1432, Callim. *epigr.* 1.16 Pf. = *HE* 1291f. etc. Identified by Meuli (as cited above n. 7) p. 88 n. 3 = p. 755 n. 6, following the lead of Ed. Fraenkel, "Rh. Mus." 73, 1923, 366ff. = *Kl. Beitr.* 1.235ff. B.E. Perry, *The Origin of the Epimythion*, "TAPA" 71, 1940, 396ff. had already cited further examples (cf. now Karadagli [cited above n. 1] pp. 113ff.) and concluded (p. 397) that οὕτω or οὕτως was "commonly used to introduce the application of a fable from the fifth century B.C. down to the second century after Christ". If my interpretation of v. 305 is correct, we can trace a slightly less stereotyped version of the formula much further back in time.

<sup>30</sup> As cited in previous note pp. 368ff. = p. 237f. Technically, the conditional clause in the Sophoclean passage is part of the fable's *narrative*, but, as Fraenkel observes, a like threat is being implied for the fable's addressee.

sons there is strength in unity, and that sticks banded together cannot be broken): ἦν δ' ἄλλος ἄλλου χωρὶς ἦτε τὴν γνώμην, / πείσεσθ' ἕκαστος ταῦτά τῃ μιῇ ῥάβδῳ or (slightly disguised) *fab.* 130.10f. 'ἄλλ' εἰ τοιαῦτα', φησί, 'τοῖς φίλοις δώσει / τὰ δῶρα, πῶς σοί τις φίλος συναντήσῃ;' and 140.8 (the ant addressing the cicada) 'χειμῶνος ὄρχου', φησίν, 'εἴ θέρους ἠύλεις' (a vivid recasting of "if you pipe during the summer, you'll be reduced to dancing in the winter"). Compare further the probably spurious *epimythia* at *fab.* 60.5f. τότε ἄν λίχνος γένοιο μῦς ἐν ἀνθρώποις, / ἐὰν τὸ καταβλάπτων ἡδὺ μὴ παραιτήσῃ and 72.23f. ὦ παῖ, σεαυτὸν κόσμον οἰκείον κόσμει· / τοῖσιν ἐτέρων γὰρ ἐμπρέπων στερηθήσῃ (where the present participle is equivalent to an if-clause)<sup>31</sup>.

(5) This last passage is a reminder that another feature frequently to be found at the end of fables is *the imperative verb*. Fraenkel<sup>32</sup> quoted such instances as Soph. *Aj.* 1154 'ὄνθρωπε, μὴ δρᾷ τοὺς τεθηκῶτας κακῶς' and Ar. *Vesp.* 1431 'ἔρδοι τις ἦν ἕκαστος εἰδείη τέχνην' (where the third-person optative is equivalent to a second-person imperative). That imperative-equivalent there falls within the narrative part of the fable, but the very next line contains an imperative proper that applies the moral of the fable to the addressee: οὕτω δὲ καὶ σὺ παράτρεχ' εἰς τὰ Πιττάλου. Note also Callimachus *epigr.* 1.16 Pf. = *Hellenistic Epigrams* 1291f. Gow-Page 'τὴν κατὰ σεαυτὸν ἔλα'. From merely the first 30 fables of Babrius one may add *fab.* 9.9 (the fisherman to the fish) 'ἀναυλα νῦν ὀρχεῖσθε' (already in Hdt. 1.141.2 παύεσθέ μοι ὀρχεόμενοι), 10.11 (a negative version) 'μὴ μοι χάριν σχῆς', 13.12 (the farmer to the stork caught in the company of cranes) 'ἀπολῆ μετ' αὐτῶν τοιγαροῦν μεθ' ὧν ἦλως', 18.15 (the North Wind and the Sun) λέγει δ' ὁ μῦθος 'πράοτητα, παῖ, ζήλου', 20.6f. (Heracles to the ox-driver) 'τῶν τροχῶν ἄπτου / καὶ τοὺς βόας κέντριζε', 25.9 (the hares refraining from suicide) 'ἄψ νῦν ἴωμεν' (first-person plural subjunctive equivalent to an imperative), 26.10 (the cranes to each other) 'φεύγωμεν' (again subj. = imper.), and 29.5 μὴ λίαν ἐπαίρου πρὸς τὸ τῆς ἀκμῆς γαῦ-

<sup>31</sup> From the Latin fables of Phaedrus, Fraenkel (see previous note) cites from Perotti's Appendix (on which see Perry's Loeb text p. xcvi) 12.12ff. (p. 388 Perry), Aesop drawing the moral of a fable: *et tu nisi istum tecum assidue retines, / feroxque ingenium comprimis clementia, / vide ne querela maior accrescat domus* and the slightly different effect ("if only he/you had not been/done X, he/you would not have suffered Y and Z" at Phaedrus *fab.* 1.3.13ff. and 3.10.47ff. (cf. 3.3.16 and Perotti's Appendix 19.7f. [p. 400 Perry]).

<sup>32</sup> For Latin examples cf. Phaedrus *fab.* 1.2.29f. (Jupiter to the frogs) '*quia nolulistis vestrum ferre*', inquit, '*bonum, / malum perferte*', 22.8 (a man to a weasel), '*noli imputare vanum beneficium mihi*', 2.3.4f. (Aesop to a man) '*noli coram pluribus / hoc facere canibus*' etc. The imperative is also idiomatic as the final stage of a formal *rebuke*: see Appendix 3 below.

ρον. Only the last instance is an *epimythion* (like the probably spurious instance in 5.10 ἄνθρωπε [cf. Soph. *Aj.* 1154 cited above], καὶ σὺ μὴ ποτ' ἴσθι καυχῆμων) rather than the conclusion of a character within the fable. But the imperatives which Antinous aims at Odysseus, at the end of his oration (v. 310 πίνε τε, μηδ' ἐρίδαινε μετ' ἀνδράσι κουροτέροισι), are again perfectly at home as the climax of a fable.

Features (4) and (5) introduce a complication. As we have seen, Antinous' angry speech began with the apparent assumption that the disguised Odysseus was drunk (v. 293), and the fable he goes on to cite fits exactly that assumption. But now, when the logic of the fable's closing formula leads us to expect, e.g., 'so you too will receive a hideous punishment for your drunkenness... unless you sober up', what we find instead is: 'you too will be dreadfully punished... *if you succeed in stringing the bow*' (line 305f.: ὡς καὶ σοὶ μέγα πῆμα πιφάσκομαι, αἴ κε τὸ τόξον / ἐντανύσης)<sup>33</sup>. The carefully introduced fable goes awry in its application. We might speak of an *abuse* or *misuse* of the form<sup>34</sup>.

This may not be the only abuse at issue. I mentioned earlier (see p. 194) Karl Meuli's idea that fables were originally the weapon of the helpless or oppressed against the powerful. But at *Od.* 21.288ff. a fable appears to be being used by the powerful (Antinous) against the oppressed (Odysseus disguised as a beggar)<sup>35</sup>. What are we to make of this?

We may begin our answer by reviving a shrewd and important observation<sup>36</sup> concerning the tone of Antinous' speech and the style of his reference

<sup>33</sup> The oddity emerges all the more clearly if we compare (or rather, contrast) such normal instances of the formula as (cf. previous note) Ar. *Vesp.* 1432 οὕτω δὲ καὶ σὺ παράτρεχ' εἰς τὰ Πιπτάλου or Callim. *epigr.* 1.16f. Pf. οὕτω καὶ σύ, Δίω, τὴν κατὰ σαυτὸν ἔλα. The inconcinnity is further emphasised by the Ring Compositional pattern at 21.289f. ~ 309f. (see n. 36). Antinous begins by saying "you are drunk"; he ends by saying "sit and drink"! Various deletions of lines within our passage have been proposed (see the list *ad loc.* in Ameis-Hentze's *Kritische und exegetische Anhang*, p. 59) but this now seems an inappropriate way to remove such contradictions.

<sup>34</sup> For such 'abuse' see Appendix 2 below.

<sup>35</sup> Meuli observes (as cited above n. 7) p. 78f. = p. 744f., that, in contrast to the norm, fable is occasionally used by the mighty towards the less powerful: he adduces the instances of Cyrus addressing the Ionians (Hdt. 1.141: cf. Karadagli (cited above n.1) pp. 23 and 65) and Tiberius explaining his reluctance to change provincial governors (Josephus *Ant.* 18.174f.: cf. Karadagli p. 31). Meuli notes that the fable in such instances acquires an *ironic* tone ("dann nimmt sie gern ironisch drohenden Ton an"), and it might be argued that Homer has redirected such irony against the user of the fable.

<sup>36</sup> By R. Oehler, *Mythologische Exempla in der älteren gr. Dichtung* (Aarau 1925), p. 8f.: "Weil Antinous glaubt, einen ungebildeten Bettler vor sich zu haben, spricht er in dieser Weise, wie man eben einfachen Leuten eine Lehr gibt. Daher ist die breite Lehrhaftigkeit, die Wiederholungen zu verstehen. Auch die Person, an die das Exempletum ge-

to the centaur Eurytion. The observation was made some time ago and is in danger of being forgotten. It is that *the tone and style in question have been tailored to fit the ignorant old beggar Antinous imagines he is addressing*<sup>37</sup>. Antinous expresses himself as though he were speaking to a simpleton or child.

We might continue with a psychological point. The suitors have been unnerved by their failure to bend Odysseus' bow, and the old beggar's request for permission to try his hand is bound to jar. Underlying Antinous' bluster about inebriation is the intolerable thought that perhaps, after all, the old man might just succeed. The breakdown of the fable's logic, in the way analyzed above, aptly conveys this lurking fear.

But there is a point of wider application to be made. It has been observed that remarks made by Odysseus to the suitors, and by the suitors to Odysseus, increasingly exploit a deep vein of irony<sup>38</sup>. Thus, at the start of the

richtet ist, kann dessen Form beeinflussen". For ἀφέλεια ("simplicity") and σαφήνεια ("clarity") as characteristic of the Fable see Archibald as cited above (n. 2) pp. 21 and 24. Oehler himself thinks the story of Eurytion is a mythological *paradeigma* (the idea goes back to Eustathius' commentary, 259.28, 260.58); but his own words provide the best refutation of this notion, for the closest Odyssean analogue to a story whose form is tailored to fit its simple and lowly addressee is the αἴνος told to Eumaeus at *Od.* 14.457ff. (though that also matches Odysseus' beggar's disguise). For the Ring Composition which Oehler detects (*Od.* 21.289f. οὐκ ἀγαπᾶς, ὃ ἔκηλος ὑπερφιάλοισι μεθ' ἡμῖν / δαίνυσσαι ~ 309f. ἀλλὰ ἔκηλος / πίνε τε, μηδ' ἐρίδαινε μετ' ἀνδράσι κουροτέροισι) cf. *Od.* 14.468 εἶθ' ὡς ἠβώοιμι βίη τέ μοι ἔμπεδος εἶη ~ 503 ὡς νῦν ἠβώοιμι βίη τέ μοι ἔμπεδος εἶη. Nestor can elevate the brawl between Lapiths and Centaurs to fit a formal mythological *exemplum* at *Il.* 1.260ff. but the style there is *very different*. A. Heubeck, *Der Odyssee-Dichter und die Ilias* (Erlangen 1954), p. 25f., who also thinks our passage a *paradeigma*, and compares (not very aptly) Agamemnon's speech in *Il.* 19.95ff., notes (p. 26 n. 40) that instead of the σεμνότης of the Iliadic passage we find (stylistically speaking) ἰσχνότης in our lines.

<sup>37</sup> One might suppose the use of a fable would more naturally reflect the *status of its utterer*: this would seem to be the case with the αἴνος quoted by Menelaus at *Soph. Aj.* 1142ff. which has been taken to show that the speaker "has quite forgotten that he is a Pelopid" (cf. my remarks in "Hermes" 109, 1981, 251), though since Menelaus taunts his addressee Teucer with lowly birth (vv. 1120ff.) the standing of Ajax's illegitimate half-brother may also be relevant. At *Aesch. Ag.* 650ff. ξυνώμοσαν γὰρ ὄντες ἔχθιστοι τὸ πρὶν/ πῦρ καὶ θάλασσα καὶ τὰ πίστ' ἔδειξάτην κτλ. the herald reflects a common formula of fable, whereby two or three animals are described as φιλίαν or κοινωῶν σπεισάμενοι (see Karadagli, as cited in n. 1, p. 101f.). This is clearly meant to characterise the herald himself as 'homely' and non-heroic, a point worth stressing since, to the best of my knowledge, it has been overlooked by all commentators on the Aeschylean verse, as it is by West in his discussion of *Colloquialism and Naïve Style in Aeschylus* as used to characterise speakers (Dover Festschrift (see above n. 18) p. 3f.).

<sup>38</sup> Griffin cited above (n. 9) p. 62f. (This is the source of the two quotations given in the text below).

episode which directly leads into Antinous' αἶνος, when Leodes has failed to string the bow, he exclaims:

ὦ φίλοι, οὐ μὲν ἐγὼ τανύω, λαβέτω δὲ καὶ ἄλλος.  
πολλοὺς γὰρ τόδε τόξον ἀριστήας κεκαδήσει  
θυμοῦ καὶ ψυχῆς, ἐπεὶ ἦ πολὺ φέρτερόν ἔστι  
ἐνθάδ' ὀμιλέομεν, ποτιδέγμενοι ἥματα πάντα. (21.152ff.).

"That speech, evidently designed for the sake of its ironic opening, is truer than the speaker knows", comments Griffin. Or, to cite an example that directly involves Antinous, consider his reaction to Odysseus' thrashing of Irus:

Ἰεὺς τοι δοίη, ξεῖνε, καὶ ἀθάνατοι θεοὶ ἄλλοι  
ὅττι μάλιστα ἑθέλεις καὶ τοι φίλον ἔπλετο θυμῷ,  
ὅς τοῦτον τὸν ἄναλτον ἀλητεύειν ἀπέπαυσας  
ἐν δήμῳ· τάχα γὰρ μιν ἀνάξομεν ἡπειρόνδε  
εἰς Ἔχετον βασιλῆα, βροτῶν δηλήμονα πάντων.<sup>39</sup>  
ὡς ἄρ' ἔφαν, χαῖρεν δὲ κληδόνι δῖος Οδυσσεύς. (18.112ff.)

"Odysseus was pleased by the omen", Griffin observes, "for Antinous was unconsciously praying for his own death".

With such a background let us return to Antinous' αἶνος and see whether this – his very last utterance, be it noted, in the entire epic – offers any scope for irony. Eurytion the Centaur is mentioned as a warning example by Antinous to Odysseus, but which of the two men does he more remind us of, as he staggers about in drunken blindness and wreaks havoc in the house of Pirithous?<sup>39</sup> Fernandez-Galiano in his commentary on vv.

<sup>39</sup> The occasion of Eurytion's presence in the house of Pirithous was presumably the wedding of the latter to Hippodameia: see Frazer, Loeb Apollodorus 2 p. 148 n. 2; *LIMC* 8.1.685f. (Frazer overlooks Athen. 11.476B = Pind. fr. 166 Sn. (ἀνδρ)οδάμαν(τα) δ' ἐπεὶ Φῆρες δάεν / ῥιπὰν μελιαδέος οἴνου (cf. *Od.* 21.293), / ἔσσυμένως ἀπὸ μὲν λευκὸν γάλα χερσὶ τραπέζαν / ὄθειον, αὐτόματοι δ' ἐξ ἀργυρέων κεράτων / πίνοντες ἐπλάζοντο. There is a list of the opposing Lapiths and Centaurs at Hes. *Scut.* 178ff. Cf. Verg. *Georg.* 2.455ff. with Mynors *ad loc.*, Ov. *Met.* 12.296ff.). One may feel inclined (with Eustathius *ad loc.* (259.44ff.)) to detect a thematic link with the suitors' wish to marry Penelope. Note the further (alternative?) tradition linking Eurytion with a wedding: Bacchylides fr. 44 Sn., Apollod. *Bibl.* 2.5.5: Ἡρακλῆς δὲ εἰς Ὀϊνον πρὸς Δεξαμενὸν ἦκε, καὶ κατέλαβε τοῦτον μέλλοντα δι' ἀνάγκην μνηστεύειν Εὐρυτίῳ Κενταύρῳ Μνησιμάχην τὴν θυγατέρα· ὕφ' οὗ παρακληθεὶς βοθεῖν ἐλθόντα ἐπὶ τὴν νύμφην Εὐρυτιῶνα ἀπέκτεινε. Cf. H. Maehler in *One Hundred Years of Bacchylides* (edd. I.L. Pfeijffer and S.R. Slings, Amsterdam 1999), pp. 77ff. = *Bacchylides* ('Zetemata' 106, 2000) pp. 193ff. For the lubricity of centaurs see, for instance, Kirk, as cited in n. 26 above, pp. 152ff., esp. p. 154. For their susceptibility to wine cf. J. Griffin's remarks on the theme of *Wine in Vergil and others*, in the volume entitled *In Vino Veritas* (edd. O. Murray and M. Tecusan, 1995), p. 286. As he notes, Polyphemus the Cyclops shares this weakness

296-302 draws our attention to “the repeated word play” (ἄασ’... / ... ἄασεν... ἀασθείς / ... ἄτην)<sup>40</sup> which “emphasises the destructive moral blindness caused by ἄτη”. Does that reflect more upon Odysseus or upon Antinous? And when one considers the very last punishment itemised in the epic, the ghastly ‘living death’ inflicted by mutilation upon Melanthius at *Od.* 22.474ff.<sup>41</sup>, with details strikingly reminiscent of Antinous’ αἴνος, is this mere coincidence? or did the mightiest of the suitors inadvertently anticipate what would befall, after the suitors’ death, the henchman whom he had ordered to fetch fire to help them string the bow (*Od.* 21.175ff.)?<sup>42</sup>

Let us sum up. The author of the *Odyssey* was clearly acquainted with the genre of the fable; but he was no more inclined to use it than was the

(for similarities between Centaurs and Cyclopes see Kirk, p. 170f.).

<sup>40</sup> Though also relevant for the word-play and repetition is the supposedly simple mind of the beggar whom Alcinous thinks he is addressing (see above n. 36). Of v. 297 (ἐπεὶ φρένας ἄασεν οἶνον) Fernandez-Galiano *ad loc.* observes that Duentzer was right to emend (to οἶνος: so too Herwerden, “*Rév. Phil.*” 2, 1878, 195ff.), since “otherwise we are presented with the odd notion of the Centaur... misleading his own understanding, φρένας”. The emendation also completes a series of balanced and parallel statements: 293f. οἶνος σε τρώει μελιθηδής, ὅς τε καὶ ἄλλους / βλάπτει, 295f. οἶνος καὶ Κένταυρον... / ἄασ’, 297 φρένας ἄασεν οἶνος. Cf. n. 43 below.

<sup>41</sup> On which see my remarks in “CQ” 44, 1994, 534ff. I did there allude to the story of Eurytion (p. 535), without seeing its full significance. P.V. Jones’ commentary *ad loc.* (*Homer’s Odyssey: a Companion*, Bristol 1988) had seen it, and also understands (as did Stanford *ad loc.*) that irony is at work behind Antinous’ rebuke.

<sup>42</sup> A very subtle device on the poet’s part seems to confirm the ironic effect here, that the punished centaur resembles the suitors more closely than he does the supposed beggar. We are told how Eurytion, under the influence of drink, κάκ’ ἔρεξε δόμον κάτα Πειριθόοιο (v. 297). R. Hankey, ‘*Evil in the Odyssey*’, his contribution to the Dover Festschrift (see above n. 18), p. 89f., has pointed out that the phrase κακὰ ἔργα, which is most obviously cognate to κάκ’ ἔρεξε, “is reserved for the suitors, the Cyclops, etc.”, and is “not ascribed to Odysseus in his own persona”. (Interestingly, Telemachus’ indignant speech to the suitors at 2.70ff. points in the same direction: σχέσθε, φίλοι, καὶ μ’ οἶον ἔασατε πένθει λυγρῷ / τεیرهσθ’, εἰ μή πού τι πατὴρ ἐμὸς ἐσθλὸς Ὀδυσσεύς / δυσμενέων κάκ’ ἔρεξεν ἐυκνήμιδας Ἀχαιοῦς / τῶν μ’ ἀποτεινόμενοι κακὰ ῥέζετε δυσμενέοντες, / τούτους ὀτρύνοντες). Furthermore, as Hankey p. 89 observes, “Odysseus in his beggar-disguise is accused by Melanthius (17.226) and Eurymachus (18.362) of having learnt ‘evil actions’ (i.e. work-shy habits and insatiable greed)... the hyperbolic language tells us more about the characters of the speakers than about this particular beggar”, which constitutes a nearly exact parallel for the function of Antinous’ αἴνος. Finally (Hankey p. 91), “the suitor Ctesippus echoes the Cyclops in his mockery of the guest-gift convention (20.296-300, echoing 9.365-70); and the leading suitors, especially Antinous in Book 17, echo the Cyclops in a general way by their violent assaults upon a stranger”. The sub-human Polyphemus resembles the half-human Eurytion in his drunkenness under the influence of wine (see n. 39).

author of the *Iliad*, with the exception of two limited and specific episodes (14.457ff., 20.293ff.). In each of these episodes there is the idea of the fable fitting the lowly status of the addressee, in each a profound irony concerning the speaker is at work. The first has Odysseus, pretending to be someone else, relate an αἶνος which exemplifies the cunning resourcefulness of Odysseus, in ways totally in keeping with the ethos of the poem. But the second outdoes this in complexity and irony. It is now Odysseus who is the addressee, although his assumed identity is still very relevant. The infatuated Antinous, on the very brink of destruction, utters a lordly rebuke<sup>43</sup> patronisingly geared to the lowly intellect he imagines he is addressing. But, by a supreme irony, the tale of crime and punishment he relates is far more directly relevant than he can understand<sup>44</sup>. Within two hundred lines he himself will be dead<sup>45</sup>.

<sup>43</sup> The *anaphora* near the beginning of Antinous' αἶνος (21.293ff. οἶνος σε τρώει μελιηδής... / ... οἶνος καὶ Κένταυρον... / ἄσ') may be meant to convey an impression of sententious moralising. Cf. ὕβρις ... ὕβρις at Soph. *OT* 873ff. with the comments of Colin Austin, "CQ" 34, 1984, 233, *otium... otio... otium* at Catullus 51.13ff. with the examples and comments of Nisbet and Hubbard on Horace *Odes* 1.16.17 and 18 and on *Odes* 2.16.5. Likewise the generalising from Odysseus' own case to that of others (293f. οἶνος σε τρώει μελιηδής, ὅς τε καὶ ἄλλους / βλάπτει, ὅς ἄν μιν χανδὸν ἔλη μηδ' αἴσιμα πίνῃ) before the αἶνος proper is reached. Such initial generalisations usually present the reverse order (the experience of others and then the specific instance: cf. Soph. *Aj.* 486f., 646ff., *Tr.* 439ff., 497ff. etc.) but cf. Eur. *Med.* 1079f. (at the end of a speech) θυμὸς δὲ κρείσσω τῶν ἐμῶν βουλευμάτων / ὅσπερ μεγίστων αἴτιος κακῶν βροτοῖς.

<sup>44</sup> Perhaps it is the conspicuous placing in the narrative of Antinous' αἶνος, just before the poem's climax, that made it so famous in antiquity (as noted by Oehler (n. 36 above) p. 122 and Griffin (n. 18) p. 123, referring to later citations of οἶνος καὶ Κένταυρον in epigram (for the force of καὶ in καὶ Κένταυρον see Nisbet and Hubbard on Horace *Odes* 1.16.18, for the general link between Fable and Proverb cf. R. Dithmar in *Enzyklopädie des Märchens* s.v. 'Fabel' (4.731), for the more specific link in Greek literature see H. van Thiel, *Sprichwörter in Fabeln*, "Antike und Abendland" 17, 1971, 105ff.). Cf. Theog. 542 (ὕβρις) / ἤπερ Κενταύρους ὠμοφάγους ὀλέσῃ, Hor. *Odes* 1.18.7ff. *ac ne quis modici transiliat munera Liberi*, / *Centaurea monet cum Lapithis rixa super mero / debellata* etc. The explicit use by Theognis of ὕβρις in connection with the Centaurs, is a reminder that here too (cf. n. 42 above) Eurytion may resemble the suitors more than he does Odysseus (for ὕβρις used of their actions cf. *Od.* 1.227, 4.627, 15.329, 16.86, 410-418 etc.). For other proverb-like allusions to a fable cf. Ar. *Vesp.* 1431 ἔρδοι τις ἦν ἕκαστος εἰδέη τέχνην (for the context's status as a fable see Fraenkel [above n. 29] pp. 368ff. = p. 237f.) as referred to by Cic. *ad Att.* 5.10.3 *o illud verum 'ἔρδοι τις'* and τὴν κατὰ σαυτὸν ἔλα in Callim. *epigr.* 1 (cf. Karadagli (above n. 1) p. 86).

<sup>45</sup> The *Odyssey* is less inhibited than the *Iliad* in its references to drunkenness, and this is the background to the Odyssean "motif of the bloodstained celebration, of slaughter in the midst of festivity, with blood staining the table and being shed among the wine; the scene which we hear described movingly by the ghost of Agamemnon, and enacted trium-

φόνος δέ οἱ οὐκ ἐνὶ θυμῷ  
 μέμβλετο· τίς κ' οἴοιτο μετ' ἀνδράσι δαιτυμόνεσσι  
 μῶνον ἐνὶ πλεόνεσσι, καὶ εἰ μάλα καρτερὸς εἶη,  
 οἷ τεύξειν θάνατόν τε κακὸν καὶ κῆρα μέλαιναν;  
 (Od. 22.11ff.).<sup>46</sup>

St John's College, Oxford

MALCOLM DAVIES

### Appendix 1: Homer and the *πρῶτος εὑρετής*

It has been observed by A. Kleingünther<sup>47</sup> that neither *Iliad* nor *Odyssey* mentions the figure of the *πρῶτος εὑρετής* or *primus inventor* and that this omission must be deliberate. So, for instance, Hephaestus features on several occasions in the *Iliad*, and his prowess in handicraft is not overlooked; but he is never credited with those inventions of *τέχνη* which loom so large in later authors<sup>48</sup>. And yet the mythical figure of the 'first finder' or 'inventor' looks early and primeval, not a post-Homeric development.

phantly when Odysseus gets his hands on the bow and shoots Antinous as he drinks his wine at his ease" (Griffin [as cited above n. 39], p. 284). The *αἴνος* of *Od.* 21 belongs here and plays a key rôle in the movements towards the climactic death of Antinous. Here too the *αἴνος* fits beautifully the new ethos of the *Odyssey*, just like the *αἴνος* in *Od.* 14 (see nn. 14-16 above).

<sup>46</sup> *μαϊνόμενος* in *Od.* 21.298 requires comment. Most frequently used by Homer of *Iliadic* battle-frenzies (cf. *Lexikon d. frühgr. Epos* s.v. B1), its present reference to a frenzy induced by wine is unusual for epic (see *LfE*, as quoted 2b, citing only our passage and comparing Panyassis fr. 13.8 on which cf. above n. 27). E.R. Dodds, *The Greeks and the Irrational* p. 67, notes that Homer rarely mentions madness as such, and suggests that "we can... find in the *Odyssey* traces of the vaguer belief that mental disease is of supernatural origin. The poet himself makes no references to it, but he once or twice allows his characters to use language which betrays its existence". Dodds is thinking of *Od.* 18.327, ("Melantho jeeringly calls the disguised Odysseus *ἐκπεπαταγμένος*"), and *Od.* 20.377 ("one of the suitors is jeering at Odysseus, and calls him *ἐπίμαστον ἀλήτην*"). For the exact meaning of these words see Russo on the first passage and Dodds p. 84 n. 17 on the second (where Russo, I think, is astray. See further *LfE* s.v. [2.643]). The rhetorical terms *comparans* and *comparandum* illuminate the operation of Homeric similes, and also the functioning of the fable (see R. Dithmar in *Enzyklopädie des Märchens* s.v. 'Fabel' [4.731]): in comparing Odysseus to Eurytion, Antinous is aligning himself with other enemies of Odysseus who imply his wits are awry. But irony (the criticism applies more to the speaker), again operates: at *Od.* 20.345ff. the suitors laugh (under Athena's prompting) in a mad fashion, and at *Od.* 9.350 the hero uses the verb *μαίνεαι* of Polyphemus' hostility towards him (cf. nn. 42-43 above).

<sup>47</sup> ΠΡΩΤΟΣ ΕΥΡΕΤΗΣ: *Untersuchungen zur Geschichte einer Fragestellung* ("Philol." Suppl. 26.1, 1933), pp. 9ff. On the general issue involved see D. Ward's article in *Enzyklopädie des Märchens* s.v. 'Kulturheros' (8.593ff.).

<sup>48</sup> See Kleingünther as cited in the previous note, 'Namen- und Sachverzeichnis' s.v. 'Hephaistos'.

Kleingünther fails to put his finger on the really key consideration<sup>49</sup>: Homer has as little time for this figure as he normally does for the fable, because both represent 'popular' ways of looking at the world which are incompatible with his dignified genre of epic. The *πρῶτος εὐρετής* is a species of that primitive and widespread phenomenon the 'culture hero', and as such is alien to the Homeric world. No Palamedes, therefore, in either epic; and deities like Demeter or Dionysus, whose main function is to be the 'first inventor' of such benefits to mankind as grain or wine<sup>50</sup>, are very rarely mentioned<sup>51</sup>.

Kleingünther's survey of this theme of the *πρῶτος εὐρετής* happens to throw up an instance<sup>52</sup> of a *Mischwesen's* first encounter with wine that might seem a partial parallel to Eurytion the centaur's. In the *Dionyskos* of Sophocles (*TrGF* 4 F 172 Radt) the satyrs' astonished reaction is thus conveyed: *πόθεν ποτ' ἄλυπον ᾧδε / ἠῦρον ἄνθος ἀνίας*; One thinks also, of course, of the Cyclops' first encounter with wine in *Odyssey* 9 and the Euripidean satyr play.

### Appendix 2: Hesiod Theogony 535ff.

Since West's great commentary is uncharacteristically reticent on the fable-like aspects of this passage, I append a few comments as they relate to my discussion above. As West says (in his note on vv. 507-616, p. 305), "the Prometheus myth is aetiological through and through", and the passage beginning at 535 is an *aition* which explains why mankind enjoys the better portion of animal meat at a sacrifice to the gods. The event that is relevant "must be the one that took place at the end of the period when men and gods lived and ate together" (West on 535), in other words, one aspect of the story relates to the fabular notion considered above (p. 199) of a primeval and happy state of affairs involving harmonious amity (between men and gods, men and Centaurs, or men and animals, for instance) which is brought to an end by a specific event. West on 507-616 (p. 306) refers to "the *myth* of a time when men and gods regularly dined together" (my italics), but one of the sources he quotes is "Babr. *Prol.* 13", the whole context of which makes us think

<sup>49</sup> As far as it goes, his observation that Homeric epic had no concern for origins and beginnings in the past (p. 10) is important and enlightening: contrast Pindar (see M.A. Grant, *Folktale and Hero-Tale Motifs in the Odes of Pindar* (Kansas 1967), pp. 57ff. and 65). Cf. W.K.C. Guthrie on *The Religion and Mythology of the Greeks*, in *CAH* ii.<sup>2</sup> Ch. 40 p. 34 = p. 887: "Homer was not interested in the origin of things. He accepted the world as he found it, and his poems show only faint and occasional traces of a knowledge that it was not always so". In this respect, the implication of a different, earlier state of affairs which *Od.* 21.293ff. contains, is very uncharacteristic of Homer.

<sup>50</sup> For Dionysus as inventor of wine see Kleingünther (above n. 47) pp. 35, 55, 110 and 144f. For Demeter as inventor of grain see his 'Namen- und Sachverzeichnis' s.v. 'Demeter' and 'Triptolemos'. Kleingünther p. 12 observes the association between the *πρῶτος εὐρετής* and *aetiologies* (on which connection see further K. Thraeder, *Das Lob des Erfinders*, "Rh. Mus." 105, 1962, 174f.).

<sup>51</sup> See the remarks in my article *Homer and Dionysus*, "Eikasmos" 11, 2000, 15ff.

<sup>52</sup> As cited above (n. 45) p. 92f. He observes that the *πρῶτος εὐρετής* will have been Dionysus.

more in terms of the *fable*: θνητῶν δ' ὑπήρχε καὶ θεῶν ἑταιρεία. / μάθοις ἂν οὕτω ταῦτ' ἔχοντα καὶ γνοίης / ἐκ τοῦ σοφοῦ γέροντος ἡμῖν Αἰσώπου / μύθους φράσσοντος τῆς ἐλευθέρης μούσης. Prometheus (like Zeus) often features in fables associated with the origins of man<sup>53</sup>. As for Hesiod's account in the *Theogony*, "it has long been recognised that in the original story Zeus did not see through the trick, but was thoroughly deceived... The statement that he was not... (though he acted as if he was) is manifestly inserted to save his omniscience and prestige" in a manner "quite typical of Hesiod" (West on 551). In the naïve world of the Fable, Zeus can often thus be circumvented: think, for instance, of the way in which the dung-beetle thwarts the eagle's plan to preserve its eggs in the lap of Zeus<sup>54</sup>. Hesiod's attempt to save Zeus' face is a later sophistication which we may deem a *misuse* or *abuse* (cf. above p. 202) of the fable's function. Apart from its general aim of explaining a feature of the ritual of sacrifice, Hesiod's narrative at 539 (καλύψας γαστρί) may give "an incidental *aition* for a culinary practice" (West *ad loc.*), and one recalls how the αἴνος at Nicander *Ther.* 344ff. not only explains how it came about that mankind has to grow old and die, but also, at v. 375f., why the snake called *dipsas* has (in accordance with its name) an insatiable thirst. Finally, ἐκ τοῦ at v. 556, like ἐξ οὗ in *Od.* 21.303 or ἐξότε at Nic. *Ther.* 355, means "since when", and refers to the present state of affairs whose origin the aetiological fable has set out to explain<sup>55</sup>.

### Appendix 3: Antinous' speech as rebuke

In emphasising those features of vv. 293ff. which are redolent of fable (p. 202f.), I controverted, in passing, Heubeck's view that the lines constitute an *exemplum*, with its characteristic tripartite structure [thesis (293-4), exemplification (295-304), restatement of thesis (305-10)], and I observed that such a three-fold structure is also at home in the fable. Professor Elizabeth Minchin has pointed out to me that Antinous' speech could with greater justice be accorded the four-fold structure typical of *rebukes* in Homer (cf. ἐνένιπεν at v. 287). Thus we find (to cite only a few of the parallels Professor Minchin has drawn to my attention):

(1) *introductory words of reproach*: ἄ δειλὸν ξείνων (v. 288): cf. *Il.* 6.326 δαιμόν', 23.570 Ἀντίλοχε, πρόσθεν πεπνυμένε, *Od.* 23.166 δαιμονίη, κτλ. etc.

(2) *a statement of the problem*: ἐνὶ τοι φρένες οὐδ' ἠβαιαὶ κτλ. (vv. 288ff.): cf. *Il.* 6.327ff. λαοὶ μὲν φθινύθουσι περὶ πτόλιν αἰπὺ τε τείχος / μαρνάμενοι· σέο δ' εἵνεκ' αὐτῆ τε πτόλεμος τε κτλ., 23.571ff. ἥσχυνας μὲν ἐμὴν ἀρετὴν, βλάψας δέ μοι ἵππους κτλ., *Od.* 23.166f. περὶ σοί γε γυναικῶν θηλυτεράων / κῆρ ἀτέρρανον ἔθηκον Ολύμπια δώματ' ἔχοντες.

(3) *a view of the problem from a broader perspective*: οἶνος σέ τρώει μελιηδής, ὅς τε καὶ ἄλλους / βλάπτει, ὅς ἂν μιν χανδὸν ἔλη μηδ' αἴσιμα πίνη (293-4): cf. *Il.* 6.329f. σὺ

<sup>53</sup> See e.g. the Index of Fables in Perry's Loeb translation of Babrius and Phaedrus s.v. 'Prometheus' and 'Zeus'.

<sup>54</sup> Perry Loeb Appendix 3: here too an *aition* is probably involved: see Davies and Kathirithamby, *Greek Insects* (London 1986), p. 3f.

<sup>55</sup> See nn. 22-25 above.

δ' ἄν μαχέσαιο καὶ ἄλλω / ὄν τινά που μεθιέντα ἴδοις στυγεροῦ πολέμοιο, *Od.* 23.168ff. οὐ μὲν κ' ἄλλη γ' ὦδε γυνὴ τετληότι θυμῶ / ἀνδρὸς ἀφεσταίη κτλ.

(4) *a proposal for making amends*: ἀλλὰ ἔκηλος / πίνέ τε, μηδ' ἐρίδαινε μετ' ἀνδράσι κουροτέροισιν (309f.); cf. *Il.* 6.331 ἀλλ' ἄνα, μὴ τάχα ἄστυ πυρὸς δηΐοιο θέρηται, 23.581ff. εἰ δ' ἄγε δεῦρο, διοτρεφές, κτλ., *Od.* 23.171f. ἀλλ' ἄγε μοι, μάϊα, στόρεσον λέχος, ὄφρα καὶ αὐτὸς / λέξομαι κτλ.

What sets our passage somewhat apart is the elaboration of stage (3) by means of a fable, as the four-fold rebuke of Achilles and Agamemnon by Nestor in *Iliad* 1 [(1) = 254, (2) = 257-8, (3) = 255-6, (4) = 259ff.] is elaborated by an *exemplum* (see n. 36 above). That the imperatives in *Od.* 21.310 are at home as the close both of a fable and of a set rebuke serves as a warning against too strictly formalistic approaches to such passages. But when coupled with recognition of, e.g., the patronising tone of Antinous' speech and its unhomeric concern with aetiology, these formal features are valuable confirmation of the fable-like function of Antinous' final intervention.

M. D.