Phenomenology and Mind

No 7 (2014): Naturalism, the First-Person Persective and the Embodied Mind. Lynne Baker’s Challenge: Metaphysical and Practical Approaches

Issue Description

Naturalism, the First-Person Persective and the Embodied Mind
Lynne Baker’s Challenge: Metaphysical and Practical Approaches
Edited by Massimo Reichlin

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Table of Contents

Introduction

Introduction
Massimo Reichlin
10-16
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.13128/Phe_Mi-19529

Session 1. Invited Speakers

Cartesianism and the First-Person Perspective
Lynne Rudder Baker
20-29
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.13128/Phe_Mi-19530
Defending theTranscendental Attitude: Husserl’s Concept of the Person and the Challenges of Naturalism
Dermot Moran
30-43
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.13128/Phe_Mi-19531
How Naturalism Can save the self
Michael Pauen
44-53
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.13128/Phe_Mi-19532
Two Forms of Non-Reductive Naturalism
Mario De Caro
54-62
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.13128/Phe_Mi-19533
Naturalism and the Doctrine of Creation
Katherine Sonderegger
64-72
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.13128/Phe_Mi-19534
Haecceity? A Phenomenological Perspective
Roberta De Monticelli
74-88
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.13128/Phe_Mi-19535
Real Selves? Subjectivity and the Subpersonal Mind
Michele Di Francesco, Massimo Marraffa, Alfredo Paternoster
90-101
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.13128/Phe_Mi-19536
First-Person Morality and the Role of Conscience
Massimo Reichlin
102-110
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.13128/Phe_Mi-19537

Session 2. Contributed Papers

We are Not, Fundamentally, Persons
Alfredo Tomasetta
114-119
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.13128/Phe_Mi-19538
Baker’s First-Person Perspectives: They Are Not What They Seem
Marc Andree Weber
120-127
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.13128/Phe_Mi-19539
Does Reductivist Event-causal Compatibilism Leave Anything Out? Lynne Baker’s Reflective-Endorsement and the Bounds of the Traditional Analyses of Moral Responsibility
Sofia Bonicalzi
128-135
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.13128/Phe_Mi-19540
Constitution, Mechanism, and Downward Causation
Alan McKay
136-143
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.13128/Phe_Mi-19541
A Humean Insight into the Epistemic Normativity of the Belief in the Self
Treasa Campbell
144-151
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.13128/Phe_Mi-19542
Towards a Faithful Description of the First-Person Perspective Phenomenon: Embodiment in a Body That Happens to Be Mine
Bianca Bellini
152-159
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.13128/Phe_Mi-19543
Observer Memories and Phenomenology
Patrick Eldridge
160-167
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.13128/Phe_Mi-19544
The First-Person Perspective Requirement in Pretense
Gaetano Albergo
168-175
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.13128/Phe_Mi-19545
Introspection Illusion and the Methodological Denial of the First-Person Perspective
Giuseppe Lo Dico
176-183
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.13128/Phe_Mi-19546
The Notion of Representation and the Brain
Valentina Cuccio
184-192
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.13128/Phe_Mi-19547
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