Phenomenology and Mind

No. 7 (2014): Naturalism, the First-Person Persective and the Embodied Mind. Lynne Baker’s Challenge: Metaphysical and Practical Approaches
Session 2. Contributed Papers

Does Reductivist Event-causal Compatibilism Leave Anything Out? Lynne Baker’s Reflective-Endorsement and the Bounds of the Traditional Analyses of Moral Responsibility

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  • Sofia Bonicalzi
DOI: https://doi.org/10.13128/Phe_Mi-19540

Published 2016-11-26

How to Cite

Bonicalzi, S. (2016). Does Reductivist Event-causal Compatibilism Leave Anything Out? Lynne Baker’s Reflective-Endorsement and the Bounds of the Traditional Analyses of Moral Responsibility. Phenomenology and Mind, (7), 128–135. https://doi.org/10.13128/Phe_Mi-19540
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