

NOTES ON PLUTARCH. DE AUDIENDO

There are a number of passages in which future editors of Plutarch's *De audiendo* should pause for thought before following Paton (1). Sometimes it is a question of preferring other variants: e. g.

37 D p. 76.3 *φρονοῦσιν ἀποβολὴν* C² M² a A Z n D.

40 C p. 81.16 *εὐθύναν* (hoc accentu) X v K.

41 B p. 83.1 *ἐνδεχόμενοι* D.

43 B p. 87.2 *ἡ φυσικὴν δύναμιν* C M² a A Z n h D.

44 C p. 89.6 *τούτῳ* C¹ G X v K J W Y N D.

44 F p. 90.7 *ἀποκαλῶν* L C.

45 E p. 91.22 *εὐθύναν* (hoc accentu) G X v K W Y N¹ h.

For the most part these are changes that would come automatically with an improved understanding of the MS tradition and better collations of the MSS (2). But there are also passages where the reliability of

(1) W. R. Paton - I. Wegehaupt - M. Pohlenz, *Plutarchi Moralia*, vol. I, Leipzig 1925, the standard edition; it has been reprinted with *Addenda et corrigenda* by H. Gärtner, Leipzig 1974. Other editions to which I refer are: D. Wytttenbach, *Plutarchi Moralia*, vols. I (text), Oxford 1795, and VI (commentary), Oxford 1810. R. Hercher, *Plutarchi Moralia*, vol. I, Leipzig 1872. G. N. Bernardakis, *Plutarchi Moralia*, vol. I, Leipzig 1888. F. C. Babbitt, *Plutarch's Moralia*, vol. I, London-Cambridge, Mass. 1927. I also refer to the following translations: G. Xylander, *Plutarchi Chaeronensis Moralia*, Basle 1570. J. Amyot, *Les oeuvres morales et meslées de Plutarque*, Paris 1572. T. G. Tucker, *Selected Essays of Plutarch*, Oxford 1913. F. C. Babbitt, as above. Other abbreviations used are: Arndt-Gingrich = W. F. Arndt - F. W. Gingrich, *Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament and Other Early Christian Literature*, Cambridge-Chicago 1957. LSJ = H. G. Liddell - R. Scott - H. S. Jones, *Greek-English Lexicon*, 9th ed., Oxford 1940. Wytttenbach, *Lexicon* = D. Wytttenbach, *Plutarchi Moralia*, vol. VIII: *Index Graecitatis*, Oxford 1830. These notes are based on material that originally appeared in my *An Edition with Commentary of Plutarch: De Audiendo* (D. Phil. thesis, Oxford 1975), and my thanks go to my supervisors, Mr D. A. Russell and Mr N. G. Wilson; to my examiners, Mr E. L. Bowie and Prof. R. Browning; and to Prof. F. H. Sandbach, who also was kind enough to read and criticize the thesis. An earlier draft of parts of this article had the benefit of being scrutinized by Mr M. D. Reeve.

(2) I have discussed the MS tradition at length in the introduction to my text and commentary, pp. lxxi - cxvii, and hope to publish a revised version of this elsewhere.

the tradition is in question, and this article is concerned with some of these. The passages are printed as they stand in Paton's text; the apparatus is based on my own collations, but presents the readings of the seventeen MSS cited by Paton (3).

38 C p. 77. 15-19 ἐπεὶ ὅτι γε πάσης ἀκροάσεως ἀπειργόμενος ὁ νέος καὶ λόγου μηδενὸς γευόμενος οὐ μόνον ἄκαρπος ὄλως καὶ ἀβλαστῆς διαμενεῖ πρὸς ἀρετὴν, ἀλλὰ καὶ διαστρέφειτ' ἂν πρὸς κακίαν, ὥσπερ ἐκ χῶρας ἀκινήτου καὶ ἀργῆς ἄγρια πολλὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀναδιδούς, δῆλόν ἐστι

ἄκαρπος ὄλως... διαμένει (-μενεῖ Madvig)... διαστρέφειτ' ἂν D: ἄκαρπος ὄλος... διαμένει... διαστρέφειτο Z n: ἄκαρπος ὦν ὄλως (ὄλος G vKYJM a A N, ὁ λόγος X)... διαμένει... διαστρέφειτο rell.

i. The reading of the archetype was presumably ἄκαρπος ὦν ὄλως... διαμένει... διαστρέφειτο. This comes under suspicion on several counts. a. The ὦν looks wrong. There are no true parallels for διαμένω with the participle of εἰμί (4), whereas Plutarch does often construct it with adjectives (5). b. If the optative is to be retained, an ἂν is probably needed (6). c. Even so, the combination of the optative with the present indicative does not seem very satisfactory (7). Paton's reaction to all this was to follow D, incorporating Madvig's suggestion of writing the future διαμενεῖ (8). This certainly results in a possible text, but it should not be accorded too much authority; both the ἂν (9) and the omission of

(3) The inclusion of S in the list on p. 75 is an error. I use Paton's sigla except that I have dispensed with his I', II, and Δ, and use *codd.* for *codices omnes* and *rell.* for *codices omnes praeter citatos*. I follow Paton here out of convenience. For the textual problems I am discussing there is little or no need to be concerned about the finer points of the tradition.

(4) In fr. 47.39 and Arist., Eth. Nic. 1159 b 8-9 there is more point to ὅμοιος ὦν: 'being alike'.

(5) E. g. 696 A-B, 702 C, 723 E, 725 B, and many of the other references in Wytttenbach, *Lexicon*, s. v. See also Arndt-Gingrich, s. v.

(6) Cf. A. Hein, *De optativi apud Plutarchum usu*, Trebnitz 1914, 72 ff. He argues that unlike some other authors of the period, Plutarch is classical in always having ἂν with the potential optative; apparent exceptions are due to corruption.

(7) Hein, *op. cit.*, 76, refers to 708 D for the combination of optative and present indicative, but there the verbs do not balance one another in the way that they do in the present passage. It may be noted that on the same page Hein quotes our passage along with Cat. Mi. 15. 3 for the combination of optative and future indicative, but without indicating that the future is by emendation.

(8) J. N. Madvig, *Adversaria critica ad scriptores graecos*, vol. I, Copenhagen 1871, 615; accepted by Hercher and Bernardakis, but not Babbitt.

(9) For a reading peculiar to D that is obviously a conjecture cf. 41 D p. 83. 22.

ὦν (10) may be the outcome of conjecture at different stages. I am inclined to prefer the emendation proposed by Pflugk and Halm: ἄκαρπος ἄν' ὕλως... διαμένοι (-μένοι iam Amyot) διαστρέφειτο (11). To suppose that the ἄν accounts for the corrupt ὦν at this point provides a more satisfactory explanation of the facts of the MSS, and the text that results is at least as good (12).

ii. At the end of the sentence the MS text has to be understood as 'making to grow from his soul, as though from idle and untilled earth, a wild crop'; the construction of τῆς ψυχῆς is idiomatic, and can be paralleled many times from Plutarch and elsewhere (13). But there are several reasons for feeling uneasy about this interpretation. a. As Castiglioni argued, in the idiomatic construction supposedly used here, the natural word order would be τῆς ψυχῆς ἄγρια πόλλ' ἀναδιδούς, though there are exceptions (14). b. Generally speaking, ἀναδίδωμι is used of the earth bringing things forth, though it is sometimes found with a plant as subject (15). c. In the earlier part of the sentence the young man is thought of in terms of a plant (n. b. ἀβλαστής) and to have a young man=plant putting forth wild crops from his mind-soil is perhaps slightly strained. Given that Plutarch's imagery elsewhere shows signs of strain (16), this last point hardly constitutes an objection to the text. But we may, and probably should, meet the first two points by accepting Hirschig's easy emendation ἀναδιδούσης (17). The sense becomes 'his soul putting forth wild crops as though from idle and untilled earth' (18).

(10) For conjectures that appear in both D and Z n cf. 38 E p. 78. 8 and 41 F p. 84. 13.

(11) J. Pflugk, "Zeitschr. Altertumsw.", 2nd series, 6, 1848, 889; C. Halm, *ibid.*, 1st series, 9, 1842, 1035 (Pflugk died in 1839). For Amyot see J. Jäger, *Zur Kritik von Amyots Uebersetzung der Moralia Plutarchs*, Bühl 1899, 38.

(12) ἄν must come after οὐ μόνον, and may be regarded as having gravitated towards its idiomatic early position in the clause to which it belongs; cf. Mar. 46. 4, Cat. Ma. 5. 6, etc.

(13) 46 D p. 93. 16-17; other examples in H. A. Holden, *Plutarch's Life of Themistocles*, 3rd ed., London 1892, 177. I have not been able to see "Rend. Ist. Lomb.", series II A, 64, 1931, 879 ff., to which Castiglioni (see n. 14) refers.

(14) L. Castiglioni, "Boll. fil. class." 33, 1926, 85. An exception is 606 D.

(15) For the normal use see 131 F, 913 A, Cam. 15. 3, and many of the instances given by Wytttenbach, *Lexicon*, s. v. For an exception see 138 D.

(16) E. g. R. Flacelière, *Plutarque: Sur les oracles de la Pythie*, Le Puy 1936, 29.

(17) G. A. Hirschig, "Philologus" 5, 1850, 346; accepted by Castiglioni (see n. 14), S. A. Naber, "Mnem.", new series 28, 1900, 90 (also wanting to delete ἐκ), Gärtner (see n. 1).

(18) The soul is thought of as the earth. For the soul putting forth things from

38 E p. 78. 9-13 ταῖς μὲν οὖν ὄρνισι τῆς ὑπηνεμίου λοχείας ὠδῖνας ἀτε-
λῶν τινων καὶ ἀψύχων ὑπολειμμάτων ἀρχὰς λέγουσιν εἶναι, τῶν δ' ἀ-
κούειν μὴ δυναμένων νέων μὴ δ' ὠφελείσθαι δι' ἀκοῆς ἐθισθέντων ὑπη-
νέμιος ὄντως ὁ λόγος ἐκπίπτων 'ἀκλειῆς αἰδήλος ὑπαὶ νεφέεσσι κε-
δάσθη''

τῆς ὑπηνεμίου λοχείας ὠδῖνας Wilamowitz: τὰς ὑπηνεμίους (-ος N¹) λοχείας
καὶ ὠδῖνας rell.

The only possible interpretation of the MS text is as follows: 'In the case of birds they say that the windy bringing-to-births and labour pains (i. e. wind-eggs) are the beginnings of imperfect and lifeless remnants'. But this is unsatisfactory sense. a. The windy speech of young men is the product of poor listening, and accordingly in the comparison we expect to be told that wind-eggs are the products (rather than the beginnings) of something. b. ὑπολείμματα is not the term we would expect for what results from wind-eggs; see further below.

Emendation is required, but at what sense should we aim? a. Aristotle's own account of wind-eggs (τὰ ὑπηνέμια) is that they come from fetations (κυνήματα) that arise without copulation (ἀνευ ὀχείας) as a result of lack of discharge (ἀπόκρισις) of seminal matter (ὑλὴ σπερματική): i. e. wind-eggs are unfertilized eggs (19). b. But he twice refers to what he considers to be an incorrect view: περὶ τῶν ὑπηνεμίων τινὲς εἰώθασιν λέγειν ὡς οὐ γιγνομένων ἀλλ' ὡς ὑπολειμμάτων ἐκ προτέρας ὀχείας ὄντων· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ ψεῦδος and οἱ δὲ λέγοντες ὅτι ὑπολείμματά ἐστι τὰ ὑπηνέμια τῶν ἐμπροσθεν ἐξ ὀχείας γενομένων, οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγουσιν: i. e. wind-eggs are the remnants of earlier conceptions (20). As in the previous sentence Plutarch has said that in speech receiving well comes before emitting well, ὥσπερ τοῦ τεκεῖν τὸ συλλαβεῖν τι καὶ κατασχεῖν τῶν γονίμων (sc. πρότερόν ἐστιν), we might expect him to adopt Aristotle's view and draw a comparison between wind-eggs= unfertilized eggs and windy speech rather than to liken windy speech to something left over from a previous conception. But his use of the word ὑπόλειμμα (21), which Aristotle uses in both reports of the view he finds unsatisfactory

itself cf. 1026 D τὸ γὰρ παθητικὸν ἀναδίδωσιν ἐξ ἑαυτῆς ἡ ψυχή.

(19) The main account is in Gen. An. 750 b 3 ff.

(20) Gen. An. 751 a 10 ff. and Hist. An. 559 b 21 ff.

(21) ὑπολημμι- in MSS other than n N h D, but the variation is trivial, especially with so uncommon a word. Plutarch's use of λέγουσι proves nothing, and he should not be interpreted as necessarily following Aristotle in this. He can refer to authorities in this way (i) when he knows their identity, and (ii) when he has a single author in mind. Cf. D. A. Russell, *Plutarch*, London 1973, 112; A. Gudeman, *Aristoteles: Poetik*, Berlin-Leipzig 1934, 9.

but nowhere else in his accounts of wind-eggs, seems to me to be decisive in showing that it is this other view that Plutarch is utilizing. In this case, the sense required from an emendation is something like Babbitt's: 'It is said that when fowls labour and bring forth wind-eggs, these result from some imperfect and infertile residue from conception'. But his ὀχείας for ἀρχάς is not very persuasive (22); ὑπολείμματα ὀχείας is not a natural way of saying 'residue from conception' (rather ἐκ προτέρας ὀχείας), and εἶναι with the plain genitive meaning 'result from' is dubious. I like M. D. Reeve's suggestion that ἀρχάς be replaced by some word meaning (e. g.) 'evacuation'. But as he himself points out to me, Plutarch's ὑπολείμματα is asking a lot of his readers if not further explained. Perhaps we may combine these suggestions and write (e. g.) ὑπολειμμάτων <ἐκ τῆς προτέρας ὀχείας> ἔκκρισιν λέγουσιν εἶναι (23).

As for Wilamowitz's emendation, I am quite unclear what sort of improvement that is meant to be. He ought not to have tampered with the pair (24); see 264 B ἦν (sc. Artemis) ταῖς λοχείαις καὶ ταῖς ὠδίῳιαι γυναικες ἐπικαλοῦνται, 282 C, 495 B, 982 F (25).

39 B p. 79. 4-6 καὶ γὰρ τὸν Ἐπαμεινώνδαν ὁ Σπίνθαρος ἐπαινῶν ἔφη μήτε πλείονα γινώσκοντι μήτ' ἐλάττονα φθεγγομένῳ ῥαδίως ἐντυχεῖν ἐτέρῳ

The MS text is possible: 'that he had scarcely ever met with any man either of greater judgement or of fewer words' (Tucker). For ῥαδίως in these circumstances cf. Phoc. 4. 3 Φωκίωνα γὰρ οὔτε γελάσαντά τις οὔτε κλαύσαντα ῥαδίως Ἀθηναίων εἶδεν (26). But it is worth contrasting the aorist ἐντυχεῖν with the perfect of the same verb in 592 F - 593 A (same anecdote) αἰεὶ δῆπου λέγει μηδενὶ πη τῶν καθ' ἑαυτὸν ἀνθρώπων ἐντετυχηκέναι μήτε πλείονα γινώσκοντι μήτ' ἐλάττονα φθεγγομένῳ and Rom. 9. 7 νεοσσοῖς γυπὸς οὐ ῥαδίως ἴσμεν ἐντετυχηκότες (27). This leads me to think that Hartman correctly proposed ῥαδίως

(22) E. Harrison, "Class. Rev." 42, 1928, 130, but accepted by R. M. Jones, "Class. Phil." 23, 1928, 78.

(23) Also possible for 'evacuation' would be ἀπόκρισις, though neither word can be precisely paralleled for this context.

(24) Accepted by him in Euripides: Herakles, 2nd ed., Berlin 1895, vol. III, 223.

(25) I have not referred to earlier literature on this difficult passage; it adds little of value.

(26) Also Lyc. 31. 5, Dem. 8. 3. These are the best of the parallels cited by Wyttenbach in his note on this passage. Cf. also I.SJ s. v. ῥάδιος B. 1. 3.

(27) Cf. also Aristox., fr. 54 A Wehrli τοῦτον (Spintharus) λέγειν ὅτι οὐ πολλοῖς αὐτός γε πιθανωτέροις ἐντετυχηκὼς εἴη...

<άν> (28). For the result cf. 394 E τῶν γὰρ ἄλλων οὐδενὶ ῥαδίως ἂν ἐντύχοις κατὰ πόλῳ, though this is not an exact parallel in sense.

40 A p. 80. 18-22 λυθείσης δὲ τῆς ἀκροάσεως πρὸς οὐδενὶ τῶν εἰρημένων οὔσαν (sc. τὴν διάνοιαν) ἀλλὰ τὰς φωνὰς καὶ διαθέσεις τῶν παρόντων ἐπιψήφίζουσιν, καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἐπαινοῦντας ὥσπερ ἐμμανεῖς φεύγουσαν καὶ ἀποπηδῶσαν, προστρέχουσιν δὲ καὶ συναγελαζομένην τοῖς ψέγουσι τὰ εἰρημένα καὶ διαστρέφουσιν...

ἐμμανεῖς Wilamowitz: ἐμμανῇ codd.

This is part of a long sentence describing the effect of envy on a listener's mind. Wilamowitz's conjecture creates a scene of people running away from a madman. One could argue for this as a possibility (29), but it has little to recommend it in the present context. a. Given that this long sentence describes the behaviour of a διάνοια distracted and confused by envy, what could be more natural than that its actions are described as frenzied?(30) b. The phrase ὥσπερ ἐμμανῆς seems to mean not so much 'like a madman' as 'in a frenzy'; cf. Plutarch's description of an elephant: ἀνέστρεφε πάλῳ ὥσπερ ἐμμανῆς ἀνατρέπων καὶ διαφθείρων τοὺς ἐντυγχάνοντας (Pyrrh. 33. 6).

40 B p. 81. 4-7 τοῖς μὲν οὖν κατορθουμένοις ἐπιλογιστέον ὥς οὐκ ἀπὸ τύχης οὐδ' αὐτομάτως ἀλλ' ἐπιμελεία καὶ πόνῳ καὶ μαθήσει κατορθοῦται, καὶ μμητέον ταῦτα θαυμάζοντάς γε δὴ καὶ ζηλοῦντας...

μμητέον C G X v K J: μμητέον γε rell. (deest I.)

The γε after μμητέον is unlikely to be an intrusion, and should be retained as genuine. One suspects that Paton rejected it to avoid the repetition brought about by the γε δῆ. But it is this second γε that is to be questioned. Though γε δῆ is a known combination of particles (31), its normal use is to emphasize the preceding word, and in the present passage it is hard to see what would be the point of such emphasis. Mo-

(28) J. J. Hartman, *De Plutarcho scriptore et philosopho*, Leiden 1916, 30.

(29) Cf. E. R. Dodds, *The Greeks and the Irrational*, Berkeley-Los Angeles 1951, 68 with n. 22.

(30) As M. D. Reeve points out to me, ἀποπηδῶσαν may offer some support to ὥσπερ ἐμμανῇ; 'jumping around' is a natural concomitant of insanity, and may be illustrated by, e. g., Eur., *Bacch.* 1094; Aesch., *Prom. vinct.* 675 f. But perhaps ἀποπηδῶσαν is not supposed to give quite this picture; note the same pair in 977 D: animals do not help one another, ἀλλὰ φεύγει καὶ ἀποπηδᾷ πορρωπᾶτω γιγνόμενα τοῦ τετραμένου καὶ θνήσκοντος ('flees jumping away from?').

(31) Cf. J. D. Denniston, *The Greek Particles*, 2nd ed., Oxford 1954, 244-246. See also the examples collected by Wytttenbach in his note on the present passage.

reover, *θαυμάζω καὶ ζηλώω* is a clear example of a Plutarchean pair (32), and I have noticed no instance in Plutarch of *γε δὴ* being used with a pair of this kind. The simplest solution is to read *τε δὴ* explaining *δὴ* as emphasizing the *τε*, i. e. the pairing; cf. Phoc. 34. 4 *ἐλευθέροις τε δὴ καὶ αὐτονόμοις*, Cleom. 13. 3 (33). An alternative would be D. A. Russell's *τε [δὴ]*.

40 C p. 81. 18-20 *ῥᾶστον γάρ ἐστι τῶν ὄντων τὸ μέμψασθαι τὸν πλησίον, ἀχρήστως τε καὶ κενῶς γινόμενον, ἂν μὴ πρὸς τινα διόρθωσιν ἢ φυλακὴν ἀναφέρηται τῶν ὁμοίων*

Plutarch has argued that on finding faults in others we must look for those same faults in ourselves. Sense seems to demand that what he goes on to say is: 'For criticizing one's neighbours is the easiest thing in the world, but it is useless and vain unless...'. Neither the *τε* of the MSS nor Wilamowitz's *γε* is satisfactory; each results in lame apposition (34). Wyttenbach was surely right to follow Amyot's lead and conjecture *δέ* (35). As he says, we may then supply *ἐστὶ* from the previous clause: 'but is a uselessly and vainly done thing unless...'. He quotes 143 E *τοῦτο δ' οὐχ ἀπλῶς γιγνόμενόν ἐστιν* and 534 B *ὀρθῶς καὶ δικαίως γινόμενόν ἐστιν ὑπὸ τῶν νοῦν ἔχόντων* for '*γινόμενόν ἐστι* pro *γίγνεται*'. But see 599 C *τὸ λυπεῖσθαι καὶ τὸ ταπεινοῦν ἑαυτὸν ἐπὶ παντὶ μὲν ἄχρηστόν ἐστι καὶ γινόμενον κενῶς καὶ ἀνοήτως*, which suggests a different way of looking at all these passages: *γινόμενον* with an adverb takes the place of an adjective.

44 B p. 88. 23-27 *πολλοὶ γάρ εἰσιν οἱ κακῶς καὶ παρὰ μέλος τὴν Πυθαγόρου φωνὴν ὑπολαμβάνοντες. ἐκεῖνος μὲν γὰρ ἐκ φιλοσοφίας ἔφησεν αὐτῷ περιγεγονέναι τὸ μηδὲν θαυμάζειν· οὗτοι δὲ τὸ μηδὲν ἐπαυεῖν μηδὲ τιμᾶν, ἐν τῷ καταφρονεῖν <τὸ φρονεῖν> τιθέμενοι καὶ τὸ σεμνὸν ὑπεροψία διώκοντες.*

τὸ φρονεῖν add. Tucker *τίθενται... διώκουσιν* Z n¹

(32) Occurring at 85 A, 471 A, 476 C, Dio 36. 3, Mar. 35. 1, Luc. 21. 3, Arist. 2. 1, 27. 7; and note the nouns at Aem. 39. 6.

(33) Cf. Denniston, *op. cit.*, 259 f. The effect of the *δὴ* can also be to emphasize the word or phrase preceding the *τε*; this interpretation is no good here because then *τε δὴ* would be no improvement on *γε δὴ*. (J. J. Reiske, *Plutarchi quae supersunt omnia*, vol. IV, Leipzig 1776, 354, proposed *γε δὴ* at Phoc. 34. 4).

(34) The parallel in 88 E does not defend this since there the *ἄλλως* makes all the difference: *ἔξει τι χρήσιμον ἐκ τοῦ λοιδορεῖν, ἄλλως ἀχρήστου καὶ κενοῦ δοκούντος εἶναι καὶ ὄντος*.

(35) In his commentary, but not his text; also conjectured by Hercher, Hartman, *op. cit.*, 30, Pohlenz (ap. Paton). Amyot has 'mais' at this point.

This is a well-known crux (36). It seems to me that a correct text and interpretation must satisfy two main requirements. a. Plutarch says that many people misinterpret what Pythagoras said. This cannot mean that they disagree with his view that *μηδὲν θαυμάζειν* is the advantage that comes from philosophy. The point is rather that they too reckon this to be the advantage, but do not interpret the phrase in the manner intended by Pythagoras; *θαυμάζειν* is ambiguous between 'be amazed at' (cf. *θαῦμα καὶ θάμβος* in the next sentence, p. 88. 28) and 'admire'. This consideration rules out texts that rely on supplying an idea from the previous clause: 'But they < say that the advantage gained from philosophy is > praising and honouring nothing'. For this reason I find Paton's text unsatisfactory. b. When Plutarch says *τὸ σεμνὸν ὑπεροψία διώκοντες*, he means that they pursue something not in itself undesirable by means of something that is (37). Similarly, when he says *ἐν τῷ καταφρονεῖν τιθέμενοι*, he must mean that setting something desirable (cf. *τὸ σεμνόν*) as their aim, they reckon disdain (cf. *ὑπεροψία*) to be identical with, or a means to, it. Therefore *τὸ μηδὲν ἐπαυεῖν μηδὲ τιμᾶν* cannot be the object of *τιθέμενοι*. Tucker's insertion of *τὸ φρονεῖν* is an excellent suggestion (38).

Assuming that the participles *τιθέμενοι* and *διώκοντες* are sound (39), we also need a finite verb. This points to emendation along the following lines: *οὗτοι δὲ τὸ μηδὲν ἐπαινεῖν μηδὲ τιμᾶν <προαιροῦνται, τὸ φρονεῖν> ἐν τῷ καταφρονεῖν τιθέμενοι...* (40). However, there are other possibilities: e. g. *οὗτοι δὲ <e. g. σφάλλονται> τὸ μηδὲν ἐπαυεῖν μηδὲ τιμᾶν ἐν τῷ |κατα|φρονεῖν τιθέμενοι...* (41). In these circumstances it seems best to obelize: after *οὗτοι δέ* and before *τιθέμενοι*.

(36) See, e. g., S. C. Larsen, *Studia critica in Plutarchi Moralia*, Copenhagen 1889, 52-54. But there are few points of value in all the earlier discussions. MSS other than D have *μηδένα ἐπαυεῖν*, but this does not affect the point at issue.

(37) This distinction between the two qualities may be illustrated from Dio 8. 1 *ὑπεροψίαν τὴν σεμνότητα καὶ τὴν παρρησίαν ἀνθάδειαν ἀποκαλοῦντες*.

(38) In his translation (p. 295) and before that in "Class. Quart." 3, 1909, 101, though Paton prints it as his own.

(39) For another case of Z and n having an ancestor that interfered see 43 F p. 88. 8.

(40) Moving *τὸ φρονεῖν* to enable the two supplements to be put into the one lacuna was suggested to me by D. A. Russell. On the other hand, we cannot now invoke homoeoteleuton to explain the falling out of these words.

(41) The idea of deleting *κατα* comes from a conjecture of Meziriac's reported in Wytenbach's note here. For *ἐν τῷ φρονεῖν τιθέμενοι* cf. 32 D.

44 C p. 89. 6-7 ὁ δ' ἐναντίος αὐτῷ πάλιν τούτων, μηδὲν ἐπικρίνων ἀλλὰ κατὰ ῥῆμα καὶ συλλαβὴν ἐφιστάμενος καὶ κεκραγώς...

ἐφιστάμενος C a² A n D: ἀνιστάμενος G² ἐπιστάμενος rel. (deest I.)

The tradition being divided between ἐφιστάμενος and ἐπιστάμενος, it is clear that ἐπ- gives no sense, and consequently editors print ἐφ-. But there is no agreement about the meaning of this (42), and in fact no available meaning is of any use in this context (43). Of possible emendations, ἀνιστάμενος (G²), 'standing up', is not inappropriate (44). But 'standing up at every word and syllable' strains the imagination, and I prefer Emperius's ἐξιστάμενος (45). This would mean 'being distraught', a common idea in contexts of listening (46). If 44 C p. 89. 9-10 ἀνασοβῶν καὶ συνεξανιστάς is correctly interpreted as 'rousing and exciting' (47), it may support this emendation.

44 C p. 89. 11-14 οὐδὲν δ' ὠφεληθεὶς διὰ τὸ ταραχώδη καὶ πολυπτόητον αὐτῷ παρὰ τοὺς ἐπαίνους γεγονέναι τὴν ἀκρόασιν ἀπέρχεται τῶν τριῶν ἐν φερόμενος· εἴρων γὰρ ἢ κόλαξ ἢ περὶ λόγους ἀπειρόκαλος ἔδοξεν εἶναι.

παρὰ Wilamowitz: περὶ codd.

This is from a description of the type of listener who praises everything indiscriminately. It is at first sight difficult to see how αὐτῷ (apparently redundant after the passive ὠφεληθεὶς) and περὶ τοὺς ἐπαίνους fit into the sentence (48). a. Wilamowitz dealt with περὶ by emending it to παρά, 'because of' (49). But this predominantly late use of παρά does

(42) Xylander, 'insistens acclamat'; Tucker, 'punctuates with loud cheers'; Babbitt, 'hangs intent'.

(43) But I suspect that ἐφ- originated as an attempted improvement on ἐπ-.

(44) Cf. Amyot, 's'élève'. Note 41 C p. 83. 10 πηδήματα.

(45) A. Emperius, *Opuscula philologica*, Göttingen 1847, 324; printed by Hercher, and approved by Hartman, *op. cit.*, 31.

(46) For the same word cf. Dio Chrys. 32. 65 καὶ ἀκούσῃσι κιθάρας ὅποιάσῃ ἐξωτάται καὶ φρίττειν κατὰ μνήμην τὴν Ὀρφέως and probably [Plat.], *Menex.* 235 A 7-8 (there is a variant); the examples given by I.SJ s. v. B. II. 3 are less good. For the idea see also Longin. 1. 4 (ἔκστασις).

(47) For this interpretation cf. (i) 713 A and (ii) Plat., *Lys.* 206 A 9 and Xen., *Cyr.* 2. 4. 20.

(48) E. g. Tucker goes astray in translating 'thanks to his applause deranging the lecture and making an imbroglio of it...'. Moreover, I.SJ s. v. πολυπτόητος puts our passage under the meaning 'timorous'.

(49) Cf. Arndt-Gingrich s. v. III. 5.

not seem to be Plutarchean (50), and the problem of αὐτῷ remains untouched. b. More helpful is Larsen's suggestion that some participle be inserted: e. g. *περὶ τοὺς ἐπαῖνους <σπεύδοντι>* (51). This disposes of any problem about *περί*, and points the way to an interpretation of αὐτῷ, viz. 'on account of his listening (52) having become for him a matter of confusion and excitement in his eagerness to praise'. *πτοία* is essentially a reaction of people, and the point must be that the lecture is a source of *πτοία* to the listener, αὐτῷ. Since Plutarch several times couples *ταραχή* with *πτοία* (53), it seems best to interpret *ταραχώδης* (which is anyway found of the mind) (54) along the same lines as *πολυπτόητος* rather than make it refer to uproar in the lecture-room.

There is, then, something to be said in favour of following Larsen. But I wonder whether it may not be just possible to extract the same sense from the MS text. Wyttenbach construes *περί* after *πολυπτόητος* (55), and this may give us what we need: 'on account of his listening having become for him a matter of confusion and excitement over praise'.

45 B-C pp. 90. 27 - 91. 1 *ἐκεῖνα μὲν γὰρ ἤδη καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ὕλως ἀποτυγχάνοντας ὥσπερ ἐγκύκλια καὶ κοινὰ πάσης ἀκροάσεώς ἐστι, καθέδρα δὲ τις ἄθρυπος καὶ ἀκλυῆς ἐν ὀρθῷ σχήματι καὶ πρόσβλεψις αὐτῷ τῷ λέγοντι καὶ...*

δὴ Paton: δέ codd.

i. Plutarch is giving a list of courtesies that are expected or are shown towards even lecturers who are complete failures. The only possible translation of *ὥσπερ ... ἐστι* seems to be 'are routine (as it were) and common to all listening'. But this is hardly satisfactory. a. The meaning of *ἐγκύκλιος* required here, 'routine', is generally speaking so common, though it happens not to be paralleled in Plutarch (56), that one hesitates to believe that Plutarch would treat it as a metaphor in need of a qualifying *ὥσπερ*. b. It would be more natural for Plutarch to say that there

(50) Without searching systematically, I have noted only *Caes. 39. 7*, where however 'in the danger' might suffice.

(51) Larsen, *op. cit.*, 54 f. Another possibility for the participle would be *σπουδάζοντι*.

(52) This seems a little better than 'the lecture', though either is possible.

(53) Cf. 38 A p. 76. 22, and see further Wyttenbach's note on 83 D.

(54) Cf. *LSJ s. v. II. 3*.

(55) As *πτοία* is constructed with *περί*; cf. *LSJ s. v. II*.

(56) So far as can be gathered from Wyttenbach, *Lexicon s. v.*, Plutarch's use of this adjective elsewhere is either literal (1024 D, *Num. 11. 1*) or to do with *παιδεία* (*Alex. 7. 2*).

exist certain *obligations* even towards speakers who are complete failures (57), and what follows reads to me like a justification for laying down requirements (58). I suspect, then, that something has fallen out, and suggest reading ἐγκύκλια < δίκαια >: 'are as it were routine rights common to all listening'. For ἐγκύκλια δίκαια cf. [Demosth.] 25. 74 ᾧ γὰρ οὐδὲ τῶν ἴσων οὐδὲ τῶν ἐγκυκλίων δικαίων μετουσίαν διδόασιν οἱ νόμοι, and for κοινὰ δίκαια cf. Per. 29. 4 αἰτιώμενοι πάσης μὲν ἀγορᾶς, ἀπάντων δὲ λιμένων ὧν Ἀθηναῖοι κρατοῦσιν εἶργεσθαι καὶ ἀπελαύνεσθαι παρὰ τὰ κοινὰ δίκαια καὶ τοὺς γεγενημένους ὅρκους τοῖς Ἑλλησιν (59)

ii. Given that καθέδρα begins a list to which ἐκεῖνα points forward, δέ cannot stand. But Paton's δῆ has nothing to recommend it except palaeography. Better would be Wyttenbach's τε (60), but I prefer to delete δέ altogether as intrusive (note the earlier μὲν), following Vat. gr. 1010 though omission there may well be by error rather than conjecture.

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(57) Tucker's translation 'are but ordinary items of common *etiquette* for any and every audience' introduces this idea of obligation, but goes beyond the Greek in doing so.

(58) Another disputed passage. I believe that p. 91. 4-8 provides the comparison and p. 91. 8-13 the inference from it, and that therefore we should think seriously about reading οὕτως for ὥσπερ at p. 91. 8. Xylander translated 'sic' at this point, as was noted by Wyttenbach; cf. also Hartman, *op. cit.*, 31 f.

(59) For the latter see also Cam. 17. 8, Polyb. 2. 58. 7.

(60) In his text; accepted by Hercher, Bernardakis, and Babbitt.