No. 14 (2018): Perception and Aesthetic Experience
Session 1. Aesthetic Experience and Enactivism

Color Relationism and Enactive Ontology

Andrea Giannotta
University of Florence

Published 2018-09-21

Keywords

  • qualia,
  • perception,
  • enactivism,
  • phenomenology

How to Cite

Giannotta, A. (2018). Color Relationism and Enactive Ontology. Phenomenology and Mind, (14), 56–67. https://doi.org/10.13128/Phe_Mi-23625

Abstract

In this paper, I present the enactive theory of color that implies a form of color relationism. I argue that this view constitutes a better alternative to color subjectivism and color objectivism. I liken the enactive view to Husserl’s phenomenology of perception, arguing that both deconstruct the clear duality of subject and object, which is at the basis of the other theories of color, in order to claim the co-constitution of subject and object in the process of experience. I also extend the enactive and phenomenological account of color to the more general topic of the epistemological and ontological status of sensory qualities (qualia), outlining the fields of enactive phenomenology and enactive ontology.