No. 5 (2013): The Place of Values in a World of Norms
Session 2. Values

Requiredness. An Argument for Value-Realism

Published 2016-11-26

Keywords

  • values,
  • norms,
  • realism,
  • Gestalt Theory

How to Cite

De Monticelli, R. (2016). Requiredness. An Argument for Value-Realism. Phenomenology and Mind, (5), 84–97. https://doi.org/10.13128/Phe_Mi-19571

Abstract

What is An analysis of Requiredness? This paper presents three versions of an argument in defence of a form of value-realism. The argument is based on a principle of nonreducibility of integral wholes to sums, as informally developed by Gestalt theorists, systematically worked out by Husserl in his III Logical Investigation on wholes and parts, and exploited by Max Scheler’s theory of material and axiological apriori.