Just accepted

32 In 2022, in Bordeaux due to a structural oversupply, grape growers’ syndicates have asked to 33 reimplement premiumized grub-ups in order to bring the market back to equilibrium. However, 34 in today’s CMO no legal basis exists to conduct such a policy. In this article, we go over the 35 policy of planting rights (transformed in 2016 into planting authorization) and of premiumized 36 grub-ups. In undertaking this historical review of Europe’s grubbing up policy, we analyze in 37 detail Pierre Bartoli’s 1982 thesis and studies of the Observatoire de l’Hérault (Dyopta) that 38 take into account experts’ opinions and statistical viewpoints. This review enables us to present 39 the main indicators in order to “objectively” analyze data that we received from a 2007/2008 40 grubbing up campaign in Hérault. Our originality is the analysis of a subset consisting of 341 41 Viniflhor applications for grubbing up premiums, which represents 20% of all beneficiaries 42 receiving premiums. The applications were later sent with the applicants’ consent to a 43 development agency that transmitted them to us. Within this subset, we selected 51 grape 44 growers with whom we conducted a qualitative and quantitative survey. Our goal was to 45 identify their real motivations for grubbing up their vines. We then put forward synthesized 46 results explaining the qualitative interviews and run the data through an econometric model. 47 The main results are that many grape growers grubbed up only a small fraction of their 48 vineyards mainly to cash in on the premiums in times of dire wine crisis. Grubbing ups of young 49 “improving varietals” reinforces this analysis. Furthermore, the 2007/2008 grubbing up 50 campaign comes a year just before the 2008/2011 Fischer-Boel grubbing up campaigns that 51 wanted to reduce Europe’s vineyard of 175,000 ha of vines by eliminating the least efficient 52 grape growers. We thought it would be interesting to shed light on this 2008 wine CMO policy 53 by using the results of the 2007/2008 grubbing-up campaign


Introduction 63
Unlike the New World's viticulture, the potential of the European grape production is 64 controlled through planting rights introduced by the 1976 wine CMO and planting authorizations 65 since 2016 and the 2013 CMO 1 . Planting rights gave the EU the possibility to control the area planted 66 in vines and therefore participated to the long-term regulation of the wine market. Historically, the 67 UE wine market was also controlled by other short-term methods such as distillation, but it is another 68 method that has attracted our attention: grub-ups and specifically premiumized ones. Interestingly, it 69 seems that one could imagine grub-ups as the flip side of planting rights: the EU commission enlarges 70 the area planted in vines by issuing additional rights and diminishes it by introducing permanent grub-71 ups. Currently under the 2013 CMO, premiumized grub-ups are no longer available as a policy tool 72 to control the production potential of European vineyards. However, today in 2022, Bordeaux's grape 73 growers' syndicates are seeking to reintroduce a legal framework to be able to use them.

1976 wine CMO: adoption of "(Re)planting 5 rights and grubbing premiums 112
In 1976, facing social tension, the European Commission decided to manage the capacity of 113 wine production by prohibiting the planting of any new vines and by doing so recreated de facto 114 "(re)planting rights." In other words, a grape grower could only plant an area of vines if he had 115 previously grubbed up an equivalent area. Simultaneously, the European Commission created 116 premiums for grape growers grubbing up their vines to compensate the suspension of their rights to 117 plant for six years (Council Regulation (EEC) No. 1163/76) [7]. 118 Later, premiums for permanent grub-ups, resulting in the permanent disappearance of planting 119 rights, appeared and were maintained through the following wine CMOs [8]. Economically, this 120 policy had an impact on the wine market: until the middle of the '90s grubbed-up areas brought the 121 European wine market to a general quantitative equilibrium [9]. Other measures concerning 122 restructuring, favoring the transition to PGI and PDO have participated in a better adaptation to the 123 market. From the 1988/1989 campaign to the 2004/2005 one, premiumized grub-ups resulted in the 124 permanent disappearance of roughly 500,000 ha of vines in all of the EU [10]. Figure 1 gives the 125 share of the grubbing-up budget in the wine CMO budget from 1993 to 2005 (light green). In regard 126 to the dimensions of the EU vineyards, on a period going from 1990 to 2007, the French ones grew 127 on average from 4 ha to 9 ha, the Spanish ones from 3.5 ha to 5.5 ha, the German ones from 2 to 3.5 128 ha and the Italian ones from 1 ha to 1.5 ha. However, there is still a large number of small vineyards 129 left and some were even created during the 2007/2012 grubbing campaigns as a result of splitting the 130 vineyards in order to be able to receive the premiums. From 2010 to 2020 changes appear as 131 restructuring financed by the CAP becomes the principal policy tool affecting Languedoc vineyards 132 instead of CMO ones such as planting rights and grubbing-up campaign [11]. 133 The introduction of the 1999 wine CMO 6 refined the management of planting vines in the 140 EU 7 . This reform arrived in the midst of fears of an insufficient wine supply, at least in certain 141 markets, due to: (1) the systematization of premiumized grub-ups from 1976 to 1997, (2) three 142 consecutive small harvests (1995/1996; 1996/1997; 1997/1998) [13] and (3) flawed diagnostics made 143 during the 1993/1994 amendment of the previous wine CMO [14,15]. In refining its management, 144 the 1999 wine CMO created a reserve system to save forsaken or unused planting rights and clearly 145 distinguished three categories of planting rights: (1)  The European Commission's proposal took into account the hardships of the European wine 202 sector, which were linked to a never before witnessed worldwide overproduction of 50 to 60 million 203 extra hectoliters 10 [24,25]. This crisis impacted to a certain degree all wine actors, including Australia 204 and other countries from the New World and the southern hemisphere. The economic situation 205 worsened in the EU due to an internal decrease of wine consumption in the traditional wine producing 206 countries and a significant increase in imports of New World wine entering northern European 207 markets, especially the United Kingdom. The European Commission concluded that this situation 208 existed due to a lack of competitiveness from the European producers because their farm sizes were 209 too small [26]. 210 In its communication "Towards a sustainable European wine sector," the European 211 Commission retained the scenario "Profound Reform of the CMO-Variant B-Two-step" and 212 justified its choice by stating: "The first phase is restoring market balance and the second phase is 213 building improved competitiveness, including the abolition of planting rights. The principal feature 214 of variant B would be a structural adjustment, i.e., temporarily reactivating the grubbing-up scheme. 215 The system of restrictions on planting rights would be extended until 2013, when it would expire. 216 The least competitive wine producers would have a strong incentive to sell their planting rights or to 217 grub up with subsidies. Rapidly, competitive producers can be expected to focus more on the 218 competitiveness of their enterprise, as the cost of planting rights will no longer hamper expansion. In 219 the medium to long term this would represent a reduction in their fixed production costs" [19]. This 220 scenario would span 5 years, aim to grub up 400,000 ha and allocate 2.4 billion euros towards 221 premiums. Incentives were also given to grape growers to act quickly as the value of the premiums 222 plantings has had some effect on the balance between supply and demand in the wine market, it has 235 at the same time created an obstacle for competitive producers who wish to respond flexibly to 236 increased demand."-recital 58 and finally "Where producers consider that the conditions in certain 237 areas are not conducive to viable production, they should be given the option of cutting their costs 238 and permanently withdrawing these areas from wine production and should be enabled either to 239 pursue alternative activities on the relevant area or to retire from agricultural production 240 altogether."-recital 68. 241 Through these recitals the grubbing-up policy appears to intervene simultaneously on supply 242 and efficiency with objectives to respectively eliminate planting rights 13 and foster economies of scale 243 in grape farms. It is also put forward as a way to eliminate the least productive producers, by enticing 244 then with a premium. Article 102 "procedure and budget" defines how to target the least productive 245 grape grower through a set of rules prioritizing the access to the premium. Priority is given to those 246 (1) grubbing up the entirety of their vineyard or completely ceasing their wine-related activity and 247 (2) to applicants aged 55 or higher. Furthermore, premiums increase with the yield and decrease in 248 the second and third years as shown in Errore. L'origine riferimento non è stata trovata.. This 249 gradualness is part of the European Commission's tradition, as it believes that it should compensate 250 the loss in revenue in proportion to the yield 14 . 251 This grubbing-up policy was successful as EU countries used a 100% of the available budget 252 and seamlessly reached the 175,000 ha target and 160,550 once the application files were treated 15 . 253 13 Planned next was the liberalization of vine planting by making disappear all planting bans (i.e. planting rights). The start of this plan ranged from 2015 to 2018 and many reasons in the text supported and motivated their definitive disappearance. But as the deadline approached, many European professionals and many locally elected representatives questioned the soundness of this deregulation as they feared disastrous consequences. 14 Delord and al. (2016) have questioned the relationship between yield, size and profitability in viticulture [18]. 15  Simultaneously to the implementation of three grubbing-up campaigns, the 2008 wine OCM 257 (CE n° 479-2008) reorganized the management of viticulture by means of the NSPs, "the national 258 support programs". These programs provided a fixed budget for each country and gave each 259 Member State (MS) the possibility to choose its objectives "à la carte within a menu", and with the 260 possibility of doing so at the regional level. By doing so, Europe was thus giving itself other means 261 of continuing to improve its viticultural performance, in particular by three preferred means in 262 are not attained. In the south of France [11], with the exception of Charentes exposed to strong 273 growth in demand for cognac, local limits have not been very much used. Hérault area planted in 274 vines has stabilized around 80,500 ha since 2011, after having lost 40,931 ha from 1988 to 2010 275 with the permanent abandonment premium [31]. 276 Grape growers use today CAP tools, such as restructuring instruments, that let them get 277 financial help in order to plant improving varietals, change the distance between rows, changing the 278 canopy management, introduce irrigation, improve environmental aspect such as planting hedges. 279 But it appears that the CAP's tools are not sufficient to replace the effects of a grubbing up 280 campaign in regard to bringing the market back to equilibrium, particularly in on a regional market. Languedoc-Roussillon [35]. 300 Past research has already been conducted in Hérault on grub-up motivation, particularly the 301 study done by Pierre Bartoli and Marc Meunier in 1982 [36]. In "La politique de reconversion 302 viticole : résultats de la prime d'arrachage en Languedoc-Roussillon 1976-79" 17 [37] the goal was 303 to examine the consequences of the distribution of sizes on production systems. They wanted to 304 understand the farmers' governing motivations, their adequacy with the wine policy and analyze the 305 socio-economic situation. This study showed the importance of the gap between the objectives set 306 forth for reconversion premiums and the actual results. This gap appeared not only at the level of 307 zones and farm structures, but also at the one dealing with the types of grubbing-up implemented 308 and their reasons. improving varietals. The study also showed "that from 1988 to 1991, the reasons for grubbing up 316 gathered from the analysis are diffuse. Their results show that premium value arrived in first place 317 (83% of grub-ups received a premium). A need for diversification is also very present (80%) and 318 it is hard to dissociate decision-making elements, such as retirement (30%), family reasons (24%) 319 from a need for cash (10%)" [38]. However, they did not precisely state their survey's sources and 320

methodology. 321
Nevertheless, this study cites through "experts' statements" the possible motivations for primed 322 grub-ups: "(1) some grape growers that are dealing with hardships, take advantage of this chance to 323 improve finances (grubbing up small surfaces), (2) small farms (<5 ha), farmers that will retire soon 324 and have nobody to takeover, will be the first concerned, (3) for certain farms the whole area may be 325 grubbed up" [38, p. 16]. We find the same reasoning that had been expressed by the European 326 Commission as the study cites their arguments and explicitly leans on them. 327 Our analysis also aims to complete and further advance these previous works by pinpointing the 328 real motivations (economic and social) that push grape growers to permanently grub up, partially or 329 totally, their vines. This leads to a finer analysis of the adequacy between the actual grub-ups and the 330 future objectives set forth by the policy within the 2008 wine CMO. 331

Our analysis of the 2007/2008 grubbing up campaign 332
Any economic policy decision taken at a level as aggregated as viticulture in Europe cannot take 333 into account all the situations of grape growers and all their motivations for grubbing up their vines. 334 Few data have been published on either the age of grape growers or on their economic performance 335 to justify the a priori choices made. Being considered as common knowledge was enough to make  This was authorized by the 1999 wine CMO, adopted at the French national level and defined 346 regionally by the "interprofessions" (inter-professionnal organisations) as they had the possibility to 347 exclude any appellation or any varietals within an appellation from being grubbed up 19 . 348 There are several reasons for doing so (1) because precise data on the 2008 wine CMO grubbing-349 up scheme is extremely hard to encounter due to privacy rules and (2) according to experts (INAO 350 and FranceAgriMer) this data may not be representative as rumor is that some grape growers split-up 351 their grape farms and made their elderly grandparents owners of the areas to be grubbed up in order the consequences of the economic crisis due to falling prices and that grubbing-up premiums were 359 also a means of survival for many grape growers, as they could use these premiums to reimburse bank 360 loans contracted to purchase land or to plant vines in order to meet the '90s new qualitative 361 orientation. The 2004 supply crisis was followed by a strong demand crisis in 2008 due to the 362 subprime mortgage crisis, which extended hardships for grape growers and increased their resort to 363 grubbing up. 364

Hypotheses 365
Using a typology of grape growers, we state the following hypotheses on their use of premiums 366 resulting from permanently grubbing up their vines: 367 -Freshly installed young grape growers facing a budget and indebtedness crisis: for them, 368 premiums will be of great help in facing current farm expenses and to pay back loans and 369 debt. 370 -Grape growers near retirement: grub-up premiums guarantee them a decent retirement. 371 20 "The study clearly illustrates the crisis. The majority of winemaking farms from Languedoc Roussillon cannot survive with the actual wine prices. We add to this the deficiency of the yields. Sacrifices have been made to 'hold on' (few private withdrawals) but we note strong restrictions on investments (on average €10,000 per farm in 2007, €6,000 in 2008)" [42]. 21 "The Languedoc-Roussillon economy: 90% of the grape-growing farms appears to be in financial hardship. The CER (Center of rural economy) of Languedoc-Roussillon presented this week an alarming report on the financial situation of the region's grape growing farms. According to this study conducted within the scope of the regional wine production observatory, the financial situation of the wine-growing farms has strongly deteriorated within the last three years" [43]. 22 "In reality it's mostly Languedoc-Roussillon that is going to grub up its vineyards. The crisis is here, worst and more profound than anywhere else and the winemakers' cash reserves are totally depleted" [44].
-Grape growers that can no longer face the crisis: their belief is that grape-growing has no 372 future in the region and has become a rewardless enterprise. Therefore, they decide to grub 373 up their vines and with the help of the premiums, they invest in other crops (wheat, fruits, 374 vegetables, etc.). They may reorient themselves towards other sectors they deem more

The sources of information: 341 Viniflohr application files 381
Viniflhor 23 manages premiumized grub-ups in France and grape-growers must submit to them an 382 application file. In addition to its administrative task, Viniflhor analyzes the information in the files 383 to compile grubbing-up statistics at the levels of the city, the department, the region and the country 384 that are published on the site of the Observatoire viticole (Dyopta) 24 . Spatialized data is highly 385 interesting especially at a fine scale, but it only allows us to randomly approach and survey grape 386 growers that have decided to grub as Viniflhor's management of grubbing-up premiums anonymizes 387 all application files to ensure confidentiality meaning that individual grape growers are theoretically 388 inaccessible. surprisingly, the farmer's age and yield were missing. These elements are essential in calculating the premium amount and should have normally been included. We assume their absence was due to the 422 fact that Viniflhor directly gathered this data on site during the field evaluation prior to the grub-ups 423 and immediately evaluated premiums, according to Errore. L'origine riferimento non è stata 424 trovata., as it completed the processing of the files. 425

Sources of information: a survey of 51 grape growers 430
After waiting 9 months, from September 2009 to March 2010, we completed our study by 431 individually surveying 51 grape growers. Indeed, as the 341 files were not anonymized we constituted 432 a sub-sample containing 51 grape growers selected by size strata [46] and using telephone interviews, 433 we were able to complete the information contained in the application files. Our survey included 434 The goal was to have access to a sample that best represented the concerned population. Many 442 questions were not fully answered, but a certain number of them enabled us to confirm certain 443 qualitative results. 444 445 5 Results 446

5.1
The grubbing-up rates 447 The grubbing up rate is an excellent indicator to measure the application of the grubbing-up 448 policy. As shown in Errore. L'origine riferimento non è stata trovata., we can define four groups 449 of application files. The first group includes the smaller sized grape growers that grubbed up all or 450 almost all their vines. The total area of their vineyard is 10 ha or less. The second group is similar to 451 the first in vineyard size. Its specificity is that the grubbing-up rate is lower, between 50 and 80%.

The varietals 483
We analyzed the grub-ups of 273 25  Languedoc (Mourvèdre) or other improving varietals (Viognier). We even found some table grapes 506 (Danlas or Dabovki), but their proportions remain minimal and stay below the 1% mark. 507 To refine our analysis, we looked at the age of the grubbed-up vines (Errore. L'origine 508 riferimento non è stata trovata.) and in doing so we retained 4 age categories with a 25-year interval 509 (0 to 24 years, 25 to 49 years, 50 to 74 years and 75 to 100 years). The major fact observed is that 510 most of the improving varietals are grubbed up before they reach 25 years. 92% of grubbed-up 511 Cabernet Sauvignon (22.9 ha/24.9 ha) and Merlot (12.4 ha/13.5 ha) were less than 25 years old. In 512 regard to Syrah, 85% of grubbed-up vines were under the age of 25. Oppositely, the age at which ages 50 and 100 (46.7 ha). We find similar age ranges for other traditional varietals as the age of 93% 516 of grubbed-up Alicante is between 25 and 49 years. 42.5% of grubbed-up Aramon is located within 517 the same range and 53% within the range of 50 to 100 years. Only in the varietals Grenache and Syrah 518 did we see vines under the age of 25 having been grubbed up: 46% and 28% respectively. However, 519 when we look at the varietals between the ages 25 and 49, the grub-ups represent respectively 46.5% 520 and 64%. explanations that are of a microeconomic nature that we will now study. 542

5.3
The motivations 543 The reasons why each grape grower grubs up his vines are unique, that is, if we take into account 544 the history of his farm, the specificities of his vineyard, his outlook on the future, his financial 545 situation, if his farming business is full time or part-time, the existence of side revenues, etc. We 546 conducted a survey in order to pursue our idea of testing the relevance of the "reaction" induced by 547 the European Commission's economic policy. We surveyed grape growers that grubbed up their vines. We recorded word for word their reasons, 553 expressed directly from the grape growers, for their grub-ups. Twenty reasons were noted Errore. 554 L'origine riferimento non è stata trovata.. We have been very thorough in recording these 555 motivations. Oftentimes we recorded two or three, near or complementary reasons coming from the 556 same grape grower (on average two and a half). be analyzed as a cost reduction (distance) or as a waiting strategy to purchase, at a later date, 579 better situated land or vines. The goal is to increase the rationality of farming. Here, we are 580 also looking at a deal that in a time of crisis is impossible to go forward with because of a lack 581 of buyers. The nature of the investment made with the premiums is not clearly stated. But it 582 is also linked to a strategy of future farm enlargement or reorientation of the estate. The 583 possibility of transforming a freed-up land lot into a building lot is only cited once. The intent 584 here to perform a double dividend: turn the estate into cash and cash in on the real estate 585 profits. Bartoli and Meunier's [36] study had shown that this double dividend was meaningful 586 in the suburbs of the Languedoc plains and in many villages. For our survey, this dimension 587 seems statistically too limited. 588 -The age of the vines or their poor state is a technical reason that is very rational. The remaining 589 question would be to know if it was appropriate to subsidize these grub-ups. Sooner or later 590 these lots would have been eliminated and their contribution to the excessive supply was low. 591 The premiums, however, were the right answer to Brussels targets. Lots that are in bad state 592 have a low profitability and therefore coincide with the elimination of the least productive 593 grape growers. However, we must state that this motivation is rather rare in our sample. 594 -A new orientation for farm activities also constitutes an answer to the objectives of the 595 commission, but in a more indirect way. Developing a more profitable business, changing 596 business models, developing another crop, selling directly to customers, and organizing 597 oenotourism, all these goals meet the target of improving competitiveness and support the 598 need for extra cash. 599 600

Econometric model: ordinary least square regression 604
In order to further explain the reasons for grubbing up within the data gathered from our 51 605 grape growers, we have used an ordinary least square (OLS) regression where Xi are the k 606 explanatory variables and Y is the dependent variable. The model is linear and for each sample n 607 the value yn is: 608 The coefficient ß are found by minimizing the error of prediction. 611 In our model Y is the grubbing rate and the k Xi explanatory variables are: grape grower's 612 sex and age, his need for cash and profitability, his agricultural activity, belonging to a cave coop, 613 having an heir to take over the vineyard, if the grape grower had already previously been in a 614 grubbing up campaign. Other variables included are the age of the vines being grubbed up and 615 several important varietals: Carignan, Syrah, Aramon, Grenache, Merlot, Cinsault and Sauvignon. 616 Our OLS model has led to interesting results that are shown in Errore. L'origine 617 riferimento non è stata trovata.. It seems that there is an average correlation between having a 618 tendency to grub up less and the fact of being a man (-0.172*) or of planning an agricultural activity 619 after the grub-ups (-0.199*). This tendency to grub up less seems to be strongly correlated to being 620 optimistic (-0.291**) and having an heir wishing to take over the family vineyard (-0.374**). These correlations are rational. The fact that a correlation exists between grubbing up and being a man is 622 linked to the fact the low number of women (12 women, 23.5%). 623 The other strong correlations in our OLS regression are linked to varietals. It appears to that 624 a strong correlation exists between a high percentage of grubbed-up vines and the grubbing-up of 625 varietals Aramon (0.316**) and Merlot (0.369**). Conversely, it seems that the more grape 626 growers own Cinsault (-0.259**), the less they tend to grub it up. This data on varietals should be 627 put into perspective with the historical evolution of Languedoc grape varietals. 628 The grubbing-up of Aramon is logical as it is one of the old Languedoc varietals planted in 629 the plains and linked to mass production of table wine. Today the area planted in Aramon is still 630 deemed excessive meaning that more should be grubbed up. The explanation of grubbing up Merlot 631 is more counterintuitive as Merlot is one of the first improving grape varietals introduced into the 632 Languedoc vineyards. Several interpretations may be put forward explaining why they have a 633 higher tendency to be grubbed up. Firstly, these may be the first generation of Languedoc Merlots 634 introduced in the 80's probably planted in poor ecological condition (soil, microclimate, canopy 635 management). In such a case, their grubbing-up and potential replacement are justified. Another 636 interpretation is that the grape growers' situation is too dire to take into account the quality of this 637 varietal. Yet another possibility is that the grubbing-up is linked to the impossibility of selling the 638 plot planted in Merlot. Finally, it must be noted that all three interpretations may be combined. 639 Cinsault is a dual-purpose varietal (it is also a used to produce table grapes) traditionally 640 found in Languedoc. Recently it has been revisited by many Languedoc PDOs, particularly in 641 Corbières, Pic Saint-Loup and Saint-Chinian and currently benefits by the high demand for rosé 642 wines. Furthermore, special rules in Hérault banned its grubbing-up in certain appellations [40]. 643 It is interesting to note that our model does not show any strong correlation between the 644 grubbing-up rate and the age of the grape grower, the financial situation of the grape grower, a 645 participation in a cooperative, the age of the vines, the existence of the previous grub-ups. Furthermore, in regard to the varietals there appear no strong correlation between the grubbing-up 647 rate and Carignan, Syrah, Grenache and Sauvignon. 648

Conclusion 652
The question to grub up a significant area of vine is again on the rise, but the mechanism for a 728 collective financial incentive through premiums no longer exists. The possibility of reintroducing 729 this scheme through the French NSP raises many questions such as what specific criteria to 730 introduce (exclusion of area or grape varieties, minimum surfaces, age of the winegrower or the Furthermore, it appears that the question of premiumized grubbing should no longer 742 exclusively be seen in terms of qualitative categories of wine, i.e. table wines versus quality wines. 743 In fact, this question should take into account both national and global markets that are increasingly 744 respectfully segmented into regions and countries. The 2007/2008 Hérault rules of excluding grub-745 ups in certain appellations or certain varietals in certain appellations could be used in the case of 746

Bordeaux. 747
Finally, on a more general note, from a historical perspective, perhaps grub-up campaigns 748 should just be seen as a succession of long-term stop-and-go policies essential to balancing the 749 market? 750