Introduction

Massimo Reichlin

10-16

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Cartesianism and the First-Person Perspective

Lynne Rudder Baker

20-29

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Defending theTranscendental Attitude: Husserl’s Concept of the Person and the Challenges of Naturalism

Dermot Moran

30-43

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How Naturalism Can save the self

Michael Pauen

44-53

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Two Forms of Non-Reductive Naturalism

Mario De Caro

54-62

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Naturalism and the Doctrine of Creation

Katherine Sonderegger

64-72

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Haecceity? A Phenomenological Perspective

Roberta De Monticelli

74-88

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Real Selves? Subjectivity and the Subpersonal Mind

Michele Di Francesco, Massimo Marraffa, Alfredo Paternoster

90-101

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First-Person Morality and the Role of Conscience

Massimo Reichlin

102-110

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We are Not, Fundamentally, Persons

Alfredo Tomasetta

114-119

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Baker’s First-Person Perspectives: They Are Not What They Seem

Marc Andree Weber

120-127

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Does Reductivist Event-causal Compatibilism Leave Anything Out? Lynne Baker’s Reflective-Endorsement and the Bounds of the Traditional Analyses of Moral Responsibility

Sofia Bonicalzi

128-135

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Constitution, Mechanism, and Downward Causation

Alan McKay

136-143

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A Humean Insight into the Epistemic Normativity of the Belief in the Self

Treasa Campbell

144-151

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Towards a Faithful Description of the First-Person Perspective Phenomenon: Embodiment in a Body That Happens to Be Mine

Bianca Bellini

152-159

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Observer Memories and Phenomenology

Patrick Eldridge

160-167

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The First-Person Perspective Requirement in Pretense

Gaetano Albergo

168-175

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Introspection Illusion and the Methodological Denial of the First-Person Perspective

Giuseppe Lo Dico

176-183

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The Notion of Representation and the Brain

Valentina Cuccio

184-192

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