Phenomenology and Mind

No. 2 (2012): Making the Social World: Social Ontology, Collective Intentionality, and Normativity
Session 2. Collective Intentionality and Social Cognition

Is Affective Intentionality Necessarily Irrelevant in Social Cognition?

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  • Sarah Songhorian
DOI: https://doi.org/10.13128/Phe_Mi-19628

Published 2016-11-27

Keywords

  • collective affective intentionality,
  • Max Scheler,
  • sympathy

How to Cite

Songhorian, S. (2016). Is Affective Intentionality Necessarily Irrelevant in Social Cognition?. Phenomenology and Mind, (2), 88–96. https://doi.org/10.13128/Phe_Mi-19628
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Abstract

The aim of this work is to understand the meaning and the extent of “affective intentionality”, to discover whether or not it is analogous to other concepts of intentionality and if it can play a role in social cognition. I will compare Searle’s conception of intentionality, in particular affective intentionality, with Scheler’s concept of sympathy. The reason for this is that I believe the comparison shows that it is not always necessary to presuppose something to have affective intentionality.

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