Phenomenology and Mind

No. 4 (2013): Sense and Sensibility. Empirical and Philosophical Investigations on the Five Senses
Session 2. Representationalism, Phenomenal Character, Subjectivity

The Content and Phenomenology of Perceptual Experience

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  • Elisabetta Sacchi
DOI: https://doi.org/10.13128/Phe_Mi-19596

Published 2016-11-26

Keywords

  • representationalism,
  • particularity,
  • phenomenological indistinguishability

How to Cite

Sacchi, E. (2016). The Content and Phenomenology of Perceptual Experience. Phenomenology and Mind, (4), 138–152. https://doi.org/10.13128/Phe_Mi-19596
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Abstract

The paper’s main target is strong and reductive “representationalism”. What we claim is that even though this position looks very appealing in so far as it does not postulate intrinsic and irreducible experiential properties, the attempt it pursues of accounting for the phenomenology of experience in terms of representational content runs the risk of providing either an inadequate phenomenological account or an inadequate account of the content of the experience.

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